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# ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN DRUG INTERDICTION

## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

JUNE 8, 14, 1988

AND A

## JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

JUNE 15, 1988

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# CONTENTS

## CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

### JUNE 8, 1988

Page

Bowsher, Hon. Charles A., Comptroller General of the United States General Accounting Office, accompanied by Arnold P. Jones, Senior Associate Director, General Government Division; Nancy R. Kingsbury, Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division; James Hinchman, General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel ........ 8
Reuter, Peter, Project Manager, RAND Corp. ........ 81
Monastero, Frank, President, Association of Former Federal Narcotics Agents; and former Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration . 99

### JUNE 14, 1988

Morgan, Hon. Robert B., Director, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, accompanied by Cuyler Windham, Senior Assistant Director for Field Services, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation; Jeffrey Gray, Special Assistant Attorney General for the State of North Carolina; and Darrel Carneal, Assistant Director of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation for Administration ........ 133
Besteman, Karst J., Executive Director, Alcohol and Drug Problems Association ........ 160
Cohen, Dr. Allan Y., Executive Director, Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation ........ 192
McConnell, Elizabeth S., Consultant on Drug Education ........ 203
Johnston, Lloyd D., Research Scientist and Program Director, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan ........ 208

### JUNE 15, 1988

Carlucci, Hon. Frank, Secretary of Defense ........ 265
Herres, Gen. Robert T., U.S. Air Force, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 278
Kelso, Adm. Frank B., II, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet 295

# ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN DRUG INTERDICTION

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Levin, Dixon, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Wilson, Gramm, and McCain; Representatives Aspin and Stratton.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; John J. Hamre and George K. Johnson, Jr., professional staff members; Barbara L. Braucht, Barbara Gallo, Pamela G. Powell and Debra A. Rice, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Terrence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. Our committee will come to order.

Today we begin a limited number of hearings on the important question of how to more usefully and responsibly involve the military in the war against drugs in this Nation. These hearings come against the backdrop of widespread frustration and discontent with the present effort to stem the tide of illicit drugs which has led to calls for more dramatic and even drastic changes in the role of the U.S. military forces. In recent years, the question of the appropriate role for the military in the drug arena has become the subject of an increasingly heated debate, but not necessarily one in which all the facts are known or even focused on.

Both the House and the Senate have recently approved legislation in their respective defense bills containing proposals for an expanded military role in the war on drugs, and we're in the middle of a conference now on that subject. So, the hearings we are having are going to be very timely. We're not going to be able to have lengthy hearings. We're not going to be able to hear from all the witnesses that we would like to. We are trying to finish the conference in 2 weeks. We have 400 language differences and 450 funding differences, and this is one of them, but I would say certainly one of the most important. So, I don't want anyone to judge these hearings to be comprehensive or all-inclusive. They simply cannot be. We have to make a decision. As they say, here we come ready or not, and we're not completely ready. But we've been dealt the cards by the Senate and by the House, and we've got to deal with them in conference.

The House bill contains a broad, sweeping mandate to the military to substantially halt the flow of narcotics in the United States within 45 days. Under the House bill the military must seal the borders to narcotics trafficking using whatever search, seizure and arrest powers may be necessary.

The Senate version also expands the role of the military, but in a substantially different way. The Senate bill gives the Department of Defense the mission of detecting and monitoring all potential aerial and maritime threats to the national security. Moreover, it allows the U.S. Coast Guard to designate certain armed forces personnel to use civil law enforcement powers under carefully prescribed conditions at sea and beyond our country's borders.

So, there are fundamental differences between the two bills. They are both aimed toward increasing the military effectiveness in the fight against drugs and the fight for interdiction.

We're in the conference, and we've got to reconcile these provisions. We are trying to finish this conference by June 17, and so we are right in the middle of it.

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations and the House Armed Services Defense Policy Panel will be attending these hearings whenever they can. They have their own hearings going on. They have already had a number of hearings in this area, but we've invited them to attend. And I think our two committees will be having a joint hearing sometime next week to hear from Secretary Carlucci. This hearing today is a Senate hearing, but we've invited the House panel.

These hearings are intended to help focus both congressional and public attention on the following questions. Number one, in what ways can the military be most effectively used in fighting the drug problem? Number two, how will this new role affect military readiness and current military missions and operations? Number three, will the military's presence alleviate or merely exacerbate longstanding problems of cooperation and coordination among the host of Federal agencies that are already involved in drug control efforts? Number four, what will be the effect of increased Federal expenditures for additional personnel and hardware in support of interdiction where military support is most often sought? And finally, what is the proper balance between supply reduction efforts, such as interdiction, and demand reduction efforts, such as education, prevention and treatment programs?

Now, our committees are not charged with trying to solve the health problems and the demand and education problems. But by the same token, with limited budget resources—and we all know about that—if the military effort gobbles up most of the resources available in the drug fight then, obviously, less will be available for the education efforts and the health efforts. So, this is the balance we're trying to arrive at, and we're doing it in somewhat of a vacuum because the task force in the House and Senate that will be recommending programs for education and health will not even make their reports before we get through with our conference. So, we are going to try to at least take a look at that balance, how much we should spend in interdiction as opposed to cutting down the demand for drugs here in this country.

This morning Comptroller General Charles Bowsher will open our hearings by reviewing for us the management and coordination of Federal drug abuse control policies and programs. His testimony is based on more than 40 separate GAO studies conducted during the 1980s on the drug problem. Among the highlights of his testimony will be the results of a recently completed report on the military's role as required by last year's Defense Authorization Act. Mr. Bowsher will also discuss the persistent problems of fragmented and uncoordinated Federal anti-drug policies and programs, the effect of Federal interdiction efforts, and the proper balance between supply and demand reduction activities.

This morning we will also hear from Frank Monastero, former DEA Operations Chief and President of the Association of Former Federal Narcotics Agents; and Peter Reuter, RAND Corporation project manager.

It is essential that we take a cold, hard look at the overall drug enforcement strategy that has to date guided our Government. We have more than doubled Federal expenditures for drug interdiction in the last 5 years. Yet, the quantity of drugs smuggled into the United States is greater than ever. This irony is more easily understood if one looks at the monumental challenge facing our interdiction agencies. There are people who simply believe that you can say, "Okay, military, go get them. Stop them, seize them, arrest them, stop this drug smuggling, get the interdiction away from our Nation." I think that needs to be put in some degree of perspective, however.

The Customs Service estimates that annually over 300 million people cross the borders of our country, including 34 million airline passengers, of whom only 44,000 are inspected by the Customs Service—34 million airline passengers, 44,000 are inspected. There are 94 million automobiles, as well as 650,000 airplanes crossing our borders every year. Annually 7.3 million shipments are made by air. In addition, 84,000 freighters carrying 5.5 million shipments and over 125,000 private yachts enter the United States every year. Lastly, over 7 million containers arrive each year in our Nation's ports of entry. From this great mass of commerce, the interdiction agencies must somehow identify and interdict the minuscule number that carry contraband narcotics. The Defense Science Board last year concluded in a study that such a task was, indeed, like looking "for needles in a haystack."

During the course of these hearings, we will hear from the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Frank Carlucci, as well as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Robert Herres, and Admiral Frank Kelso, Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic fleet. We expect these witnesses to describe the assistance currently provided by the military as well as their views on proposals for an expanded military role.

I am hopeful that these hearings will serve as a point of departure for the kind of thoughtful, dispassionate debate that is needed if we intend to seriously and meaningfully address this Nation's drug problem. Such considered debate is frequently lacking, particularly in times of crisis when impassioned rhetoric and quick fixes too often become the rule rather than the exception. This country's future demands that we dare not relegate the drug crisis to empty rhetoric, and easy and misguided solutions.

Starting with the Defense authorization bill and continuing with the proposals for comprehensive drug legislation, we in the Congress have the opportunity to set aside the rhetoric and passion and make significant and effective legislation improvements in the war on drugs.

Senator Warner, you and I both have talked about this at length with that goal in mind, and I know that you join me in looking forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are particularly pleased to have Charles Bowsher here. He served for many years in the Department of Defense and has a unique understanding of that Department and its ability to participate in the combined efforts of all of the agencies and departments of our Government in trying to fight the drug war. The problem, however, is that Congress is on a stampede and we need some direction. We say this with a sense of humility and need to get that direction, and these hearings I think will help provide it. We're on the eve of a conference where we will make a decision.

The Department is already extensively involved in assisting the various other departments and agencies of the Federal Government in participating in drug interdiction. The Congress wishes to determine what level of additional assistance might be provided by the Department of Defense. We've got to do that, Mr. Chairman, in a way not to denigrate the Department's primary role, namely, of providing for our national defense.

Second, and the question that concerns this Senator most seriously is that of arrest. The doctrine of posse comitatus has worked for over 100 years, preventing the members of the United States military from performing civil arrests or criminal, whatever it may be. I think we should not in any way move to the edge where that time tested doctrine can in any way be altered.

So, those are the two goals that I have in mind as we try and corral this stampede and point it in a correct direction. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Do any other members have opening statements this morning?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, very briefly.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, we are very fortunate to have Mr. Bowsher here this morning. He's a man of great ability and experience, and I'm sure his testimony will be very helpful.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you and Senator Warner for conducting this series of hearings concerning the role of the U.S. military in drug interdiction. While I do not oppose a reasonable use of the military to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, I do feel that the Congress may be overly optimistic about the hope for results.

As I see it, there are two problems. First, there is a demand for drugs in this country and where there is a demand, there will be a supply. Second, the severity of the punishment that is handed down for drug trafficking is not a sufficient deterrent to those who would profit from such activity.

I was not surprised at all to read in the testimony for today that a recent report found that the median time served for drug trafficking amounted to less than 40 percent of the original sentence. This does not indicate very strong support for our law enforcement officials who have been battling drugs for years. Before we throw the military into the fight, I hope that we will strengthen the hand that civilian law enforcement has in drug interdiction by imposing more severe penalties for drug trafficking.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you Senator Thurmond.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. I appreciate this hearing and the ones to follow on this very important issue as to how we can use the military, and I hope at some point maybe this morning we would get into how effectively or ineffectively we have used existing agencies and existing capabilities.

I was very interested by the statement that we will hear later on from Peter Reuter of the RAND Corporation. He states that the recent past suggests that interdiction, even if it produces high seizures, will do little to cut cocaine imports. He goes on to say that the RAND study showed that it is extremely difficult to reduce cocaine consumption in this country by even as much as 5 percent through more stringent interdiction. I think this highlights the statements that you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Thurmond made about addressing the demand side of this problem and particularly in my view, in the area of beginning to prosecute those who violate the law by using illegal drugs. Most of us grow very weary of hearing about people in public life who have been "victims" of substance abuse, which translated means they are using illegal drugs and buying illegal drugs. Nothing is being done about that aspect of the issue.

I would like to make sure that our witnesses this morning comment on a couple of issues. And one of them is, in their view, what would be the highest single priority for using the military in this war on drugs? Are we going to send the 82nd Airborne down to the Arizona/Mexico border and have them link arms? Are we going to have our AWACS aircraft used? What are the priorities for this "use" of the military in the war on drugs? I think it is a very important issue if we are going to be effective.

And second, as the chairman pointed out, we do have a fixed Federal budget. We have a fixed defense budget. So, is it more effective to spend these scarce defense dollars on drug interdiction? Or, would it be more effective to use added Federal funds in other areas, possibly restoring the funds that were cut from the Coast Guard, which in my view has done a superb job with very limited resources and capability?

And I would also like for the witnesses to comment, if they could—and I hope they've been involved in this—about the $C^3I$ system that we gave the Customs funds to create. It seems, from the information I have, the end result is that they're having to recompete the whole contract and there have been tens of millions of dollars wasted in perhaps one of the most vital aspects of this war on drugs, the $C^3I$ aspect of it.

So, I think these are very important hearings, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you holding them. I hope that we do not get mired down in our failure in the war on drugs. We're all aware that we have failed. But perhaps we can focus our attention on ways to improve our ability to fight this war on drugs. The challenge is not going away. Clearly, from the charts we already see, it is growing enormously in this country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain. I certainly agree with the thrust of your remarks. They're right on target.

Senator Gramm.

Senator GRAMM. Mr. Chairman, let me just make a brief statement.

I think it is clear that the military is going to be involved in the war on drugs. I think the question we have to answer is, what involvement can be productive? How can we integrate the military effort with the civilian effort?

I have looked at the RAND study that Senator McCain referred to earlier. I think the study indicates clearly that if you think you're going to win the war against drugs by simply building a wall around America to keep drugs away from us and our children, you're living in a fantasy world. I think, on the other hand, that we're going to have to make that effort. I think the military is going to have to be involved in this war if we are to generate the unity of public purpose that is going to be necessary to go after the demand for drugs. As I see it, this is the only productive avenue if we're going to nail the lid shut and eliminate illegal drug use in America.

I personally think that given the amount of time we had, the amount of information we had, that we wrote a good provision in the Senate for the use of the military in air and sea interdiction and the coordination of information and intelligence. I think it represents a good cornerstone that we can build on. I think that it represents a good start. And I think, Mr. Chairman, that with the information that we should be able to gain from these hearings, that we can further refine it.

I would also like to say in response to what Senator Thurmond said, I think it is clear if we're going to fight this war, the first thing we have got to do is build more prisons and put people in those prisons. I would like to see mandatory sentencing for people who sell drugs to minors. I think we need to vote on the death penalty and have the death penalty. Especially if we're going to put military personnel in a position of being attacked or killed by drug gangs, I want to be sure that we have an effective deterrent that includes the death penalty. And I think the American people agree with that. I'm confident at some point that in the Senate we're going to get to vote on it.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Shelby or Senator Dixon, do either of you have an opening statement?

Senator SHELBY. I have just one critical question, and I'm sure the panel is going to answer it or try to answer it. I have supported and will support the use of the military on drug interdiction. But I do have some questions of my own.

Will this really bring about a reduction in the amount of cocaine, for example, or other drugs that come into the country? Some of the studies have shown—and the panel is very aware of it and have made some statements in that regard—that the smugglers, or whatever you want to call them, the drug dealers, will adapt to every method of interdiction in the world. And I'm looking forward to that testimony. I don't know if interdiction will stem it, will stop it. I don't know if the death penalty will. I'm going to support both, but I think we have reached a point that we've got to try something new.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Shelby.

Senator DIXON. I'll put my statement in the record, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for the opportunity.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that we have this opportunity to hold these hearings on the role of the military in controlling the massive influx of drugs that are pouring into this country. I voted for the Senate provisions of the Armed Services bill, because I strongly support the military role in our war against drugs. I am, however, concerned that the Armed Forces have not been as effective as we would like in the past.

I believe that if the military is to be an effective participant in the drug interdiction effort there must be a strong commitment from the top leadership and a coherent strategy devised to make the best use of scarce resources. In the past the military and civilian leadership has been ambivalent about their role in the war on drugs. Their efforts have been sporadic and lacked centralized coordination of manpower, equipment and intelligence resources. The Department of Defense must recognize that drugs are an enemy of our free and democratic society as surely as any foe we face on the battlefield.

The Senate Defense Authorization Act provides for a cooperative working relationship between civilian and military agencies and for the development and issuance of coordinated policy and guidance to the forces in the field. These steps are the minimum necessary to ensure that we turn the full weight and authority of the forces of the U.S. Government to staunch the flow of illegal narcotics into this country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Bowsher, usually when you are in this room before this chairman, you're before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations where we swear in all our witnesses. But today we have the Armed Services Committee where we don't swear in the witnesses. So, you have considerable flexibility in your testimony this morning. [Laughter.]

Knowing you though, I'm sure we'll get it the same in either version.

We are delighted to have you and I ask you to introduce the group of assistants you have with you.

## STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY ARNOLD P. JONES, SENIOR ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION; NANCY R. KINGSBURY, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION; JAMES HINCHMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

Mr. BOWSHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. We are pleased to be here. I have with me Jim Hinchman on my left and Nancy Kingsbury and Arnold Jones. And we are pleased to be here today and to give you our statement and to make you aware of our views on some of these issues.

I think that drug abuse continues to be a major national problem despite increasingly expensive Federal anti-drug efforts over the last 20 years. The problem persists because of the enormous demand for illegal drugs in the United States and the overwhelming supply of illegal drugs available to meet this demand.

The drug problem has been a matter of national concern since the early 1900s when the narcotics laws were first passed. Early efforts to deal with the problem primarily focused on reducing the supply of drugs, first with the 1914 Harrison Narcotic Act requiring manufacturers and distributors of opium, morphine, heroin and coca products to register and pay taxes, and then later by prohibition and strict legal control.

By the end of the 1950s, the public and legislators generally agreed that the strict supply reduction policy by itself was not enough. And during the 1960s and 1970s, drug abuse increased dramatically and spread to new markets. The almost exclusive emphasis on supply reduction and stiff penalties was challenged with growing frequency, leading to increased research and experimentation with treatment for drug abusers. With the passage of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Federal policy clearly called for a more balanced response to the drug abuse problem by adding a vigorous prevention and treatment component to the Federal effort. From 1970 to 1976, more Federal drug control funding was devoted to such programs which were designed to reduce the demand for drugs.

Most of the early demand reduction activities were directed to providing treatment for drug users, particularly heroin addicts. Heroin abuse had emerged in the mid-1960s as a problem of major significance, and heroin was essentially the number one drug priority throughout the 1970s.

In the 1980s, the situation has become dramatically different. Cocaine is now the major problem. The smuggling of drugs, especially cocaine, from South America has escalated, and the Federal Government's drug strategy now places much greater emphasis on supply reduction, especially on interdicting drugs being smuggled into the United States. As chart A, which is over here on the right, shows, expenditures for Federal anti-drug efforts have increased from $129.5 million in 1970 to nearly $4 billion in 1987. The budgetary emphasis shifted to supply reduction programs in 1977, and the spending gap between supply and demand reduction efforts has continually widened since. By 1987, the Federal Government was spending three times more on supply reduction than demand reduction. Our analysis shows that spending on drug interdiction activities increased by practically 1,500 percent from 1977 to 1987.

Despite the increased funding, there is a continued heavy demand for drugs by U.S. consumers. Americans apparently want drugs, and they are willing to pay a very high price to get them.

The latest national survey on drug abuse in 1985 shows that the overall level of illicit drug use reported by households has remained high. About 70 million people, 37 percent of the population over 12 years of age, had used an illegal drug at least once in their lifetime, and about 23 million people, or 12 percent, were current users. That means that they reported using a drug at least once in the 30 days prior to being surveyed.

There are a variety of new drug trends in the 1980s, but cocaine has emerged as the widely abused drug of greatest concern. And crack, a potent and highly addictive form of cocaine, has exploded in epidemic proportions in some cities. Chart B here on the right, again, illustrates the increased cocaine consumption in this country from 1982 to 1985. And charts C and D over on the left here show the resulting trends in cocaine-related hospital emergencies and deaths from 1983 through 1987. In all cases, the trend is up.

The heroin addict population has remained relatively stable since the 1970s at about 500,000. However, Mexican black tar, a new and crudely processed form of heroin that is high in purity, but low in price, has become more widely available. Black tar can be processed in a shorter time than traditional Mexican brown powder heroin, leaving several impurities in the drug and coloring it dark brown to black.

Marijuana use has been declining, but it remains the most widely abused illegal drug in this country. The estimated U.S. marijuana consumption was 4.9 thousand metric tons in 1982, compared to 4.7 thousand metric tons in 1985. Domestic marijuana production has increased as has the potency of the marijuana available on the market.

Another problem reported by law enforcement officials is the increased violence associated with drug trafficking, including much greater use of automatic weapons by the drug dealers.

Drug production in foreign countries remains at high levels despite international drug control programs, and supplies available for export to the United States are plentiful. For example, there was an estimated 45 to 55 metric tons of opium produced in Mexico in 1987, 735 to 1,360 metric tons produced in Southwest Asia in 1987, and 1,095 to 1,575 metric tons produced in Southeast Asia during the 1986–1987 growing season. The amount of cocaine produced in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador in 1987 was estimated to be 322 to 418 metric tons.

Countries involved are often not motivated to take strong action against drug cultivation which in many cases has become an important part of their culture and economy and has been for a number of years. Major source countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan and Laos, are outside U.S. influence, and other governments, such as Colombia and Bolivia, where cooperative efforts have been attempted, have been subjected to corruption and violence by the drug traffickers.

Contributing to the problem are the enormous profits of drug trafficking which attract an endless stream of entrepreneurs who see opportunities far outweighing those offered by legitimate businesses. The President's Commission on Organized Crime reported in 1986 that drug trafficking generates an income estimated to be as high as $110 billion.

Finally, it is still relatively easy to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States and sell them to willing customers once they are here. Only a small part of the drugs smuggled into the United States are interdicted before they reach the domestic drug trafficking networks. For example, Customs estimated that 27 tons of cocaine were seized in fiscal year 1986 out of an estimated 138 tons smuggled into the country, and 1,106 tons of marijuana were seized out of an estimated 11,000 tons smuggled in in the same year.

It is time to assess the Federal drug abuse control policy and strategy. If we want to measure success by looking at the number of drug users and the amounts of drugs entering the country, we must unfortunately conclude that our present strategy and policies are not working. The dilemma is that no one knows which drug control programs are the most effective. Opinions vary about what the Federal Government should do to control the drug problem, and experts disagree about which anti-drug programs work best and about which programs should receive a higher priority and increased resources.

An increasing number of drug experts believe that the root cause of our national drug problem is the demand for illegal drugs. Since our current approach is not working, it seems time to consider devoting more emphasis and more resources to activities aimed at reducing demand, in other words, prevention, treatment and research on the causes and extent of drug abuse. I do not suggest that efforts to control the supply of illegal drugs are useless and should be reduced. I do suggest, however, that the Congress and the executive branch should exercise great caution before deciding to devote more resources and more emphasis to supply reduction programs.

We must also have better management and stronger leadership of Federal drug abuse control efforts. In reports and testimonies dating back to the early 1970's we have repeatedly pointed out problems caused by the fragmentation of Federal anti-drug efforts among several cabinet departments and agencies and the resulting lack of coordination of Federal drug control policies and programs.

Numerous organizational changes have been made over the past 20 years to reduce the fragmentation of Federal anti-drug efforts, to improve coordination and strengthen the leadership and oversight. At present, the National Drug Policy Board, chaired by the Attorney General, is charged with strengthening central direction and facilitating coordination of Federal drug abuse control policy and programs.

In February of 1988, we reported that the policy board had made some progress in facilitating coordination among drug law enforcement agencies. The Policy Board had also made several decisions and issued the *National and International Drug Law Enforcement Strategy,* primarily a description of existing drug enforcement strategies and activities. However, the Board had not exercised its statutory authority and responsibility to develop budgetary priorities on the grounds that it lacked the information needed to decide where resources should be allocated. Exercising budget authority effectively is a key to having a cohesive policy.

The Board has been unable to make hard choices affecting agency budgets and programs necessary to bring cohesion to Federal drug control efforts. The Policy Board operates by consensus and its members, who are heads of departments and agencies, each have a vested interest in the programs of the organizations that they represent.

I believe that the time has come to assign the authority and responsibility for planning and coordinating Federal anti-drug efforts to a single individual. This individual must be directly accountable to the President for developing and implementing a unified drug abuse control policy and a coordinated anti-drug strategy. But organizational changes by themselves are not sufficient to solve the problem. To succeed, this individual must receive strong and sustained support from the President and the Congress.

One of the first priorities of the President's drug policy coordinator should be to improve the quality and quantity of information that can be used to assess drug control programs and determine which are the most effective. Existing data systems portray general drug trends and help gauge the overall impact of the Federal drug strategy, but they do not adequately measure the effectiveness of specific drug control efforts.

The passage of the Posse Comitatus Act Amendment in 1981 clarified the extent to which the Department of Defense can indirectly support civilian law enforcement efforts. Since then, the military has played an increasing role in anti-drug efforts that has concentrated almost exclusively on assisting interdiction efforts. The cost of the DOD interdiction support has risen steadily from an estimated $5 million in fiscal year 1982 to about $405 million in fiscal year 1987.

DOD contributes support to civilian drug interdiction efforts in a variety of ways. For example, military surveillance aircraft provide radar coverage of areas determined by Customs and Coast Guard to be major air and marine smuggling routes; selected Navy ships patrolling the Caribbean have Coast Guard personnel aboard to interdict suspected smugglers; Army helicopters transport Bahamian law enforcement teams on apprehension missions in the Bahamas; and Army helicopters and personnel were used to transport Bolivian strike teams in raids on cocaine labs. In addition, DOD supports anti-drug efforts by sharing intelligence, training law enforcement personnel, and loaning communications equipment, radars, weapons, motion sensors, night vision goggles and other equipment.

DOD is prohibited by statute from assisting drug law enforcement agencies if such assistance will adversely affect military readiness. According to DOD officials, providing support to drug law enforcement agencies affects readiness to some degree, but the impact so far has been minimal. Thus, DOD infrequently turns down requests for assistance on the basis of readiness considerations, but it has on occasion provided a lower level of support than requested because of potential readiness degradation. DOD officials contend, however, that substantially increased military assistance could adversely affect readiness.

While greater involvement by the military would probably result in more drug seizures and arrests and create a greater deterrent effect, such increases may not significantly reduce drug supplies. Drug traffickers have numerous smuggling methods and routes available and can quickly counter interdiction strategies. Drug producers also have such large quantities of raw materials available that they can overcome losses from interdiction.

Furthermore, most DOD anti-drug assistance, like most civilian drug interdiction activities, is directed at trying to stop drugs being smuggled into the country on boats and airplanes between ports of entry. Such interdiction activities are very expensive and have produced few results. For example, the Air Force reported that in fiscal year 1987 it designated 591 AWACS flying hours to interdiction, and only 6 seizures and 10 arrests were attributed to this effort. The incremental cost to DOD associated with this assistance was $2.6 million.

Similarly, the Navy and the Coast Guard reported that Coast Guard personnel were on board Navy ships for a total of 2,500 ship days in 1987 to conduct interdictions. According to the Navy and the Coast Guard, these efforts resulted in 20 vessel seizures and 110 arrests at a total cost of about $40 million.

Marijuana is the drug that is most frequently interdicted between ports of entry, but most heroin and a large percentage of the cocaine entering the United States is thought to be smuggled through ports of entry, in other words, through cargo containers, airline passengers, automotive vehicles. The law prohibits DOD personnel from conducting port of entry searches and seizures, and DOD officials believe that if this prohibition were lifted, the number of military personnel needed to make port of entry inspection efforts more successful would be great and would directly detract from the armed services' primary mission.

Perhaps the greatest need that the drug law enforcement agencies have for interdiction efforts is drug intelligence, especially real-time intelligence concerning specific smuggling movements, such as aircraft and boat departures and commercial shipments, known to contain contraband. Some experts believe that drug interdiction efforts can best be improved by developing more reliable and timely intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination so that law enforcement agencies can more effectively target their interdiction efforts. DOD has tasked some of its personnel outside of the United States with collecting drug-related intelligence, though DOD points out that the amount of drug intelligence these personnel can collect is limited, given their military missions.

Both the Senate and the House versions of the defense authorization bill propose not only to increase the level of DOD involvement in the anti-drug effort, but also to provide military personnel with search, seizure and arrest authority under certain conditions.

Before making decisions, there are several issues that Congress should carefully consider. Providing military personnel with police authority would be a significant departure from this country's longstanding tradition of separating national defense and civilian law enforcement responsibilities. However, if Congress decides to give the military that authority, it needs to define it very carefully. DOD's role in collecting intelligence to support drug enforcement also raises questions—we must take every precaution to make sure that the military does not become involved in domestic intelligence operations like those engaged in during the 1960s.

Other considerations are the additional training that would be required if military personnel are to safely and effectively carry out searches, seizures and arrests, and the impact on military readiness if more personnel are diverted to a nonmilitary mission.

In addition, we question the advisability of the Navy routinely boarding U.S. and foreign registered vessels given the potential sensitivity of American citizens and foreign governments to such boardings.

In summary, the military can play a key role in providing logistical and technical support to civilian drug law enforcement efforts, but going beyond such a role needs careful consideration. And even that role must be part of a very unified Federal anti-drug plan.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. We'd be pleased to respond to any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowsher follows:]

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# Federal Drug Abuse Control Policy and the Role of the Military in Anti-Drug Efforts

Statement of
Charles A. Bowsher
Comptroller General
of the United States

Before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services

GAO/T-GGD-88-38

GAO Form 160 (12/87)

# FEDERAL DRUG ABUSE CONTROL POLICY
# AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
# IN ANTI-DRUG EFFORTS

SUMMARY OF STATEMENT BY
CHARLES A. BOWSHER
COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES

Drug abuse is a major national problem despite increasingly expensive federal anti-drug efforts. Federal expenditures for drug control were nearly $4 billion in fiscal year 1987. The drug problem persists because of the enormous demand for illegal drugs in the United States and the overwhelming supply of illegal drugs available to meet the demand.

It is time to reassess federal drug abuse control policy and strategy. If we measure success by the number of drug users and the amounts of drugs being smuggled into the country, we must unfortunately conclude that our present strategy and policies are not working. Experts disagree and opinions vary about which anti-drug programs work best, and about which programs should receive a higher priority and increased resources. An increasing number of experts believe we should attack the root of our drug problem, America's demand for illegal drugs. This approach warrants strong consideration.

We must also have better management and stronger leadership of federal drug control efforts. We lack a cohesive federal anti-drug policy and strategy. Numerous organizational changes have been made over the past 20 years to reduce the fragmentation of federal anti-drug efforts, improve coordination, and strengthen leadership and oversight. Presently, the National Drug Policy Board is charged with this mission. The authority and responsibility for planning and coordinating federal anti-drug efforts needs to reside in a single official directly accountable to the President. To succeed, this individual must receive strong and sustained support from the President and the Congress.

The military has become increasingly involved in supporting federal anti-drug efforts. The costs and benefits of having the military do more, however, require careful and thoughtful consideration. Increasing military support would probably result in more drug seizures and arrests, but it may not significantly reduce drug supplies. DOD officials also believe a substantial increase in military assistance could adversely affect military readiness. In addition, providing military personnel with search, seizure, and arrest authority would be a significant departure from this country's long-standing tradition of separating national defense and civilian law enforcement responsibilities. Whatever the Congress decides, the military's role must be part of a unified federal anti-drug policy and strategy.

Chairman Nunn and Members of the Committee:

We are pleased to be a part of your hearings examining the status of the United States drug situation and the federal government's anti-drug efforts, including the military's role in the "war on drugs."

Drug abuse continues to be a major national problem despite increasingly expensive federal anti-drug efforts over the last twenty years. The problem persists because of the enormous demand for illegal drugs in the United States and the overwhelming supply of illegal drugs available to meet this demand.

## THE FEDERAL DRUG STRATEGY HAS NOT CURTAILED DRUG ABUSE

The drug problem has been a matter of national concern since the early 1900s when the narcotics laws were first passed. Early efforts to deal with the problem primarily focused on reducing the supply of drugs, first with the 1914 Harrison Narcotic Act requiring manufacturers and distributors of opium, morphine, heroin, or coca products to register and pay taxes, then later by prohibition and strict legal control.

By the end of the 1950s, the public and legislators generally agreed that the strict supply reduction policy by itself was not enough. During the 1960s and 1970s, drug abuse increased dramatically and spread to new markets. The almost exclusive emphasis on supply reduction and stiff penalties was challenged with growing frequency, leading to increased research and experimentation with treatment for drug abusers. With the passage of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-255), federal policy clearly called for a more balanced response to the drug abuse problem by adding a vigorous prevention and treatment component to the federal effort. From 1970 to 1976, more federal drug control funding was devoted to such programs, which were designed to reduce the demand for drugs.

Most of the early demand reduction activities were directed toward providing treatment for drug users, particularly heroin addicts. Heroin abuse had emerged in the mid-1960s as a problem of major significance, and heroin was essentially the number one drug priority throughout the 1970s.

In the 1980s, the situation has become dramatically different. Cocaine is now the major problem. The smuggling of drugs, especially cocaine, from South America has escalated, and the federal government's drug strategy now places much greater emphasis on supply reduction, especially on interdicting drugs being smuggled into the United States. As chart A shows, expenditures for federal anti-drug efforts have increased from $129.5 million in 1970 to nearly $4 billion in 1987. The budgetary emphasis shifted to supply reduction programs in 1977, and the spending gap between supply and demand reduction efforts has continually widened since. By 1987, the federal government was spending three times more on supply reduction than demand reduction, $3 billion and $1 billion, respectively. Our analysis shows that spending on drug interdiction activities increased by about 1,500 percent from 1977 to 1987.

Despite the increased funding, there is a continuing heavy demand for drugs by U.S. consumers. Americans want drugs, and they are willing to pay a high price to get them.

The latest National Survey on Drug Abuse in 1985 shows that the overall level of illicit drug use reported by households has remained high. About 70 million people (37 percent of the population over 12 years of age) had used an illegal drug at least once in their lifetime and about 23 million people (12 percent) were current users (i.e., they reported using a drug at least once in the 30 days prior to being surveyed).

There are a variety of new drug trends in the 1980s. But cocaine has emerged as the widely abused drug of greatest concern, and "crack," a potent and highly addictive form of cocaine, has exploded in epidemic proportions in some cities. Chart B illustrates the increased cocaine consumption in this country from 1982 to 1985, and charts C and D show the resulting trends in cocaine-related hospital emergencies and deaths from 1983 through 1987. In all cases, the trend is up.

The heroin addict population has remained relatively stable since the 1970s at about 500,000. However, Mexican "black tar," a new and crudely processed form of heroin that is high in purity but low in price, has become more widely available. "Black tar" can be processed in a shorter time than traditional Mexican brown powder heroin, leaving several impurities in the drug and coloring it dark brown to black. Marijuana use has been declining, but it remains the most widely abused illegal drug in the country. The estimated U.S. marijuana consumption was 4.9 thousand metric tons in 1982, compared to 4.7 thousand metric tons in 1985. Domestic marijuana production has increased as has the potency of the marijuana available on the market. Another problem reported by law enforcement officials is the increased violence associated with drug trafficking, including much greater use of automatic weapons by the traffickers.

Drug production in foreign countries remains at high levels despite international drug control programs, and supplies available for export to the United States are plentiful. For example, there was an estimated 45 to 55 metric tons of opium produced in Mexico in 1987, 735 to 1,360 metric tons produced in Southwest Asia in 1987, and 1,095 to 1,575 metric tons produced in Southeast Asia during the 1986-1987 growing season. The amount of cocaine produced in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador in 1987 was estimated to be 322 to 418 metric tons. Countries involved are often not motivated to take strong action against drug cultivation, which, in many cases, has been an important part of their culture and economy for centuries. Major source countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Laos, are outside U.S. influence, and other governments, such as Colombia and Bolivia, where cooperative efforts have been attempted, have been subjected to corruption and violence by drug traffickers.

Contributing to the problem are the enormous profits of drug trafficking, which attract an endless stream of entrepreneurs who see opportunities far outweighing those offered by legitimate businesses. The President's Commission on Organized Crime reported in 1986 that drug trafficking generates an income estimated to be as high as $110 billion.

Finally, it is still relatively easy to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States and sell them to willing customers once they are here. Only a small part of the drugs smuggled into the United States are interdicted before they reach the domestic drug trafficking networks. For example, Customs estimated that 27 tons of cocaine were seized in fiscal year 1986 out of an estimated 138 tons smuggled into the country, and 1,106 tons of marijuana were seized out of an estimated 11,000 tons smuggled in that same year.

## FEDERAL ANTI-DRUG POLICY AND STRATEGY MUST BE REASSESSED

It is time to reassess federal drug abuse control policy and strategy. If we want to measure success by looking at the number of drug users and amounts of drugs entering the country, we must unfortunately conclude that our present strategy and policies are not working. The dilemma is that no one knows which drug control programs are the most effective. Opinions vary about what the federal government should do to control the drug problem. Experts disagree about which anti-drug programs work best, and about which programs should receive a higher priority and increased resources.

An increasing number of drug experts believe that the root cause of our national drug problem is the demand for illegal drugs. Since our current approach is not working, it is time to consider devoting more emphasis and more resources to activities aimed at reducing demand: prevention, treatment, and research on the causes and extent of drug abuse. I do not suggest that efforts to control the supply of illegal drugs are useless and should be reduced. I do suggest, however, that the Congress and the executive branch should exercise great caution before deciding to devote more resources and more emphasis to supply reduction programs.

## BETTER MANAGEMENT AND STRONGER LEADERSHIP ARE NEEDED

We must also have better management and stronger leadership of federal drug abuse control efforts. In reports and testimonies dating back to the early 1970s, we have repeatedly pointed out problems caused by the fragmentation of federal anti-drug efforts among several cabinet departments and agencies and the resulting lack of coordination of federal drug control policies and programs.

Numerous organizational changes have been made over the past 20 years to reduce the fragmentation of federal anti-drug efforts, improve coordination, and strengthen leadership and oversight. At present, the National Drug Policy Board, chaired by the Attorney General, is charged with strengthening central direction and facilitating coordination of federal drug abuse control policy and programs.

In February 1988, we reported that the Policy Board had made some progress in facilitating coordination among drug law enforcement agencies. The Policy Board had also made several policy decisions, and issued the National and International Drug Law Enforcement Strategy--primarily a description of existing drug enforcement strategies and activities. However, the Board had not exercised its statutory authority and responsibility to develop budgetary priorities, on the grounds that it lacked the information needed to decide where resources should be allocated. Exercising budget authority effectively is a key to having a cohesive policy.

The Board has been unable to make the hard choices affecting agency budgets and programs necessary to bring cohesion to federal drug control efforts. The Policy Board operates by consensus, and its members, who are heads of departments and agencies, each have vested interests in the programs of the organizations they represent.

I believe that the time has come to assign the authority and responsibility for planning and coordinating federal anti-drug efforts to a single individual. This individual must be directly accountable to the President for developing and implementing a unified drug abuse control policy and a coordinated anti-drug strategy. But organizational changes by themselves are not sufficient to solve the problem. To succeed, this individual must receive strong and sustained support from the President and the Congress.

One of the first priorities of the President's drug policy coordinator should be to improve the quality and quantity of information that can be used to assess drug control programs and determine which are the most effective. Existing data systems portray general drug trends and help gauge the overall impact of the federal drug strategy, but they do not adequately measure the effectiveness of specific drug control efforts.

## EXPANDING THE MILITARY'S ANTI-DRUG ROLE REQUIRES CAREFUL CONSIDERATION

The passage of the Posse Comitatus Act Amendment in 1981 clarified the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) can indirectly support civilian law enforcement efforts. Since then, the military has played an increasing role in anti-drug efforts that has concentrated almost exclusively on assisting interdiction efforts. The costs of DOD interdiction support have risen steadily--from an estimated $5 million in fiscal year 1982 to about $405 million in fiscal year 1987.

DOD contributes support to civilian drug interdiction efforts in a variety of ways. For example, military surveillance aircraft provide radar coverage of areas determined by Customs and Coast Guard to be major air and marine smuggling routes; selected Navy ships patrolling the Caribbean have Coast Guard personnel aboard to interdict suspected smugglers; Army helicopters transport Bahamian law enforcement teams on apprehension missions in the Bahamas; and Army helicopters and personnel were used to transport Bolivian strike teams in raids on cocaine labs. In addition, DOD supports anti-drug efforts by sharing intelligence; training law enforcement personnel; and loaning communications equipment, radars, weapons, motion sensors, night vision goggles, and other equipment.

DOD is prohibited by statute from assisting drug law enforcement agencies if such assistance will adversely affect military readiness. According to DOD officials, providing support to drug law enforcement agencies affects readiness to some degree but the impact so far has been minimal. Thus, DOD infrequently turns down requests for assistance on the basis of readiness considerations, but it has, on occasion, provided a lower level of support than requested because of potential readiness degradation. DOD officials contend, however, that substantially increasing military assistance could adversely affect readiness.

While greater involvement by the military would probably result in more drug seizures and arrests and create a greater deterrent effect, such increases may not significantly reduce drug supplies. Drug traffickers have numerous smuggling methods and routes available and can quickly counter interdiction strategies.

Drug producers also have such large quantities of raw materials available that they can overcome losses from interdiction.

Furthermore, most DOD anti-drug assistance, like most civilian drug interdiction activities, is directed at trying to stop drugs being smuggled into the country on boats and airplanes between ports-of-entry. Such interdiction activities are very expensive and have produced few results. For example, the Air Force reported that in fiscal year 19[illegible] it designated 591 AWACS flying hours to interdiction, and only 6 seizures and 10 arrests were attributed to this effort. The incremental cost to DOD associated with this assistance was $2.6 million. Similarly, the Navy and the Coast Guard reported that Coast Guard personnel were on board Navy ships for a total of 2,500 ship days in 1987 to conduct interdictions. According to the Navy and Coast Guard, these efforts resulted in 20 vessel seizures and 110 arrests at a total cost of about $40 million.

Marijuana is the drug that is most frequently interdicted between ports-of-entry. But most heroin and a large percentage of cocaine entering the United States is thought to be smuggled through ports-of-entry (e.g., cargo containers, airline passengers, automotive vehicles). The law prohibits DOD personnel from conducting port-of-entry searches and seizures, and DOD officials believe that if this prohibition were lifted, the number of military personnel needed to make port-of-entry inspection efforts more successful would be great and would directly detract from the Armed Services' primary mission.

Perhaps the greatest need that drug law enforcement agencies have for interdiction efforts is drug intelligence, especially real-time intelligence concerning specific smuggling movements, such as aircraft and boat departures and commercial shipments known to contain contraband. Some experts believe that drug interdiction efforts can best be improved by developing more reliable and timely intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination so that law enforcement agencies can more effectively target their interdiction efforts. DOD has tasked some of its personnel outside the United States with collecting drug-related intelligence, though DOD points out that the amount of drug intelligence these personnel can collect is limited, given their military missions.

Both the Senate and House versions of the Defense authorization bill propose not only to increase the level of DOD involvement in the anti-drug effort but also to provide military personnel with search, seizure, and arrest authority under certain conditions.

Before making decisions, there are several issues Congress should carefully consider. Providing military personnel with police authority would be a significant departure from this country's long-standing tradition of separating national defense and civilian law enforcement responsibilities. However, if Congress decides to give the military that authority, it needs to be defined very carefully. DOD's role in collecting intelligence to support drug enforcement also raises questions--we must take every precaution to make sure that the military does not become involved in domestic intelligence operations like those it engaged in during the 1960s. Other considerations are the additional training that would be required if military personnel are to safely and effectively carry out searches, seizures, and arrests, and the impact on military readiness if more personnel are diverted to a nonmilitary mission. In addition, we question the advisability of the Navy routinely boarding U.S. and foreign registered vessels given the potential sensitivity of American citizens and foreign governments to such boardings. In summary, the military can play a key role in providing logistical and technical support to civilian drug law enforcement efforts, but going beyond such a role needs careful consideration. And even that role must be part of a unified federal anti-drug plan.

That concludes my prepared remarks. We would be pleased to respond to questions.

Chart A: Federal Spending–Supply Versus Demand



Source: Various Federal Drug Strategy Documents

Chart B: Estimated U.S. Cocaine Consumption, 1982 and 1985



Note: Metric ton=2,205 pounds.

Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse

Chart C: Trends in Cocaine-Related Hospital Emergencies, 1983-1987



Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse, unpublished DAWN data, May 1988.

Chart D: Trends in Cocaine-Related Deaths, 1983-1987



Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse, unpublished DAWN data, May 1988.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bowsher.

We have with us this morning Congressman Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Les, we're delighted to have you. If you have any opening remarks or if you would like to lead off with questions——

Mr. ASPIN. I thank the chairman, and I very much appreciate his inviting the members of the House Armed Services Committee to attend these hearings because I think it would be very, very useful in our conference and beyond to get a position in which both bodies, both Armed Services Committees of both Houses, have had a chance to hear some testimony. So, I am very grateful for your invitation here this morning, Senator.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

I have two or three questions. Then I'll defer to Senator Warner, and we'll go around the room this morning. We'll have a 6-minute rule if staff will notify us.

### IN-COMING DRUG SEIZURES

You basically raised a lot of questions, and I think they are appropriate questions for us this morning. Let me ask you to try to put it in an overall framework. How big a percentage of the overall flow of drugs into this country are we now seizing?

Mr. BOWSHER. It's relatively small, Mr. Chairman. I had those statistics in the statement there. Most of it is getting through. In other words, we are not being successful. Here it is. We say that customs estimated that 27 tons of cocaine were seized in fiscal year 1986, but that was out of 138 tons. And for marijuana, it's about 10 percent.

Chairman NUNN. For marijuana, 10 percent is seized, and what percent of cocaine? Would that be about 20 percent of cocaine?

Mr. BOWSHER. About 20 percent, 25 percent maybe. I think maybe less right now, in fact, maybe getting closer to 20 percent.

Chairman NUNN. Just giving us your subjective judgment, if we were to strengthen interdiction to the point of almost optimum effectiveness—in other words, the most effective interdiction program you can envision—what percentage of cocaine and marijuana would you envision we could seize coming into this country?

Mr. BOWSHER. I wouldn't really have an estimate on that, Mr. Chairman. But I think that you have to also recognize that if the demand stays high, there probably are ways that people can develop some of these drugs within country so that——

Chairman NUNN. About 25 percent of the marijuana now is grown in the United States, as I understand it.

Mr. BOWSHER. I think something close to that is right. So, I think that as long as the demand stays high or continues to grow, the idea of sealing the borders and solving this problem probably isn't realistic.

### INTERDICTION PROGRAM

Chairman NUNN. Do you believe we could double the effectiveness of our interdiction program? Do you think that is within the realm of possibility?

Mr. BOWSHER. I'm not sure. I don't think it will come from putting a lot more of military assets into it. I think the military assets, from what we have seen so far, just give a marginal assist, and if we had more assets, we might get a much better and more effective program, but we haven't seen it yet. I think that to build on the hope that you're going to have a dramatic turnaround by adding a number of military assets here, I think it's possible, but I don't think that we have any statistics that would give you a lot of assurance that that's going to happen.

Senator GRAMM. Mr. Chairman, would you yield just a second on that point? Isn't there also evidence that the drug smuggling industry, if you want to call it an industry, is capable of producing and smuggling additional quantities of drugs to offset the seizures? So, just to take numbers, if there were 100 tons being smuggled in and you seized 10 of them, and you could double your seizures up to 20, most of the things I've seen, like this RAND study, suggest that it would be very easy for them to increase the amount of smuggling up to 120 tons. So, while you can get seizures up, your ability to affect availability and price on Main Street, America is relatively unchanged.

Mr. BOWSHER. I think that's a very good summary of the recent years here. Whenever the interdiction has been more effective, drug traffickers have been able to move with their much greater resources and their networks that have been building, obviously, over the years to alternate ways of bringing it in. So, the interdiction approach, although helpful, has not been increasingly effective. It has just really been the opposite.

Chairman NUNN. Are you basically saying that if we're going to have a big payoff on stopping the consumption of drugs in this country, we're going to have to look more to the demand side rather than the interdiction side?

Mr. BOWSHER. Yes. That would be one of our main messages here today.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just pick up on that.

### DEMAND ISSUE

Have you done any work on analyzing what the psychological cause is for this spiraling increase in demand?

Mr. BOWSHER. We have not done the work that would give you that. But as we look at some of the efforts to deal with the heroin problem in the early 1970s, there was some effect. In other words, it wasn't that we reduced it, but we brought it somewhat to a plateau. And we just don't feel that you can handle it strictly on the supply side. And so, what we are really saying today is we think it is time to start experimenting, trying to do research, trying to do the things necessary to look at the demand side.

Senator WARNER. Do you know of any other departments or agencies of the Federal Government that are looking at this demand issue? More and more attention is being focused on the need to try and deal with the demand problem?

Mr. **Bowsher**. Yes, I think both the Department of Education and HHS are doing some work.

Senator **Warner**. Do you think it would be helpful if Congress made a specific request to you to look at the demand side?

Mr. **Bowsher**. We'd be willing to do that.

[Submitted for the record, information relating to drug demand reduction.]

GAO

United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

General Government Division

June 13, 1988

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on
  Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable John W. Warner
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

Dear Senators:

In response to your June 9, 1988, request, we are enclosing some information relating to the drug demand reduction issue. This information was generally developed from work done to complete our March 1, 1988, special report by the Comptroller General on the drug problem, Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report. The information represents the views of various experts we interviewed or who have written on the issue.

We hope this information will be useful in your deliberations on the Defense Authorization Bill. We look forward to working with the Armed Services Committee as well as other interested committees over the long term to more fully assess the appropriate role of demand reduction in our efforts to combat drugs.

Sincerely yours,

Richard L Fogel

Richard L. Fogel
Assistant Comptroller General

## DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION ISSUES

The federal government's role in activities designed to reduce the demand for drugs in the United Statees changed significantly in 1982, when through the introduction of block grants, Congress provided that funds for drug abuse prevention and treatment services be given directly to the states. States were given greater responsibility for establishing program requirements, monitoring program activities, providing technical assistance, and collecting data. The federal role in administering drug abuse programs was substantially diminished, and presently is one of providing "national leadership" by encouraging the efforts of state and local governments.

Many drug control experts believe the federal government's present drug policy and strategy, emphasizing efforts to reduce the supply of drugs available for use, is imbalanced and that a higher priority and increased resources must be assigned to drug demand reduction efforts. State and local drug abuse prevention and treatment programs have not been effective in reducing demand. No one knows what education programs work, treatment has not kept pace with the drug problem, and research efforts are lacking. There are no easy answers or quick fixes to our nation's drug abuse problem. Reducing drug demand is a long-term approach with many questions as to what programs are effective and how this goal can be accomplished.

Devoting more federal emphasis and resources to efforts attacking America's demand for drugs, which many experts believe is the root of our drug problem, warrants strong consideration. The federal government could take a stronger and more active role beyond simply providing "national leadership" and encouragement. For example, the government can improve drug demand reduction efforts by (1) determining, through research and evaluation, which prevention, treatment, and other demand reduction programs are most effective and (2) assuring that effective programs are adequately funded and properly implemented.

DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION

Preventing drug abuse before it starts is a key to long-term success in resolving our nation's drug problem. Drug abuse prevention includes both motivating non-users to never start using drugs and convincing current users to stop their drug use. Prevention activities involve public awareness and education.

The 1984 federal drug strategy encourages the private sector to take part in the anti-drug effort. In recent years, a wide variety of groups and organizations have responded, often in highly creative ways. In addition, the First Lady's "Just Say No" campaign has provided drug abuse prevention with increased visibility. "Just Say No" clubs have been formed in schools, community organizations, and churches.

The importance of drug prevention is also recognized by the law enforcement community. Federal, state, and local enforcement agencies have been expanding their efforts to inform the general public about the consequences of drug trafficking and abuse. For example, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) co-sponsor the Sports Drug Awareness Program, which is considered to be a successful program aimed at the nation's high school athletes.

With the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, authorized funding for drug prevention and education activities was dramatically increased. The budget authority for these activities climbed from $164.5 million in 1986 to $505.4 million in 1987. Most of the monies were provided to the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services (HHS) which, along with ACTION, have primary responsibility for prevention and education efforts.

In a December 1987 report (GAO/HRD-88-26), we pointed out that while the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provided a large increase in drug abuse prevention and education funding, considerable uncertainty exists about what really works to prevent drug abuse. Prevention and education strategies used over the last 15 years have been evaluated through prevention research and found to be ineffective. Programs using these strategies have shown an increase in knowledge, but have generally been unsuccessful in changing drug abuse behavior, which is the ultimate aim.

One strategy involves the presentation of facts concerning the dangers of drug abuse to potential or actual abusers. According to HHS, sufficient evaluations of early prevention programs have been conducted for a judgement to be made that increased knowledge has no impact on drug abuse, and in some instances are actually counterproductive in that they encourage rather than discourage drug abuse.

A second strategy, termed "affective" or "humanistic", also proved ineffective. Programs based on this strategy were generally designed to enhance self-esteem, encourage responsible decision making, and enrich the personal and social development of students.

The extent to which programs are still using these strategies is unknown because the number and type of drug prevention and education efforts nationwide is unknown. A 1985 report by the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, Inc., described the status of data collection on alcohol and drug prevention programs as, at best, primitive.

According to the HHS, new drug abuse prevention strategies have developed out of the anti-smoking campaign within the last few years. These generally involve programs that focus on (1) social pressures believed to promote drug use and (2) training individuals to better cope with life by increasing their personal and social competence. While the new programs are more promising than the earlier ones, researchers still have many questions about their long-term effectiveness. A National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) official told us that the results of these strategies, according to research standards, have been mixed, and that additional research is needed to determine the effectiveness of these approaches with a wider range of children.

The successful strategies developed in the anti-smoking campaign eventually became the basis for the widely publicized and federally endorsed "Just Say No" program. The "Just Say No" program, however, has never been subjected to a rigorous evaluation, and HHS has expressed concerns that:

--the strategies found successful against smoking may not transfer to the drug area;

--the strategy will not produce enduring results beyond the short term, and;

--the strategy may not have applicability to all segments of the population since research to date has been restricted to white, middle class populations.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 not only significantly increased funding for drug abuse prevention and education but also added a number of requirements for evaluations of programs and activities. These evaluations are in various stages of implementation. The results of the evaluations should be helpful in deciding which types of state and local prevention and education programs are most effective and how future funds can best be used.

Implementation of monitoring and evaluation requirements should be given a high priority by the responsible agencies so that successful programs can be identified. This information could then be disseminated to the states and localities that are designing and implementing programs to combat drug abuse. We have recommended to Congress that it increase the accountability of state and local drug prevention and education programs, including a recommendation to tie funding at the local level to program success.

DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT

Drug treatment programs have been directed at overcoming the physical problems of drug addiction and providing psychological and social counseling to help the individual drug abuser live without drugs. Authorized federal funding for drug abuse treatment was $454.5 million in 1987, up from $227.3 million in 1986.

Funds are allocated by the federal government to states through a formula based on population as well as need. The states then disburse funds to local treatment entities. The Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) is primarily responsible for administering federal treatment funds through the block grant mechanism.

Twenty years ago, drug abuse treatment programs were aimed primarily at the older heroin addict. In recent years, the emphasis has shifted to a younger population of drug abusers, who use a variety of non-opiate substances, such as marijuana, cocaine, alcohol or a combination of these and other substances. However, treatment has not kept pace with the problem.

The Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association of North America, an organization of public and private treatment programs and State organizations, reported in 1986 that States were having serious problems responding to the demand for treatment services. In a March 1988 special report on the United States drug situation (GAO/GGD-88-39), we reported that the public treatment facilities in certain major cities we visited were greatly overloaded. Some cities had waiting lists up to 6 months for treatment.

According to the National Drug Policy Board, many public officials acknowledge that the quality of publicly funded treatment is steadily eroding in the face of consistent and growing pressure to take in more and more patients. The Policy

Board noted that the quality and efficacy of treatment programs should be a consideration in determining whether a program receives federal funds. The federal government should support the development of standards of care and a system should be developed which could monitor and evaluate program compliance.

The Policy Board also concluded that the federal government should play a more active role in setting priorities for treatment but not usurp the local right to set priorities. Decisions should be local, but the federal government can and should make known its views. Examples of priorities mentioned by the Policy Board were targeting specific populations (e.g., younger or earlier users, AIDS virus carriers, women of child-bearing age, "revolving door" clients) and treatment modalities (e.g., methadone maintenance, therapeutic communities).

Lastly, studies indicate that mandatory treatment of persons arrested and who test positive for drugs may have a positive effect on reducing drug abuse and crime. A significant percentage of persons arrested for major offenses have tested positive for drugs in certain cities that perform drug testing of arrestees (over 70 percent in some cities). The point of arrest provides an opportunity for entry into drug treatment.

## DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH

Drug abuse research supplements prevention and treatment efforts as new knowledge directed at the causes and consequences of drug abuse is developed and applied. Research can reinforce programs to prevent, treat, and control drug problems.

The 1984 federal drug strategy recognizes the federal responsibility for overseeing the development of new knowledge through basic and applied research and epidemiological studies. It is also the federal government's responsibility to ensure wide dissemination of such information to health care professionals, educators, law enforcement officials, and the general public. The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) is responsible for sponsoring research on the drug problem, as well as for monitoring drug abuse trends.

Continuing research is a fundamental component of any drug strategy. Drug abuse experts that we met with believe that an expansion in research efforts is necessary if we are to effectively reduce the demand for drugs. They pointed out that not enough is known about the number of drug users, the types of drugs used, or why people use drugs. Little is also known about why and how the abuse of certain drugs spreads among the population, why patterns of drug abuse and the types of drugs being abused constantly shift, as well as the relationship between drug use and criminal activity. The complex nature of drugs and their effects is another aspect of research that needs continued attention.

An example cited by the President's Commission on Organized Crime in 1986 is the need for research on cocaine. As the Commission pointed out, requests for treatment by cocaine users has escalated rapidly in recent years. But, research about cocaine and its effects has not kept pace with this growing problem.

The Commission further pointed out that the development of new illegal synthetic drugs, often called "designer drugs," presents another compelling need for expanding drug abuse research. The sudden emergence of these drugs in a segment of the drug abuse market caught drug control experts by surprise. The drugs are clandestinely produced in the United States, and they are very potent and dangerous--some are estimated to be as much as 1,000 times more powerful than morphine.

With regard to drug users, drug abuse experts we contacted told us that not enough research has been conducted on specific population sub-groups. For example, research needs to target users by age, race, and geographic location, as well as by the extent of their abuse (i.e., chronic, intermediate, or new drug users). Once such groups are targeted, research should attempt to understand the causes of drug abuse and the spread of certain drugs among the sub-groups. "Crack" cocaine, for example, is especially popular among younger drug users, particularly high school dropouts.

Another area cited as needing research relates to drug treatment. One of the problems with treatment is that many drug abusers drop out before treatment is completed. The benefits of treatment can be greatly enhanced if treatment programs were able to retain their clients for longer periods. Finding methods to improve retention rates should be given a high priority in drug abuse research efforts.

## PENALTIES, SANCTIONS, AND OTHER APPROACHES TO REDUCING DEMAND

Given the continuing and mounting concern about our nation's drug abuse problem, new and innovative methods for reducing the demand for drugs through the greater use of penalties are being proposed and tried. For the most part, these proposals are controversial, and the potential results are uncertain. However, such new initiatives may have merit and warrant strong consideration.

One such initiative that has been tried is the U.S. Customs Service's and the Coast Guard's "zero tolerance" policy. Under this recently implemented policy, the agencies arrested individuals and seized conveyances such as expensive yachts and automobiles after finding small quantities of illegal drugs. While the policy undoubtedly provides a deterrent effect to drug use, or at least to the possession of illegal drugs in certain circumstances, the implementation of the policy raised many concerns and unfairly penalized some individuals. Under growing pressure from the Congress and others, the Administration decided to modify the program to avoid penalizing innocent parties.

A similar program was conducted in New York by federal and state law enforcement agencies. This program involved seizing automobiles from individuals caught in New York with small amounts of "crack" cocaine in their cars. Law enforcement officials cited this effort as a good example of using penalties to reduce the demand for drugs, especially when the seized cars were owned by the parents of teenagers arrested.

New initiatives recently proposed by the National Drug Policy Board include penalties such as denying drivers' licenses, student loans, public housing assistance, and other government benefits to persons convicted of drug use. These initiatives expand on the concept of "zero tolerance." Controversy is expected, and if implemented they should be carried out fairly so innocent people are not penalized. On the surface, while such initiatives are controversial, they could have an impact by reducing demand for drugs.

Perhaps the most controversial effort is drug testing. Random testing of employees and testing of job applicants is being increasingly carried out by employers around the country. In addition, the President has called for random testing of all federal employees in sensitive positions. Random testing involves privacy and constitutional issues, which are being tested in the courts, and also involves the issue of laboratory testing quality and the accuracy of test results. While the military has had considerable experience with drug testing and reports great success in reducing drug abuse in the military, privacy in the military is not an issue.

## SUMMARY

Our current federal drug strategy, emphasizing efforts to reduce the supply of drugs, simply is not working. Many drug experts, including law enforcement officials, believe that drug supply reduction efforts are, at best, a "holding action" in the war against drugs and that more needs to be done to reduce the demand for drugs in this country.

The federal government's role in drug demand reduction activities has diminished over the years, from one of administering drug abuse prevention and treatment programs to one of providing "national leadership" by encouraging the efforts of state and local governments. In 1982, with the introduction of block grants, federal funding was reduced and states assumed additional responsibilities for establishing program requirements, monitoring program activities, providing technical assistance, collecting data, and auditing.

Since then, funding for drug demand reduction efforts, unlike funding for supply reduction, has been modest, with a 15 percent increase from 1982 to 1986 (after adjusting for inflation). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 significantly increased the funding for demand reduction, with the budget for 1987 ($959.9 million) more than double the budget for 1986 ($391.8 million).

Devoting even further emphasis and resources to demand reduction activities is an approach that warrants strong consideration. But, reducing demand is easier said than done. Reducing drug demand is a long-term approach with many unanswered questions as to what programs are effective and how this goal can be accomplished. We presently know little about how to reduce the demand for drugs.

State and local drug abuse prevention and treatment programs funded by the federal government have not been effective in reducing demand. We need to find ways to educate and prevent people from abusing drugs; increase our ability to provide effective treatment for all those in need; and conduct greater research on why people use drugs, how drug use spreads among the population, and the consequences of drug use, especially among our youth.

We believe legislation calling for a greater role by the federal government in efforts to reduce the demand for drugs should be considered. Such legislation could require the President to develop a strategy and plan for placing greater federal emphasis on reducing the demand for drugs in the United States. The strategy and plan could include recommendations for reducing drug demand such as (1) developing better information through research and studies on the patterns of drug use, including who uses drugs and why they use them; (2) identifying, through research and evaluation, those demand reduction programs that are effective; (3) directing and assuring that effective demand reduction programs are adequately funded and properly implemented; and (4) any other recommendations that can be identified to help reduce the demand for drugs.

Senator **Warner**. Well then, I'll take it upon myself—and perhaps others will join—to initiate that request.

Now, in your testimony you recommend the appointment of a single individual as a drug policy coordinator, commonly referred to as a czar. But I don't find in your testimony a framework of how this individual would operate. Let's start with question number one. Would he or she be a new individual or would an existing official in the Government be designated?

Mr. **Bowsher**. I think you have basically two options that you could use. One would be to take an official in the Government, such as a cabinet officer, and give them enhanced authority. You might well look more, I think, at what happened in the intelligence area where you set up the DCI to actually have control over the budgets of the other intelligence agencies or to have some significant input to them, and to have a real reporting framework—in other words, what is the strategy, the accountability for reporting, and the budget and resource allocations to support the strategy?

You could also probably do it if you had the right person at the White House level as a special assistant to the President working with the various cabinet departments and agencies.

So, I think those would be your two models that the President could consider. That would be our best advice on the organizational issue.

### POSSE COMITATUS

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Bowsher, you pointed out in your testimony the history of posse comitatus, how it has worked, and the dangers if we were to expand it in any way to allow men and women in the military to perform arrests in the domestic area. The legislation which the Senate adopted very carefully allowed those arrests to take place beyond the three mile territorial limits of the United States. But with your knowledge of the military, do you agree with me that we should not in any piece of legislation amend posse comitatus in any way to allow uniform personnel to perform arrests domestically?

Mr. **Bowsher**. I agree 100 percent. And I would also add if I could, Senator, that I very much favor the Senate version over the House version on this issue. But even in the Senate version, you have some words in there about intelligence assets and intelligence network that we would like you to consider whether you want to have in your legislation.

### DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Senator **Warner**. That was my next question. Let's go to the area of intelligence where you pointed out again quite rightfully that the military should not be involved in any domestic intelligence activities.

Mr. **Bowsher**. I think if you go back and read the hearings that Senator Sam Ervin had about the intelligence work in the 1960s, I think you get a good sense of the dangers that you are opening up when you bring the military into this role. And I think our country has survived and prospered very well over the last 200 years by making sure that our military is kept separate from civilian law enforcement. And although I can see some advantages of utilizing DOD's surveillance and intelligence and other technical capabilities, like the radars and the satellites and things like that, I think once you get the military people involved in undercover work and things like that, you're taking a great risk.

Senator **Warner**. You're moving dangerously into where they could be involved in domestic intelligence.

Mr. **Bowsher**. That's right.

### DOD PARTICIPATION

Senator **Warner**. Now, lastly, on page 9 you begin to address the DOD participation to date and $405 million budgeted in fiscal year 1987.

Had not those military elements been involved in associating themselves with other agencies and drug interdiction, they would have been off somewhere training and doing their operational and normal work. So, the $405 million is just a figure that is isolated as to what those costs were. But wouldn't the Department of Defense have expended almost a similar sum in keeping them in a state of readiness performing other activities?

Mr. **Bowsher**. Let me clarify this; $314 million of that $405 million was a one-time procurement so you really are down to $75 million of O&M. And I think on the O&M money, Senator, you're absolutely right. They'd be off training or doing the things with that money.

Senator **Warner**. Those assets procured were specifically needed for drug work and would not ordinarily have been procured for their role in maintaining deterrence and national defense?

Mr. **Bowsher**. Yes. It was specifically appropriated for drug interdiction.

## AWACS PARTICIPATION

Senator WARNER. Now, you recite, for example, the AWACS flights and so forth. That could be interpreted almost—I know you didn't intend it—as a ridicule that the military just weren't effective. But if you look at it carefully, it may well have been that the presence of those AWACS activities was a deterrent and those bringing drugs in, knowing of it—and we have to assume that they've got a pretty good intelligence network—just decided to use other means. So, although the number of actual arrests of the amounts seized which can be attributed to military participation is small, it may well be that those activities were effective and deterred that type of importing of the drugs.

Mr. BOWSHER. There is that possibility, but our people who are down there working on the sites said that many of the people down there had a sense—well, it more like what Senator Gramm described, and that is the smugglers just changed their routes or changed their tactics for moving drugs in to avoid what they obviously knew was a new deterrent, namely, the AWACS being up there, although only part of the time. In other words, one of the main problems with some of our surveillance in the past on the part of the military has been that it has not been on as full-time basis as some people had thought it might well be. And once the drug smugglers got intelligence or had an understanding of that, there was probably some feeling that they just would move it at some other time when the AWACS wasn't up there. So, there is no question there was a deterrence there. The smugglers had to think about it.

Senator WARNER. And it could well have been effective.

Mr. BOWSHER. It could well have been, yes.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

If I could just follow up briefly on that question. Isn't the real problem determining what to look for when you're flying around up there? I mean, you're looking down and you're seeing all sorts of ships down there and none of them have D–R–U–G–S on them. They all look the same from the AWACS aircraft point of view. And unless you have advance intelligence as to which ship has the drugs on it or which one is suspect leaving certain designated areas, then you're not getting anywhere by simply flying around watching ships, are you?

Mr. BOWSHER. I think you just described exactly what the problem was once you started using that type of aircraft and capability. There were so many thousands of ships down there moving around that without additional intelligence, it was very difficult to identify which ship might have some contraband on it. So, they did catch some, but it's a very difficult problem.

Chairman NUNN. It seems to me that that kind of surveillance by the military can be helpful only when it is preceded by source intelligence about which ships may have been suspect for drugs to begin with, and then the military assets can help trace those ships and assist in commanding control as to where they are and who can make the arrest. But that intelligence at the source is what is missing.

Mr. **Bowsher**. I think the drug enforcement people would agree 100 percent with you there, Senator.

Chairman **Nunn**. Do you have any suggestions about what the military can do more effectively in helping domestic law enforcement or what domestic law enforcement can do in determining which ships floating around down there have the drugs on them or which small aircraft coming in have the drugs on the planes? How do we get that type intelligence?

Mr. **Bowsher**. I think that the law enforcement agencies feel they could probably do a better job if they had more assets and could put more assets into getting that early intelligence, and then augment it with the surveillance that the military could do. Once they know something is moving, then if the military can track it, why, that's very helpful.

Chairman **Nunn**. Wouldn't it make a lot more sense for the military assets to be on some kind of call to go out when this intelligence is available and then trace ships rather than just loitering in the air and flying all over watching the waves and the ships? I just don't see that that kind of patrol does much good unless you're looking for something.

Mr. **Bowsher**. I think actually that it would be better to let the professionals design the plan and then ask for the assistance from the military as needed.

Chairman **Nunn**. It doesn't seem to me it makes much sense for Congress to prescribe, "Thou shalt go out and fly AWACS aircraft all over and look around just on some kind of rambling mission observing the tourists and the yachts," and that kind of thing. I mean, that is just sort of a silly approach, isn't it?

Mr. **Bowsher**. It is like any other war really, and that is you've got to have a theater commander. You have to have somebody down there who is running the overall program. And he has to call in the assets as they are needed. And I certainly think that the military has some assets that can be helpful. But if you prescribe it on the idea that you have the answers up here, I'm not quite sure you will have the best program. I think it is better to have the professionals in the program down there calling on the assets as they need them.

Chairman **Nunn**. As needed.

Mr. **Bowsher**. Yes.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Shelby.

### LEGALIZING DRUGS

Senator **Shelby**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There has been a lot of talk in recent weeks about legalizing drugs in this country. I hadn't heard any of that this morning. And I certainly am not of that persuasion.

You talk about demand, and there is a demand. That is what creates the market in this country. Would the legalization of drugs do away with the demand, or would that just fuel it and make the price cheaper?

Mr. **Bowsher**. We have not done work on the legalization issue.

Senator **Shelby**. You haven't done a study on that?

Mr. BOWSHER. We have not done a study on that. I have raised the issue with my team, and we have some very experienced people in this area. And they are very skeptical of moving to legalization.

Senator SHELBY. Well, I'm glad to hear that. [Laughter.]

Mr. BOWSHER. But we don't really have the studies or the evidence that we could support one position or the other on that very crucial issue.

Senator SHELBY. But what fuels all this is the demand. Demand and demand and demand will create a market. If there's a short supply, then the price is that much more. Additionally, there is always someone who is willing to take the risk. Isn't this your thesis here today?

Mr. BOWSHER. That's right.

Senator SHELBY. How do we slow this down—that is, the demand? Assuming we're not going to legalize, and I hope we're not going to do that. How do we slow the demand down? If we can't solve everything, if interdiction itself by the military is not a panacea—and I have to believe it won't be—how do we slow the demand down? Do we do it by increased penalties on the consumer as well as the people that are flying it in?

Mr. BOWSHER. I think you have to have the deterrence, and that might well include increased penalties. Another area would be education, especially for younger people. In other words, more and more I think what we're seeing when we look at the statistics is how, unfortunately, younger and younger people are getting involved in drugs. Many of the professionals today say that if you reach the kids in high school, sometimes it's too late. You have to get at the junior high kids. So, the education part is a big one.

And I think treatment, trying to get people off it once they get on it, is another aspect. And as I said earlier to Senator Warner, we have not done as much work on the demand side. He is asking us to do a significant study on that, and we would like to do that.

Senator SHELBY. If we increase the penalties tremendously—that is, the risk of people that want to fly the cocaine in, for example, the pilots and the people that are running the boats in, et cetera—to where the risk is so great that it is not a revolving door as we know it today in the criminal justice system, where would that lead us? Have there been studies in that regard, some models made? I have always thought that a deterrent, fear of the consequences if the consequences were great, might make some people think—perhaps it doesn't.

Mr. BOWSHER. I think people have felt that way many times. For example, if you think back to what Governor Rockefeller did with his program in New York, I don't think we have any real evidence at this point to offer that it has deterred. But I know a lot of people believe that greater penalties might well deter.

Mr. JONES. Senator Shelby, we certainly know that the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1986 included provisions for enhanced sentencing of drug law violators. I think the consequence of sentencing guidelines right now is open to some question—but there are more and more people in the Federal prisons who are there for longer periods of time for violating drug laws. It is anticipated that in the long run the Federal prison system particularly is going to contain mainly drug law violators and career criminals. And yet, we see price and purity on the street indicate that drug abuse is rampant.

Mr. BOWSHER. And the supply is growing even with those deterrents.

### DRUG CONSUMPTION IN EUROPE

Senator SHELBY. What about some of the other industrialized countries like Germany or Japan or Switzerland, France, and England? How is their drug consumption compared to ours per capita, and how are they coping with it if you've done any work in that area?

Mr. BOWSHER. Well, you know, some countries, such as the Netherlands, have gone more toward legalization and have had a mixed result I think.

Senator SHELBY. What about Germany?

Mr. BOWSHER. Germany I'm not quite sure. No, we have not done studies overseas.

Senator SHELBY. What about Japan? Do they have a large drug consuming population?

Mr. BOWSHER. We really don't know.

Senator SHELBY. You don't know. That would be interesting.

Mr. BOWSHER. I think one thing is interesting that our team was talking about the other night, and that is the Russian Army obviously has developed a drug problem by being down there in Afghanistan, one that probably they didn't have before. So, it shows again once you bring drugs into a group of people, lots of times you get a certain percent that are going to get hooked.

Senator SHELBY. What is the psychological damage that might occur, assuming that the military gets involved in some limited type or maybe more liberal type of drug interdiction, and then after all of this expenditure of money and changing the laws, there is no real slowdown in the smuggling of drugs and the consumption of drugs in this country? Will that have an impact with the American people that our strong Navy, Air Force, Army, Marines—Coast Guard, you know, of course, is still working with it—has not done this? Will people become more apathetic?

Mr. BOWSHER. Well, it is hard to judge what might happen.

Senator SHELBY. I think it is something for us to think about.

Mr. BOWSHER. Yes. I think it might just provide more evidence as to whether continued interdiction efforts are going to be successful or not. I think there's a general feeling right now that maybe we haven't done as much with some of the military capability for surveillance and detection and if we do the added work, and put the added assets in there, why, we'll have a better sense of whether it is helpful or not. But, again, I think as I said earlier, based on our evidence to date, I don't think people should build their hopes too high that this is going to make a radical difference.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. My time is expired.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Shelby.

Mr. Bowsher, I would like just to ask you to give us, if you would, in summary—you can do it later on this week—the recommendations you would make about these two bills that we have before us in conference, including the House bill and the Senate bill, and what would you do with those recommendations.

Mr. **Bowsher**. We'd be pleased to do that.

[Submitted for the record, comments on the Senate and House amendments to the 1989 Defense Authorization Act which pertain to DOD's support of drug law enforcement efforts.]

Comptroller General
of the United States

Washington, D.C. 20548

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed
Services
United States Senate

June 15, 1988

The Honorable John W. Warner
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

As you requested, we are providing comments on the Senate and House amendments to the 1989 Defense Authorization Act which pertains to the Department of Defense's support to drug law enforcement efforts. Our comments on the Senate and House amendments are presented in Enclosures I and II, respectively.

These comments reflect GAO's positions on federal drug control policy as I outlined during my June 8, 1988, testimony before your Committee. In essence, these positions are

-- The current federal emphasis on drug supply reduction programs has yielded limited results and strong consideration should be given to devoting more resources to programs directed to reducing the demand for drugs.

-- Better management and strong leadership of federal drug control efforts is needed, with the authority for the overall effort consolidated under one individual who has presidential and congressional support.

-- DOD can play an important role in drug control programs, but that role should be in providing logistical and technical support rather than a leadership role.

-- DOD personnel should not be authorized to conduct arrests or to gather domestic drug-related intelligence, as this would not significantly enhance federal law enforcement capabilities but would be a significant departure from the traditional separation of defense and law enforcement roles.

I hope that these comments are useful to you and the other conferees as you consider this important legislation.

Charles A. Bowsher

Charles A. Bowsher
Comptroller General
of the United States

# GAO BILL COMMENTS ON
# AMENDMENT 2069 TO S.2355
# THE 1989 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

Our understanding is that this amendment is intended to bring into play the technological capabilities of the military in detection of drug smugglers, and in the command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) functions needed by civilian law enforcement agencies to carry out their duties. It further adds "significant" incentives to increase the role of the National Guard in drug interdiction and enforcement.

The amendment is intended to expand DOD's role in the drug war while maintaining harmony with military training, readiness, and national traditions of not involving the military in the direct arrest of our citizens. It is also intended to prevent the duplication and fragmentation of civilian and military C3I functions and activities.

## SEC. 931. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE

"(a) Findings. - The Congress finds that -
"(1) the transport of weapons, drugs, and other contraband, as well as terrorists, across the borders of the United States constitutes a threat to the national security;
"(2) a mission of the armed forces of the United States will be to assist Federal law enforcement agencies responsible for the interdiction of illicit drugs entering the United States by an aircraft or vessel;
"(3) the additional resources and funds necessary to carry out this section should be made available to the Department of Defense; and
"(4) activities under this section by members of the armed forces should be carried out to the maximum extent practicable in consultation and cooperation with appropriate law enforcement agencies."

## GAO'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE BILL'S INTENT, AND GAO COMMENTS:

Our report "DRUG CONTROL: Issues Surrounding Increased Use of the Military in Drug Interdiction" (GAO/NSIAD-88-156, April 29, 1988), discusses the national security implications of the drug problem. GAO agrees with the premises of the "findings" section in that it would apparently maintain the Department of Defense (DOD) as an assist agency and not a lead agency (see Section 931 (a) (2)); establish a mission for DOD which adds structure, purpose, and accountability to DOD's involvement; recognize that the DOD will need to be funded for drug related activities which will preclude potential and real readiness degradations; and recognize that the authority to enforce civilian laws remains in the hands of the civilian, professional law enforcement agencies.

GAO suggests, however, that the language of subsection 4 be modified to delete the phrase " to the maximum extent practicable." We believe that this phrase would provide a "loophole" through which coordination with the law enforcement agencies could be degraded and, thus, pose a potential danger to retaining civilian control over drug law enforcement.

Regarding subsection (a) (3), GAO reiterates the Comptroller General's position set forth in his June 8, 1988, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. His position was that given the lack of success of drug interdiction efforts, including those involving the military, Congress should exercise great caution before authorizing large expenditure increases for such efforts.

* * * * *

"(b) Guidelines to the Military Departments. - Section 113 of title 10 United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
"(k) The Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide annually to the Secretaries of the military departments and to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands written guidelines to direct the effective detection and monitoring by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps of all potential aerial and maritime threats to the national security of the United States. Such guidelines shall include guidance on the specific force levels and specific supporting resources to be made available for the period of time for which such guidelines are to be effective."

GAO'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE BILL'S INTENT, AND GAO COMMENTS:

The amendment implies that the military takes a limited view of the types of aircraft and vessels that constitute a threat to the national security of the United States. Consequently, the military generally does not track or monitor low, slow flying aircraft or follow vessels that do not have a distinctly military profile, and current military detection and surveillance activities provide limited information useful for identifying drug smugglers.

This amendment gives DOD the express statutory mission of ensuring the effective detection and monitoring of all potential aerial and maritime threats to the national security. The Secretary of Defense, with advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will provide specific guidance on force levels and resources to accomplish this new mission. It establishes the basis for a substantial increase in DOD's participation in drug interdiction activities by directing DOD's resources into the types of activities that are compatible with traditional military activities. It is apparently intended to reduce unnecessary duplication by civilian law enforcement agencies in the purchase, operation, and maintenance of sophisticated equipment for the detection and monitoring of air and sea drug smuggling traffic.

This would be a major change in DOD's current surveillance mission and it is likely that additional costs would be incurred by DOD. To avoid potential readiness problems, it may be necessary to fund the additive procurement, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and other costs associated with this new mission. Furthermore, although the bill contemplates reduction of duplicative activities and equipment purchases by civilian law enforcement agencies, there is no specific implementation mechanism to ensure this or to ensure that in providing guidance to the military departments the Secretary consults and coordinates with the law enforcement agencies.

As drafted, this section implies that DOD has existing capability to detect all types of aircraft and vessels. In fact, significant detection capabilities currently exist in the civilian law enforcement agencies, the Federal Aviation Administration, as well as the military services, and the extent of these capabilities is not known. Before Congress decides to increase DOD's current surveillance mission to include aerial and marine drug smugglers, more information is needed about the capabilities of existing detection systems, including the suitability of existing equipment to track aircraft/vessels of interest, the modifications that would be required to military equipment and/or operating procedures to allow them to play an expanded role in detecting drug smugglers, and the estimated costs involved. In response to requirements in the 1988 Defense Authorization Act, GAO is now evaluating the capabilities of all Federal agencies to detect air drug smugglers.

If the Congress decides to enact Section 931 (b) in its present form, GAO suggests that the language of the section be modified to clarify that DOD will not assume any responsibility for directing aerial and marine surveillance and detection of drug smugglers which would dilute the control of civilian law enforcement agencies over drug law enforcement. To accomplish this end, GAO suggests that the language of Section 931 (b) be modified to read "...written guidelines defining the operational relationship between military surveillance and detection of aerial and marine drug smugglers and civilian drug law enforcement activities. Such guidelines shall be developed in consultation with the National Drug Policy Board and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, and shall specify the continued control of civilian law enforcement agencies over the general conduct of drug law enforcement activities. The guidelines shall include guidance on the specific force levels ..."

* * * *

"(c) Lead Agency for Detection. (1) Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall designate a single lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.

"(2) It is the sense of the Congress that the Department of Defense has unique capabilities, experience, equipment, and trained personnel and has contributed to the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, and the President shall give priority consideration to these factors in making the designation required by paragraph (1)."

GAO'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE BILL'S INTENT, AND GAO COMMENTS:

The 1986 Defense Authorization Act directed the President to set up a lead agency for surveillance and monitoring of drug smugglers. What resulted was a compromise that further divided these responsibilities between the Coast Guard and Customs and a replication of functions and equipment without a coherent approach to aerial and maritime surveillance. Subsection (c) is a second attempt to create a lead agency, preferably DOD, for establishing an effective network and minimizing duplication by other agencies. As drafted, the designated lead agency (probably DOD) would approve all activities by any other agency involving the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the U.S. Read in conjunction with Section 931 (b), the result of Section 931 (c) would probably be that DOD would assume all responsibility for surveillance and monitoring of aerial and marine drug smugglers, and that civilian agencies would no longer conduct such activities.

In view of the fragmented surveillance network that now exists, concentration of authority and responsibility may be desirable. GAO does not object to the concept of a lead agency, but with regard to the sense that DOD should be this lead agency, notwithstanding its technological and resource base, GAO advises that caution be exercised. The war on drugs still lacks strong leadership as well as a coherent national strategy--part of which would include whether or not a lead agency is needed and what agency should assume this role. Numerous questions need answers before a lead agency is designated. For example, who would decide on the potential drug smuggling profiles the lead agency would be looking for? Also, since 100 percent aerial and surface surveillance is most likely impossible, who would dictate the extent of coverage? Is it appropriate for DOD to dictate operational matters to law enforcement agencies? GAO believes that it is desirable for civilian law enforcement agencies to remain in overall control of drug law enforcement efforts, and therefore be tasked with determining drug smuggling profiles and when and where surveillance assets should be placed.

If the Congress decides to enact Section 931 (c) in its present form, GAO suggests that additional language be added at the end of subsection (c) (1) to clarify the continuing overall control of drug law enforcement activities by civilian law enforcement agencies. The following additional language is suggested:
"... In making this designation, the President shall consult with the National Drug Policy Board and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, and shall develop guidelines specifying the continued civilian control over drug law enforcement activities, defining the roles of both civilian and military agencies in detection and monitoring of drug smuggling, defining the operational relationships between civilian law enforcement agencies and the military, and specifying procedures for any transfer of surveillance and detection equipment to the designated lead agency."

* * * *

"(d) Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence Network.- (1) Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of the Act, the President shall report to Congress his plan for integration by the Department of Defense of command, control, communications, and intelligence assets of the United States dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs.

"(2) Not later than 120 days after submission of the report required by paragraph (1), the President shall report to Congress his plan for assignment of the responsibility for operating the command, control, communications, and intelligence network described in paragraph (1)."

GAO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL'S INTENT, AND GAO COMMENTS:

The apparent intent of this subsection is that DOD should operate the C3I network because it has the training and experience to do so. In the original amendment proposed by Chairman Nunn, this subsection (titled Section 931 (d) in the Nunn amendment) was limited to assigning DOD responsibility for operating the communications network used to provide tactical information and communications to civilian law enforcement agencies engaged in drug interdiction. Actual control over drug interdiction efforts was to remain in civilian hands, and the military would provide the communications essential to effective drug interdiction operations. The drafters of the original concept saw this as another way where DOD equipment, training, and experience could be put to use in a manner that is compatible with military operations, and that would enable civilian agencies to spend their resources on other equipment and operations necessary for effective drug interdiction activities.

GAO believes that command, control, and most intelligence functions relating to drug law enforcement should remain under civilian agency control. C3I centers are already being developed around the country to be operated by civilian law enforcement agencies and the capabilities of existing C3I systems must be considered in detail before developing a plan for integrating C3I activities. In particular, GAO believes that great caution must be exercised in involving DOD in intelligence gathering operations for law enforcement purposes. Precautions must be taken to preclude DOD involvement in domestic intelligence operations like those DOD engaged in during the 1960s. GAO believes that the foreign intelligence gathering operations of the United States are the appropriate responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence and should remain so. While GAO's recent report noted that there is an abundance of intelligence data already available that cannot be effectively analyzed and utilized, the corrective action lies with the foreign intelligence gathering agencies and not DOD. GAO believes that DOD's involvement in drug law enforcement intelligence gathering should not be expanded beyond its present role in electronic intelligence gathering and limited human intelligence gathering in foreign countries.

GAO believes that enactment of Section 931 (d) is premature, because the war on drugs still lacks strong leadership and a coherent national strategy. However, if the Congress decides to enact a provision such as Section 931 (d), GAO suggests the following changes to subsection (d)(1): Strike "by the Department of Defense" and add at the end of the subsection the sentence "This plan should indicate how the Department of Defense will assist in this integration." We also suggest allowing more time for the study, perhaps 180 days.

* * * *

"(e) Airborne Radar Coverage. - As soon as practicable after the date of enactment of the Act, the President shall deploy radar surveillance aircraft in sufficient numbers to provide an appropriate increase in the flying hours dedicated to drug interdiction. An appropriate increase of flying hours shall be dedicated to assistance to civilian agencies responsible for drug interdiction. An appropriate increase of flying hours shall be dedicated to such assistance along the Southwest border of the United States until such time as the aerostat radar surveillance systems that, as of the date of enactment of this Act, are planned for installation along such borders, are fully operational."

GAO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL'S INTENT, AND GAO COMMENTS:

This subsection requires DOD to increase flying hours by an unspecified amount. It is an attempt to increase the coverage now in force, but is open-ended in its scope. The general assumption is that more DOD involvement in surveillance will result in a proportional return on the cost to do so. The Comptroller General testified on June 8, 1988, that increasing DOD's involvement in drug interdiction may not make a significant impact on reducing the influx of drugs coming into the United States. The Comptroller General cited DOD and law enforcement agency data which indicate that minimal results are achieved under current operating procedures. This lack of confidence in returns on investment must be viewed in terms of the impact increasing DOD surveillance coverage could have on military readiness and DOD's ability to meet its national defense mission.

For the reasons stated above, GAO suggests deleting section 931 (e).

* * * *

"(f) Loan of Pursuit Aircraft. - The Department of Defense shall make available to the Coast Guard and Customs Service rotor wing and fixed wing aircraft of the armed forces to be used by such agencies in the pursuit of aircraft or vessels involved in illegal drug operations."

GAO's INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL'S INTENT, AND GAO COMMENTS:

This amendment is intended to encourage DOD to make aircraft and vessels available to the Coast Guard and Customs Service. DOD already has existing authority to do this and aircraft is already being loaned to these agencies. Civilian law enforcement agencies have indicated to us that they could use more assets, however, we reiterate our concern that in the absence of an national strategy that defines DOD's role and sets operational priorities, simply increasing DOD's involvement is questionable. GAO's recent report, as stated above, lays out concerns that the use of DOD may not be effective and increasing such involvement may not yield sufficient returns.

For the reasons stated above, GAO suggests deleting section 931 (f).

* * * * *

"(g) Drug Interdiction Assistance. - (1) Section 374 (c)(2) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following new subparagraph:

> (C) Equipment operated by or with the assistance of personnel of the Department of Defense for the purpose of monitoring and communicating the movement of air and sea traffic (including equipment operated by or with the assistance of personnel assigned under subsection (a) may be used to intercept vessels and aircraft for the purpose of identifying and communicating with such vessels and aircraft and directing such vessels and aircraft to a location designated by appropriate civilian drug enforcement officials.'

"(2) Section 374 (c)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by -

> (1) striking out 'In an emergency circumstance, equipment'; and inserting in lieu thereof 'Equipment', and
>
> (2) striking out 'determine an emergency circumstance exists' and inserting in lieu thereof 'approve such assistance', and
>
> (3) Section 379 of 10 USC is amended by inserting the following new subsections at the end thereof:
>
> '(e) Under regulations jointly prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation in consultation with the Attorney General, members of the armed forces who -

> '(1) are assigned to duty on vessels of the Navy to which a member of the Coast Guard has been assigned under this section. (2) have been provided with appropriate training in the law enforcement functions of the Coast Guard, and (3) have been designated by an authorized member of the Coast Guard to perform the law enforcement functions of the Coast guard may, outside the U.S., assist or perform any of the law enforcement functions of the Coast Guard under section 89 of 14 USC.

'(f) Upon motion by the Attorney General or his designees, any civilian action, claim, or proceeding brought against any member of the armed forces arising from such member's performance of duties under this chapter shall be deemed an action exclusively against the United States and the United States shall be substituted as a party defendant. The United States shall be entitled to all defenses otherwise available to an employee of the United States under state or federal law as well as defenses to which the United States is independently entitled.'"

## GAO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL'S INTENT, AND GAO COMMENTS:

GAO suggests that, if the Congress decides to enact a provision such as Section 931 (g), the language contained in the original Nunn amendment entitled Section 931 (d), with some modifications, be substituted for the language in the present bill.

The original Nunn amendment provides a specific, clearly defined role for DOD in operating communication systems in support of drug interdiction by civilian law enforcement agencies, and avoids the problems discussed above relating to command, control, and intelligence gathering. Under current law, DOD personnel, in an emergency situation can communicate with vessels or aircraft outside the land areas of the United States for the purpose of communicating with them and directing them to a location designated by civilian law enforcement officials. The original Nunn amendment eliminates the requirement for designation of an emergency and allows communication with aircraft inside the United States.
GAO suggests that--because the Nunn proposal apparently broadens DOD's authority, by eliminating the need for an emergency and allowing communication within the land areas of the United States--some modifications be made in the original Nunn amendment, to clearly limit DOD's role to communication with vessels and aircraft, thus emphasizing continued civilian control over drug law enforcement. GAO also suggests requiring consultation with the National Drug Policy Board and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System before DOD assumes these responsibilities. Including the modifications suggested by GAO, the original Nunn proposal would read as follows:

"(d) DRUG INTERDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES. -- Section 374(c)(2) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following new subparagraph:

"(C) Equipment operated by or with the assistance of personnel of the Department of Defense for the purpose of monitoring and communicating the movement of air and sea traffic (including equipment operated by or with the assistance of personnel assigned under subsection (a) shall be used to --

"(i) operate the communications network which provides the agencies referred to in subsection (a) with tactical command, control, and intelligence information appropriate to the drug interdiction and enforcement responsibilities of such agencies; and "(ii) identify and communicate with vessels and aircraft and direct such vessels and aircraft to a location designated by appropriate civilian drug enforcement officials.

"(iii) The Department of Defense shall coordinate with the National Drug Policy Board and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System before assuming the responsibilities in subsections (i) and (ii)."

Regarding the extension of the Coast Guard's law enforcement powers to the Navy in subsection (3), the present language allows this outside the U.S. if Naval personnel are assigned to ships with a Coast Guard member aboard, have been trained, and have been designated by the Coast Guard to perform law enforcement functions. Nothing in the amendment authorizes arrest, seizure or search powers for the military within the borders of the United States.

This is similar to the current LEDET program but would require fewer Coast Guard personnel on board Navy ships. GAO's understanding, however, is that currently there are more LEDET personnel available than there are dedicated ships to put them on. Consequently, there seems to be no practical argument for bestowing this authority on military personnel.

GAO, in general, is apprehensive about giving arrest authority to military personnel. As noted in the Comptroller General's June 8, 1988, testimony giving military personnel arrest authority would be a significant departure from our country's long standing tradition of separating national defense and civilian law enforcement responsibilities. Giving the military such authority needs careful consideration especially the ramifications that could be involved in the military boarding and seizing vessels of other countries on the high seas. GAO also is concerned that the military would assume all Coast Guard enforcement authorities--fishing right violations, pollution, safety, etc. While some infractions may be considered as serious as drug violations, there is a question whether the military's arrest authority would be limited to "serious violations."

For the reasons stated above, GAO suggests deleting subsection 931 (g)(3)(e).

* * * *

"(h) Enhanced Drug Interdiction and Enforcement Role for the National Guard. -

"(1) Preamble. - Congress having made a finding that 'the transport of weapons, drugs, and other contraband, as well as terrorists, across the borders of the United States constitutes a threat to the national security,' the Secretary of Defense is directed to urge the Governors of the several states to provide plans for participation by the National Guard in performing the objectives of this law.

"(2) In General. - (A) The Secretary of Defense may provide to the Governor of a State who submits a plan to the Secretary under paragraph (B) sufficient funds for the pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses of personnel of the National Guard of such State used for the purpose of drug interdiction and enforcement operations and for the operation and maintenance of the equipment and facilities of the National Guard of such State used for such purposes. (B) The Secretary may provide funds under paragraph (A) to the Governor of a State who submits a plan to the Secretary specifying how personnel of the

National Guard of such State are to be used in drug enforcement and interdiction operation by a National Guard of a State unless--

"(i) such operations are conducted at a time when personnel of the National Guard of the State are not in Federal service; and

"(ii) participation by a National Guard personnel in such operations is service in addition to annual training required under section 502 of title 32, United States Code.

(C) Before funds are provided to the Governor of any State under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Attorney General of the United States regarding the adequacy of the plan submitted by the Governor to the Secretary.

"(3) Source of Funds. - (A) Of the amounts appropriated pursuant to section 301(a), up to $30,000,000 shall be available for the purposes specified in paragraph (1). (B) Of the amounts appropriated for National Guard Personnel Army, and National Guard Personnel, Air Force, for fiscal year up to $30,000,000 shall be available for the purposes specified in paragraph (1).

"(4) Report. - (A) Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the potential effectiveness of using members of the National Guard and the Reserves for drug interdiction efforts, consistent with applicable law, along the borders and the points of entry of the United States. (B) The report described in paragraph (A) shall include consideration of the potential for the long-term use of National Guard units of Arizona, Texas, California, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Tennessee, South Carolina, Florida, Virginia, New York, Georgia, and other states as appropriate to perform drug interdiction operations consistent with applicable law, coordinated by the Chief, National Guard Bureau the Director of Operation Alliance Joint Command Group, and the Command, Communications, Control and Intelligence Centers at March Air Force Base, California and Richmond Heights, Florida."

## GAO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL'S INTENT, AND GAO COMMENTS:

Currently, the National Guard, when not in Federal service, is under the command of the Governor and may perform law enforcement actions. However, they now must absorb the costs of this. This amendment allows up to $30 million in assistance to the Governors for drug enforcement operations. The $30 million are funds out of what has already been appropriated and do not constitute an "add-on."

GAO's recent report, "DRUG INTERDICTION: Operation Autumn Harvest: A National Guard-Customs Anti-Smuggling Effort" (GAO/GGD-88-86, June 2, 1988) concluded that an August 1987 National Guard-Customs air interdiction operation along the Arizona-Mexico border was not properly planned and coordinated. The lack of planning and coordination contributed to the failure of the operations. To ensure coordination of future operations involving the National Guard, GAO believes that it may be advisable to insert at the end of the first sentence of subsection (h)(2)(B) the following "...as well as how the operations will be coordinated with Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies."

* * * *

"(i) Rule of Construction. -Nothing in this section or in the amendments made by the section shall be construed to limit the authority of the executive branch in the use of Department of Defense personnel or equipment for law enforcement purposes otherwise authorized by law."

GAO'S COMMENTS:

GAO has no comments on this subsection.

* * * *

"(j) Report by the President. -Not later than September 1, 1988, the President shall submit a report to Congress containing legislative proposals, including budgetary requests, to enhance the capability of the Department of Defense to perform the functions described in this section."

GAO'S COMMENTS:

GAO has no comments on this subsection.

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ENCLOSURE II ENCLOSURE II

GAO BILL COMMENTS ON
AMENDMENT TO H.4264
THE 1989 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

The House bill provides funds for procurement, research, and operational support for the war on drugs. In addition, it addresses the issue of arrest power by providing the military with this power under the conditions of hot pursuit. Our comments follow:

TITLE X - ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS

"Sec. 1001. DRUG INTERDICTION

"(a) Procurement - "(1) The amount provided in section 102(a) for procurement of aircraft for the Navy is hereby increased by $180,000,000 of which- (Note: the figures below represent the final authorized amounts as noted in Section 1003. The figures in parenthesis represent the original funding levels in Section 1001.)
"(A) $125,000,000 ($90,000,000) is for procurement of three (two) E-2C aircraft; and
"(B) $90,000,000 is for procurement of six HH-60 helicopters.
"(2) the amount provided in section 102(c) for shipbuilding and conversion for the Navy is hereby increased by $70,000,000 ($42,000,000) for procurement of ten (six) Island-class patrol boats.
"(3) The amount provided in section 102(d) for other procurement for the Navy is hereby increased by $25,000,000 ($8,000,000) for procurement of secure communications equipment.
"(4) The amount provided in section 102(d) for Navy other procurement is hereby increased by $45,000,000 (no funding in 1001) for procurement of two aerostat radar surveillance systems.

"(b) RDT&E. -The amount provided in section 201 for research development, test, and evaluation for the Army is hereby increased by $3,000,000.

"(c) Operation and Maintenance. - (1) The amount provided in section 301 for operation and maintenance for the Army is hereby increased by $2,000,000.

"(2) The amount provided in section 301 for operation and maintenance for the Navy is hereby increased by $120,000,000 for drug interdiction assistance, of which--

"(A) $60,000,000 shall be transferred in accordance with subsection (d)(3); and

"(B) $60,000,000 shall be used to defray expenses of Defense drug interdiction assistance activities.

"(d) Transfers to the Coast Guard. -(a) The Secretary of the Navy shall loan to the Coast Guard for a period of ten years, at no cost to the Coast Guard, the equipment specified in subsection (a) (other than the equipment specified in subsection (a)(1)(A)), which shall be used for Coast Guard activities relating to the interdiction of the transportation of illegal addictive narcotics into the United States.

"(2) Upon delivery to the Navy of the E-2C aircraft authorized in subsection (a)(1)(A), the Secretary shall loan to the coast Guard for a period of 10 years, at no cost to the Coast Guard, no less than two E-2C aircraft in the current inventory of the Navy.

"(3) The Secretary of the Navy shall transfer from amounts available for operation and maintenance for the Navy for fiscal year 1989 the sum of $60,000,000 to the Coast Guard for (a) the operation and maintenance of the equipment loaned to the Coast Guard under this section, and (b) other Coast Guard operating purposes relating to the interdiction of the transportation of illegal addictive narcotics into the United States, as considered appropriate by the Secretary of Transportation.

"(e) Limitation of Procurement. -Amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense for procurement for fiscal year 1989 or any prior fiscal year may be obligated for equipment for enhancement of authorized drug enforcement activities under subsection (a) or any other provision of law if the equipment--

"(1) is fully supportable within the existing service support system of the Department of Defense; and

"(2) reasonably relates to an existing military, war reserve, or mobilization requirement."

GAO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL'S INTENT, AND GAO COMMENTS:

The provisions of this section are intended to be funded by cuts from the Administration's SDI program. It essentially restores $350 million from prior cuts to the defense budget.

With regard to the procurement and RTD&E segments of this section, the drug law enforcement agencies have indicated a need for more resources to accomplish their individual enforcement plans. GAO has been told they need more aircraft, vessels, sensors, and other assets. Because of funding constraints, these agencies are unable to provide for these needs and turn to the military for assistance. With this section, Congress is proposing to add $480 million to the war on drugs even though the National Drug Policy Board (NDPB) said in testimony that it has not yet determined the most effective and efficient means to spend money to fight drug abuse. Furthermore, GAO's recent report "DRUG CONTROL: Issues Surrounding Increased Use of the Military in Drug Interdiction" (GAO/NSIAD-88-156, April 29, 1988) noted that while enforcement agencies want more resource type assistance from the military, and the military is willing to provide more, many professionals believe that without clear, coherent direction for the government-wide anti-drug program, raising DOD's level of effort in the interdiction portion of anti-drug activities probably will not make a significant difference in the amount of drugs entering the United States.

GAO continues to urge a "top down" approach to addressing the interdiction needs of civilian law enforcement agencies. As the Comptroller General testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 8, 1988, we reaffirm our conviction that central leadership by one individual, answerable to the President, accompanied by a national strategy for narcotics control purposes that prioritizes the Federal government's efforts in this regard, is needed before the Congress makes decisions on changing DOD's role or significantly increasing its level of effort in its existing role.

Although we do not support the Senate provision encouraging the designation of DOD as the lead agency for surveillance, if it is accepted in conference then consideration should be given to deleting subsection (d)(2). As lead agency, DOD might better utilize the E2Cs for drug surveillance. GAO, however, questions providing large funding increases for drug interdiction equipment. In light of the lack of success of drug interdiction programs in reducing the supply of drugs as discussed in our recent testimony, Congress should exercise great caution before authorizing large expenditures for drug interdiction equipment.

Regarding the O&M segment of the bill, GAO believes that O&M funds should be provided for directly in law enforcement agencies' individual authorizations and appropriations. GAO does not believe that DOD funds should be transferred to law enforcement agencies for the operation and maintenance of assets DOD no longer controls.

* * * * *

"Sec. 1003: USE OF ARMED FORCES FOR INTERDICTION OF NARCOTICS AT UNITED STATES BORDERS

"(a) General Requirement. --

"(1) Authority to locate, pursue, and seize aircraft and vessels.--Within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall deploy equipment and personnel of the Armed Forces sufficient to halt the unlawful penetration of United States borders by aircraft and vessels carrying narcotics. Such equipment and personnel shall be used to locate, pursue, and seize such vessels and aircraft and to arrest their crews. Military personnel may not make arrests of crew members of any such aircraft or vessels after the crew members have departed the aircraft or vessels, unless the military personnel are in hot pursuit.

"(2) Radar coverage. --As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall deploy radar aircraft in sufficient numbers so that during the hours of darkness there is continuous aerial radar coverage of the souther border of the United States.

"(3) Pursuit aircraft.--The President also shall deploy sufficient numbers of rotor wing and fixed wing aircraft to pursue and seize intruding aircraft detected by the radar aircraft referred to in paragraph (2). The President shall use personnel and equipment of the United States Customs Service and the Coast Guard to assist in carrying out this paragraph.

"(4) Use of National Guard and Reserves.--In carrying out this Act, the President shall use members of the National Guard and the Reserves. The tours of such members shall correspond to their training commitments and shall be considered to be within their mission. The President shall withhold Federal funding from any National Guard units whose State commander does not cooperate with the drug interdiction program required by this Act.

"(5) Expenses.-The expenses of carrying out this Act shall be borne by the Department of Defense.

"(b) 45-Day Deadline.-The Secretary of Defense shall substantially halt the unlawful penetration of United States borders by aircraft and vessels carrying narcotics within 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

"(c) Report. - As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall report to Congress the following:

"(1) The effect on military readiness of the drug interdiction program required by the Act and the costs in the areas of procurement, operation and maintenance, and personnel which are necessary to restore readiness to the level existing before commencement of such program.

"(2) The number of aircraft, vessels, and persons interdicted during the operation of the drug interdiction program and number of arrest and convictions resulting from such program.

"(3) Recommendations for any changes in existing law that may be necessary to more efficiently carry out this program.

"(d) Request for Funding. -- Within 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a request for--

"(1) the amount of funds spent as a result of the drug interdiction program required by this Act; and

"(2) the amount of funds needed to continue operation of the program through fiscal years 1988 and 1989. Such requests shall include amounts necessary to restore the readiness of the Armed Forces to the level existing before commencement of the program.

"(e) Budget Requests. - The President shall submit in his budget for fiscal year 1990 for the Department of Defense a request for funds for the drug interdiction program required by this Act in the form of a separate budget function.

"(f) This section shall expire on September 30, 1989."

## GAO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL'S INTENT, AND GAO COMMENTS:

As with the Senate version, GAO does not favor giving the military arrest authority. We are particularly concerned that the arrest authority that would be authorized by subsection (a)(1) is not clearly and carefully defined.

Based on our report "DRUG CONTROL: Issues Surrounding Increased Use of the Military in Drug Interdiction" (GAO/NSIAD-88-156, April 29, 1988), we believe that the costs of complying with this mandate in terms of resources and readiness degradation would be exorbitant. In addition, we believe that the feasibility of substantially halting the penetration of the U.S. borders by drug smugglers within 45 days is extremely questionable. Since 1977, the Federal government has increased spending on drug interdiction programs by more than 1500 percent to $1.4 billion in 1987 but large amounts of illegal drugs still enter the United States. GAO suggests not including Section 1003 in the conference version.

Chairman NUNN. Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this has been a very important hearing already. We have, I think, established the fact that despite our best efforts on interdiction—and perhaps they haven't been our best efforts, and I look forward to hearing more about where we can improve our interdiction efforts—we are losing the war on drugs. The fact is that unless we address the demand side, we are not going to effectively address the drug plague that is destroying the young people of this Nation.

And I would join with Senator Warner, Mr. Chairman, and hopefully you, in asking the GAO to come up with a study that would suggest some ways to address the demand side. I would hope we would include in that not only the treatment and education aspect of it, but also the penalties that should be imposed, such as in the zero tolerance effort, which was ridiculed and then relaxed. That perhaps was too stringent, but at the same time I don't think we should allow people whose vehicles, airplanes or boats are used for transporting illegal drugs to get off scot-free.

I also don't know, Mr. Bowsher, if you had a chance to read the statement of Mr. Monastero, who is one of the witnesses.

Mr. BOWSHER. No, I haven't.

Senator McCAIN. He makes a very interesting statement where he says: "The Bureau of Justice Statistics recently released a report indicating that in 1984 the median sentence served by those released from State prison was 17 months or 45 percent of their original court ordered sentence. For drug trafficking offenses, it was 16 months or 39 percent of the original sentence." The point here is that even if you are apprehended and sentenced, and I understand those percentages are extremely low, then what are the chances of significant punishment being meted out and, indeed, served by the offender?

### FUNDING THE COAST GUARD

I would like to get back to this business of the funding of the Coast Guard. Do you feel that the reduction in the funding of the Coast Guard has significantly affected their ability to carry out their drug interdiction efforts?

Mr. BOWSHER. Yes, we do. We feel that it has reduced it, and we do feel that one of the things that Congress ought to carefully consider is whether it is wise to add large amounts of military money for this program versus these reductions, you might say, in the civilian agencies and the Coast Guard who are really the ones that have been fighting this battle and really have to fight the battle.

Senator McCAIN. I think that's an important point, and I think that we should do whatever we can do, not as members of the Armed Services Committee, but as members, to restore and even increase that funding for the Coast Guard. We may have to fence it because I understand there was money appropriated and authorized for the Department of Transportation. The Department of Transportation made a decision to reduce some of that funding. Is that accurate to your knowledge, or was that money deferred to other uses?

Mr. **Bowsher**. My expert on this says that he thinks basically it was done by Congress over the Transportation Department budget.

Senator **McCain**. Thank you.

### $C^3$I SYSTEM

The U.S. Customs Service, as you know, received funds for a $C^3$I system to tie together the sensors used to detect drug smugglers in coordination with the Coast Guard, the FAA and the military. I understand that they are now back to square one. Is that your information?

Mr. **Bowsher**. I would like Arnold Jones here to give you the information on that.

Mr. **Jones**. I think right now there is some concern as to whether or not the contractor providing the hardware is going to be able to meet the terms of the contract, and we are looking at that program. And I think the implications of your question, Senator, are quite correct.

Senator **McCain**. Thank you. We would appreciate that information. I think it goes to the source of the problem as we discussed earlier, and that is the intelligence capability that we need in order to coordinate these efforts. If we expect an AWACS aircraft to function properly, we've got to give it a target as opposed to investigating each one of 360 ships that are around Miami at any given time.

Have they evaluated the requirement for the $C^3$I and whether it would meet the need or not, Mr. Jones?

Mr. **Jones**. As you know, the requirement to construct the $C^3$I, as well as the monies, were provided for in the Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1986, 41 millions of dollars. Notwithstanding, there has been, as a result of coordination among a lot of agencies as required by law, a significant difference in what the Congress envisioned and what is going to be.

For example, in the area of intelligence, the on-line, real-time interfacing with EPIC has not been realized. There is still a need for the Customs to go through human interfaces to get information out of EPIC—intelligence. You have Customs building its own sites and not collocating with the military. You have Customs, at least in one of the facilities, sharing command responsibility with the Coast Guard. So, you have a lot of anomalies that sort of run against the notion of a unified, civilian-run communications command and control concept for the air and marine interdiction program. And this is counter to the intent, as I read it, in the act of 1986.

Senator **McCain**. I also agree with you, and it's hard to understand, frankly.

Finally, could you tell us, Mr. Bowsher or your capable staff here, what you feel would be the most cost effective way of using additional funds? I don't think there is any reluctance on the part of the American people nor this Congress to devote additional funds to fight this war on drugs. And I think it is important that perhaps we could get your perspective on what would be the most cost effective means of fighting drugs and what steps we could take, including where the use of the military ranks on your priority list.

Mr. BOWSHER. I think what is really needed—and what we really never have developed—is an overall strategy. And I think what is needed to get an overall strategy is somebody that's in charge, to figure out with the professionals in this business about how best to wage this war, you might say, against drugs. And I just don't think we've achieved that yet. And so, rather than us giving you specifics, I think overall, hopefully in the next administration, somebody could be put in charge, somebody who would be asked to come up with a real strategy, and then call upon the various assets that the different agencies, including the military, have that could play a role.

I really think the idea that the military can substitute for the professionals in the law enforcement area is something that is very worrisome. I think you really have to recognize that if you're going to have effective law enforcement here, you've got to go with the professionals on the civilian side that know the business. But you've got to get them well coordinated. You've got to get them to—as Arnold Jones was just answering the question—address some of the things that have hindered this effort for many years now. And many people have tried to do it, and I don't underestimate for a moment how tough it is. I think it is a very, very tough thing to achieve. But that is what I think we need most of all.

Senator MCCAIN. Start where the drugs are.

Mr. BOWSHER. Where the drugs are and a good strategy put together by some real professionals.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

I believe Senator Dixon is next.

## GRAND STRATEGY

Mr. DIXON. Mr. Bowsher, following right along with that, I agree that we need a grand strategy for this, something that looks at the supply side. But as you so carefully pointed out, all of our best efforts there are doomed to some failure in that a sufficient supply to meet demand will somehow continue to get into this country. Then we need to look at the demand side as well. I think you've accurately pointed that out.

I assume on the basis of everything I now know that there is really no grand strategy yet in place in this regard. Is that correct?

Mr. BOWSHER. No, there really isn't. When you look at the strategy that the Policy Board has put together, you basically have a summation of the current enforcement efforts, you might say. And I don't think anybody has really pulled it together.

Senator DIXON. Most of our work, at least that that has been able to generate media attention in large degree, has been on the supply side, interdiction, trying to eliminate the drugs in other countries, the seizures, law enforcement.

Mr. BOWSHER. That's right. The seizures get good TV coverage.

Senator DIXON. Yes.

Mr. BOWSHER. But when you meet with the law enforcement people, they'll tell you they could have one tomorrow and one the next day, and it wouldn't really affect the overall problem that we're facing.

Senator DIXON. Yes. For instance, on the demand side, I've had the interesting experience of going to rehabilitation centers in Springfield, IL, in our capital city, and in Chicago, IL—I can't recall the names. It may be "gateway centers"—at which they take time with these young people, particularly teenagers, to rehabilitate them. I believe they claim a success rate of in the 70 percentile area with those who will stay voluntarily in their homes for at least a year. Obviously, on the demand side, that is a very significant penetration of future use of drugs by these individuals. And clearly, I think that's something we ought to be looking at. Would you agree with that?

Mr. BOWSHER. I think it is very much so. I'm not sure, though, that we ought to think that we could get a 70 percent success rate on treatment in this area.

Senator DIXON. I think we could not probably where you don't have voluntary participation.

Mr. BOWSHER. That's right.

Senator DIXON. Their experience has been with those who volunteer. That is sort of like Alcoholic Anonymous groups. When they get in there and they really want to, they're going to do it.

Mr. BOWSHER. Yes.

Senator DIXON. But I think it is something we ought to look at, and I think we ought to look at education even in the grade schools. You so carefully pointed out that even prior to high school we have the problem now. I think education has to begin with the very, very young in grade schools. That ought to be part of the grand strategy. Would you agree?

Mr. BOWSHER. I agree.

Senator DIXON. And I had been to a number of other conferences recently that developed ideas, some of which I see in today's Washington Post, that the administration is talking about.

It occurs to me, for instance, like the driver's license. I'm an old secretary of state from the State of Illinois where they license individuals at the age of 16. I can assure you that the most important single thing in the mind of a teenager is to get that driver's license.

Mr. BOWSHER. As a former resident of Illinois, I can agree with you.

Senator DIXON. Yes. Don't you think that is a worthwhile idea that in the case of drug users that are obviously chronic users, addicts, that the driver's license is, obviously on the demand side, one of the things that will to some extent discourage drug use in the country?

Mr. BOWSHER. I think it is one of the things that ought to be looked at and considered. That's right.

Senator DIXON. So, I would just want to conclude my questioning by suggesting that I suspect that thoughtful people all over the country, and I would hope in the Congress, would agree with what you're saying—that what we need is a central person and then a sound strategy on the demand and supply side to look at all of the facets of this problem, a lot of which don't get the name of the particular Congressman or Senator on the front page of the newspaper, but will address the problem in a realistic way and find a solution in total concept to the whole problem.

I thank you for your contribution because I think if this or some new administration will tackle that, it can be a great contribution to the national well-being of this country for many, many decades in the future.

Mr. BOWSHER. We agree with that.

Senator DIXON. I thank the Chair.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, would you allow me just one brief observation?

Chairman NUNN. Sure.

Senator WARNER. Following in my inquiry, a number of members have expressed an interest as to whether or not you could perform a study on the root causes of the demand, and I'm going to ask if you would help us in drafting the letter that we would forward to you——

Mr. BOWSHER. Yes.

Senator WARNER [continuing]. Because there is no sense in our trying to set a framework which you feel is not appropriate.

Mr. BOWSHER. No. We like to work that way, Senator, where our staff and your staff get together and draft a letter and make sure that we can do the job.

Senator WARNER. We'll undertake that today, and I hereby invite as many members as wish to join me on it. And second, it would be our hope that you could do this in a period of time so as to coincide with these major decisions being made by the Congress.

Chairman NUNN. Which means within 3 or 4 days. [Laughter.] In other words, get the study you've already done out of your drawer.

Mr. BOWSHER. You made me speechless with that one.

Senator WARNER. Well, I have known some of your studies to linger on and gather a little moss over a year or two. [Laughter.]

Mr. BOWSHER. We'll try not to do that. We'll try to be as timely as possible.

Senator WARNER. I thank the Chair and the members.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner, I certainly join with you in that request. I think it's an excellent suggestion.

Congressman Stratton, we're glad to have you with us this morning.

Mr. STRATTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. I have lost track of where we are. Is Senator Cohen next? Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bowsher, I think I've read the writings of a number of existential philosophers, and I came away with a greater sense of optimism after reading them than I did your report. [Laughter.]

It is a depressing critique, and frankly it leads me to the conclusion—it's inescapable. You haven't said it this way, but the conclusion in reading the report is that Congress in passing legislation mandating a military involvement or greater military profile in the fight against drugs has come up with a purely emotional response to a deep-seated social problem. Would you agree with that?

Mr. BOWSHER. Well, I hesitate to——

Senator COHEN. You are not under oath, as Senator Nunn has indicated before. [Laughter.]

Before you answer, let me put it this way. From what I gather in your report, you said the following: "Looking to the military to solve or make a contribution to solving the problem on the supply side is going to, number one, cost us a good deal of money; number two, under the current circumstances, will not be efficiently spent; number three, it may compromise our traditional notion of the role of the military in our society; and number four, will produce little benefit in cutting the amount or the cost of the drugs at the retail level on the streets of the United States." Right?

Mr. BOWSHER. That's basically right.

Senator COHEN. Now would you want to answer the first question as to whether or not it has been a purely emotional response?

Mr. BOWSHER. Yes. The other night I was watching a TV program about the air war over London. And they were pointing out that they finally got some big guns into Hyde Park to shoot up at those German bombers. And now they were interviewing some of the gunners, and they were saying, you know, we never had a chance at hitting any of those German bombers at night, but it sure made the people in the subways feel good when they heard our guns pounding off.

I have about the same sense of what you're trying to do here. You're trying to bring in more assets. I think one of the problems we've had here with using the military so far is that its support has been very preprogrammed, as I understand. Ninety days ahead of time they've been scheduling the AWACS flights and things like that. And I think if we could bring in, as the chairman said, a more timely response of some of these assets, I think it could be useful to the professionals. But the idea that you're just going to have great success by more AWACS flights I think is not realistic.

Senator COHEN. Well, to carry your analogy or metaphor a bit further, we may be bringing out the big guns and be firing up in the air, but the chances are we might hit some commercial airliners in the process. We ought to keep that in mind as well.

But coming back to the point, what are we doing? We have rushed off with the passage of legislation in both Houses to deal with this particular problem. Based on your report, however, there is very little chance of significant success. It would be minimal, to say the least, or marginal I should say.

### CREATING A DRUG CZAR

Does it really take a czar—and I have no problem with creating a drug czar—to say that we shouldn't be sending the Coast Guard off to the Persian Gulf or the Navy to Mexico?

Mr. BOWSHER. It probably doesn't, but I think it will take a czar to bring a unified and an effective program in the drug area.

Senator COHEN. The problem I'm trying to get at is here we are, Congressman Aspin and Congressman Stratton and others. We're all going to be sitting around a table for the next several weeks trying to decide whether we want to have an additional cruiser or an additional destroyer or whether we're going to fund an additional carrier. We have some pretty limited constraints on how we're going to spend that DOD money. And it seems to me that it doesn't take a rocket scientist or a drug czar to figure out that we really ought to be spending more money on DEA, the Coast Guard, Customs agents. It would be much more effective in the war against drugs than simply sending out the military to try and coordinate on intelligence.

You dealt with it very briefly in your stated remarks, your oral remarks, but in your pamphlet you identify a number of serious problems as far as calling upon the DOD to provide military intelligence for the interdiction of drugs, not only with respect to whether this involves the military intelligence operators in this country, but in terms of limited assets, the inability or unwillingness of DOD to compromise their informants, their networks. There's a vast variety of problems associated with using military intelligence to combat drugs.

So, I think it doesn't take a good deal of intelligence to figure out that we've got to beef up the DEA and the Coast Guard and the Customs agents and not be allocating those resources away from DOD, away from either the shipbuilding programs, the aircraft programs, or whatever they might be and to divert them to a policy that is going to be doomed to failure, at least in any significant sense.

I welcome Senator Warner's recommendation about doing a study on the demand side, but it seems to me that these studies have been done years and years in the past. It will deal with education, which you have talked about. It will deal with poverty and despair. It will deal with the decline of religion in our lives, about ethical impoverishment. We're not just talking about teenagers in the ghettos. We are talking about upper and middle class individuals from Wall Street on down who suffer from an ethical impoverishment as well. So, we can talk about all the problems that are there, but they're basically social and political. And now we're going to be debating on capital punishment, whether that is a factor that ought to be taken into account now in terms of whether we're going to be discouraging the demand side.

So, I think that what we need is a lot more caution and, as you correctly state, some reflection upon an overall strategy which we have not had to date. But frankly, we play a major role in helping to disburse the policy because we react to the political overtones that tend to sweep through the halls of Congress. And I think that by mandating certain action without reflecting upon your report, we perhaps have not done the appropriate thing. And I hope that Chairman Nunn and Congressman Aspin will take this into account as they reconcile the differences between the House and the Senate versions of the bill.

One final point. You've said very little about the policy toward countries who supply drugs to this country. I didn't see any references to it in your report. Has that been a failure on our part? Is it a waste of time or effort? Should we be seeking more economic sanctions against those nations who either are indifferent or ineffective in controlling the production and distribution of export of drugs into our country?

Mr. BOWSHER. We have done reports on that in the past, and what seems unfortunate is that many of our efforts have not been overly successful. I think I did mention a couple problems and that is the corruption and the economics of how much this now means to the economy of some of these countries. It just doesn't seem that we have been able to be effective in negotiating with them or in some of the actions that we've taken to eradicate. We have had some successes but, again, when you look at the supply that's coming into this country today, you have to conclude that the overall success in that area has not been too great.

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Cohen.

Senator Levin.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## COST EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY USE

I'd like to pick up on Senator McCain's questions about cost effectiveness of the use of the military. And your report states that it is difficult to quantify the program's results, and I would agree with that.

But you also provide us some data. And here is what it seems to show at least as we look at it, that in fiscal year 1987 the Air Force designated 591 AWACS flying hours to drug interdiction which resulted in 6 seizures and 10 arrests at a cost of $2.6 million. And in the first quarter of 1988, 154 AWACS flying hours resulted in 2 seizures and 3 arrests at the cost of $678,000. And according to our math, that means that it costs about $350,000 to $450,000 per seizure.

Now, the Coast Guard data shows that in fiscal year 1987 the Navy provided over 2,500 ship days to their program, to the LEDET. Is it called the LEDET program, the Coast Guard program?

Mr. **Bowsher**. Yes.

Senator **Levin**. Resulting in 20 vessel seizures and 110 arrests at a total cost of $40 million, and that averages out to about $2 million per seizure according to our math.

Now, are these cost effective programs in your opinion?

Mr. **Bowsher**. When you just look at those numbers, why, you'd have to conclude they're not too cost effective. The one thing these programs do have is what I believe Senator Warner pointed out earlier, and that is that they have a deterrence that is very hard to measure. And if we did more comprehensive work—we might come up with a cost benefit that would be more favorable. But looking at the numbers by themselves, it looks like we're spending a lot of money and throwing some pretty big assets at something that we're getting not too great of a return on.

## CIVILIAN PROGRAMS

Senator **Levin**. Now, the civilian programs also have deterrent features to them too.

Mr. **Bowsher**. Yes.

Senator **Levin**. So, for instance, your report points out that the Customs Service needs additional container cargo inspectors and that Customs officials believe that a major percentage of illicit drugs enter the country by containers, but the Customs is currently able to inspect no more than 3 percent of these containers; 3 percent is all they are able to inspect. They also say that inspection of containers could be increased at the rate of 1 percent for every 500 added inspectors.

Now, can you give us a cost effectiveness analysis between adding 500 inspectors, for instance—let's say that costs $15 million or $20 million—and what $15 million or $20 million in cost to the military would produce? If you can't give it to us this morning——

Mr. BOWSHER. I can't give it to you this morning, but we could work on that.

Senator LEVIN. Okay, because it seems to me that that's a pretty important factor. You have Customs short of people to look at containers which they say is the major source of entry, and I think our analysis would tend to show that would be a lot more cost effective. It has a deterrent effect, right, which is difficult to measure. But I presume there wouldn't necessarily be a greater deterrent effect through use of the military than Customs, or would there? How would you compare the deterrent effect?

Mr. BOWSHER. I'm not quite sure. I'm not sure we could, but we'll give it a try.

Senator LEVIN. All right. But if the deterrent effects are reasonably equal or balance out, then you're left with the cost per seizure or the cost per arrest. And it strikes me just looking at this data that you get a lot more arrests for each dollar invested in the Customs Service and the Coast Guard than you would in the military. And that's just the way we would see it.

How long would it take you to produce that kind of analysis? Could that be done also in a matter of days, or is that weeks and months?

Mr. BOWSHER. We can do some analysis on that in a few days.

[The information follows:]

GAO is unable to provide a cost effectiveness analysis because of a lack of information for measuring the effectiveness of drug interdiction programs. Existing drug data systems portray general trends and help gauge the overall impact of federal drug strategies, but do not adequately measure the effectiveness of specific drug control efforts.

Estimates of the average cost of seizing a unit of drugs could be developed, but such estimates would be insufficient to permit us to make a cost effectiveness comparisons. For example, there is no way to measure the value of seizing one type of drug compared to another type of drug: e.g., the value of a cocaine seizure versus a marijuana seizure. Among other reasons, these values cannot be measured because we do not know the quantities of drugs being smuggled in the United States and the effect of removing a given quantity of any drug from the market.

As the Comptroller General stated in his testimony, one of the first priorities of a drug policy coordinator (GAO supports the establishment of this position) should be to improve the quality and quantity of information that can be used to assess drug control programs and determine which are the most effective.

Senator LEVIN. That would be very helpful.

Finally, on the way in which these costs are determined, I used some figures here and now I want to play devil's advocate with my own figures. I believe they were quoted in your report. Let's assume the Air Force designated 591 AWACS flying hours to drug interdiction, which I indicated resulted in 6 seizures and 10 arrests. Do you know how that flight pattern of those 591 AWACS flying hours would be different from what those AWACS planes would otherwise do? In other words, when we look at that data, are we to assume that those AWACS planes would not be flying but for this mission?

Mr. **Bowsher**. No.

Senator **Levin**. Is it a different mission?

Mr. **Bowsher**. I think they tried to combine some of the missions, Senator, but let us get more information on that. We have that in our work papers. But I think what you had there with the AWACS flights is you had training and exercises taking place in that area, and some portion of the effort was devoted to the drug interdiction effort and some portion to some of the other things that were happening in that area. And you were looking at different targets on some of those flights, a mix of targets, you might say.

Senator **Levin**. Apparently I have another moment or two.

The Customs Service has said that they would rather buy their own aircraft than depend on the availability of military aircraft and they believe that military aircraft are over-equipped for the job. Do you have a comment on whether or not military equipment is poorly suited for this particular mission?

Mr. **Bowsher**. I think maybe we could describe it best this way, and that is most of your military equipment looks for fast moving, somewhat sophisticated targets, and on this type of work lots of times you need something that is maybe a little slower and can pick up and stay with the target. It's a little like back in the Navy—John will remember this—that when you're flying a certain type of plane off on ASW, you want a plane that can get over the target and stay there. And that's what you need more in this type of a thing. And some of the military equipment is really designed to get out there and do things bigger and faster than what you need in this drug area. So, that's the real dichotomy between the types of equipment.

Whether it would be cost effective to use military equipment, we haven't really done the work between the two options.

Chairman **Nunn**. Senator Gramm.

Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator **Gramm**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bowsher, as always I appreciate your input. I think that you're findings pretty well confirm what most of us have been trying to garner as information on our own.

I guess the sad reality is if you look at something like cocaine, the value of the product rises 208 times from the time it is grown in the field until it is sold on 14th Street in Washington. So, in an industry like that, you can suffer seizure rates of 90 percent, 95 percent, and still make huge profits. So, I think that we have to admit that there is some of this guns in Hyde Park element that is present.

### WINNING THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS

And quite frankly, my view is that we're never going to get American society to do what has got to be done, to win this war, unless we're going to have a death penalty; unless we're going to have mandatory sentencing for smugglers, unless we're going to build a lot more prisons and put a lot of people in them. I don't see us accepting the kind of zero tolerance that we're going to have in order to have any chance of winning this war.

Senator Shelby asked about Japan and their program. I've taken a look at the Japanese program, and in essence it's a program of zero tolerance. About a decade ago, they decided they were about to have a problem. They went out and had mandatory testing. People that were deemed to be addicts were put in mandatory rehabilitation programs. Anybody found with drugs went to prison. As a result, they pretty well have thinned their ranks.

I feel our problem—I'd like to get your reaction to it—is that while we've got 23 million Americans that are using drugs at least once a month, we're acting like the guy selling drugs is the only criminal. Certainly, the seller is—and even though we're not going to get many of them, if we can kick their fanny good when we do get them, it makes me feel better. I'm willing to spend money to do that even though the records on how many are really going to jail of the ones we arrest are just terrible.

But the problem, as I see it, is we're still treating the person buying the drugs as a victim. Do you have any kind of data, showing of that 23 million people who use drugs once a month, how many of those would be hard-core addicts and how many of them would be people who go to work every day and who hopefully pay taxes?

Mr. BOWSHER. We do not have that data and neither does anyone else right now. And we think you need better data in this area to go after some of those issues. Another big question that comes up often is how many of those people really turn into drug sellers or pushers having got on the habit. We don't have that kind of data but it would be most helpful if we did.

Senator GRAMM. Well, it seems to me that we need a program to treat the addicts, but if you're talking about a casual user, it seems too me the only effective deterrent is going to be punishment. Now, whether you're talking about taking somebody's driver's license for a year, whether you're talking about seizing their Volvo if they're riding around in it using cocaine, whether you're talking about throwing them out of public housing if they take drugs into public housing, whether you talk about suspending somebody's guaranteed student loan, it seems to me that those kinds of approaches are going to be essential if we're going to have any kind of real impact on this problem. Do you agree with that?

Mr. BOWSHER. I think that's the thing that has to be looked at and studied and built into the strategy. I would hesitate without having done studies on this to give you any opinion, but some kind of a mix of that is needed. In other words, I think we have to look at education. We have to look at treatment. We have to look at a set of penalties. No question.

Senator GRAMM. Well, one of the things that disturbs me—and I've spent a lot of time recently looking at this problem—is that, while there is some encouraging things that are going on in terms of using methods we've used in getting people to stop smoking to prevent people from using drugs, the record so far, on the thing that we as Americans assume is the miracle cure to everything, which is education, the data is not very encouraging. The level of drug use among students that are going to a college is not much different than those that are not. The level of usage among those that have had drug awareness programs is not much different than those that haven't. At least looking at that avenue, while I'm totally committed to education and share with Jefferson a belief that it is as near a cure-all as we've got, the initial data is just not very encouraging. Unless you are going to combine education with some kind of penalties for drug use, that we're not going to solve the problem.

The final thing I wanted to talk about is that on this whole military issue that the big question comes down to what are the alternative costs? If the alternative cost of using an AWACS in drug interdiction is flying AWACS around trying to track buzzards as a training mission, then maybe we ought to try to find ways to use it more effectively. If the alternative cost of using the Navy in tracking real ships versus made up ones, and that can tie into the drug war, then that's probably a pretty good idea. I think the problem is the American public tends to have this image that there isn't any alternative cost and that we would just as soon have all these soldiers—one out of every three has a grenade launcher now—down on the border in these armored vehicles.

But I think the real truth lies somewhere between this notion that you've got to look at the total bill cost of using military equipment and that they're not doing anything anyway. I think that what we've got to find, and I think where you could help us, is in trying to get a fix, what is the real alternative cost. How much of this is a substitute for training and in what kinds of areas?

I know we have a program in Austin with our reservists that fly an F-4 that is reconfigured as a very sophisticated photographic plane. We have used them in our drug interdiction program to the extent that it doesn't interfere with other things they're doing and the people are available. When we feel like we've identified a clandestine airfield, we send them out and they photograph it. Now, that's pretty much compatible with their training. They would be out photographing something else if they weren't photographing that airfield. Those are the kind of things it seems to me that we ought to be pushing our effort toward and we ought to stay away from those things where there is no compatibility and where the alternative costs are too high.

Mr. BOWSHER. I think that's right. And I think that tracks with what Chairman Nunn was saying earlier, and that is if we can call the military in to assist at the right time with the equipment that maybe the law enforcement people don't have, then I think it can be helpful and effective. And I think we can do some work on that.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gramm.

Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you might indulge me in an opening statement. I have taken the red eye to come back to this hearing because I thought it particularly important. Let me ask the indulgence of my colleagues too.

## DRUG EDUCATION PROGRAM

I will just tell you that a quarter of a century ago—it's not quite that long, but after the red eye, it seems it—I first sought public office in the State Legislature of California running on a platform of the need to conduct drug education so that young people might make an informed choice and confident in their good judgment, thought they would make one that would at least take us a long way toward their not being easy prey to the temptation of drug use.

Well, in the interval I have succeeded at the legislative level in the State in enacting a number of programs authorizing and directing drug education. And I think we all can take legislative if not judicial notice of the fact that many of those educational programs, however well intended, really were not very productive. They certainly didn't produce the result that I had hoped for. And at the same time patterns of drug use have changed enormously in the interval.

This country has a drug problem, and we are in the process of attempting to quantify it, to give it dimensions. And suddenly there is a fever pitch—it finally climbed to the top of every public opinion survey in 1986. When the public led, Congress got right out and followed and, even though we have violated all the rules of good legislative process, managed to throw together in haste some fairly useful legislation in the form of the 1986 Anti-drug Abuse Act.

I mention that because I think that once again we are spread thin, overworked, and suddenly this committee is compelled to enter into an area that is somewhat beyond our jurisdiction.

Let me indicate that I stipulate, as I have several times on the floor, in debate, for example, on the Mexican certification resolution and the debate upon this matter, the Wilson-Nunn amendment, that we have not begun to do nearly enough in the way of curtailing demand. And I've heard interesting testimony this morning from the witnesses. I've heard in some respects even more interesting comments and questions from my colleagues.

And there is no question that some drug education has been effective. I can think of some programs that have been extremely effective that cost less both in time and in money and in effort than the kind of remedial effort, the rehabilitative effort, that is involved in the most successful of the rehabilitation programs. Phoenix House, for example, was a pioneer in this area. Phoenix patients take up a 9 to 15 month residence, and take advantage of one-on-one counseling in almost a boot camp existence. And what it really is aimed at doing is trying to provide someone in need of the help, the kind of support that they haven't been able to get from their friends and family. That is a very difficult, very expensive, very time-consuming process. And even with those that spend the time in that residential setting and subject themselves to that kind of familiar pressure and the necessity to be honest with themselves, the success rate of people staying clean is about 75 percent.

So, there is every reason to engage in prevention, and let us stipulate that we need to do more to curtail demand. Let us also stipulate that whatever interest we may as individuals have as generalists seeking to address this pernicious threat, which I think is probably the most serious threat to our national security, is beyond the jurisdiction of this committee. It is an easy and simplistic thing to say that if there were not demand, if we were not the market, there would be no problem and we wouldn't have to worry about interdicting supply. You could also say if there were no supply, we wouldn't have to worry about there being demand, and that would be just about as useful.

The fact of the matter is there exists a connection. And we have been looking at a number of econometric studies that seek to try to evaluate what increasing the costs to smugglers will do. I think that what we have to understand is that we need to make monumental efforts as a society, and there is a role for government in the curtailment of demand.

But we have a caucus in the Senate that is specifically concerned with the overall problem of drug use. The problem that we are focusing upon this morning is what role there can be for the military in the interdiction of supply, and the reason that we are focused upon it is because, obviously, there is a relationship between supply and demand.

The flood of drugs coming into the country has made it contradict a number of the rules. We are now seeing a flood of cheap drugs. And I would ask my friends on the committee to focus for a moment on the situation that I think they will agree is a frightening one. The gangs in Los Angeles, unlike the mafia, now have begun a decentralization of a very profitable corporate business. They have moved throughout the West, into the Midwest, and represent a truly national crime problem. It isn't like the mafia families that carve out a territory and respect one another. These gangs have become a part of a wholesale and retail drug apparatus that truly requires a national response. And among the things that the caucus, of which I am a member, is concerned about is whether or not we're making an adequate effort providing sufficient prosecutors to deal with this truly national threat.

My point is simply this. I think that if you talk to Admiral Yost, you will find that he thinks that putting Coast Guardsmen on Navy vessels, to quote the testimony that I heard him give the other day, has vastly amplified the effectiveness of the Coast Guard in being able to interdict the supply of drugs coming through the choke points in the Caribbean.

We also have been told time and again by the DEA and by Customs that they think the results of the pressure in the Southeast has been to divert the traffic to the Southwest, and that most of the smuggling is coming in by air over the Mexican border. That is why it has been on the minds of so many people to seek to employ these assets.

And I commend the chairman for not only the language, but really the philosophy behind the language that was inserted in a lot of this bill that spoke of the special expertise of the military in using airborne radar to dispatch fixed and rotor wing aircraft. We have taken this action because civil law enforcement authorities have indicated that they need material support for the task of interdicting the supply of drugs.

Now, it might be nice if Customs and DEA had AWACS, had their own air force, but that isn't going to happen. We all know that it isn't going to happen. We all know that we do have these assets in the military. And the point that Senator Gramm was making I think is valid one. There is training for the military in performing these missions.

Let me, having made that lengthy opening statement, ask just two or three questions. Has there been any effort made, as far as you're aware, to determine the amount, Mr. Bowsher, of cocaine, heroin and marijuana that is smuggled into the country by air? Can you give us any kind of reliable statistics?

Mr. BOWSHER. Mr. Jones tells me that they are trying to track that data, but they are not overly confident that there is reliable data on that subject. In other words, they do believe that more of it is coming in, as you pointed out Senator Wilson, but they don't have a great deal of confidence in the data on how it is coming in. But I think the general trends you outlined probably are right.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I don't know when we're going to hear from Commissioner von Rabb or Mr. Lawn of the DEA. They clearly feel from the testimony they've given to the caucus that it is very useful to amplify their capability with the kind of assets and manpower that we are talking about. Mr. Bowsher and Mr. Jones clearly feel that there is a tremendous amount coming in and that we are getting very little of it. They typically speak of flights coming in without a flight plan, without lights at night, and easily able to penetrate the radar screen we have because of all the holes in it along that 1,900 mile border.

They do not feel, as I think so many of my colleagues seem to have expressed this morning, that all effort at interdiction is simply an exercise in vain. They do not feel that way. And it seems to me that no one is really in a position to contradict their optimism that more successful efforts can, in fact, make life more difficult for those engaged in the smuggling and, in fact, not withstanding—and we haven't yet heard from Mr. Reuter of RAND, but I have examined as summary of his report, the testimony that he has brought before us this morning.

And I don't think this can be dealt with in a purely econometric way. I think that we're talking about not only influencing behavior of fifth and six graders who are the market, but I also think that we're talking about influencing the behavior of people who admittedly are making an enormous profit that makes it a temptation to incur risks.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wilson, I don't want to interrupt, but we've got two more witnesses.

Senator WILSON. Well, I'm eager to hear them, Mr. Chairman, so I will subside.

But the point that I wish to make is that I really think that we need to find out from those who are directly involved in interdiction, who have that as their assigned mission—and if they can't justify the kind of assistance that we are seeking for them, then I think that that's relevant. But really what I've heard this morning, it seems to me, has painted a rather deceptive picture and one that I think their testimony needs to at least be made available to challenge.

Chairman NUNN. Senator DeConcini in the Appropriations Committee is having a hearing this afternoon, and I believe that both the Coast Guard and Customs are going to appear. And I would invite any members to attend. I'm sure he would be pleased to have them attend, and I'm sure that he'd be glad to accept any questions.

You know, we've had to impose our hearings on top of everything else. And we just aren't going to be able to hear from everybody. I have heard over and over from Customs and the Coast Guard and DEA, and I'm sure all of us have in other committees. So, I think their testimony and their views will be well known to this committee, but we're not going to be able to have hearings and hear from everybody we want to. We're just out of time.

Mr. Bowsher, we appreciate very much your being here and your staff. We appreciate the work you've done. We would like to keep the record open for questions, and we would like for you to work with us. I've talked to Congressman Aspin and Senator Warner, and we would like for your staff to help work with us as we try to draft something in conference that increases the effectiveness of the military services in interdiction and does it in a prudent way.

Mr. BOWSHER. We would be pleased to work with you and the committee on this.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Mr. BOWSHER. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Congressman Stratton, did you have any questions? We've got two more witnesses here. We're delighted to have you here.

Mr. STRATTON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, but I appreciate the opportunity to sit in on these discussions.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you for being here.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would simply add that I don't know of any public servant that has a higher degree of credibility before the Congress than Mr. Bowsher, and we've seen an exemplary chapter in your career today. We thank you.

Mr. BOWSHER. Thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. We do have two other witnesses. We have asked them to appear as a panel. One of them is the former DEA, Drug Enforcement Administration, operations chief, Mr. Frank Monastero. We have also Dr. Peter Reuter who is a project manager at RAND Corporation and has just issued a report. And we are pleased to have both of you here this morning.

We have had excellent attendance this morning, and we've had a lot of questions, so we are running behind time. But we want to hear fully from our next two witnesses. And I'm not going to interrupt you, and we will let you proceed in making your statements this morning. Dr. Reuter, would you like to proceed?

## STATEMENT OF PETER REUTER, PROJECT MANAGER, RAND CORP.

Dr. REUTER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. I'm a senior economist in the Washington office of the RAND Corporation. The views I will express here today are my own. They do not necessarily represent those of the RAND Corporation or any of its research sponsors.

In 1986 the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy requested that RAND carry out an analysis of the consequences of further increasing military involvement in drug interdiction, focusing particularly on how this might affect the consumption of cocaine and marijuana. A report was prepared within RAND's National Defense Research Institute, and was published in February. I will summarize the principal findings of that report in my testimony today, spending most of my time on the cocaine results.

As has already been discussed at the hearing today, interdiction expenditures have grown substantially since 1981 and seizures have also grown dramatically. Whereas in 1981 interdictors seized less than about 1.7 tons of cocaine, the total may have been as high as 27 tons in 1986. Even though total cocaine imports increased rapidly over the same period, it seemed certain that the seizure rate was much higher in 1986 than in 1981. Indeed, it has already been suggested that the seizure rate may have been as high as one-fifth.

Nonetheless, not only did total imports apparently increase, but the price of cocaine, both at the import and retail levels fell rapidly. By late 1986 large shipments of cocaine were selling for only $20,000 per kilogram in Miami, compared to about $55,000 in 1981. By December 1987, the price had fallen still further to about $15,000 per kilo. At the retail level, broken down into one gram units, the kilo price fell from about $600,000 to $250,000 between 1981 and 1986.

Interdiction affects the consumption of cocaine in the United States by raising its price. No one seriously claims that interdiction can control the amount of drugs physically able to reach this Nation. There are simply too many experienced smugglers, as well as too many producers and refiners, for that to be feasible. Interdiction might be able to make smuggling costs so high that U.S. consumers want less and thus less is delivered, but interdiction cannot be so effective that, say, only 100 tons of cocaine is able to reach our shores. Thus we need to look at how interdiction raises smuggler's costs and eventually the price of cocaine for users.

There are four primary costs of smuggling: drugs, personnel, transportation and corruption. Not only are each of them currently modest compared to the retail price of cocaine, but it is hard to see how they can be made significantly higher.

Drugs are cheap to produce. The leaf that goes into making a kilogram of cocaine costs about $1,000 to buy and not much more goes into the refining process itself. Fully 99 percent of the price of the drug when it sells on the streets in the United States is accounted for by payments to people who distribute it.

Seizing cocaine close to the source thus imposes little penalty on the drug distribution system. The drugs are cheap to replace. A kilo seized on the beaches in Colombia in 1987 probably cost less than $5,000 to replace, including the costs of getting it from the refinery to the point of export. Even by the time it has made it out of Colombia into Mexico or the Bahamas, it probably costs less than $15,000. These are substantially lower figures than those that applied in 1981.

One result of that is it seems likely that smugglers will now spend less to protect their drugs. Precautions are expensive. The smuggler whose cocaine costs $10,000 per kilo will spend more to protect it, for example, looking for the greedy local sheriff, than will a smuggler whose replacement cost is only $5,000 per kilo. The second smuggler may also find it sensible to send larger shipments in a single load. The transportation costs are the same for a 200 kilo shipment in a private plane as for a 100 kilo shipment. A smuggler who wants to get across 200 kilograms a month will be more likely to do it in one rather than two shipments when the price of cocaine falls. Thus, a lower price for cocaine in Colombia will induce smugglers to send larger shipments by methods that are more vulnerable to the interdictors. The increasing seizure rate of the recent years may represent not only improving performance on the part of the interdictors, but also simply the change in the economic incentives of smugglers.

Simple arithmetic shows how little seizure of the drug itself at the import level can affect the retail price of cocaine. Assume for the amount that instead of seizing roughly 20 percent of all cocaine shipped from Colombia, the interdiction agencies are able to seize 50 percent. The present retail price is approximately $250,000 which includes compensation for the current losses. If an additional 30 percent of those drugs are now seized at the point of import, the kilos sold in the street must incur an additional $6,000 in replacement costs assuming that a kilo costs the smuggler as much as $20,000 to replace. Thus, our very successful drug seizures program would have added less than 3 percent to the retail price of cocaine.

An analysis of labor costs is no more encouraging. The problem here is simply that the smugglers of cocaine need very little skilled expensive labor per kilogram. Even if their workers demand high compensation for the risks of long prison terms, it will have little effect on the landed price of the drug.

Consider the pilot who flies in 250 kilogram shipments over the Mexican border. A fair guess is that he now receives $250,000 for incurring the risks of both of attempting to land under difficult conditions and of going to prison. Assume now that we have much more effective interdiction, so the probability of the pilot getting caught rises substantially and/or he faces a longer prison term if caught. The pilot in response triples his demand and now will make the trip only if paid $750,000. This still adds only $2,000 to the per kilograms cost of bringing cocaine to the United States, less than 1 percent of the retail price.

The problem of interdiction is made even more complicated, as suggested earlier in the hearing today, by the fact that smugglers have shown an ability to adapt to changes in the strategies of interdictors. When in the early 1980s the Customs Service improved its radar surveillance of the south Florida coasts, which was then the primary entry point for both cocaine and marijuana, smugglers changed their methods of bringing in the drugs. For example, cocaine smugglers shifted much of their traffic to other routes. In particular, there seems to have been a substantial increase in the amount of cocaine brought in through Mexico. Once in Mexico—and there are few barriers to entry from the south of that country—the drug may be brought across by small plane, private vehicle or even by sea at relatively low risk.

We attempted to take all of these matters into account by creating a formal mathematical model to look at the interaction between smugglers and interdictors. In the model, interdictors seized increasing quantities of cocaine, even increasing shares of total shipments. They were, however, unable to rescue total consumption by more than 5 percent when they could raise the risk for almost every mode of bringing in the drug. And there lies the rub. It is hard to see how all the many and disparate methods of bringing in the very compact drug could be made very risky.

In building a model, we tried to make assumptions that generally favored the interdictors relative to the smugglers. Yet, it still proved very difficult to raise smugglers' costs enough to greatly increase the retail price of cocaine and thus reduce total consumption. When we raised the risk of capture along one of the 11 routes that we suggested smugglers had available to them, from about one-fifth to one-half, smugglers negated this by shifting to other routes, and their costs rose by less than 2 percent of their total costs, or about $117 per kilo. It was only when 10 routes out of the 11 became high risks that smugglers' costs rose by enough to substantially reduce consumption. As more routes became high risk, an increasing share of total shipments were coming over the Mexican land border.

The analysis that I've just described still suggests that more interdiction, even when smugglers adapt, ought to raise prices. Yet, more intense interdiction since 1981 has been accompanied by declining prices contrary both to intuition and simulations that I have just reported. The explanation may lie in the phenomenon of learning by doing, the fact that most individuals and organizations get better at their job the longer they do it. This is the basis for the famous strategy of the Boston consulting group in the 1970s, investing in the learning curve.

Our conjecture—and it is admittedly not more than that—is that the rapid growth of the cocaine market has increased the number of experienced smugglers and that this has driven down the cost of bringing cocaine to the United States. Experienced smugglers can control their risks better than novices. They know more about the particular risks of importing, have better connections with corrupt officials, can obtain better credit from their suppliers, et cetera. In the early days, pre-1980, there were relatively few experienced smugglers. And they could not, without raising their risks a great deal provide enough cocaine for the entire market. Thus the price of cocaine smuggling was determined by the marginal smuggler who was a novice trying to become a veteran.

In fact, many novices do become veterans. Interdiction does better against novices than experienced smugglers precisely because the latter are better at avoiding interdictors. But if enough novices make it through, at least when the market is expanding as it has, the stock of experience may grow relative to the size of the market. With enough experienced smugglers in the business, they can now supply the entire market, and the price of smuggling services falls. This seems like a plausible account of why the cocaine import price has tumbled by over two-thirds since 1981.

One unintended and unfortunate consequence that emerges from systematic analysis of interdiction concerns the source countries. Interdiction can impose costs on smugglers in a variety of ways. But inasmuch as it is based on the seizure of drugs, rather than raising personnel or tranportation costs, it will increase the earnings of the source country producers, thus exacerbating the problems with which the U.S. Government is urging the source country governments to deal.

The temptation to reach for the military is understandable. The services have vast quantities of equipment designed to ensure that we can see our enemy, rapidly close in on him once seen and then destroy him if he does not then agree to follow our orders. Surely the services must be able to do this against drug smugglers, still not a very high technology foe, if they are to be competent against the Nation's better-armed strategic adversaries.

The problem is that smugglers have a different set of goals from those of America's other adversaries and that drug interdiction efforts require acceptance of certain constraints that do not apply in wartime. Smugglers do not seek to cross the border in large numbers in a short period of time. They seek instead to enter in a steady flow, disburse once they are over the border, and never reassemble. More importantly, this Nation is not willing to impose the strict entry requirements that are almost an automatic feature of wartime. We still wish to permit regular commerce and tourism. Long delays at the Mexican border for commercial traffic, such as resulted from Operations Intercept and Alliance, are regarded as intolerable for any length of time. Pleasure craft owners are not going to take easily to increased restrictions on their activities for the sake of catching a few extra drug smugglers.

Thus, the heart of the problem, especially after adaptation to more stringent interdiction, is telling smuggler from innocent. Data from the Coast Guard, which has sole jurisdiction from outside U.S. territorial waters, sometimes with Navy equipment, point to the problem. Even when the Coast Guard has prior information that a vessel may be carrying drugs, only one out of eight of those boarded is found to have drugs. That is about five times higher than the agency's success rate when it has no prior information. This points, however, to the difficulty even with intelligence of knowing just who is a smuggler.

The military services can ensure that the Coast Guard will see more vessels and can pursue more of them for boarding. But it cannot at the moment do much to help the maritime services distinguish the undistinguishable. Smugglers do not need distinctive equipment and can readily blend in with other traffic. As a result, the book of hull types issued to the Coast Guard commanders is a thick one. Alas, in this case, the thicker the book, the less the information that it imparts.

Maritime interdiction has primarily been oriented toward catching marijuana smugglers and has certainly made smuggling from the Atlantic coast of Colombia a fairly risky business. But an increasing amount of cocaine now also seems to move by sea and represents a much more difficult target than does marijuana. A 100 kilogram shipment of cocaine is more difficult to detect once the boat is boarded than is a 5 ton cargo of marijuana. Thus, even if the military does increase the number of ships seen, halted and searched, it it likely the cost of smuggling cocaine by sea will remain modest.

The military problem here is unfortunately similar to that faced by the United States when attempting interdiction against North Vietnamese supply routes into South Vietnam. It is the very simplicity of the enemy's needs and technology that makes interdiction difficult. There are no large fixed targets whose destruction makes a difference. Smuggling organizations also show the decentralization, adaptability and capacity to camouflage themselves in the civilian traffic and population that made the Viet Cong such an elusive target.

It is difficult to see how increased interdiction effort aimed at the cocaine traffic can much reduce total consumption of that drug even in the long run. None of the factors that are required for smuggling, drugs, couriers and equipment, are in short supply. All are relatively cheap. Given our unwillingness to control all border traffic tightly, we must accept that the borders will be vulnerable to the low cost importation of compact drugs such as cocaine and heroin. The solution of the cocaine problem will have to be found within the Nation's borders.

I'll be happy to answer any questions

[The prepared statement of Dr. Reuter follows:]

# Statement
# of
# Peter Reuter
# The RAND Corporation
# Santa Monica, California

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. I am a senior economist in Washington Office of the RAND Corporation. The views I will express here today, however, are my own; they do not necessarily represent those of the RAND Corporation or any of its research sponsors.

In 1986, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy requested that RAND carry out an analysis of the consequences of further increasing military involvement in drug interdiction, focusing particularly on how this might influence the consumption of cocaine and marijuana. A report was prepared within RAND's National Defense Research Institute and was published in February. I will summarize the principal findings of that report in my testimony to-day, spending most of my time on the cocaine results.

As interdiction expenditures have grown since 1981, the amounts of cocaine seized have also grown dramatically. Whereas in 1981 interdictors seized less than 1 ton of cocaine, the total may have been as high as 27 tons in 1986. Even though total cocaine imports increased rapidly over that same period, it seems certain that in 1986 a very much larger share of shipments to the U.S. were seized than in 1981; the interdiction seizure rate in 1986 may have been as high as one fifth. (CHART 1) Nonetheless, not only did total imports apparently increase but the price of cocaine, both at the import and retail levels, fell rapidly. By late 1986, large shipments of cocaine were selling for only $20,000 per kilogram in Miami, compared to about $55,000 per kilogram in 1981. By December 1987, the price had fallen still further to about $15,000 per kilo. (CHART 2) At the retail level, broken down into one gram units, the kilo price fell from about $600,000 to $250,000 between 1981 and 1986.

The recent past suggests that interdiction, even if it produces high seizures, will do little to cut cocaine imports. Some concerns have been voiced that the interdiction agencies are not making the best use of the resources already at their disposal. Equally important is what might be achieved from more effective interdiction, whether using military or non-military resources? The RAND study showed that it is extremely difficult to reduce cocaine consumption in this country by even as much as 5 percent through more stringent interdiction. The problem lies in the adaptability of smugglers, the variety of methods by which cocaine may be brought into the United States, and the cheapness of both drugs and labor for smugglers.

## Smugglers' Costs

Interdiction affects the consumption of cocaine in the U.S. by raising its price. Noone seriously claims that interdiction can any longer control the amount of drugs physically able to reach this nation. There are simply too many experienced smugglers, as well as too many producers and refiners, for that to be feasible. Interdiction may be able to make smuggling costs so high that U.S. consumers want less and thus less is delivered, but interdiction cannot be so effective that, say, only 100 tons of cocaine is able to reach our shores. Thus we need to look at how interdiction raises smugglers costs and, eventually, the price of cocaine for users.

There are four primary costs of smuggling: drugs, personnel, transportation, and corruption. Not only are each of them currently modest (compared to the retail price of cocaine), but it is hard to see how they can be made significantly higher.

Drugs are cheap to produce. The leaf that goes into making a kilogram of cocaine costs about $1,000 to buy and not much more goes into the refining process itself. Fully 99 percent of the price of the drug when it sells on the streets in the United States is accounted for by payments to people who distribute it.

Seizing cocaine close to the source thus imposes little penalty on the drug distribution system. The drugs are cheap to replace. A kilo seized on the beaches in Colombia in 1987 probably cost less than $5,000 to replace, including the costs of getting it from the refinery to the point of export. Even by the time it has made it out of Colombia into Mexico or to the Bahamas, it probably costs less than $15,000. These are substantially lower figures than those that applied in 1981.

As a result it seems likely that smugglers now will spend less to protect their drugs. Precautions are expensive. A smuggler whose cocaine costs $10,000 per kilo will spend more to protect it (for example, looking for the greedy local sheriff) than will a smuggler whose replacement cost is only $5,000 per kilo. He may also find it sensible to send larger shipments in a single load. The transportation costs are the same for a 200 kilo shipment in a private plane as for a 100 kilo shipment. The pilot's risk of long term imprisonment is also the same. A smuggler who wants to get across 200 kilograms a month will be more likely to do it in one, rather than two, shipments when the price of cocaine falls.

Thus a lower price for cocaine in Colombia will induce smugglers to send larger shipments by methods that are more vulnerable to the interdictors. The increasing seizure rate of recent years may represent not only improving performance on the part of the interdictors but also the change in the economic incentives of smugglers.

Simple arithmetic shows how little the seizure of the drug itself can affect the retail price of cocaine. Assume for the moment that instead of seizing 20 percent of all cocaine shipped from Colombia, the interdiction agencies were able to seize 50 percent. The present retail price is approximately $250,000, which includes compensation for lost drugs. If an additional 30 percent of drugs are now seized, the kilo sold in the street must incur an additional $6,000 in replacement costs, assuming that a kilo costs the smuggler as much as \$20,000 to replace. Thus our very successful drug seizure program would have added less than 3 percent to the retail price of cocaine.

An analysis of labor costs is no more encouraging. The problem here is simply that smugglers of cocaine need very little skilled labor per kilogram. Even if their workers demand high compensation for the risks of long prison terms, it will have little effect on the landed price of the drug.

Consider the pilot who flies in 250 kilogram shipments over the Mexican border. A fair guess is that he now receives about \$250,000 for incurring the risks of the business, both of attempting to land under difficult conditions and of going to prison. Assume now that we have much more effective interdiction, i.e. the probability of a pilot getting caught substantially rises and/or he faces a much longer prison term if caught. The pilot then triples his demands and now will make the trip only if paid \$750,000. This adds only \$2,000 to the per kilogram cost of bringing cocaine to the U.S., less than 1 percent of the retail price.

The tale is even more discouraging when we consider the other types of labor used by smugglers. Pilots presumably value their freedom fairly highly; they have, after all, prospects of reasonable earnings in legitimate positions. The same cannot be said for crewmen on ships coming up from Colombia. Their earnings from other employment may be very modest indeed and the rigors of a U.S. federal prison may not appear too daunting when compared to life on a Colombian fishing vessel. They already face at least a one in nine chance of being arrested on any marijuana smuggling trip and the federal judiciary is not lenient in these matters; in South Florida the average 1986 sentence was 46 months for those caught by the Coast Guard. Nonetheless, it is believed (unfortunately a stronger statement is not possible) that the crew members earn only about \$15,000 each for taking the trip; the master may get as much as $25,000. Total crew costs are probably between $100,000 and $150,000. Even if better interdiction were to double this, it still would add little to the cost of bringing in a kilo of cocaine, assuming that smugglers are willing to put aboard 100 kilograms at a time.

## Adaptation

The problem of interdiction is made even more complicated by the fact that smugglers have shown an ability to adapt to changes in the strategies of interdictors. When, in the early 1980's, the Customs Service improved its radar surveillance of the South Florida Coast, then the primary entry point for both cocaine and marijuana, smugglers changed their methods of bringing in the drugs.

In the case of marijuana, as the Coast Guard increased its efforts against sea-borne traffic into southern Florida, the smugglers shifted to smaller loads. Whereas the average seizure in 1978 was 9.0 tons, by 1986 that had fallen to 4.6 tons. The result was an enormous dilution of the efficacy of maritime interdiction. It takes the same resources to interdict a 5 ton shipment as to interdict a 20 ton shipment, particularly since the Coast Guard vessels must generally tow the smuggler back to shore for legal processing within a few days. Thus by halving the size of the average shipment, the smugglers practically doubled the task confronting interdiction agencies. Indeed, since smugglers now could use smaller boats, the interdictors had to sort through a larger number of potential smuggling vessels.

Similarly, cocaine smugglers shifted much of their traffic to other routes. In particular, there seems to have been a substantial increase in the amount of cocaine brought in through Mexico. Once in Mexico, and there are few barriers to entry from the south of that country, the drug may be brought across by small plane, private vehicle or even by sea at relatively low risk.

## Simulation Results

An effort to simulate the effect of increasingly effective interdiction, through a formal mathematical model, indicated little impact on U.S. cocaine consumption. In the model, interdictors seized increasing quantities of cocaine, even increasing shares of total shipments. They were, however, only able to reduce total consumption by more than 5 percent when they could raise the risks for almost every mode of bringing in the drug. And there lies the rub; it is hard to see how all the many and disparate methods of bringing in the very compact drug could be made very risky.

We built a model in which smugglers had to make a choice among different routes for bringing in cocaine. Each route was associated with a particular combination of risk and transportation/personnel costs. As the interdictors raised risks along a particular route, the smugglers were induced to shift away from that route and send more of their shipments along alternative routes. Raising the probability of interdiction increases the smuggler's costs since he must now face higher drug replacement, transportation, and labor costs. With little hard data available, assumptions were made that favored the interdictors. For example, we assumed that labor costs were very sensitive to risk, so that raising the risk of being caught from one-quarter to one-half led to a quadrupling of the amount a pilot could demand for making the trip.

Even with these favorable assumptions, it proved very difficult to raise smugglers' costs enough to greatly increase the retail price of cocaine and thus reduce total consumption. In the model, smugglers had 11 routes available to them, 5 by air, 5 by sea and one by land; the land route represented transshipment through Mexico. The choices are shown pictorially in CHART 3. The interdictors were assumed to be able to raise risks on all the routes except the land route, in which the drug is, in effect, walked or driven across the border in small shipments. The probability of a shipment getting caught on the land route stayed fixed at 10 percent but other costs (particularly personnel) were assumed to be relatively high. This represents our pessimism that it is possible to do much about movement across the Mexican land border.

When we raised the risk of capture along one route from about one-fifth to one-half, smugglers negated this by shifting to other routes; their costs rose by less than 2 percent, or about $117 per kilo. It was only when six out of 11 routes were subject to the high risk that costs rose by more than 10 percent. Finally, when all 10 of the non-land routes became high risk smugglers' costs per kilo rose by $7663 or about 3 percent of the retail price. As more routes become high risk, an increasing share of total shipments were coming over the Mexican land border.

## Learning by Doing

The analysis described above still suggests that more interdiction, even when smugglers adapt, raises prices. Yet more intense interdiction since 1981 has been accompanied by declining prices, contrary both to intuition and the simulation reported above. The explanation may lie in the phenomenon of "learning by doing" i.e. the fact that most individuals and organizations get better at their job the longer they do it. This is the basis for the famous strategy of the Boston Consulting Group in the early 1970's "investing in the learning curve".

Our conjecture, and it is no more than that, is that the rapid growth of the cocaine market has increased the number of experienced smugglers and that this has driven down the cost of bringing cocaine to the United States. Experienced smugglers can control their risks better than novices; they know more about the risks of particular methods of importing, have better connections with corrupt officials, can obtain better credit from their suppliers etc. In the early days (pre-1980), there were relatively few experienced smugglers and they could not, without raising their risks a great deal, provide enough cocaine for the entire market. Thus the price of cocaine smuggling was determined by the marginal smuggler, who was a novice trying to become a veteran.

Novices, if they are not caught, eventually become experienced. Interdiction does better against novices than experienced smugglers, precisely because the latter are better at avoiding interdictors. But if enough novices make it through, at least when the market is expanding rapidly, the stock of experience may grow relative to the size of the market. With enough experienced smugglers in the business, they can now supply the entire market and the price for smuggling services falls. This seems like a plausible account of why the cocaine import price has tumbled perhaps two-thirds since 1981.

## Source Country Incomes

One unintended and unfortunate consequence that emerges from systematic analysis of interdiction concerns the source countries. Interdiction can impose costs on smugglers in a variety of ways but inasmuch as it is based on the seizure of drugs rather than raising personnel or transportation costs, it will increase the earnings of source country producers, thus exacerbating the problems with which the U.S. government is urging the source country governments to deal.

Seizures will generally raise total shipments from the source countries. Those additional shipments can only be obtained by raising the price paid to coca growers and refiners. Thus the increased seizures will raise source country income. Of course, higher seizures will raise smuggler costs and thus reduce demand, but only under special circumstances will the price increase reduce demand by more than enough to compensate for the seizure itself.

It is not inevitable that more successful interdiction increases export demand. If interdiction can make smugglers take more precautions and raise their non-drug costs (personnel, transportation or corruption payments), then it will reduce total shipments. It is difficult to determine whether that is a distinction in goals that can be achieved in practice.

### The Military Role

The temptation to reach for the military is understandable. The services have vast quantities of equipment designed to ensure that we can see our enemy, rapidly close in on him once seen, and destroy him if he does not then agree to follow our orders. Surely the services must be able to do this against drug smugglers, still not a very high technology foe, if they are to be competent against the nation's better-armed strategic adversaries.

The problem is that smugglers have a very different set of goals from those of America's other adversaries, and that drug interdiction efforts require acceptance of certain constraints that do not apply in war time. Smugglers do not seek to cross the border in large numbers in a short period of time. They seek instead to enter in a steady flow, disburse once they are over the border, and never reassemble. More importantly, this nation is not willing to impose the strict entry requirements that are an almost automatic feature of wartime. We still wish to permit regular commerce and tourism. Long delays at the Mexican border for commercial traffic, such as resulted from Operations Intercept and Alliance, are regarded as intolerable for any length of time. Pleasure craft owners are not going to take easily to increased restrictions on their activities for the sake of catching a few extra drug smugglers.

Thus the heart of the problem, especially after adaptation to more stringent interdiction, is telling smuggler from innocent. Data from the Coast Guard, which has sole jurisdiction outside U.S. territorial waters (sometimes with Navy equipment), point to the problem. Even when the Coast Guard has prior information that a vessel may be carrying drugs, only one out of eight of those boarded is found to have drugs. That is about five times higher than the agency's success rate when it has no prior information. It points, however, to the difficulty, even with intelligence, of knowing just who is a smuggler.

The military services can ensure that the Coast Guard will see more vessels and can pursue more of them for boarding, but it cannot do much to help the maritime services distinguish the undistiguishable. Smugglers do not need distinctive equipment and can readily blend in with other traffic. As a result, the book of hull types issued to Coast Guard commanders is a thick one; the thicker the book, in this case, the less the information it imparts.

Maritime interdiction has primarily been oriented toward catching marijuana smugglers and has certainly made smuggling from the Atlantic coast of Colombia a fairly risky business. But an increasing amount of cocaine now also seems to move by sea and represents a much more difficult target than does marijuana. A 100 kilogram shipment of cocaine is much harder to detect, once the boat is boarded, than is a 5 ton cargo of marijuana. Thus even if the military does increase the number of ships seen, halted, and searched, it is likely that the cost of smuggling cocaine by sea will remain modest.

The military problem here is unfortunately similar to that faced by the U.S. when attempting interdiction against North Vietnamese supply routes into South Vietnam. It is the very simplicity of the enemy's needs and technology that makes interdiction difficult. There are no large fixed targets whose destruction makes a difference. Smuggling organizations also show the decentralization, adaptability and capacity to camouflage themselves in the civilian traffic and population that made the Viet Cong such an elusive target.

## CONCLUSION

I have limited my testimony primarily to cocaine, since that is the drug which is generating the greatest concern at the moment. We also simulated increasingly stringent interdiction against marijuana. The model showed that interdiction could accomplish more in reducing imports of that drug. Unfortunately, we were not able to include a model of the domestic production sector and it is clear that the effects of marijuana interdiction have been greatly mitigated by the growth of the domestic industry.

It is difficult to see how increased interdiction effort aimed at the cocaine traffic can much reduce total consumption of that drug, even in the long-run. None of the factors that are required for smuggling, (drugs, couriers and equipment) are in short supply. All are relatively cheap. Given our unwillingness to control all border traffic tightly, we must accept that the borders will be vulnerable to the low-cost importation of compact drugs such as cocaine and heroin. The solution to the cocaine problem will have to be found within the nation's borders.

I would be happy to answer any questions.



Chart 1

## Cocaine Import Price



Chart 2

## Simulating Interdiction Activities

- Smuggling costs vary among different routes
- Assignment of interdiction resources also variable


5 Sea Routes
1 Land Route
5 Air Routes

Chart 3

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Reuter. We will move ahead to our next witness so we can move along. Then we'll come back and question both of you. Mr. Monastero, we're glad to have you today.

## STATEMENT OF FRANK MONASTERO, PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF FORMER FEDERAL NARCOTICS AGENTS; AND FORMER CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Mr. MONASTERO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you'd like, I'll just submit it for the record, or if we have the time, I'd like to read it.

Chairman NUNN. We would like for you to go ahead and present it if you would.

Mr. MONASTERO. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. If you want to summarize, that will be fine.

Mr. MONASTERO. All right.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss the United States military's role in drug interdiction.

I think it is important to examine why we are here today. Why is it necessary to assess whether the military's role in combating drug abuse needs to be expanded? The simplest answer is that we perceive our Nation to be unable to stop the flow of illicit drugs from without with the resources now being applied. And the solutions range from one extreme, legalization, supposedly to remove the profit, on the one hand, to the death penalty to get rid of the pushers on the other; from programs to arrest more users to major spending increases to effectively close our borders; from empowering a Federal drug czar to strengthening local police; from increasing aid to other nations to eliminate growth to cutting off aid to those same nations for the same purpose. As each day passes, the litany of remedies gets longer.

All of these ideas, and many I haven't mentioned, have varying degrees of merit, and at some point today or in the future, it may be useful to discuss them. But in my opinion, the most useful approach would be to briefly call attention to the blueprint on which the Federal Government's approach was based at least at one point and evaluate whether perhaps the plan was flawed or, if not, whether application of the plan lacked integrity, or if perhaps like any good plan, it needed more flexibility, or a combination of these.

My experience with plans, however, leads me to another more usual option. That is, we started with a good plan and simply forgot to keep our eye on it. I don't expect that in the course of the time left we could come to any conclusions on these issues. But, nevertheless, I would call your attention to the 1984 Federal Strategy, and I have a copy here. I would say that on the whole it's an excellent document. It was issued by the President September 10, 1984, pursuant to the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, and 11 cabinet departments are listed as participants. Let me quote from page 5 under the heading "The Federal Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse."

> The first Federal Strategy was published in 1973 in response to Congressional direction for the development of a comprehensive, coordinated, long-term Federal

strategy for all drug traffic prevention functions conducted, sponsored or supported by any department or agency of the Federal Government.

The 1984 Strategy goes beyond the Federal responsibilities and establishes a comprehensive national strategy where all individuals; all business, civic and social organizations; all levels of government; and all agencies, departments and activities within each level of government are called upon to lead, direct, sponsor, and support efforts to eliminate drug abuse in families, businesses and communities.

Some of the principal headings are: "Drug Abuse Prevention," "Drug Law Enforcement," "International Cooperation," "Medical Detoxification and Treatment," "Research," and "Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Armed Forces."

In my opinion, which may not be widely shared, we forgot about it. And I'm not disagreeing with Mr. Bowsher. If you forget about something, you really don't have it. So, we really don't have a national strategy at this point.

Instead of addressing all elements of the plan, we somehow started to concentrate heavily on only certain objectives. Instead of the balance which the original document proposed, there was far greater concentration on those activities which seemed to be the short-term solutions. Show a Federal enforcement presence and make more arrests and seizures became the administration's battle cry, supported by funding enhancements by Congress, acknowledged by the media and the public. But support for increases at the prosecutor level was just a little less enthusiastic; at the judicial level, less yet; and at the corrections level, less yet. The idea of converting abandoned military bases, for instance, which the administration proposed early on, fell by the wayside as did the need for substantial and continued increases in treatment, rehabilitation and research. In any event, the plan itself was excellent though it failed to address one or two important areas. And funding and support for enforcement initiatives was generously forthcoming. One of the most amazing things about the document is few people, even so-called experts, are even aware it exists.

There are a number of issues which need to be addressed, but the one most pertinent to today's discussion has to do with enforcement's unabounding success. No, not its failure, but its success. Somehow we lost sight of the fact that arrest and seizure in and of themselves are not deterrents to crime, except for those who want to be law abiding citizens in the first place: For those committed to a life of crime, for those stimulated by greed at the cost of others' lives, for those with little opportunity otherwise, those confused by ambivalence and the mixed signals of government, any opportunity for quick, easy money is attractive. Fueled by erroneous information in the late 1970s about the benign effects of drugs like cocaine and marijuana and a strong economy in the 1980s, with our lust for freedom of choice and a lack of readiness to address the potential, we had a fire storm in no time.

We assumed that arresting traffickers would turn the tide. But revolving door justice is not a deterrent to crime. In fact, it becomes an inducement. How many times can you arrest the same person or seize the same vessel without others getting the idea that this drug business might just be the way to finance a new home or a failing business or a well-deserved retirement? What has happened? Courts are clogged. Cases are plea bargained as quickly as possible. Jails and prisons are full to the point that it's one out for one in. Well-meaning proposals are introduced to send some traffickers back to their own countries rather than to overcrowded prisons.

And what is the result? The more arrests that are made, the worse things get now to the point where in frustration we say legalize drugs. Why? Not because drugs are good, but because law enforcement has failed.

Law enforcement has not failed. DEA, Customs, Coast Guard, all of the enforcement agencies are doing a tremendous job. But without the rest of the criminal justice system working at exactly the same level of efficiency, no part of that system is really effective. And now we want to give the military a larger role in the same unbalanced process of making more arrests and seizures.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics recently released a report indicating that in 1984 the median sentence served by those released from State prison was 17 months, including prior jail credits, or 45 percent of their original court-ordered sentence. For drug trafficking offenses it was 16 months or 39 percent of the original sentence.

Making more arrests and seizures alone won't work. What will happen is that we will effectively discredit our military, as we are doing with law enforcement, with our own public and perhaps with our enemies as well. If you gentlemen had a good laugh and slept just a little easier the day a private plane flew from West Germany to Red Square, just imagine the image we create if it seems not even our great military machine can thwart these devils.

Customs and the Coast Guard and the military as well are doing a good job. More and bigger seizures are made each day. Then why doesn't it stop? Because we could do more to assist other countries. We could do more in the areas of treatment and research. We could do more in the area of prevention. Our enforcement programs could be better organized.

Drug abuse is a most complex issue. It involves the psychological and physical effects of the user, the dynamics of both a legitimate and illicit supply, the social customs and traditions of this country and many others, individual rights and governmental responsibilities, with international, diplomatic and financial ramifications. It is driven by a consumer market which has as a motivation thousands of different reasons, real and perceived, for consumption. It is supplied by not one, but thousands of networks, most with profit as a motive, but again for a thousand different reasons.

It is important that we keep a broad perspective to assure a balanced approach. For instance, we should not lose sight of the fact that from 1980 through 1987, 14 of the top 20 DAWN mentions were legitimate drugs manufactured in the United States. Doctors and pharmacies were the source for 80 to 90 percent of these diverted drugs. In fiscal year 1986, DEA recorded 509 domestic clandestine laboratory seizures. In fiscal year 1987, that figure increased to 682. Seventy-eight percent of these seizures were made in just three States: California, 42 percent; Texas, 22 percent; and Oregon, 13 percent.

The national intelligence estimate for 1987 indicates that 25 percent of the marijuana on the illicit market in the United States now comes from domestic production. Last year 113 million plants, of which 7 million were cultivated, were seized and destroyed, and the figure has increased each year. Don't you think it would be useful to know why that figure has gotten larger each year when each year more resources have been added to address the problem?

One part of the answer lies in the fact that the entire criminal justice system must be working well. Another part of the answer is that a total balanced approach is needed. As those statistics demonstrate, interdiction plays no role in this part of the problem. What does play a major part is the consumer. As long as that consumer exists, somehow some people will supply illicit drugs.

As with most crime, the best way to reduce drug abuse is to prevent it from occurring in the first place. Considerable research is needed to validate educational efforts now in use and to develop and refine programs that will work.

Research is needed to expand treatment alternatives and to provide treatment opportunity. Social programs and prison alternatives are needed. We can't think in terms of putting everyone in prison. On the other hand, and as unfortunate as it may seem, there are those we simply don't know how to rehabilitate, as one treatment expert said, because they have never been habilitated in the first place. Those people, both juveniles and adults, with criminal records which show a consistent appetite for crime, must be imprisoned for long periods.

We must have comprehensive national policies toward those countries which are the source of illicit drugs. In my opinion in most cases help and assistance is the best approach. But that assistance must be provided recognizing that drug abuse is among the top three priorities which our Government has when we deal with key source and transit countries. Stopping production at the source can be the most effective approach. But simple eradication or crop substitution is not the answer. We must help to build and support a total system to address societal problems, just as we need to do in our own country, before eradication will be effective. And just as at home, our effort must be sustained.

If there has been one area of neglect, it has been our failure to have a pro-active plan sanctioned at the highest level of the State Department toward source countries when they were still only potential source countries. Let me quote again from the 1984 strategy under the heading "Priorities."

> The 1984 Strategy continues to be concerned with the widespread social and health problems created by the abuse of a number of drugs. The highest priority in the 1970s was given to heroin, the drug perceived to be "most dangerous," with the understanding that as use and abuse patterns changed, it would be useful to modify older priorities and reallocate resources accordingly. Opiate abuse still causes serious problems in terms of criminality and personal suffering and the 1984 Strategy continues to recognize the need for a strong response to heroin. However, intensified use patterns and recent research leave little doubt that cocaine is potentially as destructive to health as heroin.

We knew before 1984 where that potential was and we knew then that Colombia, Peru and Bolivia would need much more assistance than they were provided. Granted Peru was a special situation then, but Bolivia was opened to any action plan, and despite the gallant effort of our Ambassador, we failed to respond adequately. In my opinion the Secretary of State and, by the way, all of those before him as well failed to see that he needed to lead in developing our foreign policy to address drug abuse just as much as he clearly saw that need with respect to our national security.

We need a working criminal justice system, as I mentioned earlier, one which will demonstrate that law enforcement can be effective. And a part of effective law enforcement is interdiction. There is no question that the Defense Department can and has already played a role in interdiction as they have in assisting other programs. And there is no question that local police, for the most part, and the public as well, want the military even more involved. But in our system of government, it is up to the elected officials to gain a thorough understanding of the issues and make appropriate choices. Sometimes those decisions are not popular, but that doesn't make them any less right. Interdiction is a critical part of the overall strategy, but we should not mislead ourselves into thinking it is worth more than other elements, some of which have been neglected.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Monastero follows:]

Statement of

Frank Monastero
Former Chief of Operations
Drug Enforcement Administration
Current President
Association of Former Federal Narcotics Agents

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Customs and the Coast Guard and the military as well, are doing a good job. More and bigger seizures are made each day. Then why doesn't it stop? Because we could do more to assist other countries, we could do more in the areas of treatment and research, we could do more in the area of prevention. Our enforcement programs could be better organized.

Drug abuse is a most complex issue. It involves the psychological and physical effects of the user, the dynamics of both a legitimate and illicit supply, the social customs and traditions of this country and many others, individual rights and governmental responsibilities, with international, diplomatic and financial ramifications. It is driven by a consumer market which has as a motivation thousands of different reasons, real and perceived, for consumption. It is supplied by not one but thousands of networks, most with profit as a motive, but again, for a thousand different reasons.

It is important that we keep a broad perspective to assure a balanced approach. For instance we should not lose sight of the fact that from 1980 through 1987, 14 of the top 20 DAWN* mentions were legitimate drugs manufactured in the United States. Doctors and pharmacies were the source for 80 to 90% of these diverted drugs. In FY86 DEA recorded 509 domestic clandestine laboratory seizures. In FY87 that figure increased to 682. Seventy-eight percent of these seizures were made in just three states (California 42%, Texas 22.5% and Oregon 13.5%). The National Intelligence Estimate for 1987 indicates that 25% of the marijuana on the illicit market in the United States now comes from domestic production. Last year 113 million plants, of which 7 million were cultivated plants, were seized and destroyed. And the figure has increased each year. Don't you think it would be useful to know why that figure has gotten larger each year when each year more resources have been added to address the problem. One part of the answer lies in the fact that the entire criminal justice system must be working well. Another part of the answer is that a total balanced approach is needed. As those statistics demonstrate, interdiction plays no role in this part of the problem. What does play a major part is the consumer. As long as that consumer exists somehow some people will supply illicit drugs.

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*Drug abuse trends in the United States are monitored by the federal government through a system known as Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). Death and drug injury data are collected from hospital emergency rooms in 27 metropolitan areas around the country.

As with most crime, the best way to reduce drug abuse is to prevent it from occurring in the first place. Considerable research is needed to validate educational efforts now in use and to develop and refine programs that will work.

Research is needed to expand treatment alternatives and to provide treatment opportunity. Social programs and prison alternatives are needed. We can't think in terms of putting everyone in prison. On the other hand and as unfortunate as it may be, there are those we simply don't know how to rehabilitate, as one treatment expert said, because they have never been habilitated in the first place. Those people, both juveniles and adults, with criminal records which show a consistent appetite for crime, must be imprisoned for long periods.

We must have comprehensive national policies toward those countries which are the source of illicit drugs. In my opinion, in most cases help and assistance is the best approach. But that assistance must be provided, recognizing that drug abuse is among the top three priorities which our government has, when we deal with key source or trans-shipment countries. Stopping production at the source can be the most effective approach. But simple eradication or crop substitution is not the answer. We must help to build and support a total system to address societal problems, just as we need to do in our own country, before eradication will be effective. And just as at home, our effort must be sustained. On a number of occasions I have proposed that the State Department undertake to construct what might be termed an enforcement module which could be provided to countries on a loan basis for the purpose of enforcement initiatives such as interdiction and eradication.

In the United States, when DEA regularly launches its annual eradication program, they are able to approach many state and local police agencies for assistance. These agencies already have the equipment and the capacity to support certain aspects of the eradication effort. As an example, the State of Illinois has eight single wing aircraft which are used principally for traffic monitoring and control. Obviously, they have the trained personnel (trained not only as pilots, but as observers as well) to fly the aircraft, along with the necessary logistical support. DEA need only approach the Illinois authorities to arrange for their participation in the eradication program.

There are many agencies around the country which have the airplanes, helicopter, four-wheel drive vehicles, etc., needed for such an endeavor. In most other countries, where illicit crop production is a problem, the same situation does not exist. It is virtually impossible to mount an effective campaign without this type of equipment. Therefore, what I have proposed is that enforcement modules consisting of a certain number of aircraft, helicopters, trucks and other vehicles be established along with the maintenance and operating funds to support the module for perhaps one year. After an assessment of the specific need, one or more modules would be made available to the country in question for up to a two year period on a loan basis only. The stipulation would be to the effect that all equipment must be returned intact, that is, without having been cannibalized, but need not otherwise be in usable condition. This stipulation would hopefully prevent parts from being diverted for use in other ways by the country involved. At the end of the time period a new assessment could be made as to whether the loan was to be extended.

It is unrealistic to think that many of the countries involved in coca production or opium production have the capacity to deal with the problem without this kind of support.

If there has been one area of neglect it has been our failure to have a proactive plan, sanctioned at the highest level of the State Department, toward source countries when they were still only potential source countries. Let me quote again from the 1984 strategy, under the heading "Priorities".

> The 1984 Strategy continues to be concerned with the widespread social and health problems created by the abuse of a number of drugs. The highest priority in the 1970s was given to heroin, the drug perceived to be "most dangerous," with the understanding that as use and abuse patterns changed, it would be necessary to modify older priorities and reallocate resources accordingly. Opiate abuse still causes serious problems in terms os criminality and personal suffering and the 1984 Strategy continues to recognize the need for a strong response to heroin. However, intensified use patterns and recent research leave little doubt that cocaine is potentially as destructive to health as heroin.

We knew before 1984 where that potential was and we knew then that Colombia, Peru and Bolivia would need much more assistance than we were providing. Granted Peru was a special situation then but Bolivia was open to any plan of action and despite the gallant effort of our Ambassador we failed to respond adequately. In my opinion the Secretary of State and by the way all of those before him as well, failed to see that he needed to lead in developing our foreign policy to address drug abuse just as much as he clearly sees that need with respect to our national security.

We need a working criminal justice system as I mentioned earlier. One which will demonstrate that law enforcement can be effective. And a part of effective law enforcement is interdiction. There is no question that the Defense Department can and has already played a role in interdiction as they have in assisting other programs. And there is no question that local police for the most part and the public as well, want the military even more involved. But in our system of government it is up to the elected officials to gain a thorough understanding of the issues and make appropriate choices. Sometimes those decisions are not popular but that doesn't make them any less right. Interdiction is a critical part of the overall strategy. But we should not mislead ourselves into thinking its worth more than other elements, some of which have been neglected.

Chairman **NUNN**. Thank you very much.

### DRUG INTERDICTION

Just a couple of questions to the panel here. Dr. Reuter, you mentioned you have strong reservations about the ability of interdiction to decrease cocaine consumption in the United States. You also indicated you would not abandon interdiction as one element in an overall drug control strategy. Within the context, what would you do with interdiction to make it more effective?

Dr. **REUTER**. I have spent most of my time thinking about how much should be done and less about how resources should be allocated within the budget.

There are two elements that need to be taken into account more than they are now. One is the relationship between the availability of hardware for pursuit or protection, and two, the resources that actually are available to make use of that hardware.

Drug interdiction, like any other kind of interdiction, involves a four step process of surveillance, detection, pursuit, apprehension. The system only works as well as the weakest of those elements. Within the interdiction effort, there has been a lack of consideration of keeping a balance in these elements.

I notice, for example, that in at least one of the bills that is being considered here, there has been a substantial increase in appropriation for particular kinds of hardware associated with air interdiction. It is unclear to me that that is the point at which the system is most constrained at the moment. I think that there is a need for looking at the balance of all of the components before decisions are made about where the expenditures should be made.

Second, I think there is a need for adaptiveness on the part of interdictors. I've talked about adaptation by smugglers. The interdictors tend to lead rather than follow. In this case, there's something to following rather than leading. That is, as smugglers have changed their methods, it is appropriate to have interdiction resources that are less fixed and can be used more adaptively against smugglers.

For example, tethered aerostats over the southwest border look fine against the current smuggling pattern which emphasizes private planes coming over a very ill-defended border. And I'm sure the first day the tethered aerostat goes up, it will catch something or it will be relatively productive in its first days. If smugglers are as adaptive as I think they are, it will become of declining use and the resource has little use in other contexts. So, it's really a concern about having resources that are mobile and flexible and a balance amongst the resources that I think is most significant.

Chairman **NUNN**. Let me just ask both of you this question. If you had $100, just hypothetically, or $1 million, whatever number, how would you divide that money now in putting it into either interdiction—if so, what parts of interdiction—or to education, prevention, health? How would you divide it? What is a balanced program?

Dr. **REUTER**. Frank, I would be happy if you went first on that.

Mr. **MONASTERO**. Well, as I said in my statement, Senator, I think "balance" is the key word. And you would have to look at what you've given already to those programs. Some of them have been neglected substantially. Some of them are not really being neglected much at all.

Chairman NUNN. Let's say you're going to put $100 additional in on the basis of where we are now.

Mr. MONASTERO. I think if I had to make a simplistic response to that, I would say one of the things that we don't have, for instance, that we really need to make the criminal justice system work better, for instance, is a violator tracking system. We don't have a simple system to tell us which people should remain in jail for 10 years and which people should remain in jail for 2 months. That's a very simple thing that we don't have to make the criminal justice system work better.

The Customs Service—I am an aviation safety specialist now. I'm not in the drug area anymore. It's too frustrating. But if you wanted to do something for the Customs Service that was simple and the military could help in this area—somebody brought up the fact that the military hardware is a little too sophisticated. Well, it is too sophisticated for Customs, but it's there and it's available. It doesn't have to be built. So, what they need is they need to adapt their training. They need to adapt more training. The military need to provide some expertise for a short period of time to transition that equipment into the Customs Service. That would be a good use of some of the money.

Some of the money has to go to looking at these educational programs. There are literally 15 or 20 well-known, widely used educational programs in the country now directed toward drug abuse and not one of them has been validated. That would be a good use of some of the money. Let's look at some of these programs that are directed toward drug prevention and at least validate that we're going in the right direction with those programs.

So, it's hard to give you one simple answer.

Chairman NUNN. That's very helpful. Thank you.

Dr. Reuter.

Dr. REUTER. I want to follow up on that—it's hard to give one simple answer or even one complex answer. There isn't anything that would permit, no matter how bright, an observer to make a proper judgment about the allocation of resources within the drug programs because, in fact, we have never gone about collecting the kind of data that would permit us to make judgments on that basis. I have looked narrowly at one kind of program, the interdiction program, and have come up with relatively pessimistic results. I can't say what would happen if we were to shift money from interdiction to high level domestic enforcement or to low level domestic enforcement, nor can anyone else. We don't have monitoring systems that permit us to make decisions about the impact of different kinds of programs. And the National Drug Policy Board, which certainly takes its lumps for not making strategic decisions, works in a setting in which I don't think that anyone could make well-informed strategic decisions. As a researcher, I have a bias here, but I think that, in fact, one of the things that has to be done is allocate some money to developing monitoring systems that would permit the Drug Policy Board to carry out its business in an informed way.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much. Could you both submit maybe one page of supplements just capturing what you've said here, what you would spend the money for, what you would advise the Government to do now in a positive way?

Mr. MONASTERO. Could I make one comment on that, Senator? If there is anything you should do, it is to solve this problem of who is going to head up and how——

Senator WARNER. That would be my question. What is the structure that spends the money? How about the czar issue?

Mr. MONASTERO. Well, you need a person who has that as a sole responsibility. A cabinet officer like the attorney general or another type of cabinet officer can't focus attention on this issue. It is one of the priorities in this Government. We can't have an attorney general addressing the problems that he needs to address and the drug problem as well. You have to have someone focusing attention, his entire or her entire attention, on the issue. There is a lot of good research. There are a lot of experts like myself who think we have all the answers. Someone needs to bring us all together. There is good research on prisons. There's good research on treatment, on education. But there is no comprehensive direction or sifting of all of this information to bring it together. And a cabinet officer who has other responsibilities cannot do it. A White House advisor might be able to do it. Maybe the staff of the Vice President might be able to do it. But a person with other responsibilities can't do it.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Mr. Reuter, did you wish to address my question also?

Dr. REUTER. I don't have any strong views about the appropriateness of a drug czar. I think that whatever reorganization changes are made here will have relatively little impact. We simply don't know what is likely to be a more effective way of dealing with this problem. And at least if there were a drug czar, one could point the finger at a single person rather than a whole panoply of agencies. But I'm not sure it's a much more important change than that.

Senator WARNER. Your analysis is good. It really focuses our attention on reigning in some of this stampede I referred to earlier on the military involvement. But there's almost a hopelessness that keeps coming out of your pronouncements. At some point we've got to stand up and face the issue and come up with solutions. That's our job. Those of us around here who don't have much time for original thinking have to call on persons like yourself who can do a little original thinking. So, let's end up on a high note. If interdiction doesn't work and the drug czar doesn't work, what would work?

Dr. REUTER. Can I end on a note of almost optimism? Remember, I have talked mostly about cocaine, and if you look around here, you'll see that cocaine is the drug that gets mentioned all the time. And there have been passing references by witnesses and Senators to other drugs, marijuana and heroin in particular.

The truth is that the Nation's drug problem is changing and certain aspects of it are worsening, but not everything is getting worse. The figures with respect to marijuana consumption have shown a clear downward trend for a decade now by a number of measures. With respect to heroin, the problem has really been contained for perhaps 15 years. We don't have a very good understanding about why those things happen. I would argue that marijuana is largely affected by a change in attitudes toward smoking rather than drugs. The decline in the heroin recruitment probably comes from the fact that tough enforcement made the lives of heroin sufficiently miserable that potential heroin users thought that wasn't such a good path.

I think that with cocaine that in some—this is almost cockeyed optimism, but not entirely silly—that the sheer addictiveness of crack may be our salvation in the sense that crack turns out to bring people, according to treatment experts, into treatment more rapidly than any other drug has, and that it may acquire exactly the right kind of reputation which is that it is an extremely dangerous drug and not one to be trifled with. And we see recruitment go down a lot.

Now, that still leaves us with significant problems, but I think there is no reason to believe that this problem is going to continue to get worse.

Senator WARNER. Is there any parallel to alcohol? That's a drug that this Nation has now recognized. We just must tolerate it. To the extent it is controlled at all, I suppose it's through taxation on alcohol. I am not able to give any views on cocaine, but apparently some people are able to tolerate it just like people tolerate alcohol. Is that correct.

Dr. REUTER. Yes.

Senator WARNER. And not run the risk of heavy addiction or having their lives become undone and so forth.

Dr. REUTER. Yes. There are varying patents of use of what we think of as addictive substances. Basically the vast majority of tobacco users, cigarette smokers, are addicted cigarette smokers who smoke regularly and heavily. And you'd have perhaps the top 50 percent of smokers account for maybe 60 or 70 percent of all cigarettes that are smoked. In contrast, you have with alcohol a relatively modest share of all alcohol users who account for a very large share of all the alcohol consumed. I think cocaine looks more like alcohol than it looks like tobacco. There are some people who may disagree with that.

Having said that, I still think that prohibition isn't such a terrible policy with respect to alcohol. Everyone will agree that the number one public health problem with respect to substance abuse is alcohol, putting tobacco to one side because I think our concerns about tobacco are rather different. But the Nation threw up its hands with prohibition because it couldn't tolerate the social costs of the corruption and the violence that prohibition generated. It made that decision with very much less understanding of the health consequences of alcohol use than we have now.

I'm not standing here to advocate prohibition of alcohol again, but I don't think that repeal should be looked on as having been such a success. We have a very large number of people who are heavy alcohol users and have major health problems as a result. If you look at the data available concerning alcohol consumption in prohibition, it was clear there was an enormous decline, perhaps as much as two-thirds, during that period, and a lot of the symptoms of acute alcohol problems, such as cirrhosis of the liver declined even more dramatically. If there is anything to be learned from prohibition and repeal, it is that we are perfectly capable of making decisions on the wrong grounds.

Senator **Warner**. Is there any crossover between the use of cocaine and alcohol or are they pretty well separable types of uses?

Dr. **Reuter**. There seems to be some complimentarity; that is, people who use cocaine extensively have the problem of coming down from the high. And one of the ways they do that apparently is increased use of alcohol. So, certainly one of the scare stories you can tell about cocaine legalization is you may not care a lot about cocaine use, but if increased cocaine use means that lots more people are going to be drinking heavily, it sounds like we've added to a problem we already have.

Senator **Warner**. I thank the Chair. I thank the witnesses.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you both for being here. We would appreciate it if you could supplement your testimony by just one simple page; say "Here's what I would do if I were in charge." Thank you very much.

[The information follows:]

The RAND Corp.,
*June 16, 1988.*

Hon. Sam Nunn,
*Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Dirksen Senate Building, Washington, DC.*

Dear Senator Nunn: The following is a response to your request for a one page statement "on what I would recommend spending an additional $100."

First, a few words of caution; my recent RAND research dealt mainly with the likely payoff, if any, of more intensive use of military assets in interdiction efforts. Thus, my reply to your question is based on a mix of analytic results and informed opinion. In addition, we do not have adequate measures of effectiveness for most programs addressing the drug abuse problem. This means that budget decisions in this area have necessarily been more difficult to make—and will remain so—in this area than in most other policy domains. It also means that the Congress needs to invest more heavily in efforts to learn just what works and what does not.

The drug policy budget is traditionally divided into three categories; enforcement, treatment and prevention. The current division (FY 1988) is 74% enforcement, 11 percent treatment and 15 percent prevention. I would recommend a significant shift in that allocation mix with higher priority being given to treatment and prevention.

Within enforcement, I believe, resource emphasis should be shifted from interdiction and international programs to domestic enforcement. The available evidence suggest that more can be accomplished by increasing enforcement efforts closer to the retail level of transaction. In FY 1988, state and local enforcement assistance amounted to $85 million out of domestic enforcement expenditures of about $1 billion.

There is no doubt that we can reduce a major component of the drug problem by increasing the resources of the treatment system. Heroin addicts in treatment use less heroin; as a consequence they commit fewer crimes and are less exposed to the risk of AIDS infection. In many cities, heroin addicts seeking treatment now are unable to enter without long delays. That should be remediable relatively rapidly with expenditures in the order of $200-400 million per annum ($2,000 per slot for 100-200,000 slots). While less can be said regarding the efficacy of treating PCP and cocaine abusers, demand for these services also continues to exceed the supply.

Funding for prevention has increased substantially since 1986. However more should probably be put into development of better programs rather than formula pass throughs of the kind created by the 1986 Omnibus Drug Control Act.

Finally, developing a monitoring and evaluation capability is urgent. At present it is impossible to determine the effectiveness of particular programs because data on quantities consumed, prices paid for drugs, and numbers of persons using regularly are so poor. There is need for more frequent and better targeted surveys, and the creation of user panels, at the metropolitan area level. With such monitoring programs in place, it would be possible to determine how effective different kinds of enforcement and treatment programs are at curbing use. Since these programs operate primarily at the local level, the data collection must also be directed at that level. It is not feasible to provide tight budget estimates but this should involve expenditures of the order of tens of millions of dollars rather than hundreds of millions.

Yours sincerely,

PETER REUTER.

Chairman NUNN. We have some additional questions for the record of which we would appreciate a response as soon as possible.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

Senator NUNN. Mr. Monsanto, if only one avenue were open to resource enhancement which program would you select?

Mr. MONSANTO. The following is offered assuming the question is, "If only one avenue were open to resource enhancement, which would you select?"

Having an opportunity for only limited resource enhancement on a short term basis (but with the opportunity to select any program), I would design a nationwide media blitz with two principal goals.

1. Target the non user (with heavy emphasis but not total emphasis on youth) presenting the immediate, short term, down side of drug abuse. (Again, heavy concentration on cocaine, "crack" cocaine and marihuana, but with subtle messages about cigarettes and alcohol as well). Recovered abusers should not be used as spokespersons, especially not celebrities. If anything, these peoples should be shown when they are down and out, when they are struggling to recover.

2. Target the public with a campaign to discredit drug abuse and crime generally. The theme: Taxes are higher because of drug abuse and crime. Your home may be burglarized because of drug-seeking criminals. Your children are in jeopardy because of drug abuse. You should not have to tolerate these conditions. Drugs are bad. Criminals are bad.

If taken from the perspective of the Armed Services Committee and the military's role only, my response is as follows:

Having an opportunity for only limited resource enhancement on a short-term basis, I would concentrate on assuring that the assets the military is providing are used effectively. As an example, much of the equipment provided is sophisticated and the receiving agencies do not have adequately trained personnel. Furthermore, the military is reluctant to provide a substantial number of training slots in order not to impact on its own schedules. With some limited funding enhancements such problems could be corrected. For instance the Customs Service was provided Black Hawk helicopters but was forced to fly these aircraft without adequately trained crews. The military could provide small cadres of personnel to better support transition. This experience would be useful to the military as well. Operation BAT (in the Bahamas) and Operations Blast Furnace (in Bolivia) are such examples. Interdiction efforts along the borders in which military personnel could play a passive role only, could be useful.

These ideas are not new, but they are working.

### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE WILSON

Senator WILSON. Since the purpose of the "Drug Czar" is to coordinate the disparate agencies and efforts both to interdict and curtail demand, why not appoint the President as the Czar?

Mr. BOWSHER. The drug policy coordinator mentioned by the Comptroller General in his June 8, 1988 testimony would have the authority for planning and coordinating federal anti-drug policy and strategy. GAO believes the job of the drug policy coordinator, given the magnitude and seriousness of the nation's drug problem, should be a full-time position. Consequently, GAO believes that the coordinator must be a subordinate of the President, rather than the President himself.

### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Could you describe in detail the problems you feel exist in the way Customs has established the requirements for Customs $C^3I$ system and managed and coordinated the program, and the way in which Eaton Corporation has managed the program?

Please provide additional detail on the:

—Coordination between Customs, the Coast Guard, FAA, military, and civil authorities, and the cost-effectiveness of the netting, displays, and proposed systems interface and integration.

—Use of $41 million in public funds and the allocation of these funds to specific types of expenditures.

—Problems in contract management and failure to establish proper systems requirements.

—Problems with the contractor and reasons for recompeting the contract.

—Overall pattern of non-performance by the contractor, which has had serious performance problems with the B-1, EF-11, Intelligence work-station and many other contracts.

—Prospects for producing an effective C$^3$I system with the current quality of management and the current systems requirement.

—Your current estimate of whether Customs should manage these facilities and the cost-effectiveness of separate Customs facilities.

Mr. Bowsher. GAO is currently finalizing a report on the implementation of Customs C$^3$I Program requested by the Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. This report provides (1) information on whether coordination among federal interdiction agencies existed during the development of the program as required by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, (2) identifies changes in the program that resulted from coordination, and (3) discusses whether the program will result in a unified federal effort for commanding, controlling, and communicating with interdiction forces. This report addresses several of your questions concerning Customs C$^3$I program and will be issued shortly. We will be happy to respond to your questions or meet with you or your staff to discuss the report after it has been released by the Chairman. We are unable to address your questions on (1) problems in contracting management and failure to establish proper systems requirements, (2) problems with the contractor and reasons for recompeting the contract, and (3) overall pattern of performance by the contractor, because these issues were not part of the scope of our pending report.

Senator McCain. Could you describe in detail the funding problems now affecting the U.S. Coast Guard, their cause(s), and the priorities for solving those problems and the cost of solving them? Please provide similar data for the Customs Service.

Mr. Bowsher. For fiscal year 1988, the President requested $1.964 billion for the Coast Guard's operating expenses. The Congress appropriated $1.789 billion directly for the Coast Guard and an additional $103 million indirectly for the Coast Guard, in the form of DOD support for the Coast Guard's drug law enforcement activities. This left the Coast Guard with $72 million less than the President's operating budget request. The Coast Guard has estimated that it will incur unanticipated extra operating expenses in fiscal year 1988 totaling $31 million, including $17 million because of the decreased foreign exchange value of the dollar, and $14 million for the January 1, 1988 pay raise. In total, the Coast Guard estimates it faces an operating budget shortfall of $103 million in fiscal year 1988. Because about three-fourths of the Coast Guard's operating budget consists of fixed costs, such as personnel compensation, the operating budget shortfall must be made up in the short run primarily through cuts in variable operating costs.

In February 1988, the Coast Guard stated that it would absorb its estimated fiscal year 1988 $103 million operating budget shortfall mainly through (1) a "squeeze down/slow down" in fiscal year 1988 operations and support throughout the entire Coast Guard and (2) a reduction or closing of a number of Coast Guard facilities. The Coast Guard further stated that as a result of the "slowdown," it would reduce its drug interdiction efforts by 55 percent from fiscal year 1987 levels. GAO does not know whether the Coast Guard's decision to reduce its drug interdiction efforts was a necessary result of the Coast Guard's funding shortfall.

In March 1988, the administration asked Congress to transfer $60 million to the Coast Guard from other Transportation Department accounts in order to reduce the Coast Guard's funding shortfall. The Coast Guard estimates that the remaining shortfall of $43 million would have to be absorbed through Coast Guard base closings; and by deferring maintenance, training, and spare parts purchases. The administration's request was sent to Congress as a supplemental appropriation request.

We are unaware of any function problems similar to those of the Coast Guard being experienced by the U.S. Customs Service.

Senator McCain. Could you provide a summary cost effectiveness analysis of adding funds to the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and military efforts to interdict drugs?

Mr. **Bowsher**. We are unable to provide a cost effectiveness analysis because of a lack of information for measuring the effectiveness of drug interdiction programs. The Comptroller General stated in his June 8, 1988, testimony that existing drug data systems portray general trends and help gauge the overall impact of federal drug strategies, but do not adequately measure the effectiveness of specific drug control efforts.

Estimates of the average cost of seizing a unit of drugs could be developed, but such estimates would be insufficient to permit us to make cost effectiveness comparisons. For example, there is no way to measure the value of seizing one type of drug compared to another type of drug: e.g., the value of a cocaine seizure versus a marijuana seizure. Among other reasons, these values cannot be measured because we do not know the quantities of drugs being smuggled in the United States and the effect of removing a given quantity of any drug from the market.

As the Comptroller General stated in his testimony, one of the first priorities of a drug policy coordinator (GAO supports the establishment of this position) should be to improve the quality and quantity of information that can be used to assess drug control programs and determine which are the most effective.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you gentlemen. The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

# ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN DRUG INTERDICTION

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TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 1988

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
*Washington, DC.*

## DEMAND, REDUCTION, AND THE PROBLEM OF DRUG ABUSE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Bingaman, Dixon, Wirth, Warner, Wilson, Gramm, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; John J. Hamre and Ronald P. Kelly, professional staff members; Barbara L. Braucht, Barbara B. Brown, and Cindy Pearson, staff assistants.

Also present: William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Robert K. Griffith, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terrence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order. Last week the Senate Armed Services Committee held the first of several hearings on the question of how we can most responsively and most effectively involve the military in the war on drugs.

These hearings are designed to assist us in resolving one of the most difficult issues we face in the House-Senate Conference on the Defense authorization bill because we must reconcile two different approaches to expanding the military role. It is imperative that we obtain testimony from the experts as to whether the military can really make a difference in the drug war, and if so, how.

Last week's witnesses, including the Comptroller General and a panel of experts all confirmed that the current anti-drug strategy, based on interrupting and reducing the available supply of illicit drugs, is not working. Moreover, they suggested that supply reduction efforts even if greatly expanded, will never, taken by themselves, turn the corner on the drug problem.

In this morning's hearing we will hear from two distinguished panels of witnesses who will discuss a continuing and expanded military role and supply side efforts in the broader context of the overall drug problem. Specifically, these witnesses will speak on the effectiveness of supply reduction efforts as contrasted to demand reduction initiative, such as treatment, prevention and education.

We don't have jurisdiction in this committee over the education part and the health part, but we need to have some inkling of the potential in the treatment and health and the education area before we mandate, at least, the expenditure of very large additional funds from a military point of view in the interdiction area, and so we are trying to get at least a glimmer of perspective before we deal with only one part of this problem, the interdiction, which is of course a very important part.

Our first panel of witnesses consists of former U.S. Senator and current Director of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, known as SBI, my good friend and former colleague, Robert Morgan, accompanied by Cuyler Windham, the Senior Assistant Director for Field Services, North Carolina SBI. They will discuss the balance between supply and demand reduction efforts from the perspective of State and local law enforcement authorities.

Our second group of witnesses is a panel of experts in treatment, education and prevention: Karst J. Besteman, Executive Director of the Alcohol and Drug Problems Association; Dr. Allan Y. Cohen, Executive Director of the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation; Elizabeth "B.J." McConnell, Consultant on Drug Education; and Dr. Lloyd B. Johnston, Research Scientist and Program Director of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

They will share with us their substantial experience in demand reduction efforts. And, based on that experience, their views on the potential future contribution of the military in supply side initiatives.

We are fortunate to have with us such a broad range of expertise on these varying aspects of the drug problem, and we welcome all of you here this morning. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this panel this morning, particularly Senator Morgan. I recall when I first came to the Senate the many courtesies that you paid me and I'm just delighted to see that your expertise is continuing to be offered to the public, particularly on a question as important as this one.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have a copy of a letter that you and I sent to the Comptroller General. I would like to put it in the record this morning, together with the Comptroller's reply and his first response to the inquiry by this committee on an analysis of the demand problem.

[The material referred to follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, DC, June 9, 1988.*

Hon. CHARLES A. BOWSHER,
*Comptroller General of the United States,*
*General Accounting Office,*
*Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. COMPTROLLER GENERAL: Thank you for your testimony yesterday on federal drug abuse control policy and the role of the military in anti-drug efforts. Your testimony was a valuable contribution to our deliberations on the Defense Authorization bill.

One of the points you made was that Congress should consider devoting more emphasis and resources to activities aimed at reducing this country's demand for illegal drugs. As discussed at the hearing, we believe that such consideration is warranted.

As you know, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees will confer next week on our respective Defense Authorization bills. We expect to complete the conference by Friday, June 17, 1988. We are, therefore, requesting that you provide us, as soon as possible, a brief summary of key demand reduction issues for use in our deliberations next week. In your summary, please discuss research, education, treatment, and other ways that drug demand could be reduced, such as greater use of penalties to deter drug use.

After you complete this initial summary, we look forward to working closely with you and your staff to develop a comprehensive study of the appropriate role of demand reduction in federal anti-drug efforts.

Sincerely,

SAM NUNN,
*Chairman.*
JOHN WARNER,
*Ranking Minority Member.*

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U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
*Washington, DC, June 13, 1988.*

Hon. SAM NUNN,
*Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate.*

*Hon.* JOHN W. WARNER,
*Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate.*

DEAR SENATORS: In response to your June 9, 1988, request, we are enclosing some information relating to the drug demand reduction issue. This information was generally developed from work done to complete our March 1, 1988, special report by the Comptroller General on the drug problem, "Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report." The information represents the views of various experts we interviewed or who have written on the issue.

We hope this information will be useful in your deliberations on the Defense Authorization Bill. We look forward to working with the Armed Services Committee as well as other interested committees over the long term to more fully assess the appropriate role of demand reduction in our efforts to combat drugs.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD L. FOGEL,
*Assistant Comptroller General.*

## DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION ISSUES

The federal government's role in activities designed to reduce the demand for drugs in the United Statees changed significantly in 1982, when through the introduction of block grants, Congress provided that funds for drug abuse prevention and treatment services be given directly to the states. States were given greater responsibility for establishing program requirements, monitoring program activities, providing technical assistance, and collecting data. The federal role in administering drug abuse programs was substantially diminished, and presently is one of providing "national leadership" by encouraging the efforts of state and local governments.

Many drug control experts believe the federal government's present drug policy and strategy, emphasizing efforts to reduce the supply of drugs available for use, is imbalanced and that a higher priority and increased resources must be assigned to drug demand reduction efforts. State and local drug abuse prevention and treatment programs have not been effective in reducing demand. No one knows what education programs work, treatment has not kept pace with the drug problem, and research efforts are lacking. There are no easy answers or quick fixes to our nation's drug abuse problem. Reducing drug demand is a long-term approach with many questions as to what programs are effective and how this goal can be accomplished.

Devoting more federal emphasis and resources to efforts attacking America's demand for drugs, which many experts believe is the root of our drug problem, warrants strong consideration. The federal government could take a stronger and more active role beyond simply providing "national leadership" and encouragement. For example, the government can improve drug demand reduction efforts by (1) determining, through research and evaluation, which prevention, treatment, and other demand reduction programs are most effective and (2) assuring that effective programs are adequately funded and properly implemented.

## DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION

Preventing drug abuse before it starts is a key to long-term success in resolving our nation's drug problem. Drug abuse prevention includes both motivating non-users to never start using drugs and convincing current users to stop their drug use. Prevention activities involve public awareness and education.

The 1984 federal drug strategy encourages the private sector to take part in the anti-drug effort. In recent years, a wide variety of groups and organizations have responded, often in highly creative ways. In addition, the First Lady's "Just Say No" campaign has provided drug abuse prevention with increased visibility. "Just Say No" clubs have been formed in schools, community organizations, and churches.

The importance of drug prevention is also recognized by the law enforcement community. Federal, state, and local enforcement agencies have been expanding their efforts to inform the general public about the consequences of drug trafficking and abuse. For example, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) co-sponsor the Sports Drug Awareness Program, which is considered to be a successful program aimed at the nation's high school athletes.

With the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, authorized funding for drug prevention and education activities was dramatically increased. The budget authority for these activities climbed from $164.5 million in 1986 to $505.4 million in 1987. Most of the monies were provided to the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services (HHS) which, along with ACTION, have primary responsibility for prevention and education efforts.

In a December 1987 report (GAO/HRD-88-26), we pointed out that while the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provided a large increase in drug abuse prevention and education funding, considerable uncertainty exists about what really works to prevent drug abuse. Prevention and education strategies used over the last 15 years have been evaluated through prevention research and found to be ineffective. Programs using these strategies have shown an increase in knowledge, but have generally been unsuccessful in changing drug abuse behavior, which is the ultimate aim.

One strategy involves the presentation of facts concerning the dangers of drug abuse to potential or actual abusers. According to HHS, sufficient evaluations of early prevention programs have been conducted for a judgement to be made that increased knowledge has no impact on drug abuse, and in some instances are actually counterproductive in that they encourage rather than discourage drug abuse.

A second strategy, termed "affective" or "humanistic", also proved ineffective. Programs based on this strategy were generally designed to enhance self-esteem, encourage responsible decision making, and enrich the personal and social development of students.

The extent to which programs are still using these strategies is unknown because the number and type of drug prevention and education efforts nationwide is unknown. A 1985 report by the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, Inc., described the status of data collection on alcohol and drug prevention programs as, at best, primitive.

According to the HHS, new drug abuse prevention strategies have developed out of the anti-smoking campaign within the last few years. These generally involve programs that focus on (1) social pressures believed to promote drug use and (2) training individuals to better cope with life by increasing their personal and social competence. While the new programs are more promising than the earlier ones, researchers still have many questions about their long-term effectiveness. A National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) official told us that the results of these strategies, according to research standards, have been mixed, and that additional research is needed to determine the effectiveness of these approaches with a wider range of children.

The successful strategies developed in the anti-smoking campaign eventually became the basis for the widely publicized and federally endorsed "Just Say No" program. The "Just Say No" program, however, has never been subjected to a rigorous evaluation, and HHS has expressed concerns that:

--the strategies found successful against smoking may not transfer to the drug area;

--the strategy will not produce enduring results beyond the short term, and;

--the strategy may not have applicability to all segments of the population since research to date has been restricted to white, middle class populations.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 not only significantly increased funding for drug abuse prevention and education but also added a number of requirements for evaluations of programs and activities. These evaluations are in various stages of implementation. The results of the evaluations should be helpful in deciding which types of state and local prevention and education programs are most effective and how future funds can best be used.

Implementation of monitoring and evaluation requirements should be given a high priority by the responsible agencies so that successful programs can be identified. This information could then be disseminated to the states and localities that are designing and implementing programs to combat drug abuse. We have recommended to Congress that it increase the accountability of state and local drug prevention and education programs, including a recommendation to tie funding at the local level to program success.

## DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT

Drug treatment programs have been directed at overcoming the physical problems of drug addiction and providing psychological and social counseling to help the individual drug abuser live without drugs. Authorized federal funding for drug abuse treatment was $454.5 million in 1987, up from $227.3 million in 1986.

Funds are allocated by the federal government to states through a formula based on population as well as need. The states then disburse funds to local treatment entities. The Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) is primarily responsible for administering federal treatment funds through the block grant mechanism.

Twenty years ago, drug abuse treatment programs were aimed primarily at the older heroin addict. In recent years, the emphasis has shifted to a younger population of drug abusers, who use a variety of non-opiate substances, such as marijuana, cocaine, alcohol or a combination of these and other substances. However, treatment has not kept pace with the problem.

The Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association of North America, an organization of public and private treatment programs and State organizations, reported in 1986 that States were having serious problems responding to the demand for treatment services. In a March 1988 special report on the United States drug situation (GAO/GGD-88-39), we reported that the public treatment facilities in certain major cities we visited were greatly overloaded. Some cities had waiting lists up to 6 months for treatment.

According to the National Drug Policy Board, many public officials acknowledge that the quality of publicly funded treatment is steadily eroding in the face of consistent and growing pressure to take in more and more patients. The Policy Board noted that the quality and efficacy of treatment programs should be a consideration in determining whether a program receives federal funds. The federal government should support the development of standards of care and a system should be developed which could monitor and evaluate program compliance.

The Policy Board also concluded that the federal government should play a more active role in setting priorities for treatment but not usurp the local right to set priorities. Decisions should be local, but the federal government can and should make known its views. Examples of priorities mentioned by the Policy Board were targeting specific populations (e.g., younger or earlier users, AIDS virus carriers, women of child-bearing age, "revolving door" clients) and treatment modalities (e.g., methadone maintenance, therapeutic communities).

Lastly, studies indicate that mandatory treatment of persons arrested and who test positive for drugs may have a positive effect on reducing drug abuse and crime. A significant percentage of persons arrested for major offenses have tested positive for drugs in certain cities that perform drug testing of arrestees (over 70 percent in some cities). The point of arrest provides an opportunity for entry into drug treatment.

## DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH

Drug abuse research supplements prevention and treatment efforts as new knowledge directed at the causes and consequences of drug abuse is developed and applied. Research can reinforce programs to prevent, treat, and control drug problems.

The 1984 federal drug strategy recognizes the federal responsibility for overseeing the development of new knowledge through basic and applied research and epidemiological studies. It is also the federal government's responsibility to ensure wide dissemination of such information to health care professionals, educators, law enforcement officials, and the general public.

The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) is responsible for sponsoring research on the drug problem, as well as for monitoring drug abuse trends.

Continuing research is a fundamental component of any drug strategy. Drug abuse experts that we met with believe that an expansion in research efforts is necessary if we are to effectively reduce the demand for drugs. They pointed out that not enough is known about the number of drug users, the types of drugs used, or why people use drugs. Little is also known about why and how the abuse of certain drugs spreads among the population, why patterns of drug abuse and the types of drugs being abused constantly shift, as well as the relationship between drug use and criminal activity. The complex nature of drugs and their effects is another aspect of research that needs continued attention.

An example cited by the President's Commission on Organized Crime in 1986 is the need for research on cocaine. As the Commission pointed out, requests for treatment by cocaine users has escalated rapidly in recent years. But, research about cocaine and its effects has not kept pace with this growing problem.

The Commission further pointed out that the development of new illegal synthetic drugs, often called "designer drugs," presents another compelling need for expanding drug abuse research. The sudden emergence of these drugs in a segment of the drug abuse market caught drug control experts by surprise. The drugs are clandestinely produced in the United States, and they are very potent and dangerous--some are estimated to be as much as 1,000 times more powerful than morphine.

With regard to drug users, drug abuse experts we contacted told us that not enough research has been conducted on specific population sub-groups. For example, research needs to target users by age, race, and geographic location, as well as by the extent of their abuse (i.e., chronic, intermediate, or new drug users). Once such groups are targeted, research should attempt to understand the causes of drug abuse and the spread of certain drugs among the sub-groups. "Crack" cocaine, for example, is especially popular among younger drug users, particularly high school dropouts.

Another area cited as needing research relates to drug treatment. One of the problems with treatment is that many drug abusers drop out before treatment is completed. The benefits of treatment can be greatly enhanced if treatment programs were able to retain their clients for longer periods. Finding methods to improve retention rates should be given a high priority in drug abuse research efforts.

## PENALTIES, SANCTIONS, AND OTHER APPROACHES TO REDUCING DEMAND

Given the continuing and mounting concern about our nation's drug abuse problem, new and innovative methods for reducing the demand for drugs through the greater use of penalties are being proposed and tried. For the most part, these proposals are controversial, and the potential results are uncertain. However, such new initiatives may have merit and warrant strong consideration.

One such initiative that has been tried is the U.S. Customs Service's and the Coast Guard's "zero tolerance" policy. Under this recently implemented policy, the agencies arrested individuals and seized conveyances such as expensive yachts and automobiles after finding small quantities of illegal drugs. While the policy undoubtedly provides a deterrent effect to drug use, or at least to the possession of illegal drugs in certain circumstances, the implementation of the policy raised many concerns and unfairly penalized some individuals. Under growing pressure from the Congress and others, the Administration decided to modify the program to avoid penalizing innocent parties.

A similar program was conducted in New York by federal and state law enforcement agencies. This program involved seizing automobiles from individuals caught in New York with small amounts of "crack" cocaine in their cars. Law enforcement officials cited this effort as a good example of using penalties to reduce the demand for drugs, especially when the seized cars were owned by the parents of teenagers arrested.

New initiatives recently proposed by the National Drug Policy Board include penalties such as denying drivers' licenses, student loans, public housing assistance, and other government benefits to persons convicted of drug use. These initiatives expand on the concept of "zero tolerance." Controversy is expected, and if implemented they should be carried out fairly so innocent people are not penalized. On the surface, while such initiatives are controversial, they could have an impact by reducing demand for drugs.

Perhaps the most controversial effort is drug testing. Random testing of employees and testing of job applicants is being increasingly carried out by employers around the country. In addition, the President has called for random testing of all federal employees in sensitive positions. Random testing involves privacy and constitutional issues, which are being tested in the courts, and also involves the issue of laboratory testing quality and the accuracy of test results. While the military has had considerable experience with drug testing and reports great success in reducing drug abuse in the military, privacy in the military is not an issue.

## SUMMARY

Our current federal drug strategy, emphasizing efforts to reduce the supply of drugs, simply is not working. Many drug experts, including law enforcement officials, believe that drug supply reduction efforts are, at best, a "holding action" in the war against drugs and that more needs to be done to reduce the demand for drugs in this country.

The federal government's role in drug demand reduction activities has diminished over the years, from one of administering drug abuse prevention and treatment programs to one of providing "national leadership" by encouraging the efforts of state and local governments. In 1982, with the introduction of block grants, federal funding was reduced and states assumed additional responsibilities for establishing program requirements, monitoring program activities, providing technical assistance, collecting data, and auditing.

Since then, funding for drug demand reduction efforts, unlike funding for supply reduction, has been modest, with a 15 percent increase from 1982 to 1986 (after adjusting for inflation). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 significantly increased the funding for demand reduction, with the budget for 1987 ($959.9 million) more than double the budget for 1986 ($391.8 million).

Devoting even further emphasis and resources to demand reduction activities is an approach that warrants strong consideration. But, reducing demand is easier said than done. Reducing drug demand is a long-term approach with many unanswered questions as to what programs are effective and how this goal can be accomplished. We presently know little about how to reduce the demand for drugs.

State and local drug abuse prevention and treatment programs funded by the federal government have not been effective in reducing demand. We need to find ways to educate and prevent people from abusing drugs; increase our ability to provide effective treatment for all those in need; and conduct greater research on why people use drugs, how drug use spreads among the population, and the consequences of drug use, especially among our youth.

We believe legislation calling for a greater role by the federal government in efforts to reduce the demand for drugs should be considered. Such legislation could require the President to develop a strategy and plan for placing greater federal emphasis on reducing the demand for drugs in the United States. The strategy and plan could include recommendations for reducing drug demand such as (1) developing better information through research and studies on the patterns of drug use, including who uses drugs and why they use them; (2) identifying, through research and evaluation, those demand reduction programs that are effective; (3) directing and assuring that effective demand reduction programs are adequately funded and properly implemented; and (4) any other recommendations that can be identified to help reduce the demand for drugs.

Senator WARNER. We are making every effort in this committee to determine the best way in which the Federal taxpayer's dollar can be spent to help control the drug problem. We have immediately before us the question of the expansion of the role of the U.S. military. But we've got to look at the dollars spent by the military in fulfilling its mandate from the Congress in comparison to the dollars spent on the demand side.

I think this hearing is particularly appropriate and I commend the Chair for making the arrangements.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'm going to be very brief, because I want to get to the panel. And I want to advise the panel that because of a previous commitment on strategic modernization with the House that I'm scheduled to chair in about 20 minutes, I won't be able to stay here for the important testimony that you're about to give us.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank you once again publicly for calling these hearings to try and give us a grasp on what we can do here. I'm particularly interested in listening to the testimony of the panel that's going to start off this morning and the one that's going to follow, particularly with regard to my dear friend and colleague, Bob Morgan, the former member of this committee.

We consider you an expert and one who's on the spot out there in the State, doing his job in cooperation with others. If you want to go afield a little bit and give us your advice from your perspective on how we should and how we should not use the military in this number one social problem of America, if not the whole world, please feel free to do so.

While I think we have to use the expertise of the military, I'm hesitant about how far afield we should go in this proposition, and I'm afraid that there's a tendency to say, well, now that the military is involved they will solve the problem of drug interdiction, which I think none of us believe to be realistic. And so where they fit, how they fit and how they're used and any advice you can give us on that subject will be very much appreciated. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Senator Exon. I would like to explain to all of our witnesses and to interested observers here that we are in conference and we've got all of our sub-panels meeting this morning. We are trying to resolve most of these issues by tomorrow at noon.

And so the absence of Senators doesn't indicate a lack of interest this morning. They're working in panels on other matters, and their staffs will be representing them here, and they will, I'm sure, get a complete analysis of your testimony this morning.

And so we are caught in trying to make a decision on subjects that we have never had hearings on in this committee. And these decisions are going to affect not only the military but will also affect the funding for other programs like treatment and education, and we are trying, as I said, to put it in perspective.

Senator Exon, we know you're going to be busy and if you solve all the problems this morning, Senator Warner and I will have a whole lot less to do later on this week, and so you have our blessings.

Senator Morgan, we're delighted to have you back before this committee.

## STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT B. MORGAN, DIRECTOR, NORTH CAROLINA STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACCOMPANIED BY CUYLER WINDHAM, SENIOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR FIELD SERVICES, NORTH CAROLINA STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; JEFFREY GRAY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; AND DARREL CARNEAL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR ADMINISTRATION

Senator **Morgan**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Exon and Senator Warner. It's sort of an unusual position for me, but one that we appreciate very much, because we in the State law enforcement have felt, for some time, that maybe our views were not being heard as they should have been.

While I speak this morning, as the Director of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, I am a member of the Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies, which is made up of the directors from 29 States that have statewide agencies such as North Carolina and Georgia.

We did not have time to clear our remarks with the whole association, but I think the views that I will present here today and those presented in my statement fairly represent the views of all the directors, State directors, across the country, or most of them.

In addition to that, my assistant director, Mr. Overton, who was here with me last week, who could not be here today, is the President of the State Association of Drug Investigative Officers. And so I think together we represent to you a somewhat consensus view of both the drug enforcement officers themselves and the directors, although I would make it clear that we don't purport to—they have not taken an official position.

I realize, Mr. Chairman, the many duties of the Members of the Senate, and for that reason we have prepared a rather thorough statement of the views with regard to drug enforcement and your staffs have been extremely nice.

Mr. Windham, who is on my left, and is the Senior Assistant Director and probably knows as much about drug enforcement as any person I know and he's been in it most of his life, both with the FBI and with the SBI, is with me. And he, of course, has added to the statement.

On my right is Jeff Gray, who's a Special Assistant Attorney General. And on my far left is Darrell Carneal, Assistant Director of the Bureau for Administration, who's also an agent.

Let me just briefly tell you about the State Bureau of Investigation in North Carolina.

Senator NUNN. Senator Morgan, we will have your entire statement as a part of the record. I have had a chance to read your entire statement and it is very helpful. You can present it in any way you like.

Senator MORGAN. Thank you very much. We are a State criminal investigative agency, established about 50 years ago. It was established primarily to provide expert assistance for local officers and to provide forensic crime services.

We now provide the communications for law enforcement all across the State. And, of course, we're hooked in with NCIC. We have about 325 sworn agents, including about 90 forensic scientists who are also sworn agents and who are extremely well qualified.

The total makeup of our organization is about 600. We have primarily a responsibility for drug enforcement all across North Carolina, and we have been involved in it to a great degree.

Yet we feel like, while we have made a great deal of progress, I would have to tell you that there are more drugs on the streets of North Carolina today, and I think in the Nation, and especially cocaine, than there was 5 years ago. Notwithstanding all of the interdiction efforts, it is cheaper today than it was 5 years ago, and the purity of it is much, much higher than it was 5 years ago.

Now there has been a tremendous effort in interdiction, both on the State, national and the local levels, and I hate to think how bad it would be if we had not made those efforts.

But I think sometimes, as Senator Exon pointed out, when we talk about seizing large quantities of cocaine in Florida or on Interstate 95 or at the airports, we sometimes leave the impression with the public that we really are going more than we are. And I think that sometimes it lulls us into a feeling of apathy with it.

I would point out, lest I forget it, that the role of the Federal Government has been very, very helpful in many, many ways. But as far as manpower in States like North Carolina, I think it might surprise you to know that it is very, very limited.

The last time I counted, we had only 10 DEA agents in the whole State of North Carolina. Mr. Windham and I were talking last night, we probably have 12 or 13 now, remembering that our State is about 600 miles wide and 250 miles in depth. We have, I think, two Coast Guard investigators and two Coast Guard liaison officers. Of course, there are some men stationed there, as their regular Coast Guard duties.

There are only 40 Customs agents who deal with the port of Wilmington, and who assist some in drug enforcement. But primarily the work is being done by the State and by the locals.

For instance, in the Wilmington office, we have four DEA agents, but we have also four SBI agents who are assigned regularly to those offices.

In the Greensboro office, we have two DEA agents and two of our agents, and our agents are usually called in and called away from what I call sometimes the demand or the supply on the streets, which bothers me a great deal. But I do want to point out, lest I forget, that the Federal role is very, very important.

Eighteen years ago, when I became Attorney General, law officers in North Carolina were not required to be able to read or write. There were no training facilities in the State at all. There were probably many local deputy sheriffs who could do little more than sign their name.

We tried to prevail upon the legislature to provide training. We were not able to. But with Federal funds we were able to establish a criminal justice academy, and then after the Federal funds ran out, of course, the State picked it up.

We started the minimum standards. We now have high requirements. We started the police information network. And I could go on and on and on, with programs that are meaningful in North Carolina today that were seeded and funded by the Federal Government.

It shouldn't be, of course—we've all been in State governments—it shouldn't be that they would have to be seeded by the Federal Government, but the sad truth of the matter is that that is pretty much true.

We have marijuana growing in 90 of our 100 counties, and especially in our mountainous areas. From early spring until late fall, we will have two airplanes in the air every day looking for marijuana and these pilots are extremely capable. Some of them can spot a few stalks of marijuana from a mile up in the air by the unusual color of it.

Just yesterday we spotted some from the air, and the stalks were 10 feet high. And my colleagues, my associates, tell me that the value of it is about $1,600 a stalk. I like to be on the conservative side and move it down to about a thousand. But that's still, when you find a hundred stalks, you're talking about a hundred thousand dollars.

By the way, we found some yesterday in my own rural county belonging to a 22-year-old schoolteacher. We're making progress in marijuana, but not as much as we ought to.

Highway 95: there must be at least a quarter of a million cars a day that go up and down that highway. With a grant from the 1986 Drug Abuse Fund——

Senator **Warner**. Excuse me, can I interrupt you? I took a trip with the DEA in a helicopter and they showed me how they spotted those stalks in Virginia. Are you increasing that program? Because that seems to me to be one of the most effective.

Senator MORGAN. We are not increasing it, Senator, but we have a goodly number of highway patrol officers who do patrol it that we have trained to profile these cars.

Senator WARNER. No, I'm talking about the use of the helicopters to spot at a thousand feet. Are you training additional people to fly in the helicopters to spot the marijuana stalks?

Senator MORGAN. Sir, we use fixed wing aircraft and we've found them more valuable, but we do the flying in the SBI, but we do train local officers to be the spotters. They fly with us. And we have a schedule every day, flying different counties and we can't meet all the demands of the local sheriffs who want us in their counties.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Senator MORGAN. But the pipeline on Highway 95—you take North Carolina; we have Interstate 95 running north and south, from Miami to New York. We have Interstate 77 running north and south, through Charlotte. We have Highway 40, Highway 85, Highway 26, and millions of cars go up and down those roads every day and we stop very few of them. But yet we will invariably get large amounts of cocaine and large amounts of money.

So, interdiction, while I hate to think where it would be or where it might be if we don't have it, is not the sole answer. I think we have to deal with demand.

The idea of using the military gives me some concern for a number of reasons.

First of all, of course, we all know the military has its own missions. They're not trained as law enforcement officers, and I do not in my own opinion, think that it is cost effective. And since I came here in 1975 and sat on the Intelligence Committee, I have become somewhat of a civil libertarian and I teach Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties at Campbell University law school, and I have a great concern in involving the military in civilian law enforcement.

Now, let me hasten to point out, we do have cooperation with the military now. Down on the coast, we've used the Navy's radio systems when we are dealing with smugglers off the coast, where our communications systems were not adequate. Senator Warner, we have used the National Guard helicopters on occasions. However, their pilots have not been trained to the extent that ours have, and they have not been as helpful as we would like for them to be.

But on the other hand, they have been helpful, and the military is being cooperative.

Down in Fayetteville, Cumberland County, where Fort Bragg is located, for 20 years we've had a city-county narcotics squad. Mr. Windham, many years ago, worked directly with that squad, and we worked with the military. I had a meeting with them within the last month.

But we are very, very cautious. When their people accompany agents in that squad—they will quite often accompany those agents, and if military personnel are involved, then they will become involved; but otherwise they just merely accompany us.

On the other hand, if they, in their work on the military base or otherwise, run any civilians in, they bring us in. It's been a very cooperative and a good arrangement.

But to put the military involved in directly dealing with civilians does give me quite a bit of concern.

Senator NUNN. What about out in the waters, the international waters and those areas? That's one of the things we're going to be struggling with in conference, as to whether to give the military limited powers of arrest with pre-trained people who have been deputized, in effect, by the Federal agents to be able to assist the Coast Guard as needed, beyond the territorial limits. What do you think about that proposition?

Senator MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I have great fears about the priority of it and the effectiveness of it. I would prefer to see it remain with the Coast Guard who are more properly trained with it.

And I also think that the money—and here, again, I have to yield to you on the cost of it—but I think the money that would be spent in utilizing the military, even in extraterritorial waters, would not be cost effective.

[The prepared statement of Senator Robert B. Morgan follows:]

Remarks presented by Robert Morgan, Director
North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Committee:

Illegal drugs have invaded our land. We allowed this invasion and furthered it's advances by inaction. We tolerated small ills, not realizing larger problems to come. The tragic proportions of this invasion are only now being understood.

Americans have yet to decide whether illegal drug use will be allowed to destroy our society and our nation.

The answer must come from our people, but responsible leadership must guide the way.

We are under attack by an enemy dedicated to the destruction of values and mores that have long served to make America great.

We must not fail to see our weaknesses as a nation and must not fail in every attempt to marshall our forces in this battle with an enemy so insidious that it tears at the very fabric of our social order . We must not fail to comprehend a very real threat to our nation.

You can talk with experts, you can invite their input and you can gather their opinion, but you have only to talk to your sons and daughters and their friends to know the depth of the threat of this enemy to our land.

I live in a rural county in North Carolina which in many ways reflects an idyllic lifestyle envied by most of us in this fast pace hurry, hurry world. But in conversations with friends I hear the anguish and the disbelief at the degree to which illegal drugs permeate our communities. My county is not an exception and neither is my state.

I today speak as Director of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). I am a member of the Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies known as (ASCIA) and, although not representing ASCIA today, my views are shared by other State investigative agency directors with whom I have talked in recent days.

A word about the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation: As law enforcement within the North Carolina Department of Justice our primary responsibility is to assist sheriffs' departments and police departments in criminal investigations, in the identification and apprehension of criminals and in crime prevention across the State, and also to enforce laws under which we have origioanl jurisdiction.

The SBI has three major fuctions: We provide computer communications and criminal information to agencies throughout the State and connect with the national system. We provide laboratory services, which examine evidence of all types; and criminal investigations, which provide investigative assistance to law enforcement in North Carolina, to the Sheriffs, to the Police Departments and other State Departments and Federal agencies, as well as our own investigative efforts.

I want to address law enforcement functions from the State perspective. Law enforcement is fighting an all-out war with those who traffic in and distribute illegal drugs and, sadly, we are not winning that war. We are effective, indeed we are. We have more cases being worked, more people are being arrested and more criminals convicted. Our prisons are filled to overflowing. And, yet there is no shortage of illegal drugs on our streets. In fact, judging from the falling prices of some drugs, the supply is plentiful and increasing. This war taxes our resources and over extends our manpower.

There is a tremendous effort being made in North Carolina by local, state and federal agencies. There are always a number of street level undercover campaigns under way, with officers working their way into drug operations, identifying the sellers and often the sources of supply of these drugs in our neighborhoods. This is dangerous work. Undercover officers are often by themseves buying drugs from people, many who are users and addicts and all potentially dangerous. Such campaigns produce significant numbers of arrests and disrupt local drug distribution systems but only for short periods of time.

Arrests occur daily, generally culminating the considerable amount of investigative work. Significant quantities of drugs -- now usually cocaine -- and large sums of money are often involved. Frequently the dealers are heavily armed, placing our officers in greater danger. When we know this in advance, we involve special response or weapons teams. But often a routine arrest can turn into tragedy. Only recently an SBI Agent was wounded and had to shoot and kill his assailant--a public school teacher who had sold cocaine on several occasions to the Agent.

In North Carolina as in a number of other states, domestic marijuana eradication is a major undertaking. Last year we found and destroyed growing marijuana in over 90 of our 100 counties. We have two planes up daily looking for marijuana. This is a Federal, State and local effort and in the last five years has proven a successful program evidenced by the smaller growing plots, the movement of some operations indoors, and into neighboring states.

Interdiction efforts are effective. We work with the Coast Guard and with U. S. Customs to locate illegal drugs coming in along our coast. Now, however, our most effective interdiction programs are on our highways, particularly on the interstate system We are also very busy at our major airports. Recently, we have initiated interdiction programs at bus and train stations and hope to expand like programs to motels and hotels in areas of our State. Frankly, we have been alarmed at the volume of drugs that are transported into and throughout our State by plane and bus and at the weapons, including machine pistols, found and confiscated.

Federal Grand Juries and, more recently in North Carolina, State Grand Juries have been quite effective in providing information on drug organizations and individuals involved. Grand Juries enable us to reach into other States for suppliers of the cocaine and other illegal drugs coming into North Carolina. They help us to track illegal drugs from other countries but, unfortunately, we have not had good results in getting some of these criminals back into the United States.

Legal drugs are also diverted into illegal uses. Recognizing this as a significant problem in the early 1970's, we formed a unit to conduct investigations of the movement of prescription drugs into illegal uses. Our unit has been effective in investigations of misuse of drugs within institutions and among professionals. But this drug problem also appears to be increasing.

So many efforts; so few people. I would estimate that in North Carolina there are no more than 300 federal, state and local officers committed full-time to fighting the illegal drug trade. Most of the federal commitment, rightly so, is in those states closer to the sources of supply. Much of the local law enforcement commitment is to crimes against persons and property. Probably more than half of which are the result of drug abuse. This leaves the State to bridge an increasing chasm in the fight against illegal drugs.

When you look at the resources we have at the local and state level to fight in this drug war, it is amazing that we are doing as well as we are. The credit for that goes to the officers on every level, to their professionalism and dedication, and to their willingness to work together. Never before has there been such cooperation among so many different organizations: Sheriffs' departments and police departments at the local level; our State Highway Patrol, our Alcohol Law Enforcement, and the SBI at our State Level; and the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U. S. Customs, and the Coast Guard at the Federal level.

This cooperation is formal and informal. The SBI works hand in hand with local inter-agency units, some of which were created with funds provided the State by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. These interagency units allow the maximum benefit of limited law enforcement resources to an area. We also work in various task force arrangements with federal agencies, sharing information, pooling manpower, and stretching resources to be more effective in identifying the sources of illegal drugs and apprehending major distributors.

Law enforcement is doing an outstanding job with its resources in fighting the drug war. It is obvious that we alone are not doing enough, for we are not winning this war. That is why I come to you seeking your help in developing a comprehensive program to effectively deal with a national problem, to seek much needed resources for State and local law enforcement agencies, and to seek your commitment to the long campaign necessary to stop the United States from being the market place for every drug gangster and cartel in the world.

To be really effective, I believe our efforts must be focused at two places: the supplier of illegal drugs and the user of illegal drugs. While I find it difficult at times to understand why our federal government with all of its power and influence is unable to get our "friends" to curtail the manufacture and shipment of illegal drugs, my focus will be on what we can and what we should be doing within the United States to impact the supply and demand for illegal drugs.

Efforts to interdict illegal drugs smuggled into this country must continue, but should not be considered a panacea and must be kept in perspective, Interdiction efforts are particularly important to Florida, Texas, Arizona, California and other states and federal agencies have concentrated much of their personnel in those states. Some of the detection equipment available to the military may be helpful from time to time and loan arrangements for that equipment should be in place.

However, the military of this country should not become directly involved in domestic law enforcement. The military has its purpose and should not be diminished. Their training and their equipment is not for domestic law enforcement purposes and their effectiveness would be minimal in curtailing the flow of illegal drugs into this country. I strongly believe the military should never be looked upon as a replacement or substitute for effective law enforcement at the federal, state or local level. It is natural to fear, as I do, the involvement in civilian affairs of our government, especially in peace time. It smacks of militarism.

I propose instead that the resources necessary for the military to become involved would be better spent and the resources more effectively utilized if spent on law enforcement, especially State and local; on treatment and rehabilitation; and on effective drug education programs. Illegal drugs are doing their damage in communities throughout this nation. That is where major battles must be fought and is where the war against illegal drugs must be won.

My experience as Attorney General of North Carolina [before I came to the Unites States Senate] showed me the benefits provided when federal government supports local and state law enforcement with needed funds for manpower, training, and equipment. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) gave grants in that period and these grants were well spent and did much to bring new professionalism to law enforcement. In North Carolina, we used LEAA funds to create a Criminal Justice Academy. We used the funds to develop a standards program for criminal justice officers, and used funds to provide better forensic services, better training and better equipment for law enforcement.

More recently, law enforcement in North Carolina benefited from funds provided by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Almost $5 million came to the Governor's Crime Commission through that act. With this support North Carolina began a number of county and regional drug enforcement programs; provided needed training for some drug investigators; provided for expanded interdiction programs; provided two special drug prosecutors to assist district attorneys in complex cases; and provided for a drug treatment referral system within the Department of Corrections.

For my own agency, the SBI, these funds provided additional equipment for our Crime Laboratories in Raleigh and in Asheville; for research; for the establishment of a drug intelligence network among state, local and federal officers; and for a special interdiction unit to focus on airports and a unit to focus on bus stations and on clandestine laboratories. While federal funds are only a small portion of the resources we have committed to the war on drugs, they have been a big help in expanding our efforts.

North Carolina needs this type of federal support to be expanded and to continue. Funds could be used to provide additional manpower and training, more interagency programs to identify and focus on the organizations involved in trafficking, and more prosecutors to work with district attorneys on conspiracies and grand jury investigations. More training is needed for police and sheriffs' deputies in drug law enforcement, and more drug buy money for street campaigns is sorely needed.

Many are the needs of law enforcement in the war on drugs, but one of the most effective weapons, I believe, will be the education of young people. Meaningful and effective drug education must be done at the community level, but certainly it could be encouraged and supported by federal funds. There are many drug education programs. Some are good and some are not as good. In North Carolina, the Attorney General and the Superintendent of Public Instruction have joined in supporting a program called D.A.R.E.

D.A.R.E., which stands for Drug Abuse Resistance Education was developed by the Los Angeles Police Department and the Unified School District in 1983. Today the program is in 35 States. We observed this program two years ago and last year with the support of the Attorney General brought it to North Carolina. Although the SBI is under-staffed, we felt strongly about the potential of the D.A.R.E. program and have committed manpower and were joined by a number of local law enforcement agencies within the State.

D.A.R.E. is offered at elementary school levels and it focuses, not just on dangers of drugs, but on building self-esteem, on showing young people how to resist peer pressure, on teaching decision-making skills, and on healthy alternatives to drug abuse. A unique feature is that D.A.R.E. is taught by specially selected and trained uniformed officers. This year about 20,000 fifth and sixth grade students in North Carolina have experienced D.A.R.E. and the overwhelming response from students, teachers, parents and officers has been positive. The program will continue to expand in North Carolina and, I believe, in the nation.

It is important that we as a nation address the illegal drug problem. I know of no more serious problem confronting our nation today. There are no easy answers. There are no quick fixes, no gimmicks. Our nation needs a comprehensive program and a commitment to see it through. All levels of government have responsibilities. I believe lasting solutions will come. We need your support in strengthening State and local law enforcement and we need drug education programs for our young people.

Law enforcement officers in North Carolina have been urging for several years that we first learn to appreciate the simple economics of supply and demand. And second, that we recognize that ultimately our only hope of solving or at least controlling the drug problem lies in addressing the demand side of the problem.

So long as our teenagers and young adults seek to use illicit drugs or to use licit drugs illegally, then our efforts to limit the overall supply of drugs in this country through means of law enforcement and/or smuggling interdiction will come to naught. Indeed the recent history of drugs and drug interdiction efforts are the best evidence that attacking the supply of drugs can never lead to an adequate solution to the overall drug problem.

For every year, at least the last five years, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies have seized increasing quantities of illegal drugs and yet, at the same time, the prices for those drugs, particularly cocaine has steadily gone down.

When the first South Florida Task Force was established in November of 1982, cocaine dealers were paying about $60,000 for each kilogram. Today in South Florida they pay about $9,000 per kilogram in a multi-kilogram deal and only up to $14,000 per kilogram in lesser quantities.

Even in Kansas City, America's heartland, and far from South Florida's ports of entry, cocaine dealers pay only about $30,000 per kilo. Moreover the General Accounting Officer of the United States Congress recently reported that U. S. Customs Service seizures of cocaine coming into this country rose from 5.2 metric tons in 1982, to 24 metric tons in 1986, and Custom Service seizures are only part of the total law enforcement seizures.

The North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation alone seized 407 pounds of cocaine in the fiscal year 1987, up from 109 pounds in fiscal year 1983. And, of course, neither of these amounts nor those seized by any other law enforcement agencies are included in the Customs Service figures.

What these estimates show is that in an age of increasingly large seizures of illegal drugs in the interdiction effort, the supply of drugs is increasing at even faster rates than the amount of drugs being seized to the point that the price of drugs, cocaine for example, is at ports of entry now only about 15% or one-sixth of what it was a mere five years ago.

Can we name any other consumer good whose price has dropped so dramatically?

Even more astoundingly the quality, the purity of the drug sold on the street has also increased in dramatic fashion. Five years ago cocaine bought on the street was at best 20% to 30% pure. Now it is routinely 55% to 65% pure. And with the advent of Crack, 90% to 95% pure. And there appears to be no signs of abatement of this growing supply.

There have been four primary vehicle proposals suggested, all of which we have long since recognized in North Carolina.

First, we increase street level enforcement efforts. That is, we encouragement law enforcement officers and agencies to target street level dealers and individual users of illegal drugs. We thereby demonstrate the legal penalties for illegal drug use and even small scale dealing.

North Carolina Attorney General Lacy Thornburg was one of a select few top state law enforcement officials to recognize the importance of this vehicle as early as 1985, when he encouraged the State Bureau of Investigation to initiate undercover campaigns targeting small dealers that resulted in early 1986 in two large scale and state-wide roundups of such dealers.

"Individual users and small scale dealers of illicit drugs need to know, he stated firmly, that in North Carolina there will be a price to pay for such activity." Over 600 dealers were arrested in one campaign and over 300 in another. With full cooperation from the state's local prosecutors and Superior Court Judges, one half of all those arrested eventually were sentenced to the state's prison for their crimes. One-third of the first offenders arrested were sentenced to prison along with four-fifths of the repeat offenders. Since then the State Bureau of Investigation has continued to help local law enforcement agencies in North Carolina with these street-level campaigns.

The second proposal is to address the demand side in an education and prevention effort. Programs aimed at equipping children and young people with the information and skills they need to resist pressures to begin using drugs. Here, too, North Carolina's Attorney General has been a precedent leader.

Shortly after he took office in 1985, he heard about a primary drug prevention program developed in Los Angeles and called D.A.R.E. and worked with his counterparts in education, State Superintendent of Public Instruction Dr. Craig Phillips, to bring this program to North Carolina's elementary schools.

As Attorney General Thornburg said upon initiation of the program in the State, "We need to teach our children more than merely to say 'No' to drugs, we must teach them how and why to say 'No' if we are to have a lasting impact."

The third proposal is that of treatment and rehabilitation of addicts. It is perhaps in this area that North Carolina and others have most cause for concern. Although many good treatments are available, both from the State and local government mental health agencies and from a number of private treatment centers, there remains a serious deficiency in the number of treatment spaces available in these programs. Too many addicts who seek treatment are turned away for lack of institutional space.

The problem here is not with the existing treatment programs but instead with what may be our overall failure to see treatment as a primary vehicle of "demand reduction." In this, North Carolina is certainly not alone.

The final proposal, and in many respects the most critical, as well as the most difficult to launch, is the effort to bring about a social climate of moral intolerance for improper and illegal drug use.

We need to understand the extent to which a social climate of moral intolerance for improper drug use holds the key to controlling overall social demands for drugs.

If we did not tolerate improper drug use, we would not have it.

A primary mechanism for increasing social intolerance for improper drug use is to explode the myth that improper drug use is a "victimless crime," and consequently to place the "casual" or "recreational" user of drugs at the center of the moral debate.

First Lady Nancy Reagan accomplished such an explosion and placement wonderfully well when she talked of the recent assassinations in Latin America of a Drug Enforcement Administration agent in Mexico and the Attorney General of Colombia in his home country. As regards the casual cocaine users in this country, she said, "Their money bought the bullets for those assassinations." Therefore, she said forcefully, "If you are a casual drug user, you are an accomplice to murder."

In a March 3rd news report an incident was recounted that demonstrated both the First Lady's logic and the extent to which we apparently still tolerate improper drug use as a society.

Forty-two year old Richard Moskowitz, President of Ram Commodities in New York and a member of the New York Commodity Exchange, and his forty-seven year old traveling companion, Jeff Tofler, were arrested in flight aboard Eastern Airlines Flight 977 from New York to Miami as Mr. Moskowitz was attempting to "free-base" cocaine in the airplane's lavatory.

Fortunately, for the 98 passengers aboard, the ether and butane Maskowitz was using in his "free-basing" did not explode and blow a hole in the side of the aircraft. Surely no sane person perceives such "recreational" drug use as a "victimless crime."

At the same time, does not the mere fact that a forty-two year old stockbroker apparently felt so morally at ease with his "recreational use" of cocaine indicate how far we are as a society from moral intolerance of improper drug use?

One must wonder how many of Richard Moskowitz's friends and associates have subtly encouraged his drug use by expressing no moral outrage at its presence.

This last proposal for "demand reduction", places the burden of responsibility on each one of us, as North Carolinians and as Americans, indeed as fellow human beings.

We must realize individually that to the extent we fail to set good examples for our children and our fellow citizens, to the extent that we ignore such improper drug use as we come across it, and to fail to confront improper drug users with the victims of their crimes, then we shall also bear a share of the blame for drug-induced social ills.

Illegal drugs are an enemy to our nation. The drug problem is truly our national crisis, but it is also a state and local crisis. To solve it will take the efforts of each and every one of us.

Senator EXON. Could I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

Senator NUNN. Certainly.

Senator EXON. Mr. Morgan, give me an estimate of what percentage of the drugs are hard drugs. Marijuana is a problem, let's put that aside. I know we do produce some marijuana in this country, and I think we have begun to do a pretty good job of stamping it out.

But from the hard drug standpoint, nearly all of this, if I understand it correctly, has to come into the United States. Much of it over the seas, but some from across the borders, but practically all of the hard drugs are coming into the United States across our borders in some fashion, is that correct?

Senator MORGAN. Yes, sir. I think so.

Senator EXON. Well, isn't that then an area, even with the misgivings that you have stated, where particularly the Navy, and the Air Force to a lesser extent, could assist the activities of the Coast Guard, at least with regard to surveillance?

Senator MORGAN. Senator, I think you could expand the Coast Guard. I would have no objections to that. But I think any hopes of stopping the flow of drugs from crossing our borders, with the military or otherwise, is very remote.

I would suggest, with all of our interdiction efforts now, that we have not interdicted more than 5 or 10 percent of it.

Early on in North Carolina, we put nearly all of our emphasis on our nearly 3,600 miles of tidal coast lands, or 360 miles of oceanfront. And all they did was move over to the mountainous areas and moved into the highways. We have nearly 500 airports in North Carolina that are within reach of Latin America.

The plane that I flew up here on yesterday is a Cessna 404 10- or 12-passenger plane that was bringing a load of cocaine from Colombia into North Carolina. And so I think the hopes of interdicting it and being successful in winning the war there are remote.

I think where we have to put our emphasis, Senator, is on demand, and that is where I hope, while I do not want to neglect interdiction, where we in the States need help is with dealing with the demand.

There probably are not 300 officers in all of North Carolina, and we have 100 counties committed to drug enforcement.

The county of Wake, one of the biggest counties in the State, we think the sheriff has two people committed. Certainly not more than five. The capital city of Raleigh has not more than five. Many of the rural counties have a lot of officers who are capable, if we had the resources to train them how to deal with drugs.

Senator EXON. Are you saying, then, Mr. Morgan, in answer to my question, that the military is not going to play a significant role fighting drugs because interdicting drugs is not the most effective course of action? You think our main effort should be on the demand side?

I cannot quite see where the military is going to play a key role in that factor. Is that your premise?

Senator MORGAN. Yes, sir. Exactly. I do not see how they could play a key role on the demand side. And really, I do not think they should.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. We hate to keep interrupting you, but you are right on a point now that we want to pursue. Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Senator Morgan. Thank you for your very important testimony.

Following up what Senator Nunn said, I am in agreement with you that the Coast Guard needs to be expanded in their capabilities and equipment. And regrettably, they have been reduced in funding. As you know, there has been money shifted away from the Coast Guard.

First, and I guess I am asking again the same question Senator Nunn asked, but is there not a role, particularly in surveillance, in extraterritorial waters, that the military, both the Navy and the Air Force, could play?

And second, if you could please address the question of demand. And by the way, I am in total agreement with you. We have got to address the demand side if we ever expect to really interdict the flow of drugs.

GAO reports indicate that, and every other bit of evidence, rational evidence that we have, indicates that. But if you are going to attack the demand side, and I notice you said that you have become something of a civil libertarian, are you not going to have to do something about the users and the buyers of illegal drugs, as well as the suppliers?

Senator MORGAN. Senator McCain, you are exactly right, and that is my theory.

Three years ago when I took this position, or came back to the Department of Justice, we made two statewide roundups in North Carolina. In the first one we apprehended 600, in the second one 300. And over half of those went to jail. Nearly all of the second offenders went to jail.

Senator McCain, in my opinion, there really are not many users that are contributing to the problem as users. In cocaine, it is so expensive that if you become a user you automatically become a dealer.

I brought—that would be one ounce of cocaine. Let me hasten to point out it is simulated cocaine. That is $2,000 anywhere on the streets of North Carolina today. One of these little vials contains about one gram. And so that you might get an idea, a little Sweet N'Low or NutriSweet package you have on the lunch table is one gram. That is $100.

If you are addicted to cocaine, you are certainly going to use that much. And I heard a young basketball player——

Senator WARNER. Over what period of time, Senator?

Senator MORGAN. In 1 day.

Senator WARNER. That is the minimum requirement for——

Senator MORGAN. For an addict. This young basketball player that was recruited for Wake Forest told us, he is now in prison, that he was using $700 to $800 a day. So they have to become dealers.

And Senator McCain, I just think we have to let these people know that there is a penalty for using it, and they have to pay that penalty, and we have to create a moral intolerance for drugs in America.

Senator, in the 1970s when I was attorney general, we had a problem with heroin. It was widespread everywhere. And we made then a concerted effort against heroin pretty much as the Nation is making today. And while we have not eliminated it, we certainly have kept it intact and probably reduced it.

But I think the reason for it was there was a stigma attached to heroin, but there is no real stigma attached to cocaine.

For a long time, even when Mr. Windham was on the streets, professionals were arguing that it was not addictive, and it was a recreational drug. And until we bring about the feeling of moral intolerance, and I think we have to bring about that to deal with the demand.

If I can take another second, Mr. Chairman. I am sure you know more about it than I do, or as much. If you took this 1 ounce of cocaine, $2,000, and put a little baking soda with it and a little water, you dissolve the hydrochloride in there.

And then when it evaporated off you would heat it and the liquid would evaporate off, you would have some solid in the bottle and that would be crack, and that is where the word crack comes from. That is pure base.

That much cocaine would make 500 of these little vials of crack, which sell for $25 to $35 on the street. And our schools are literally full of it. And gentlemen, as I travel around North Carolina, I have parents and school people begging us to do something about it. And there is nothing that we can do.

In the little town of Benson on Highway 95 in March the town council and the mayor came to see me, telling about the problem of crack, and we have got the worst problem in my county of anywhere in the State, because we have a lot of migrant workers, begging us to do something about it. And they said, we do not distrust our officers, but they just do not know how, because they do not pay them much.

Last week, Mr. Windham brought into my office a father of a 14-year-old boy from that very town who is hooked on crack. And once you have taken the hydrochloride out of this stuff you have become addicted just overnight. And that son is addicted to crack.

He noticed he was sleeping, he was staying out late, his grades hit rock-bottom. He could not find anywhere to put him. He finally put him in Charter Treatment Center or Charter Northridge in Raleigh, at the cost of $3,500 a week. And his hospitalization would not pay it because it had no operating room.

Dealing with the demand, dealing with education, and dealing with rehabilitation and treatments are the things that we need to concentrate on, and of course not neglect interdiction.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Warner. What you are saying is we only have so many taxpayer dollars, we try and maintain a credible level of interdiction, but rather than pouring more and more into interdiction, which at best is ineffective, let us take those taxpayer dollars and put them back home in these areas where we can deal with the demand? Is that about the bottom line of your testimony?

Senator Morgan. Senator Warner, that is exactly what I am saying.

Senator McCain. Including enforcement and prosecution of the so-called users?

Senator Morgan. Yes. And Senator McCain, if I can say so, or add one thing, that is where your drug abuse program of 1986 helped our administrator, the courts, got money for two special prosecutors who worked out of District Attorney's offices, who do nothing but prosecute drug cases. And they have helped us with State grand juries.

One of our problems is, once we get these street dealers in the courts, the State courts are so bogged down that it is hard to deal with them. And last year, while we arrested these 900 and put half of them in prison, the North Carolina prison system released 900 felons under court order, because we had reached the maximum.

Mr. Chairman, I know my time is limited. But if I could tell you about my program for a minute, the DARE program, I am sure you have heard of, that was originated in Los Angeles. We started it in our department this last year.

DARE stands for Drug Abuse Resistance Education. It originated in Los Angeles. We took five of our agents and sent them out there and trained them, and we came back and we recruited police officers and deputy sheriffs, good men, and we spent 2 weeks training them. We give them a 17-week curriculum.

They go into the school and they teach the fifth or sixth graders one day a week for 17 weeks. And Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, we have reached 20,000 youngsters this year. And it is a wonderful program.

We do not scare them to death about drugs. We teach them about drugs. We teach them to say "no," but more importantly we teach them how to turn and walk off. We teach them how to resist the peer pressure. And we teach them self-esteem. And lack of self-esteem is one of the contributions of it. And there is a side effect.

These kids love the officers, and the officers have fallen in love with them. Those officers will stay on that playground. They are there to meet the school buses in the morning. They stay with them.

The kids fuss about who is going to go to the cafeteria with them. They are around them. Think what that is going to mean for law enforcement, for cooperation and informants 10 years from now, and I highly recommend that.

Chairman Nunn. Who pays for that?

Senator Morgan. We took manpower from within our bureau. We decided we would rather have one man in the classroom than two on the streets.

And we did not have any money to print the curriculum. So I went to Wachovia Bank and John McNair gave us $75,000 to have the curriculums printed for this year. Yesterday the leaders of the North Carolina legislature had a press conference and endorsed appropriations to make it statewide.

We have it now in 35 school units, and of course we have about 150 school units. But that, I think, is the finest program that we could have.

Chairman Nunn. When you say demand side, do you include in your definition of demand side going after the user in a law enforcement direction?

Senator MORGAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. So demand to you is health treatment, education, something like the DARE program, and also prosecution of users?

Senator MORGAN. Yes, sir. To bring about this moral feeling of intolerance toward drugs.

Senator WARNER. Senator, what would you feel about other penalties, apart from just imprisonment, because our prisons are overflowing right now?

Supposing we were to impose by law on a convicted user the penalty of forfeiting any right to, say, continuing to participate in Federal student loan programs, Federal housing programs, or other means by which the Federal Government assists individuals in gaining their goals in life, just slam down and say that is it. If you are going to be a user and you are caught and you are convicted, forget it. We are taking you out of these other Federal programs.

Senator MORGAN. Senator, I have read of those proposals, and while I am not ready to say just how far we should go, I think that is in the right direction. And I think we ought to let youngsters know in America that if they use it they are going to be foreclosed from so many things.

We have never yet hired an agent that has ever used cocaine or any hallucinogenic drugs. And you would be surprised at the bright young people that we would like to have, but somewhere along the way they did not know and they have experimented with cocaine, or hallucinogenics.

So they are deprived of that right. They are deprived of the right of that job. So maybe those other——

Senator WARNER. We also have to be understanding. I mean, the whole concept of our Federal criminal system, and indeed the States, is if you make a mistake you cannot be penalized for the rest of your life.

And so, if an individual is convicted, it seems to me we have to show some temperance if that individual wants to rehabilitate himself or herself, and once again get back into the mainstream of life. And so I suppose there has got to be a balance in the system of penalties.

Senator MORGAN. Certainly. The reason we do not hire them in law enforcement is because we are afraid once they have used it that the likelihood of them coming back to it, especially in the area where the temptations are so great.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Morgan, what about testing? We talk to the military, and one of the things the military tell us is that they have had the most success with this, the testing program within the military.

Of course, that is different from civilian society, because the penalty for showing up as positive on the military test is basically to be kicked out of the military, at least on the second go-round.

But they have reduced, I am told, some commands have reduced from 35 percent use down to 3 or 4 percent use by a testing program, I suppose primarily as a deterrent. Have you had any experience with that?

And do you know—I know we have so many problems with polygraphs—as to whether they are accurate or not? What about drug testing?

Senator MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, the military is entirely, of course, under a different situation where they have them in control. And we have debated that quite a bit in our own agencies.

We do not test, we do not have random testing. But what we do is constantly monitor and watch people. I walked through our own crime lab in Asheville a couple of years ago, and there was a Ph. D., a scientist. And I noticed his nose was red and he was sniffing. And he really did not want to talk to me.

And I asked about him, and they said, well, you know, he is just sort of a scientist. But I worried about it. And so one day I ordered him to submit to a urine test and a polygraph test, and he just admitted, he said, I have used cocaine within the last hour, and I have used it five times in the last 24 hours.

So what we do now is monitor. If we ever get to the point where we feel like we have a problem, we would go to random testing. But I do not believe that the tests are reliable enough to require testing of everybody.

Chairman NUNN. Are any school systems doing voluntary testing in North Carolina?

Senator MORGAN. Not that I know of.

Chairman NUNN. If you had $100 from the Federal level, additional money beyond what is being spent right now, how would you allocate that between interdiction, education, and health?

Senator MORGAN. I think I would allocate a relatively small amount for interdiction, to add to interdiction, because I do not think we can really stop it that way.

I would allocate it to education and to treatment in health, because once these people get on it, if we do not treat them they are going to be on it forever. They are going to be a customer or user forever.

And if they are using it, they are going to be selling it, and they are going to be recruiting other customers, because that is the only way they can stay on it.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, let me pick up on your question.

Senator Morgan, if you were given $100 in the chairman's hypothetical, I think probably you would find in North Carolina or California or wherever that if you spent that on rehabilitation you would find yourself owing somebody about $10.

Rehabilitation is absolutely essential, I think, for anyone who has made the decision that he or she is willing to stop and wants help to come back. But it is a very expensive proposition, not just in money but in time and in effort. And the prospects for rehabilitation are not guaranteed. That is, success is not guaranteed.

One of the best programs I know is the Phoenix House program, and they have about a 75 percent success rate after people have been in 24-hour residence, for about a minimum of 9 months.

And actually, Mr. Chairman, I think that we are compelled to recognize that we are going to have to do all of these things. We are going to have to interdict the supply, we are definitely going to have to do much more about curtailment of demand.

And particularly, I am delighted to hear Senator Morgan's response to the North Carolina experience with the DARE program, which we are very proud of. It did, as he told you, originate in Los Angeles, and Chief Gates, working with other law enforcement leaders around the country, has managed to export that to virtually all sectors of the country. And the experience has been similar to the praise and enthusiasm expressed by Senator Morgan.

And so my own feeling is that the best use of the money that we have, the best return on it, is the prevention that will be achieved through that kind of a DARE program.

But let me just ask you this, Senator Morgan. When you speak of interdiction, are you speaking of interdiction on the streets of North Carolina?

Senator MORGAN. Generally, I am speaking of interdiction into the country and into the States.

Senator WILSON. Let me just ask you this. I have found, speaking with police chiefs and sheriffs and DAs and school officials in my State that they plead for two things.

One is that there be more effort made to curtail demand. The second thing is that there may be a difference in different States. I happen to think mine suffers the doubtful distinction of being the cocaine-using capital of the world.

But law enforcement officials there say, we are overwhelmed by the supply. And they think that there is a relationship between this flood of drugs coming in and the activities of those who are bringing them in and try to sell them at retail.

So they are convinced that their efforts on the streets are made more difficult and dangerous and expensive and less likely to succeed, because there has been a failure to interdict the supply of drugs into the country.

And they have further been supportive of the kind of effort that we have authorized here on the Senate side. Not perhaps anything as far-reaching as the House version.

But here on the Senate side what we did was to authorize the use of airborne radar and fixed and rotary wing aircraft throw up a net along the southern boundaries of the United States because civilian law enforcement simply cannot do it.

I mean, there are such gaping holes that the small amount that we have provided to Customs, to DEA, while they are useful in the sector in which they are employed, leaving vast open stretches through which the drugs come pouring.

And so I do not really think it is a question of choice. It seems to me we are compelled to do what we can effectively do by way of interdiction, knowing that we will not begin to get all of it but knowing that if we can significantly improve on interdiction that is going to be reflected on the streets of our communities.

What I am hearing from my law enforcement officials, and this really is my question to you, they say that because of the flood of drugs there has been a change in the aggressiveness with which retailers market these illegal drugs, now that crack has dropped the price so that it is available for 25 cents a bag, they have to deal in volume.

And what they are saying is, the one analogy to legitimate business is that the dealers engage in trial subscriptions. They do not even charge at all. They give it away. And they give it away to 10- and 11-year-old children, not just on school grounds but wherever they find them. And in fact, we have been reading news stories of that kind in the Washington papers.

But they are convinced that, in addition to the effort being made to try to educate the young to the perils, and this program that you mentioned, the DARE program, does not just talk about the perils, it does through a semester raise the self-esteem of these kids.

That is the best possible safeguard we have. But they are convinced that their lives are needlessly at peril, and that the kids that they are seeking to protect are needlessly at peril because the supply of drugs is so widespread.

In other words, the supply of drugs does not just feed an existing appetite, it also creates new markets.

So do you agree with that analysis? And do you think that the job of law enforcement has been made increasingly difficult by our failure to interdict the supply beyond the borders?

Senator MORGAN. It certainly has, Senator. And interdiction plays a major role.

But 5 years ago we in North Carolina, in this bureau, interdicted 107 pounds of cocaine. Last year it was 400 and some, and the supply is still cheaper and still prevalent. I think we have to do it all.

If we had the money to do everything, by all means, put it everywhere, in interdiction too. The question, I guess, is where can you best spend the money? And of course, I see the needs on the local level.

Senator, in a county in North Carolina where the largest military base of its kind in the world is located, the sheriff 2 years ago had $2,500 in his budget for buy money.

Now, you have to remember the county taxes come from ad valorem taxes. That would not even allow him to buy 1 ounce of cocaine and get into the courts. So we need money.

We need to put our resources in all the areas. Interdiction is a very important part, and we certainly ought to, it ought to maintain a presence, and enhance it where we can. But on the cost effectiveness of your interdiction, I sometimes question, I do not know.

For instance, the military, all I know, and I am sure you have better figures than I do, but I think I read in Time where two AWACS planes flew last year at a cost of $35.7 million and made two hits.

Now, I am not sure, and this is just what I read, that is more than our entire budget for the State bureau of North Carolina, with 325 agents, where we had several thousand people arrested and put many of them in jail last year. And so it is a question of priorities, and that is why I know you have some hard decisions to make.

Senator WILSON. Well, let me just ask you this. If you were sitting on this side of the table and you had done that, and you were aware that these military aircraft exist, and that the personnel who have skills in not only flying those aircraft but in using the airborne radar exist, and if they can engage in aerial interdiction, when we are told by Customs and DEA that more and more of what is coming in is doing so by air, does it not make sense to use those existing assets and that existing manpower?

Senator MORGAN. Senator, under the circumstances of the situation that you gave, where they are utilizing it as training and not involving additional cost, and they are not coming in contact on a one-to-one basis with the civilians, it no doubt would make sense.

But as I read the military, they are saying, this is additional cost, or it may be detracting from other, from their main mission. That I would have to yield to you on. I do have, Senator, some real fears of involving the military on a one-to-one basis with our civilian population.

I guess that is based upon being from North Carolina. You know we did not join the Union. We did not vote for George Washington, we did not have any Senators up here, because we were pretty individualistic.

We would not join until we had those prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. And we just have a fear in North Carolina, we have a fear, Senator, of authority almost anywhere. But I really have a real fear of involving the military on a one-to-one basis in law enforcement.

Senator WILSON. Senator, let me just ask you this. Even given that deep-seated Carolinian tradition of suspicion of authority, which I think to be a healthy attitude within bounds, would you have any problem with the existing authority that Coast Guardsmen have on the high seas to stop a suspected smuggler, to search vessels, to seize contraband, and to arrest those who are found to have contraband?

Senator MORGAN. Senator, not as I understand it.

Senator WARNER. That is existing law, now.

Senator MORGAN. That is existing law, and I sort of draw a distinction in my own mind between the Coast Guard and the Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

Senator WILSON. Well, let me ask you this. The Senate version of this amendment to the Defense bill takes that one very small step further, and what it says in response to the experience that we have had.

And Admiral Yost, the Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, recently testified that by putting Coast Guardsmen on naval vessels the ability of the Coast Guard to perform their interdiction mission had been enormously amplified. And that is his word.

That being true, what we have said in this amendment is that without the sort of violation of posse comitatus that I think you are envisioning, what we would do is authorize those naval personnel, or those personnel aboard naval vessels, they could be marines, they could be sailors, who are aboard a naval vessel, who have been specifically trained, and who are in effect deputized for that purpose by the Coast Guard, would be able to assist in the kind of effort that the Coast Guard now makes in terms of high seas search and seizure and detention of those who, because they are found with contraband, are suspected of being smugglers. Now, that certainly does not press.

Senator MORGAN. Senator, it is inching mighty close to it. And I will be honest with you, it gives me concern.

If I thought it was the absolute answer, I probably would be more inclined to agree. But every time you move a little further toward invading this line between the military and the civilians, it does bother me.

And also, Senator, the cost effectiveness of it bothers me. And another thing, I am afraid that if we are not careful, if we come out of Washington with this great program of military interdiction, here again we lead so many of our people to believe we are really doing something about drugs when we really are not doing a whole lot on the streets. And because of the courts and the prisons in law enforcement.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wilson, I think we have not been keeping strict time.

Senator WILSON. I noticed that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. But you have gone about 15 or 20 minutes, so I think I ought to rotate it now.

Senator WILSON. If there is someone else with questions, go right ahead.

Chairman NUNN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly, Senator Morgan, I certainly agree with just about everything you have had to say.

I think it is also important to recognize that, to my knowledge, our Navy and Air Force just do not go out and involve themselves in paper exercises. And I think they will testify at our hearing tomorrow that this will be an additional requirement placed on the Army and the Air Force in particular.

And I am also in agreement with you about the money that is involved here, particularly since it is clear that we need a much tighter central management and more integrated approach to prioritizing how these resources should be used.

And one of the issues that will come up again tomorrow is the failure of us, the Government, to come up with an effective $C^3I$ command, control, communication and intelligence system. Some $41 million seems to have been wasted already in an ineffective Customs $C^3I$ system.

I do not know what you could have done with that $41 million. But I would suggest that it could have had an enormous beneficial effect on our war on drugs throughout the country.

I also share your concern about military people interfacing with citizens. And I think you and I could have envisioned the repercussions of a false arrest, a mistreatment of a citizen by members of the military, or even a tragedy such as the downing of an airplane in a mistaken identity situation, which has happened quite often.

I would just like to ask you again, if you had that $100, would you place the emphasis on education? Or would you place it on prosecution? Or would you balance both of those out?

Senator MORGAN. Senator McCain, I would balance it between the three.

If I could just give you an idea of where we spend our money under the 1986 act, the first year we got $4 million, the Governor's crime commission under that. We used $122,000 to train the highway patrolmen on interdiction on the highways, and they have done a tremendous job.

But we only have 12 trained in the whole State. We used $350,000 for corrections to try to locate or designate the addicts in the prisons and get them, plug them into the rehabilitation system.

We used $232,000 for an anti-drug smuggling task force that works the highways and the airports and so forth, $88,000 for an intelligence network. But then we used a whole lot of it——

Senator McCain. Let me ask, how well did the Intelligence network perform?

Senator Morgan. It is working very well.

Senator McCain. I think that is one of the real keys to it. We are not talking about surveillance around Miami, we are talking about an AWACS looking at 3,600 boats and ships.

Senator Morgan. Senator McCain, you are making Cuyler very happy, because that is his thing on intelligence, because we have developed and are developing a good intelligence network in North Carolina.

But two of the most vital grants that were made was to the administrator of the courts and a State administrator to hire two prosecutors to help the local DAs who have thousands of other cases. And they are doing a tremendous job with us. But we can take our cases to the Federal courts and we do, but you know, they only want the big cases.

If I could just point out another thing, Senator, on interdiction. This squad that I alluded to here, we have one man in the Raleigh area, and working with him is one officer from the local sheriff's department and the local police department.

And they will run out to the airport where we have 35,000 people coming and going every day, and then they will run down to the bus station and go through the buses overhead racks. We have no right to go through the baggage unless we have reason.

But there is seldom a day that goes by—just to give you one example a couple of weeks ago Terry was out at Raleigh-Durham airport and he saw a man standing over, he just sort of looked suspicious, and he watched him.

A Pan Am plane landed and a lady walked up to him and began to talk. As as they started to walk away the agent walked along and showed him his credentials and said, "may I talk to you?"

And she was sort of haughty and she said, "Yes, I know what you want to talk about. I am clean." He said, "Well then you will not mind if I search your bag, no?" And so he searched her bag and fortunately he found a post office receipt where a package had been mailed to a little town, just a crossroads post office down below my home.

And so he immediately got with the postal inspectors and they intercepted it, and there were 28 ounces of crack in that package mailed to herself, to Godwin. And what was ironic and sad is, the postmaster said that that lady had been getting a package about that size every 2 weeks.

We did the same thing on a lady in Charlotte at the airport. She had been going to Florida once a week and bringing back a pound of cocaine. And so when we talk about solving it solely by interdiction, we cannot do it. We need all of these things you are talking about.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator, for a very important testimony, in my view.

Senator MORGAN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator WIRTH [presiding]. The Senator from Texas.

Senator GRAMM. Mr. Chairman, thank you for recognizing me. Mr. Morgan, I woke up this morning to hear Mayor Ed Koch on the radio saying that we just ought to Federalize this drug problem. I would like to ask you your response to that.

Senator MORGAN. Senator Gramm, it can best be handled, I think, by the State and locals. The Feds have a place in it. I think you may not have come in, but we are led to believe that the Feds are doing a lot.

In my State of North Carolina, we have 10 or 12 DEA agents, 40 Customs officers, but that is dealing with the port of Wilmington, two Coast Guard investigators, two Coast Guard liaison officers.

The work is being done by the State officers and the county sheriffs and the local police, and we do not have resources to do it. But we are doing the best that we can.

Senator GRAMM. So your view would be then that we need a partnership effort. But that we certainly do not want to take the position that we can have the Federal Government come in and set up a whole new duplicative procedure all the way down to the JP to hear cases involving drug use.

Senator MORGAN. No, sir. Senator, I am just as afraid of that as I am the idea of the military dealing 1-to-1 with the civilians.

I think, Senator, with a little training money, and as I mentioned earlier, it is too bad that we have to call on the Federal Government to give us seed money, but that is a fact of life, because you know, the local legislatures do not do what we ought to do.

But with a little training money we can train a lot of deputy sheriffs and policemen to be good officers, for just a small part of what it would take to employ a Federal officer and to train him and to bring him in.

Senator GRAMM. Mr. Morgan, you have probably seen some of the data that has been coming out, some of which has been presented to this committee, that suggests that, while we would all like to think we can build a wall around America and keep drugs out, that the cold reality is that the value of cocaine rises 208 times between the time it leaves the field in Colombia and the time that it is sold on 14th Street in Washington, DC.

Almost without limit, no matter what you do in interdiction with that kind of multiplier on value, you are going to have a relatively minor impact on the price as it is sold on the street.

I for one support military involvement at the level we have adopted in the Senate, because of, I think, two things. Number one, we simply need to have the military involved in this war.

And number two, we are never going to convince people to do what we have got to do, in terms of prosecuting users, if we are not willing to make a commitment to try to stop the drugs from getting into the country. But in reality we cannot win the war through interdiction alone. You agree with that, do you not?

Senator **Morgan**. Senator, you are exactly right. As long as I can go on the streets of Raleigh and buy that much cocaine for $2,000, that is one ounce, and within 15 minutes turn it into $12,000 worth of crack, you cannot stop it if you build a wall around the country 100 feet high.

Senator **Gramm**. I think part of the clue there is we cannot even keep it out of our prisons, where we do have walls.

Senator **Morgan**. That is certainly true.

Senator **Gramm**. So your view is that we have to—how do you think, if you were going to give—and I am about to run out of time.

But if you were going to give a short sentence, what do you think we have to do?

Senator **Morgan**. I think, Senator, you have got to give us the resources to go after the users who are also street dealers, because they have to deal to use it.

We need to expand our education prevention program. These kids we are teaching in the fifth and sixth grade already know more about drugs than many of us know about it. We have got to expand that and then we have got to give our courts and prisons enough resources to handle them when they get them there.

As I mentioned earlier, on two roundups last year, the year before, we picked up over 900 people, put over half of them in jail and nearly all of those who were second offenders in jail.

We have got to deal in that area. We have got to have the resources to deal with the street dealers and the users. We have got to have education for prevention. We have got to deal with some treatment and rehabilitation for those that want it.

Senator **Gramm**. Would it be fair to say that you are in favor of a measured response in terms of users? Maybe a confiscation program involving users? Suspending people's driver's licenses, denying them access to public services and public benefits?

I mean, we obviously do not have enough room in jail to put away the felons that are selling the drugs. If we arrest some guy using cocaine in his Volvo, would it not just be easier to take his Volvo than to try to put him in jail?

Senator **Morgan**. Yes, sir. Now, if we find him using cocaine, and it is in his Volvo, we ought to take it. Now, we need to be careful that we do not get into this situation that we did with the fishing boats where we turned the public against us.

But if a person has cocaine in his vehicle and is using it in his vehicle, it ought to be confiscated, and I think that is the language they will understand.

Senator **Gramm**. Well, it seems to me you get away from the problem you had with that yacht where the owner knowingly is either using it or allowing it to be used.

I do not think it is the question of the quantity. If the owner knew it was being used, no matter how much it was, I think you have got public support to seize the property.

I think the problem is when somebody else is using it and he does not know it. Then I think that is where the problem arises.

Senator **Morgan**. That is a problem. But if a person is using it or knowingly using it in a vehicle or anywhere else I say we ought to confiscate it.

We have got to get to the economics of it if it is going to help us. I could not agree more.

Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WIRTH. The Senator from Idaho.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome here, Senator Morgan.

I do not know whether the subject has been brought up, but in your efforts in North Carolina, has the death penalty question for the drug kingpins been discussed, and would that have any relevancy?

Senator MORGAN. Senator, it has been discussed by various legislators.

The President pro tempore of the Senate has talked with us about it. I have not given a lot of thought to it myself because we have not been able to extract the penalties that we have got.

But personally, I feel that for a person that is dealing in cocaine on a more than once basis, no penalty is too severe for them. And I might say that up until recent years I have always opposed the death penalty, but what I have seen in my now nearly 10 years of law enforcement, I think if a person is a dealer and a big-time dealer, anything we do to him is not too bad.

Senator SYMMS. In other words, if someone broke into your house, and started to use a baseball bat or a club on one of your children it would be assault and battery. It would be justifiable homicide, if you took care of him.

And so you are saying, if somebody moves into a school district and starts selling cocaine to young children, that the end result is as bad as the former that I have described?

Senator MORGAN. Senator, understanding that we are in law enforcement and we see the worst of it every day, I would have to agree with you.

Maybe if I moved out from a more objective viewpoint or standpoint, I might moderate my views.

Senator SYMMS. No, I tend to agree with you. I think that there is a point here where society should be outraged about what is happening.

Either we have to go to a market use and drive the price down to where there is no profit in it, and then face the consequences of a lot of people with a severe problem, or else we have to start enforcing the laws against the consumers to take away the demand.

I would say that is really what you are saying in law enforcement. Is it not?

Senator MORGAN. Right.

Senator SYMMS. That what we are doing is not working?

Senator MORGAN. It is not working now. I think it can work if we put enough effort and resources and commitment to do it.

We did it with heroin. Now, we have eliminated heroin. But in the 1970s when I was attorney general that was a real problem in North Carolina. But we dealt with it because it was a stigma, and the courts were willing to impose punishments.

But, you know, there is not that stigma attached to cocaine that it did to heroin. It was known too long as a recreational drug or a drug of the elite. Mr. Windham, who is a longtime law enforcement officer, says when he was with the FBI and then came with the SBI that he has had many people say, you know, cocaine is not addicting or it is all right, do not bother it.

And so that view had prevailed too long in our society. And it is hard today to get penalties. Even the penalties that we have, and that would be one reason I might be reluctant to go to more severe penalties.

I found as a trial lawyer that I could win my case a lot better if the prosecutor demanded the death penalty, because the jury was a lot less likely to find him guilty. But I do not know, that is a question of argument. But no penalty is too great for the people who will corrupt our young people.

Senator Symms. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Wirth. Senator Morgan, we thank you very much, and your colleagues, for being with us this morning and for your very thoughtful and very helpful testimony. And we look forward to working with you as we try to sort our way through this enormously complicated relationship of the problem of drug abuse and the use of the military.

Senator Morgan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sure that I speak for my 29 colleagues across the country that we would more than welcome an opportunity to be of assistance to you as you go about your duties in any way that we can.

Senator Wirth. Well, we thank you. And your experience is certainly superb and most helpful.

As you know, at this time of the year, when there is a campaign coming up, you get a flurry of interest up here, and there is a steadiness, I think, to what all of you have done and the experience all of you have had is something that we would be well-advised to take advantage of. I thank you very much, sir.

Senator Morgan. Thank you.

Senator Wirth. Our second group of witnesses this morning, if we could have them all come together to the witness table, is a panel on demand production.

Those witnesses include Karst Besteman, Executive Director of the Alcohol and Drug Problems Association, Dr. Allan Cohen, Executive Director, Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, Elizabeth McConnell, consultant on drug education, and Dr. Lloyd Johnston, research scientist and Program Director of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.

We are delighted to have you all with us this morning. If you would all join us at the witness table.

What I would like to do, is to ask each of you to summarize your statements as best as possible. You are all familiar with the rules of the committee. Your statements will be included in full in the record.

We would like you to summarize those statements in 5 minutes or so. That would be very helpful, so that we could then get to an exchange between you all and members of the committee.

And so with that as a general guideline, we would appreciate your sticking to that. And let us just go in the order in which you all were introduced.

Mr. Besteman, if you might start, then we will go to Dr. Cohen, Ms. McConnell, and Dr. Johnston. Thank you all very much for being here. Mr. Besteman.

## STATEMENT OF KARST J. BESTEMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROBLEMS ASSOCIATION

Mr. Besteman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for the opportunity to testify to you on the problems of drug abuse and how to respond to them on a Federal level.

I would like to emphasize a few points in my formal statement. The first is I think that it is necessary for the Nation to adopt a goal-driven strategy, a long-term Federal strategy that is explicit in what it wants to accomplish.

I think the statement that we are absolutely going to eliminate drug abuse is not an achievable goal, and it has been one of the things that has helped us stumble in how we have conceived our strategies.

The other important place, and I think history teaches us, is that during a period when we had a much better-balanced policy and program approach between diminishing the supply and diminishing the demand, we had relative success.

In the last approximately 15 years, we have constantly added to interdiction of supply and supply reduction and simply have let the demand reduction area drift along, until the initiative of 1986. And there was some positive impact from that initiative.

Looking back at some policy direction between 1963 and 1975, the policies that the Federal Government adopted were generally set forth in a document that was put out in 1963 that was called the Prettyman Commission Report. It gave a certain long-term approach to what we were doing.

Since 1976, most of the Federal policy pronouncements which come out almost annually have not had that kind of studied scope of the other document. And I will not go into the illustrations. Some of them are in my testimony.

I was asked to concentrate particularly on the treatment area in preparing this testimony, and I would like to make a few points as to what I think is important in that area.

One, I think, for the last several years, there has been a lack of access by people who are addicted, or having trouble with drugs, to treatment. The capacity of this country to treat the problem has simply not been large enough.

There has been resistance by communities to have treatment sites. There has been instability in the funding of treatment. And we can go into those details later.

The physical plants that people are treated in, the clinics, the storefronts, the therapeutic communities, the facilities, most of them were taken over in a very short period of time in the early 1970s, were never designed for long-term use and are in need of renovation, refurbishing, and in some cases replacement.

While we have been watching these trends take place in the treatment area, there has been great policy debates and no settling on whether we should have cabinet committees, what the role of the Vice President should be, should this be a Presidential initiative?

And I think it is interesting that the time in which we have had our best policy direction a President, no matter who it is, has put himself on the line on this issue. And we have talked about reorganization.

There are also issues of health insurance in terms of our general population and in terms of the Federal employee, health benefits are important to setting a standard for the Federal attitude toward treatment.

Particularly in keeping with your request for staying within 5 minutes, I will terminate my remarks at this point and ask my colleagues to continue.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Besteman follows:]

## TESTIMONY OF
## KARST J. BESTEMAN
## EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
## ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROBLEMS ASSOCIATION

Mr. Chairman:

I am appreciative of the opportunity to appear before this Senate Committee to discuss issues important to the evaluation and understanding of impact of the federal drug laws and polices. My Association commends you and your members for taking the time to discuss and develop ideas which can assist you in the important task of providing national leadership.

I am Executive Director of the Alcohol and Drug Problems Association of North America (ADPA). The Association was formed in 1949 with the sole purpose of advocacy on behalf of the States to convince the federal government that alcoholism and alcohol abuse were a legitimate health problem which warranted federal intervention. That initial goal was realized in 1970. Since that time our membership has expanded to incorporate four classes of members. State governmental agencies still form the ADPA State Council. Public, Private, Profit and Non-Profit treatment and prevention agencies comprise an Agency Council. State professional and program associations form another council within ADPA. Finally we have an Individual Council to which any interested professional can affiliate and enjoy the benefits of membership.

My experience with the drug abuse problem spans 31 years beginning in 1957 at the Public Health Service Hospital as a clinical social worker. I subsequently did field research on treatment outcome, managed the federal civil commitment treatment program for narcotic addicts.

Later in my federal career I managed programs in research, training, prevention, and treatment as the Deputy Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse. I have also served as the HHS Region III Regional Health Administrator in New York City and retired as Assistant Surgeon General in March of 1984. I have been Executive Director of ADPA since that date.

ADPA's prime purpose is to seek solutions to the problem of addiction and to minimize its consequences to the physical and social health to the nation. ADPA does this by serving as policy advocate for those ideas and programs which offer a positive impact on solving these problems. We also act as a forum for our members to join together to improve the quality of services being provided to persons seeking treatment for alcoholism and addiction. Additionally we develop the finest training and professional educational programs designed specifically to meet the training needs of today's practitioners.

My testimony today is based on the premise that there is a need for a goal driven strategy to reduce the death, destruction and negative social and health consequences of drug abuse. I work from the assumption that absolute elimination of all drug abuse and addiction is not an achievable goal but that we have an opportunity to substantially reduce the abuse of drugs, to minimize the negative consequences to the health of the abuser, and to minimize the negative impact the social and economic costs to the nation.

Within this framework I will address in detail the role and benefit in making the support and availability of treatment on request a key element in a successful strategy. In my opinion an examination of the Federal Government's role and policies in the efforts to reduce drug abuse demonstrates a failure to use the full range of policy and program options available. This failure has directly contributed to the recent increase in the problem indicators.

## DEMAND REDUCTION ISSUES

A review of the policy statements made by the last four administrations confirms that the intention in policy and program design was to achieve a balanced and comprehensive response to a problem described as a threat to the well being of our society. There is now a twenty year history of discussing supply and demand strategies. Review of the implementation of the policies shows a much less balanced approach and occasionally a reluctance to follow through on well publicized announcements. There has also been a reluctance to build on progress or achievements of a previous administration.

Except for the authorization to establish two hospitals to treat narcotic addicts in 1929 the Congress did not concern itself with demand reduction until 1966. At that time the provision of treatment for addicts was authorized as part of a bill aimed at enhancing the criminal justice system and giving the federal courts greater latitude in sentencing drug addicts. Congress added a section to that bill which authorized the establishment of community based treatment programs but delayed appropriating funds for one year.

In 1968 there were amendments to the Community Mental Health Centers Act which authorized the establishment of specific alcohol and drug abuse treatment units within that service system at the community's option. In 1971 the President initiated the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention by executive order and submitted legislation to the Congress for passage. In the late spring of 1972 the Special Action Office was established in law. It had a legislatively mandated life span of three years. The intent was to mount a high profile, well financed, national effort to achieve the goal of "winning the war on drugs."

The major goals of the legislation were to eliminate all waiting lists for treatment and to establish a network of community based treatment centers across the nation. The service system that developed had flaws which are to some extent still present today. Because of the intended short term emergency nature of this effort, treatment programs were established rapidly and outside the general medical and psychiatric treatment systems. There was a very strong emphasis given to cost containment. Programs were funded on a slot cost basis and monitored to assure that they were serving the number of clients indicated in the funding agreement. Early community project grants gave way to state-wide services contracts which resulted in a highly structured, directed effort. The treatment system was lean, provided minimal services, included no primary care for medical conditions, or specialized vocational rehabilitation services. These services were theoretically to be provided on referral. Often these services were not delivered.

This treatment system was extended beyond 1975 and remained intact with erosion by inflation and with no increase in annual funding until the advent of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health (ADM) Block Grant in 1981. The ADM Block Grant was instituted with a twenty-five percent reduction of support for the community treatment system justified by anticipated savings in more efficient management. Since the system was already essentially administered through the States there was not a management savings available and throughout the early eighties the treatment system was reduced. During this period more addicts and drug abusers presented for treatment and the system was operating above its designed capacity. The infusion of treatment monies in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 reversed this erosion. It did not produce a treatment capacity surplus.

Two factors caused great stress on the service system in recent years. First, there is a major increase in persons seeking treatment with severe cocaine abuse. Secondly, within the needle sharing population of drug abusers the patients were becoming more debilitated. This was largely a result of the impact of the Human Immunosuppressant Virus (AIDS virus) among the needle sharing heroin addicted patients. Suddenly a service system designed to treat addictive behavior was faced with patients having serious life threatening medical complications as well.

During the last several years the treatment system has not had a well articulated strategy. In 1982 the federal strategy stated..."This broad social impact requires greater attention to the entire spectrum of drug abuse..." followed shortly by the statement that "1982 strategy does not attempt to dictate from a national level the relative priorities for local responses to drug problems." The final comment about priorities absolved the federal government from responsibility by stating "described simply, real success is achieved when those people most affected by drug and alcohol abuse are directly involved in solving their own problems."

Today, drug abuse treatment system is being stressed as never before. The presence of AIDS virus in patients and patients already exhibiting the AIDS symptoms has put an additional burden on the treatment providers. In programs which are already over capacity these patients require additional services and special review of their health status. The historic distance between the drug abuse treatment system and the health care resources of the community is in need of a firm corrective action.

Equally important in the restoration of patients to full function as contributing members of society is the need to strengthen the relationship between the social service and the vocational rehabilitation resources with the drug abuse treatment system. Few communities and states have effectively dealt with this lack of coordination. One exception is Oregon.

The physical plant for most drug treatment programs dependent on public funding is substandard in appearance and functional design. When we established many of the drug treatment clinics and programs they were housed in aging and dilapidated structures. There was no money or inclination to place addiction treatment programs in new and modern buildings. When the clinics were opened there was great pressure to initiate service and little regard for the fact that the clinic might be still serving patients ten years later. By policy, there were not funds for new construction and limited funds for upgrading facilities in the health and safety areas. Under the assumption that drug treatment clinics are needed for a foreseeable future, now is the time to address the issue of capital investment. Programs functioning as public service centers funded by tax revenue are not permitted to accumulate an operational surplus to invest in upgrading the physical plant. Therapeutic communities are particularly vulnerable in this area. Because they are funded so heavily from public sources they have found it difficult to justify investment in their facility. The community funding agency is primarily concerned with the possibility of enlarging the patient population.

There has been some improvement in the ability of drug treatment programs to garner third party payments. This has occurred even though many health insurance benefit plans do not cover the treatment of drug abuse or addiction. Recent evaluation of the federal employee health benefit offerings by the Office of Personnel Management noted the limitation in the substance abuse benefits. There is an unspoken attitude that people are not worthy of ordinary health insurance protection for addiction. Proposals such as S-1265 which attempts to define a national minimum health insurance coverage for employed persons does not address alcoholism and addiction.

The Drug Treatment programs are staffed by a wide variety of professionals and paraprofessionals. The staffing patterns are sparse and the wages are modest when compared to other health settings. Front line counselors are expected to be skilled, energetic, dedicated, and tireless in the face of patient loads which regularly exceed the design of the staffing pattern. Many physicians, psychologists, and social workers must deal with peers who question why we continue to work with difficult clients in agencies with little prestige. The value of addiction treatment and the value of professionals who work ceaselessly with addicted clients is poorly understood. It is the task of those of us in the field to educated the public to this fact. To that end, several organizations have joined together to promote "Independence through treatment" during the week of July 3-9, 1988. This will be an opportunity for the field programs to talk with their neighbors and demonstrate the benefits of treatment to the community. (See Tab A)

There are issues directly related to treatment which the service providers can not address without some additional help. Clinicians and program managers want and have requested help in obtaining evaluation studies. We think properly designed and executed research can give us guidance regarding which treatment modality is most effective for which group of patients. Minimally this includes adolescents, the elderly, pregnant women, and culturally attuned treatment for ethnic and racial populations. We look to the national institutes within the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration to provide aggressive leadership in this area.

The struggle with national policy, planning, and setting program priorities has been handicapped by the lack of current, accurate, and universal data. I have attached as an example (See Tab B) a table defining the patients receiving treatment in federally funded programs for drug abuse in 1980. At that time such information was routinely collected and analyzed for policy guidance. Today no comparative table can be generated for the policy makers to use in their deliberations. It is important if we as a nation are to make informed decisions regarding treatment priorities and strategies to know the characteristics of the recipients of our efforts. It is also useful to have this information to follow the impact of changes in policy and the results of new efforts.

I have been discussing matters as they impact community based treatment systems. There is another major system that has a great deal of contact with drug abusers. It is the criminal justice system. For over twenty years there has been concern that the criminal justice system does not deal effectively with drug abusers. I am not referring to its ability to convict and incarcerate. I am concerned that while a drug abuser is involved during trial, incarceration, and parole supervision, there is no aggressive intervention to deal with the drug abuse. Studies sponsored by the National Institute on Drug Abuse have consistently concluded that treatment has a major impact on reducing the amount of criminal behavior generated by an addict. There is no apparent response to this within the Criminal Justice System. The addicts and abusers are identified. The public is informed of the high costs in criminal acts generated by addicts and abusers of drugs. The criminal justice System is not acting to interrupt the condition which fuels a great proportion of the undesirable behavior.

It could do so by offering treatment referrals at the time of arrest. Requiring treatment for drug abusers while incarcerated. And providing drug treatment as part of supervised parole and probation.

An additional concern about the infrastructure responsible for the federal effort in solving the drug abuse problems. There has been diminished of personnel resources within the Department of Health and Human Services. With the decision to remove the National Institute on Drug Abuse from the direct supervision of the treatment service system there was a reduction in the number of people at the institute. Since that time the NIDA budget, due in large part to AIDS related funding has grown rapidly. There has been no concurrent growth in personnel to staff and manage these important activities. By all the usual standards of personnel allocation NIDA is understaffed to carry out its mission. National Leadership in the treatment area is inadequate because of the policy and personnel decisions of 1981/2 which evolved from the implementation of the ADM Block Grant. If the Congress proposes as national policy and aggressive expansion of community outreach and treatment into the intervenous drug using population, I would strongly recommend a careful examination of the personnel requirements to effectively manage these federal program responsibilities.

I have spent a great deal of time discussing the treatment needs of the country. Before I close I want to briefly point to the importance of some other issues. First I want to emphasize the importance of a strong federal effort in research. The treatment community has benefitted from the research into methadon maintenance, [1]narcotic antagonists, and long term treatment outcome studies. Policy makers and the American public have come to depend on the survey data regarding high school seniors and the household survey. There is now a need to have ethnographic research of the needle sharing and the sexual

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1. Narcotic antagonists make it impossible for the brain to respond to the presence of opiates. The impact of heroin is then nothing.

practices of IV Drug Abusers to guide us as we address the presence of AIDS in the patient population.

With the increased demands being placed on the clinical staff within treatment programs, there is justification to rebuild a training capacity targeted at enabling drug abuse treatment programs deal with patients suffering from AIDS. In addition to assuring the highest quality treatment for addiction, this training effort can provide the training to deal with death and dying, the counseling of sexual partners, and in outreach skills and strategies to further the goal of controlling the spread of the AIDS virus. Training is also needed for the primary care provider in the general medical setting to diagnose, treat, or refer appropriately patients with problems with drug abuse and addiction.

There is ample justification for an increased emphasis on prevention. Only by deflecting people from addictive and destructive abuse of drugs will we ultimately be able to reduce the problem and the associated costs. There is great benefit to a neighborhood, a community, and a society to have a clearly drawn line of what is acceptable and unacceptable. We are reaching a high level of awareness in this country regarding the negative aspects of drug abuse. There have been significant changes in the public attitude regarding youthful drug abuse. The attitude toward adult drug abuse does not seem so well formed. It is however difficult to perceive that there has been a major change in behavior by adults in their drug seeking patterns. We must build strong community values which provide immediate negative social feedback to the abuser. Social sanctions from family and close friends are a powerful influence on behavior patterns.

Finally, I want to propose that the Congress, the Administration, and the public abandon the "War on Drugs." First there never has been a true mobilization of the country to support the use of the word "War". Second, we have a history of abandoning a whole series of other "Wars". Remember the "War on Poverty; the "War on Waste"; the "War against Bigotry". In their execution these wars ultimately were fought against people. To have a war on drugs is to put social distance between the larger society and the abusers. The way to stop drug abuse is to incorporate the individual into the greater social values and mores of our culture. Remember what the name was for our enemies in each of our previous military wars. We have always had hostile negative labels for the enemy. By using this simplistic slogan we give life to the definition of drug abuse as "use of a drug I don't use by people I don't like". There is a small chance of influencing a drug abuser when by words and actions the policies have labeled the individual as an outcast with less than human worth. There is also the fact that we have not won a war in forty years which should give us pause.

I recommend that the Congress study carefully the policy shifts of the last twenty years. There have been periods of relative effectiveness and calm. There was a period where the goals were well defined and priorities made explicit. (See Tab C) There were periods of progress. There were policy failures. One of the major mistakes that we have made is thinking that law enforcement could solve the problem alone. During the period from 1957 to 1966 the federal laws regarding drug abuse were as punitive and aggressively enforced as during any period in our history. This did not stop the spread of drug abuse and the introduction of new compounds into the illicit market.

Effectively dealing with this social-medical problem requires persistance, stamina, and patience. Rather than a warlike approach I would recommend that we have the perspective of the farmer who in spite of drought, pestilence, floods and other setbacks, persists to reap what he has sown. His strategy and tactics show a respect for the land and an ability to take advantage of every opportunity to make incremental improvements in his productivity. I have included a policy statement from the Netherlands as an attachment. (See Tab D) Please note the calm and dispassionate language of the document. Also I would bring to your attention the list of projects on page 4 column two. Particularly points 3.) a & b. Their problem is somewhat smaller than ours. They are dealing with their addicted citizens by inclusion. We have a history of dealing through exclusion.

TAB A

# ALCOHOL AND DRUG COALITION

## AD HOC Coalition on National ALCOHOL AND DRUG Issues

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**NATIONAL ALCOHOL AND DRUG TREATMENT — OPEN HOUSE WEEK**

**"INDEPENDENCE THROUGH TREATMENT"**

**July 3-9, 1988**

The Week of July 4th symbolizes America's freedom and independence. Many Americans are not free because they suffer from Alcoholism and Drug Addiction. The general public and our policy makers need to know about addiction as a disease and that effective treatment methods have been developed. As professionals in the addiction field, it is our responsibility to educate the public and our leaders that Treatment works, recovery from addiction is possible, the benefits of treatment outweigh the costs and greater access to treatment is a necessary element of our nations approach to solving Alcohol and Drug Abuse.

The Ad Hoc Coalition on National Alcohol and Drug Issues represents many of our National Alcohol and Drug Associations as well as other organizations concerned with substance Abuse (see attached fact sheet). It provides a strong collective voice on Capitol Hill including monitoring vital legislation and regulatory activities, delivering testimony before Congressional Committees and other government agencies and communicating the need for action on public policy initiatives relevant to the field. The Coalition along with service providers, program managers and many concerned citizens in order to promote the need for the expansion of treatment have declared July 3-9, 1988 the National Alcohol and Drug Treatment Open House Week with the theme: Independence through Treatment.

The Coalition requests that Alcohol and Drug Treatment Programs all over the country become involved in this vital project and plan activities emphasizing the benefits of treatment. The Coalition recommends the following activities be considered:

1. Hold an open House during the week of July 3-9, 1988 for at least one day.
2. Invite Senators, Congressmen, State and Community policy makers and the public to each program's open house.
3. Send information on their programs accompanying the invitation to policy makers.
4. Create special programs regarding the benefits of treatment and emphasizing the National Theme: "Independence through Treatment."
5. Schedule a Local Press Conference to be held at the Treatment Center.
6. Distribute literature on the benefits and costs of Treatment. The Ad Hoc Coalition intends to send all participants a brochure describing the "Benefits of Treatment."

On a National Level, a Rally kicking off the week is being planned for July 3, 1988 in Washington, D.C.. National Leaders in the field, Presidential Candidates, supporting Senators and Congressmen and celebrities have been invited to participate. In addition, a National Media Campaign is being planned to take place the entire week of the project.

(Over)

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**444 North Capitol St. N.W.** **Washington, DC 20001**

## NATIONAL ALCOHOL AND DRUG TREATMENT — OPEN HOUSE WEEK

**"Independence Through Treatment"**

**July 3-9, 1988**

This form will be used in developing a list of all Treatment Programs participating in this National Project and will assist the Ad Hoc Coalition in sending for the materials.

**Please complete and return to the address below by May 30, 1988.**

**Return to:**
National Alcohol and Drug Treatment/Open House Week
Attn: Jeffrey T. Kramer
c/o ADPA
444 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 706
Washington, D.C. 20001

Organization: ______________________________

Org. Rep.: ______________________ Title: ______________

Mailing Address: ______________________________

City/State/Zip Code: ______________________________

Phone #'s: (     ) ______________________________

**Please place a check mark next to the appropriate box.**

☐ We **will participate** in the National Alcohol and Drug Treatment Open House Week.

**We plan to provide the following activities (Please circle):**

1. Hold an Open House during the week of July 3-9.
2. Invite our Senators, Congressman, State and Local Leaders to attend open house and will include literature on our program.
3. Provide a program on the benefits of Treatment emphasizing the theme: Independence through Treatment.
4. Schedule a news Conference at our Treatment Program.
5. Distribute Ad Hoc Coalitions literature and/or our own literature on the Benefits of Treatment.

☐ We are **uncommitted regarding our involvement** in the National Alcohol and Drug Treatment Open House Week but would like to receive more information as it becomes available.

☐ We are **not able to participate** in the National Alcohol and Drug Treatment Open House Week but want to be listed as a Supporting Sponsor.

☐ We **have no interest in participating** in the National Alcohol and Drug Treatment Open House Week.

# ALCOHOL AND DRUG COALITION

## AD HOC Coalition on National ALCOHOL AND DRUG Issues

### FACT SHEET

**NATIONAL ALCOHOL AND DRUG TREATMENT — OPEN HOUSE WEEK**

"Independence Through Treatment"

I. **Ad Hoc Coalition Members:**

The Ad Hoc Coalition on National Alcohol and Drug Issues represents over 30 national alcohol and drug associations, as well as other organizations concerned with substance abuse, including representatives of alcohol and drug abuse treatment providers and counselors, State alcohol and drug abuse administrators, biomedical researchers, and public health professionals. The Coalition provides a strong collective voice regarding the need for ongoing policy and legislative initiatives relating to alcohol and drug abuse prevention, treatment, and research.

Members of the Coalition include the following organizations:

Alcohol and Drug Problems Association of North America
American Academy of Pediatrics
American Council for Drug Education
American Medical Society on Alcoholism and Other Drug Dependencies, Inc.
American Psychological Association
American Public Health Association
Americans for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment
American Youth Work Center
Association of Labor-Management Administrators and Consultants on Alcoholism
Center for Science in the Public Interest
Children of Alcoholics Foundation, Inc.
Committee on Problems of Drug Dependence
Families in Action Drug Information Center
Health and Medical Council of Washington
Legal Action Center
National Association of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Counselors
National Association of Addiction Treatment Providers
National Association of Black Substance Abuse Workers, Inc.
National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors
National Black Alcoholism Council
National Council on Alcoholism
Northeast Methadone Coalition
Therapeutic Communities of America, Inc.

(Over)

444 North Capitol St. N.W. Washington, DC 20001

IA

100TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

# H. J. RES. 577

Designating July 3 through 9, 1988, as "National Drug and Alcohol Abuse Treatment Week".

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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 25, 1988

Mr. FAUNTROY introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service

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# JOINT RESOLUTION

Designating July 3 through 9, 1988, as "National Drug and Alcohol Abuse Treatment Week".

Whereas drug and alcohol abuse and dependence are major public health problems that are preventable and treatable;

Whereas the victims of drug and alcohol abuse suffer the despair of decline and dependence and their families suffer turmoil and pain;

Whereas alcohol and drug abuse treatment provides a successful means toward independence from substance dependence and is a necessary element in solving the problems associated with alcohol and drug abuse and dependence;

Whereas the economic costs to society of alcohol and drug abuse in 1983 alone were over $176,000,000,000;

EXHIBIT I-7

TAB B

### FREQUENCY AND PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF CLIENTS
### ADMITTED BY PRIMARY DRUG OF ABUSE AT ADMISSION:
### JANUARY - DECEMBER 1979

| PRIMARY DRUG | FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION | | PERCENT DISTRIBUTION | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Heroin | 95,198 clients | | 40% | |
| Other Opiates | 17,586 | | 7 | |
| Non-Rx Methadone | | 3,105 | | 1 |
| Other Opiates and Synthetics | | 14,481 | | 6 |
| Marijuana | 38,222 | | 16 | |
| Barbiturates | 9,213 | | 4 | |
| Amphetamines | 15,370 | | 7 | |
| Alcohol | 17,612 | | 7 | |
| Cocaine | 9,028 | | 4 | |
| Hallucinogens | 6,452 | | 3 | |
| PCP | 8,355 | | 4 | |
| Tranquilizers | 7,201 | | 3 | |
| Other Sedatives or Hypnotics | 5,545 | | 2 | |
| Other Drug Types | 5,632 | | 2 | |
| Inhalants | | 3,373 | | 1 |
| Over-the-Counter | | 598 | | - |
| Other | | 1,661 | | 1 |
| TOTAL | 235,414 | | 100 | |

NOTE: Clients for whom no primary drug was reported and transfer admissions from CODAP clinics are excluded from this table.

SOURCE: National Institute on Drug Abuse, Client Oriented Data Acquisition Process.

TAB B

EXHIBIT I-6

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF CLIENTS ADMITTED BY SEX, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND AGE AT ADMISSION ACCORDING TO PRIMARY DRUG OF ABUSE AT ADMISSION: JANUARY - MARCH 1980

| SEX, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND AGE AT ADMISSION | PRIMARY DRUG AT ADMISSION |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ALL CLIENTS | U.S. CENSUS 1970 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | HEROIN | OTHER OPIATES | MARIJUANA | BARBITURATES | AMPHETAMINES | ALCOHOL | COCAINE | HALLUCINOGENS | PCP | TRANQUILIZERS | OTHER SEDATIVES | OTHER |  |  |
| **SEX** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 74.1 | 67.7 | 73.7 | 65.6 | 65.0 | 83.4 | 76.3 | 75.4 | 74.1 | 47.9 | 59.8 | 74.5 | 72.3 | 48.7 |
| Female | 25.9 | 32.3 | 26.3 | 34.4 | 35.0 | 16.6 | 23.7 | 24.6 | 25.9 | 52.1 | 40.2 | 25.5 | 27.7 | 51.3 |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Number of Clients | 20,701 | 4,551 | 11,366 | 2,116 | 4,663 | 4,620 | 2,530 | 1,410 | 2,073 | 1,647 | 1,665 | 1,438 | 50,679 |  |
| **RACE/ETHNICITY** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| White | 34.1 | 78.1 | 73.0 | 80.5 | 79.0 | 75.0 | 62.3 | 85.6 | 60.4 | 84.7 | 83.7 | 40.7 | 59.5 | 86.3 |
| Black | 47.2 | 16.4 | 15.3 | 12.7 | 14.9 | 19.6 | 30.5 | 7.7 | 23.7 | 9.2 | 10.6 | 14.7 | 27.7 | 11.0 |
| Hispanic | 17.0 | 4.7 | 9.2 | 5.1 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 6.0 | 4.5 | 14.5 | 4.3 | 4.8 | 38.7 | 11.1 |  |
| Mexican | 8.0 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 12.0 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 34.4 | 5.7 |  |
| Puerto Rican | 8.4 | 2.2 | 5.1 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 4.2 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 3.3 | 4.7 |  |
| Cuban | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | * | * | * | 1.1 | 0.1 | * | 0.2 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 |  |
| Other Hispanic | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.5 |  |
| Other | 1.0 | 0.8 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 2.2 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 7.9 | 1.7 |  |
| American Indian | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 5.0 | 1.0 |  |
| Alaskan Native | * | * | 0.1 | 0.1 | * | 0.1 | — | 0.1 | * | 0.1 | — | — | * |  |
| Asian/Pacific Islander | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 0.6 | 3.1 | 0.6 |  |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |
| Number of Clients | 20,681 | 4,553 | 11,350 | 2,115 | 4,664 | 4,630 | 2,530 | 1,408 | 2,073 | 1,647 | 1,666 | 1,436 | 50,681 |  |
| **AGE AT ADMISSION** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Under 18 Years | 0.2 | 1.3 | 44.7 | 15.1 | 15.9 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 30.3 | 16.1 | 13.0 | 25.4 | 36.7 | 16.0 |  |
| 18 to 19 Years | 1.3 | 2.5 | 15.9 | 11.0 | 11.6 | 6.0 | 10.0 | 20.1 | 15.4 | 6.0 | 12.6 | 10.0 | 7.0 |  |
| 20 to 24 Years | 17.1 | 21.3 | 21.0 | 32.0 | 31.7 | 16.0 | 33.4 | 31.7 | 44.0 | 17.0 | 24.5 | 22.7 | 22.3 |  |
| 25 to 29 Years | 37.7 | 30.0 | 10.0 | 21.6 | 23.0 | 15.9 | 26.6 | 11.4 | 17.7 | 20.3 | 17.5 | 14.6 | 25.6 |  |
| 30 to 44 Years | 39.9 | 33.7 | 6.4 | 16.5 | 16.0 | 32.1 | 19.4 | 6.4 | 7.7 | 29.7 | 16.0 | 12.6 | 25.2 |  |
| Over 44 Years | 4.4 | 4.0 | 0.6 | 3.2 | 1.1 | 28.0 | 1.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 14.0 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 4.7 |  |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |
| Number of Clients | 20,700 | 4,544 | 11,350 | 2,116 | 4,657 | 4,637 | 2,527 | 1,408 | 2,072 | 1,643 | 1,664 | 1,436 | 50,622 |  |

* Less than 0.05%

-- Quantity is zero

NOTE: Clients for whom no primary drug was reported and transfer admissions from CUDAP clinics are excluded from this table.

EXHIBIT I-9

TAB B

### TOTAL DAWN SYSTEM
### SEX, RACE, AND AGE COMPARISONS ASSOCIATED WITH 1979 DAWN EMERGENCY ROOM AND MEDICAL EXAMINER EPISODES
### 1979 U.S. CENSUS AND 1977 NATIONAL DEATH RATE

| | DAWN EMERGENCY ROOM EPISODES[1] % | 1979 U.S. CENSUS % | DAWN MEDICAL EXAMINER EPISODES[1] % | DEATHS FROM ALL CAUSES--1977 % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | | | | |
| Male | 44.7 | 48.7 | 56.8 | 55.1 |
| Female | 55.3 | 51.3 | 43.2 | 44.9 |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| RACE | | | | |
| White | 69.2 | 86.3 | 75.9 | 87.6 |
| Black | 26.2 | 11.8 | 19.7 | 12.1 |
| Other | 4.6 | 1.9 | 4.4 | 0.3 |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| AGE[2] | | | | |
| 6 - 9 | 0.1 | 6.7 | * | 0.3 |
| 10 - 19 | 22.1 | 19.3 | 5.0 | 1.5 |
| 20 - 29 | 43.1 | 19.4 | 38.2 | 2.7 |
| 30 - 39 | 20.1 | 15.0 | 23.6 | 2.5 |
| 40 - 49 | 8.4 | 11.3 | 13.2 | 4.9 |
| 50 & Over | 6.2 | 28.4 | 19.9 | 88.1 |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

[1] Unknown/no response categories have been excluded from percentage calculations for DAWN data to permit meaningful comparisons with U.S. Census data and National Death Rate data.

[2] Distributions have been adjusted to reflect omission of data for cases/patients five years of age and under which are not collected in DAWN (see Introduction; Definitions of Drug Abuse).

* Less than 0.05%.

NOTE: Percentages will not necessarily sum to 100.0 due to rounding and/or omission of values of less than 0.05%.

SOURCE: Census data obtained from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 870, "Estimates of the Population of the United States, by Age, Sex and Race: 1976 to 1979" U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1980. Mortality data computed from 1977 mortality statistics and 1979 census estimates; mortality statistics collected by U.S. National Center for Health Statistics and reported in: Monthly Vital Statistics Report (Advance Report), Final Mortality Statistics, 1977, Vol. 28, No. 1, Supplement, May 11, 1979.

TAB C

## SUPPORTING THEMES

In addition to confirming the validity of the basic strategy of balancing mutually supportive supply reduction and demand reduction activities, the experiences of the past six years, in which the drug program has been a major priority of the Federal Government, have taught us important lessons. These lessons become general themes which underlie findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the chapters which follow. Together with the supply/demand balance, these themes form the basis for the comprehensive Federal strategy to combat drug abuse. They are:

1. *We must be realistic about what can be achieved and what the appropriate Federal role is in the war against drugs.* We should stop raising unrealistic expectations of total elimination of drug abuse from our society. At the same time, we should in no way signal tacit acceptance of drug abuse or a lessened commitment to continue aggressive efforts aimed at eliminating it entirely. The sobering fact is that some members of any society will seek escape from the stresses of life through drug use. Prevention, education, treatment, and rehabilitation will curtail their number, but will not eliminate drug use entirely. As long as there is demand, criminal drug traffickers will make some supply available, provided that the potential profits outweigh the risks of detection and punishment. Vigorous supply reduction efforts will reduce, but not eliminate, supply. And reduction in the supply of one drug may only cause abuse-prone individuals to turn to another substance.

   All of this indicates that, regrettably, we probably will always have a drug problem of some proportion. Therefore we must be prepared to continue our efforts and our commitment indefinitely, in order to contain the problem at a minimal level, and in order to minimize the adverse social costs of drug abuse.

   We must develop better measures of program progress than the "addict counts" or gross seizure and arrest statistics which have been used in the past, and we must educate the public to shift its focus to the more relevant trend, availability, and quality arrest data which are available.

   Further, we must be realistic about what the Federal Government can and cannot accomplish in this area. It *can* play a major role in limiting supplies of drugs, in maintaining a widespread treatment capacity, and in providing technical assistance, research, demonstration, and evaluation. It *can* take the lead in enlisting the cooperation of other nations of the world in suppressing the production of illicit drugs. It *can* provide leadership in our domestic effort to reduce the levels of drug abuse, particularly if our national leaders clearly articulate their commitment to this effort.

We must recognize, however, that the Federal Government *cannot* single-handedly eliminate drug abuse or its effects on our society. Only through the combined efforts of the Federal, State and local governments, private individuals and businesses, and a variety of local organizations, working together, can we hope to ultimately succeed in this vital undertaking.

2. *Not all drug use is equally destructive, and we should give priority in our treatment and enforcement efforts to those drugs which pose the greater risk, as well as to compulsive users of drugs of any kind.* At any given level of consumption, different drugs pose different threats to the behavior and condition of users. Further, at high levels of consumption—particularly with intravenous injection—the effects are vastly increased. Public policy should be most concerned with those drugs which have the highest social cost.

   This does not suggest devoting *all* resources to the highest priority drugs, and *none* to lower priority drugs. All drugs are dangerous in varying degrees and should receive attention. But where resource constraints force a choice, those drugs with the potential for causing the highest social cost should be given priority.

3. *Supply reduction is broader than law enforcement and we should utilize a variety of supply reduction tools.* Federal supply reduction efforts should be targeted at all aspects of illicit production (or diversion from licit production) and distribution of drugs. The activities involved range from crop substitution and economic development to interdiction of illicit shipments and the removal of important traffickers from the supply system through long prison terms. More effective regulation and monitoring of the legitimate production and distribution of drugs such as amphetamines and barbiturates, which are also abused or used illicitly, is one reduction tool which should receive greater attention than it does now.

   Undertaking a comprehensive supply reduction program requires the cooperation of many foreign nations and the active participation of numerous Federal, State and local agencies. Full utilization of all resources should be encouraged, and closer cooperation fostered to ensure that all are contributing optimally to the overall supply reduction effort.

4. *Federal law enforcement efforts should focus on the development of major conspiracy cases against the leaders of high-level trafficking net-works, and should move away from "street-level" activities.* The most effective way to control and reduce supply is to immobilize large trafficking networks through the prosecution and conviction of their leaders. Since the leaders of trafficking organizations normally insulate themselves from overt illegal acts by delegating these acts to subordinates, conspiracy cases often are the only effective means for the law to reach them.

   To optimize the development of conspiracy cases, (1) higher priority should be placed on developing and analyzing operational intelligence, (2) the percentage of Federal agent time spent on "street-level" activities should decline, and (3) cooperation with border interdiction forces and with State and local police forces must be improved. This last item, improving cooperation with border interdiction and local police forces, is also important to insure that other vital law enforcement efforts continue to be adequately performed.

5. *The current treatment focus of demand reduction efforts should be supplemented with increased attention on prevention and vocational rehabilitation.* The bulk of Federal resources and attention have gone for treatment since the drug program was elevated to a high priority. In light of the acute need which existed at that time, this focus was clearly necessary.

   Yet, treatment is a response to a problem which has already developed. Given the difficulties of successful treatment, it is obvious that effective programs which prevent the problem before it develops are highly desirable. Similarly, vocational rehabilitation during and after treatment which enhances the probability that a former abuser will not return to drug use should be given priority. The task force believes both these areas should be important parts of the overall demand reduction program.

6. *Neither successful prevention or successful rehabilitation is drug specific; both should be closely integrated with other social programs.* The successful prevention models which exist have not been drug specific. That is, they have dealt with the broad range of adolescent problem behavior—drug use, alcoholism, truancy, and juvenile delinquency. Further, the more successful programs have been tailored to the specific problems and resources of a local community. Thus, prevention should be centered in broad range, community-based programs. The Federal role should be catalytic in nature, providing technical assistance, training, and limited seed money.

Rehabilitation is a critical step in returning a drug user to a productive life. Individuals need help in developing or recovering skills which enable them to support themselves. Some need basic schooling, vocational counselling, and skills training; some need a form of supported work; and still others simply need a job. All of these services are provided by existing community manpower services; we must be sure that they are available to former drug users and stabilized patients in treatment.

## B — DRUG PRIORITIES

One of the major themes of the Federal strategy discussed in chapter 1 was the importance of differentiating in terms of the particular drug of abuse, and the frequency and quantity of use. Implicit in that decision to differentiate is the assumption that public policy should be most concerned with those drugs which have the highest costs to both society and the user, and with those individuals who have chronic, highly intensive patterns of drug use.

In order to determine the social cost of a particular drug, we should consider the following factors:

- *The likelihood that a user will become a compulsive user, either physically or psychologically dependent on the drug:* closely linked to this concept is the ability of the drug to produce tolerance, requiring successively higher intake to achieve the same result.
- *Severity of adverse consequences of use, both to the individual and to society:* in terms of criminal behavior, health consequences, economic dependence and the like. (This is discussed in greater detail below.)

- *Size of the core problem:* the number of compulsive users who are currently suffering (or causing others to suffer) adverse consequences.

## ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES TO THE INDIVIDUAL

The adverse consequences of drug use are of two types: consequences which are the direct result of drug use, and indirect consequences which are associated with drug use. *Direct* consequences include:

- *Illness or death:* Illness or death can occur from overdose, a severe toxic or allergic reaction to a drug, or from rapid withdrawal. In New York City, drug-related deaths are a major cause of death for males aged 15 to 25. Death due to drug abuse is often the result of ignorance—ignorance of possible contaminants in drugs, ignorance of the danger of using combinations of drugs, ignorance of the strength of the drug purchased and of techniques to determine nonlethal doses. If drug use affects reproductive organs, or when certain drugs are taken during pregnancy, a second generation may suffer casualties.
- *Acute behavioral effects:* The paranoia produced by intravenous injection of amphetamines can cause violent behavior and consequent criminal acts such as rape and homicide. Acute paranoia and extreme anxiety from the effects of hallucinogenics, and depression (in the withdrawal state) from stimulants such as amphetamines, are other examples of behavior effects.
- *Chronic behavioral impairment:* Adverse behavioral effects may also be chronic as with the inertia, apathy and depression associated with long-term heroin use. Also, impairment can be measured in things such as loss of productivity, health costs, welfare assistance, and criminal costs.
- *Intellectual Impairment:* Some evidence of intellectual impairment has been reported by clinicians on the West Coast. Specifically, mental status evaluations of chronic users of hallucinogens who stopped after two or more years revealed a clinical impression not unlike that of mild chronic brain disease.

*Indirect* consequences include:

- *Injury or death associated with impaired judgment:* Potent, mind-altering drugs such as LSD can affect judgment, which may for example, result in accidental death by succumbing to bizarre hallucinations, such as believing one can fly. Even a "mild" drug such as marihuana may distort preception and thus increase the risk of death in automobile accidents of either a driver or pedestrian.
- *Injury or death associated with conditions of use:* Poor nutrition and neglected hygiene stemming from the total focus of energy

on obtaining drugs can cause damage to vital organs. Transmission of viral hepatitis from shared needles is another medical problem of drug abusers. Young people in the drug culture are particularly susceptible to pneumonia. Infections associated with injections using unsterile needles may be fatal.

- *Developmental difficulties:* The potential for personality impairment due to drug use is an important consequence, but one difficult to assess. There are crisis periods in the course of every individual's development, but adolescence is a particularly vulnerable period because the individual seems inundated with crises. These crises provide an opportunity for growth, formation of new ideas, and the emergence of a healthier and more mature personality. The use of drugs as a means to deal with these crises may diminish, delay, or prevent this maturation process.
- *Barriers to social acceptance:* The public image of the drug user is extremely negative; thus, the user is often stigmatized, making it extremely difficult for a current or former drug user to find acceptance in society. Moreover, arrest and conviction for violation of drug laws results in the creation of a criminal record which may follow a user for the rest of his life.

Ministry of
Welfare
Health and
Cultural Affairs

Fact Sheet 19-E 1985

TAB D

# Fact Sheet

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## Policy on drug users

Drug abuse did not emerge as a social problem in the Netherlands until the late 1960s. Since that time, however, the use of drugs has continued to increase. Initially the police and judiciary dealt severely with drug users but increasing doubts arose as to the value of criminal proceedings in such cases. These doubts and the growing scope of the problem led the government to appoint experts from various disciplines to form the Working Party on Drugs. The Working Party's recommendations, published in 1972, have largely determined the direction of present-day drugs policy. Since that time, there have been two aspects to drugs policy, enforcement of the Opium Act and policy on assistance, the central objective being to prevent and deal with the risks that drug abuse presents to addicts themselves, their immediate evironment and society as a whole. Responsibility for coordinating alcohol and drug policy lies with the Minister for Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs. In 1974 the Interministerial Steering Group on Drug Misuse Policy was set up to coordinate at national level the activities of the various ministries involved. In 1982 the Group's responsibilities were extended to include policy on alcohol.

**The 1976 Opium Act**
In its report the Working Party on Drugs concluded as long ago as 1972 that the basic premise of drugs policy should be the extent of the risks involved in drug abuse. These risks, or the likelihood of harmful effects, are largely dependent on the nature of the category of user and the circumstances in which the drugs are taken and are determined only in part by the direct psychopharmacological properties of the substances themselves and their effect on the consciousness. The Working Party suggests that a distinction can be made between the risks associated with different substances. In view of the government's adoption of the risks approach, radical amendments of the outdated Opium Act of 1919 which would fulfil the Netherlands' obligations stemming from the 1961 international Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs were put before Parliament. The amended Act entered into force in 1976. Responsibility for implementing the Opium Act rests jointly with the Minister for Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs and the Minister of Justice.
The amended Opium Act draws a distinction between 'drugs presenting unacceptable risks', such as heroin, cocaine, LSD, amphetamines and hash oil, and 'traditional hemp products', such as hashish and marihuana, the possession of hemp products for personal use being subject to a less severe penalty. Activities such as possessing or trafficking in drugs of any kind, except for medical or scientific purposes, are punishable offences. An important amendment was the considerable increase in the penalties imposed for national and international drug trafficking. The maximum penalty for trafficking in heroin and cocaine, for example, was increased from 4 to 12 years' imprisonment. The Act also reflects the view that criminal law plays only a minor part in preventing individual drug abuse. Although the risks to society must of course be taken into account, every possible effort must be made to ensure that drug users are not caused more harm by criminal proceedings than by use of the drug itself.
The view that government policy should take into account the differing risks incurred by drug abuse is also reflected in the prosecution policy pursued in implementing the Opium Act.

**Prosecution policy and the expediency principle**
One of the basic premises of Dutch criminal procedure is the expediency principle laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure whereby the Public Prosecutions Department is empowered to refrain from bringing criminal proceedings if there are weighty public interests to be considered ('on grounds deriving from the general good'). Guidelines have therefore been established for detecting and prosecuting offences under the Opium Act. Similar guidelines also exist for other offences such as the illegal possession of arms, pirate broadcasting, and exceeding the speed limit. The guidelines contain recommendations regarding the penalties to be exacted and set out the priorities to be observed in detecting and prosecuting offences. The scale of priorities adopted corresponds to the distinctions made in the Opium Act. Accordingly, detecting the import and export of 'drugs presenting unacceptable risks' takes the highest priority whilst detecting the possession of 'hemp products' for personal use takes the lowest priority.
Special police officers and customs officials take specific action to detect the import and export of, and large-scale trafficking in *all* drugs (including hemp products).
Parliamentary approval of a government bill to amend the Opium Act will make it possible to step up efforts to combat national and international trafficking in drugs presenting unacceptable risks. The bill proposes that, apart from trafficking itself, activities carried out *preparatory to trafficking* in such drugs should be treated as criminal offences. Furthermore, all persons who attempt to import drugs into the Netherlands, make preparations to do so or assist another to do so, should be liable to prosecution in the Netherlands, regardless of their nationality.
The application of the expediency principle in the Netherlands may be seen as part of a pragmatic prosecution policy. In cases involving low-priority offences

*Statutory penalties laid down in the Opium Act*

| | maximum penalty for possession | maximum penalty for manufacturing, transporting or trafficking | maximum penalty for importing or exporting |
|---|---|---|---|
| hemp products | *up to 30 grams:*<br>a minor offence; one month's detention or Fl 5.000 fine | *up to 30 grams:*<br>a minor offence; one month's detention or Fl. 5.000 fine | four years' imprisonment and/or Fl. 100.000 fine (2) |
| | *more than 30 grams:*<br>two years' imprisonment and/or Fl. 1000.000 fine (2) | *more than 30 grams:*<br>two years' imprisonment and/or Fl. 100.000 fine (2) | |
| drugs presenting unacceptable risks (heroin, cocaine, etc) | *for personal use:*<br>one year's imprisonment or Fl. 10,000 fine (1) | eight years' imprisonment and/or Fl. 100,000 fine (2) | *for personal use:*<br>one year's imprisonment or Fl. 10,000 fine (1) |
| | *in other cases:*<br>four years' imprisonment and/or Fl 100,000 fine (2) | | *in other cases:*<br>twelve years imprisonment and/or Fl. 100,000 fine (2) |

(1) The Act does not lay down a maximum quantity for personal use. In practice, the courts apply a quantity of ½ gram.
(2) If the value of any materials involved in such offences or the proceeds resulting wholly or partially from such offences exceed(s) Fl 25.000, a maximum fine of Fl 1.000.000 may be imposed.

the Public Prosecutions Department may decide not to prosecute. The law thus steps aside, as it were, in cases where prosecution would have no beneficial effect in reducing the risks involved. This may be the case for example, if criminal proceedings against users of hemp products would create more problems for them than would be solved. On the other hand, prosecution may well be of value if it leads to treatment as is the case when drug users are conditionally released from pre-trial detention or receive a suspended sentence on condition that they undergo treatment.

**Recent trends**

Proceeding from the statutory distinction between 'drugs presenting unacceptable risks' and 'hemp products', the following trends can be noted.

*a) hemp products*

The relatively less severe penalties imposed in respect of the use of hemp or cannabis products have not led to an increase in their use. In 1976, 3% of young people aged 15 and 16 and 10% of the 17 and 18 age group had *occasionally* (that is, on one or several occasions) used hashish or marihuana. In 1985 these figures were 2% and 6% respectively.

*b) drugs presenting unacceptable risks (e.g. heroin and cocaine)*

Owing to the highly illegal nature of the use of drugs in this category no definite figures are available. Reliable estimates for 1985 vary from 15,000 to 20,000 drug addicts (out of a total population of 14 million).
A number of general trends can be noted:
- the majority of addicts is addicted to heroin;
- the extent of the overall problem appears to be stabilising, although within the category of users as a whole various smaller groups continue to emerge and disappear again;
- over the years drug abuse seems to have increased, in particular amongst groups with a relatively disadvantaged social and economic position (often those belonging to ethnic minorities);
- the use of cocaine is increasing;
- heroin users tend not to restrict their use to heroin but to combine all manner of substances, including alcohol and psychotropic drugs;
- there are indications that the average age of users is rising and that people are older when they take drugs for the first time.

**Policy on aid and prevention**

The first government policy document on aid to drug addicts appeared in 1977. Since then the Government has formulated a number of policy principles, the most important of which are listed below:

a. a multi-functional network of medical and social services should be built up at local or regional level to provide assistance in ways which are appropriate to the differentiated problems;
b. assistance must be made more accessible;
c. the social rehabilitation of drug addicts and former drug addicts should be promoted;
d. greater and more efficient use should be made of non-specialist facilities that can provide assistance to drug addicts, such as primary health care facilities, including general practitioners, and youth welfare facilities;

e  the various aid facilities should be coordinated more effectively;

f  since there is more to prevention than publicity campaigns, the role of information should not be overestimated; the risks of drug abuse should be put across as part of a general health education campaign rather than as a separate issue.

### *a. a multi-functional network*

The development of aid networks is dependent at local level on the municipal executives and may vary from town to town. (If necessary, municipal authorities may cooperate to form a regional network). The pattern of services provided by different local networks also varies, combining any of the following:

- assistance on an outpatient basis (field work, social counseling, therapy, the supply of methadone, rehabilitation);
- semi-residential care (day centres/night centres, day-care treatment, employment and recreation projects);
- residential aid (crisis centres, detoxification centres, drug dependence units, drugfree therapeutic communities).

### *b. making help more accessible*

For many years care concentrated too much on ending addiction and its associated behaviour without necessarily meeting the needs of the addicts or helping them to function within society. One of the consequences of this was that addicts who did not primarily feel the need to 'kick the habit' or were not capable of doing so, remained beyond the reach of assistance and this in some cases led to further social isolation and degradation. Once this problem was recognised increasing encouragement was given to forms of aid which are not primarily intended to end addiction as such but to improve addicts' physical well-being and help them to function in society, the inability to give up drug use being accepted as a fact for the time being. This kind of assistance may take the form of field work, initial reception, the supply of substitute drugs, material support, and social rehabilitation opportunities. Special attention is given to ensuring that services are accesible to ethnic minorities.

The fact that the government is willing to encourage the giving of assistance to addicts who do not – for the time being at least – see any likelihood of establishing a drug-free lifestyle, is indicative of the realistic approach being taken and the determination not to abandon drug addicts. Failure to provide care of this type, which stresses the need to help addicts, would be a worse alternative and would simply increase the risk to the individual and society. Obviously, the long-term objective of the current approach is also to help addicts lead a drug-free existence.

The Dutch Government rejects the idea of compulsory treatment of any kind.

### *c. promoting social rehabilitation*

Promoting social rehabilitation is an important part of the aid process because both during and after treatment, addicts and former addicts often have no realistic prospects in society in the sense of work or some other meaningful occupation, training opportunities and accomodation. The necessary attention should therefore be given at the earliest possible stage to developing genuine social alternatives for drug addicts. This means that such matters as housing (supervised or otherwise), vocational training and appropriate work, training for work and assistance in finding employment are not only important in the after-care stage but also constitute an inseparable part of the treatment, to be incorporated from the outset. Only then can addicts be sufficiently motivated to take part in an aid programme.

### *d. greater and more efficient use of primary care facilities*

To date, treatment has largely been given in special centres for drug addicts which have been operating for several years. In recent years it has been realised that specialised treatment of this kind must be limited to essential cases only, to avoid restricting the accessibility of aid services and the effects of the stigma associated with drug use, both of which tend to reinforce the label of being a drug addict. Projects have been set up to encourage addicts and former addicts to make use of general facilities including health and social services and youth welfare and housing facilities that are accessible to all members of the public, as a means of initiating or furthering the process of social integration.

### *e. better coordination of aid services*

The way in which the different aid services are planned and/or funded varies considerably, making it essential to create conditions that will enable these facilities to be coordinated more effectively. Since 1978 primary responsibility for creating a cohesive network of aid facilities has been vested in municipal authorities so that aid can be geared as much as possible to the local or regional situation. In other words, there has been a decentralisation of powers. The municipal authorities draw up policy plans and can submit them to the Interministerial Steering Group on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Policy (ISAD) to be considered for central government financing. It is the ISAD which has done most to coordinate planning and funding at central government level. These efforts at coordination will be placed on a statutory footing when the Health and Personal Social Services Act enters into force (see further Fact Sheet 4).

### *f. prevention*

It is a principle of prevention policy that publicity campaigns and educational material should deal with the risks of drugs and alcohol as a single subject. The Dutch Government takes the view that general information about potentially harmful substances should preferably be incorporated in the primary school subject of 'healthy living'. Secondary school pupils are also encouraged to act responsibly in this respect.

The significance of information as a means of preventing drug (and alcohol) abuse should not be overestimated however. Various studies have shown that publicity is ineffective in preventing the problems of drug abuse, particularly where it has the effect of sensationalising the dangers of drugs or seeks to warn or deter people. Publicity of this kind is likely to be one-sided and is therefore not used by the Dutch Government. Such publicity may even encourage experimentation with drugs. The example of parents and other role models has been found to be of greater influence.

Recent research into the lifestyles of heroin addicts in the Netherlands has given rise to new attitudes towards prevention. The research showed that, from the point of view of the circumstances and the negative prospects of many addicts, the use of drugs has a certain functional significance for them, that is to say, it is by using drugs that they are able to cope to some extent with the difficulties, conflicts, contradictions and other problems they encounter in society. This finding has widened our understanding of the reasons why drug addicts turn to drugs and makes it clear that current measures of prevention are not necessarily the most appropriate solution.

It was also found that experimenting with drugs does of experimenters who subsequently give up drugs (the so-called chippers) is several times greater than the number who ultimately become addicts. Measures to prevent beginners sliding into addiction are therefore extremely important. Preventing *problems* arising in the first place may consequently receive more emphasis than preventing the *use* of drugs.

In view of the above, the Dutch Government believes that drug use should be shorn of its taboo image and its sensational and emotional overtones and that the image of the junkie should be demythologised, that is, reduced to its real proportions. Drug users should be treated as far as possible as 'normal' people who are given 'normal' opportunities and of whom 'normal' demands are made. This means that drug users or even addicts should not be regarded primarily as criminals nor as dependent, helpless patients. Drugs users have to face their responsibilities too. It is obvious that many of them have, to a certain extent, consciously chosen their lifestyle.

Generally speaking, the phenomenon of drug use and particularly the problems associated with it should be made more amenable to discussion.

## Aid services, organisations and funding

*1) medical and social assistance: the Medical Consultation Bureaus for Alcohol and Drug Problems*

The Medical Consultation Bureaus for Alcohol and Drug Problems (CADs) are private institutions, the entire costs of which are met directly by central government. 70% of these funds are provided by the Minister of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, the remaining 30% being provided by the Ministry of Justice since the CADs are also active in the field of after-care and probation.

70% of the CADs clients have alcohol and 30% have drug problems. Given the nature of their problems, however, it is difficult to make a distinction between the assistance given to alcoholics and that given to drug addicts. Although the CADs are primarily organisations providing outpatient mental health care, their services are also strongly oriented towards social welfare as the vast majority of their staff (900 in all) are social workers.

The objectives of individual CADs may very somewhat, from overcoming addiction through treatment to stabilising the condition of addicts by supplying methadone on a 'maintenance basis', which means that the dosage of methadone is not gradually reduced to nil as is the case when the drug is supplied on a 'reduction basis'. Assistance aimed at stabilising the condition of addicts is termed 'counselling'. A variety of methods are used including psychotherapy, group therapy, material assistance, family therapy, and advising groups of parents. An increasingly important area of the CADs' work is to advise teachers, general practitioners, youth workers and other members of general health and welfare services so that they themselves are able to advise and inform others (see I d). The prevention role of the CADs has expanded considerably in recent years. They occasionally also organise information campaigns. A further aspect of the CADs' work is the initial reception of alcoholics and drug addicts in police stations and counselling during and after detention in penal institutions.

The nationwide network of CADs comprises 17 head offices and some 89 subsidiary branches or addresses where consultation sessions are held. The network's total budgat for 1985 amounted to Fl. 62 million.

In addition to the supply of methadone by the CADs and a number of social welfare organisations for young people, several municipal authorities have set up their own methadone programmes which are usually run by the municipal (GG & GD) or regional (DGD) health services (budget: approx. Fl. 7 million, financed by the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affaires). The drug may be supplied on a reduction basis (the dose is gradually reduced) or on a maintenance basis (a constant dose). Methadone is now supplied either by a medical consultation bureau or the municipal health services in virtually all the municipalities with a drugs problem (that is, in about 50 municipalities).

*3) social welfare services (facilities for youngsters)*

Drug users - chiefly young people - can obtain help from a wide range of social welfare services aimed partly or specifically at drug users. A broad approach to prevention activities is therefore preferred. Certain multiple-risk groups can often be identified, such as the unemployed, ethnic minorities, young people from marginal groups and drug addicts, for whom a joint approach is required. This can best be done at local level.

The projects listed below concentrate on different aspects of aid to young people in particular and are easily accessible, with few criteria for admission:

a. 16 projects aimed at preventing the social isolation of drug addicts;

b. 29 projects to make contact with addicts and refer them to general or specialised aid agencies;

c. 31 social assistance and crisis centre projects;

d. 13 day centres and night centres where psychosocial assistance is provided;

e. 18 social rehabilitation projects for addicts and former addicts, encompassing sub-projects in supervised accomodation, training and adjustment to work, in some cases in the form of after-care following outpatient or residential treatment.

Finally, a number of national aid services are also approaching the problem of drug use from the point of view of religious or other philosophical convictions or the ethnic identity of the target group.

The total budget for 1985 amounted to approximately Fl. 50 million for 107 projects in 45 municipalities. Roughly one half of this sum was accounted for by the four major cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, whilst one third was spent on aid to drug addicts from former Dutch colonies overseas, namely the Moluccans and Suriname.

Some 500 people are employed in these aid services.

*4) residential facilities (drug dependence units)*

Residential facilities for the treatment of drug addicts and alcoholics are situated throughout the Netherlands providing a total of 807 beds of which 151 are for drug addicts, 461 for alcoholics and 195 for either category of patient. These facilities may take the form of independent clinics or special units in general psychiatric hospitals. The type of treatment varies. Emergency treatment and physical detoxification may last between two days and three weeks. Clinical treatment with the purpose of ending addiction may last from three to twelve months. The first year of treatment is financed from health insurance contributions. The cost of subsequent treatment is met pursuant to the Exceptional Medical Expenses (Compensation) Act. These facilities cost about Fl. 70 million in 1985.

*5) Federation of Alcohol and Drug Dependence Organisations (FZA)**

The FZA (formerly the Federation for the Care of Alcoholics) was established in 1953 in response to the need for cooperation at national level between organisations providing assistance to alcoholics. It coordinates the activities of its member organisations and gives support to their policies. Member organisations include the Medical Consultation Bureaus for Alcohol and Drug Problems, special clinics for alcoholics and drug addicts, and, increasingly, social welfare organisations. The FZA also plays an important national role in providing information, developing expert knowledge and training of personnel.

*6) Information organisations*

Grants are also given to a number of long-established national organisations active in the field of alcohol abuse which are increasingly turning their attention to other kinds of addiction.** These organisations help to prevent the problems of addiction by producing publications and organising meetings and other information activities which involve numerous volunteers. Together with the FZA these organisations formed the Coordinating Committee for Information Packs (KKI). Packs of educational material (in Dutch) can be ordered from the central office of the KKI.***

*7) Alcohol and Drug Use Research Institute (SWOAD)*****

The SWOAD is an academic institute which furnishes documentation and carries out and commissions research on alcohol and drug abuse.

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* FZA, Postbus 171, 3720 AD Bilthoven; tel. 030 - 78 07 24

** National Committee against Alcoholism and Other Addictions (NCA), Willem Barentszstraat 39, 3572 PC Utrecht; tel. 030 - 71 12 00

Royal National Association against Alcohol Abuse, Postbus 29728, 2502 LS The Hague; tel. 070 - 46 95 38

*** KKI, Postbus 18871, 2502 ER The Hague; tel. 070 - 63 91 68

**** SWOAD, De Lairessestraat 38, 1071 NS Amsterdam; tel. 020-78 13 43

**International Cooperation**

The Netherlands is a party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. A bill to accede to the 1972 Protocol amending the Convention is currently being discussed by Parliament. In addition, the Netherlands is a member of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Apart from activities within the framework of the WHO, UNESCO, the EC and other international organisations, discussions in the Pompidou Group are regarded by the Netherlands as being of particular importance since they afford an opportunity for cooperation and coordination at regional level. The Pompidou Group is linked to the Council of Europe by a partial agreement. Its purpose is to further cooperation between its 16 European member states with regard to combating illegal drug trafficking and improving preventive measures and aid to addicts.

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Preservation of monuments (FS-9-E)
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Public libraries (FS-30-E)
Museums and museum policy (FS-31-E)
Archaeology (FS-32-E)
Archives (FS-33-E)
Adult education (FS-35-E)

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Besteman. We appreciate your help on that front. Dr. Cohen, your statement as well will be included in full in the record, and we thank you very much for being with us.

## STATEMENT OF DR. ALLAN Y. COHEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND EVALUATION

Dr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to be here with such distinguished colleagues on this panel. There is here a great deal of accumulated wisdom.

To the point, the Senate and the House are in a delicate and important position in deciding not only the proper role of the military in substance abuse but as a part of an overall strategy.

I would like to focus on two things very briefly: One, on the potential limits of interdiction, and two, some very promising developments in demand reduction, particularly prevention.

First of all, I think we all know why interdiction is important. Just from a rational point of view, it is not only a symbol of national resolve, but also, hopefully, it reduces availability and increases price to potential consumers. We need that.

I want us though to imagine a fantasy where the interdiction efforts with cocaine and heroin and cannabis products, which are now the primary ones imported, are totally successful.

Suppose the F-15s were able to find every drug smuggling plane and that Customs folks were able to sniff out all the imported drugs. What would happen? Well, we would have no cocaine available, no heroin available, and less marijuana available.

What would be the effect of that? One thing is that most drug users now, particularly the young, are poly-drug users. Yes, they prefer their favorite drug, but they use others.

There was a previous experiment of so-called sealing off the borders, one called Operation Intercept, several years ago, that succeeded in diminishing substantially the flow of marijuana from Mexico into California in particular.

We found a massive shift of use away from marijuana and toward, for example, barbituates. We have to face the fact that even if interdiction was effective, we would still have amphetamines, barbituates, PCP, and LSD.

The designer drug clandestine laboratories would be so quick to develop a synthetic cocaine, I am afraid we would only be given 3 or 4 months lead time. The same would likely be true with heroin.

The point is that the "loyalty" to the specific intoxication of drugs nowadays is very, very limited. Getting "high" in the ways that people are doing, that consumers are doing, will be replaced by whatever drug is available. That does not say that interdiction would not be important to reduce supply. It does mean that it cannot be the solution.

Briefly now, let me spend a minute on prevention. At the core of any strategy has to be the individual decision whether or not to use. Prevention (that is the reduction of demand to experiment with drugs in the first place, and to continue after experimentation the prevention of that escalation) is a new science. And I think it has taken some unfair licks recently—the criticism that we have not been able to prove without a shadow of a doubt that in fact prevention does work.

We have more evidence now. We know what kinds of strategies put together with reasonable confidence will make a reasonable impact on the problem. And I mention just very briefly they will be: on the local level, coordinated, comprehensive, community-based actions which will include parent mobilization, parent education, peer resistance, peer counseling and leadership programs, sound school policies and curricula, the provision of meaningful alternatives for young people, wise local ordinances and planning, solidarity against drugs in the community, and cooperation among community institutions and agencies that stop turf wars and sensitivity to the individual cultural and ethnic characteristics of communities.

Nationally, it seems very, very consensual, at least among my colleagues, that we need strong coordinated national policy, consensus against illicit drugs, wise legislation that supports local prevention efforts, well-based media campaigns, special and increasing concern with tobacco and alcohol use among the young as gateway drugs, and a reasonable increase in the relative funding for prevention and education efforts in relationship to interdiction.

I will stop there. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:]

## DRUG ABUSE DEMAND REDUCTION THROUGH PREVENTIVE STRATEGIES: AN URGENT NATIONAL PRIORITY

**Testimony of Allan Y. Cohen, Ph.D. before a Hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Forces, June 14, 1988**

I am honored to be able to share some understanding of the urgency of drug abuse demand reduction with this most important Committee. The principles and data from which I draw are shaped by over 25 years of experience in the substance abuse field, ranging from individual therapeutic work with drug users to management of a major non-profit research and program development organization with a track record of over 40 significant projects developing, demonstrating, researching or evaluating various aspects of substance abuse demand reduction.

The focus of this testimony reflects my recent field of concentration--prevention. In addition to having studied and written about drug abuse prevention for over fifteen years, I serve as Associate Editor of the Journal of Primary Prevention, as the lead prevention advisor for the U.S. Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, and as Editorial Board Member for the Journal of Psychoactive Drugs. I serve as member of the Board of Directors for various prevention action organizations, including the National Association of Prevention Professionals and Advocates (NAPPA),the National Committee for the Prevention of Alcoholism and Other Drug Dependencies (NCPA) and Students Against Driving Drunk (SADD). I currently direct the Pacific Institute for Research & Evaluation, one of the nation's largest private organizations studying various facets of substance abuse prevention. I am also a Clinical Psychologist, licensed to practice in California, Maryland and the District of Columbia.

I wish to focus this statement both on the limitations of a national strategy based primarily on interdiction (whether civil or military) and the urgent need and promise in the domain of demand reduction, specifically in the areas of primary prevention and early intervention.

## The Limitations of Interdiction

There is almost total expert consensus that a solution to the plague of drug abuse can best be accomplished by a combination of reduced availability (or supply) and reduced demand (or desire to use).

There is obviously a legitimate role for supply reduction and interdiction in a unified national strategy. Reasonable principles and goals for supply reduction include two basic points:

(1) Elimination of a percentage of drug production and importation tend to restrict availability and thus increase difficulty of procurement and cost to the user.

(2) Laws and interdictive actions are important as symbols of national resolve.

The lessons of history as well as results of our best accumulated research demonstrate the limited helpfulness of supply reduction strategies alone in solving America's substance abuse problems. Indeed, over-dependence on supply reduction and interdictive strategies may distort the highest priorities for national resources and action.

The reasons are both well-documented and consistent with common sense. Let us consider those reasons with specific reference to the interdiction of trafficking outside our borders, whether by civil or military means:

(1) Interdiction can only be partially effective. It affects only cocaine, heroin and to some extent cannabis products. (Incidentally, we must understand the limits of crop eradication efforts in producing countries. If we cannot eradicate cannabis "crops" from our national forests and parks, how can we expect besieged third world countries to more successfully eradicate

their production?)

(2) Interdiction is specific to certain drugs, while drug use has become more and more non-specific. Evidence is now strong that most users are basically "polydrug users." Although they may have certain preferences,even physiological addiction, they use many substances. If one substance becomes more costly or totally unavailable, they will likely use other drugs.

Let us hypothesize the impact of total success of interdiction strategies (a fantasy of course) and the subsequent elimination of the import of cocaine, heroin and cannabis products. The immediate result would be the unavailability of coca products and of heroin. With only domestic marijuana production remaining, the price of cannabis products would rise significantly. Other factors would become apparent or likely:

A. The supply of all other dangerous substances would remain constant, including amphetamines, barbiturates, PCP, LSD, so-called designer drugs, sedative-hypnotics, a wide range of opiates, psychoactive prescription drugs, toxic inhalants, alcohol and so on.

B. Cocaine and heroin consumers would be forced either to:

--increase use of other drugs they already use;

--switch to other substances that most closely mimic their favorite drug effects (e.g. intravenous stimulants for cocaine, opioid pills for heroin, synthetic THC for cannabis); or

--quit entirely and seek treatment.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the last alternative will be the dominant reaction.

There is a further likely complication. It is almost certain that clandestine U.S. labs would quickly produce synthetics aimed at mimicking cocaine effects. Other opioids and synthetics already exist as heroin substitutes and would be traded more vigorously. The tremendously dangerous designer drugs mimicking heroin would be given wider circulation. The incentive to increase homegrown marijuana production would increase dramatically.

The conclusion of these and other points is relatively simple: Demand fuels supply; there will be no market for cheap and potent drugs if Americans do not wish to try them or use them. This is not a controversial conclusion. It has been clearly articulated by the Drug Enforcement Administration, distinguished diplomats and almost all experts in the drug abuse field.

There is little or no possibility that military assets applied to interdiction will alone make a meaningful impact on substance abuse. A more practical question is whether the funds spent on supply reduction and interdiction can be better spent if we assume the nation's limited financial resources.

## The Essence of Demand Reduction

It is inherently difficult to create dramatic legislation striking at the root of the demand for dangerous substances. Congressional and Executive action for supply reduction and/or legal sanctions against drug use are by far the easiest to generate. However, it is action against the roots of demand that have the greatest possibility of creating a relatively drug-free America.

Parenthetically, it may be important to state that stringent sanctions and aggressive law enforcement is really an extension of the supply reduction strategy. Even though the illegality of drug use and trafficking acts as a deterrent for a significant portion of the population, most of the deterrent effect of legal sanctions has already been realized. There is a widely held belief by dealers and users that they will not be arrested or successfully prosecuted. Considering the real limits on our enforcement, judiciary and correctional institutions, the strengthening of drug penalties, widespread drug testing and increased enforcement would still represent only an irritant to the virus of substance abuse, especially among the young.

The essence of true demand reduction is the individual decision to experiment or not, to use or not, to seek treatment or not. That decision is affected by many factors--cultural environment, adult models, peer pressure, life deficits--but ultimately based on individual values and choice. Young people especially act like consumers , and will seek and use that product if the perceived benefits outweigh perceived risks. The deception of drugs of course is that long-term benefits are never greater than the risks, and the dysfunction "bought" by the consumer is often unknown until it is much too late. Concurrent testimony is being offered about the importance of the treatment of drug abuse dependency. Treatment is a major component of demand reduction; addicts are a potent source of the demand for cocaine and heroin. But let us turn our attention to an earlier stage of intervention.

## The Promise of Prevention

Prevention strategies seek to reduce personal and group demand either before experimentation (primary prevention) or before experimentation progresses to serious use (early intervention).

The logic of investment in prevention lies in its inherent cost-effectiveness. Compared with the human and dollar cost in treating chemical dependency and/or in the prosecution and imprisonment of individuals, thousands may be prevented from chemical dependency for the dollars it takes to deal with a single addict for the rest of his/her life.

Tragically, we have traditionally invested relatively little in prevention programming, especially outside of the school system. Federal prevention programming has been severely underfunded and lacking in coordination. Lacking national leadership and programmatic guidance, even promising local prevention efforts have simply not reached "critical mass" in most communities.

Given this sad formal under-emphasis, still the state-of-the-art in drug and alcohol abuse prevention has moved ahead rapidly. Gone are the days when prevention practitioners believe that scare oriented education will deter all experimentation. Soon to be extinct in influence are those well-meaning promoters selling a" magic bullet"-- the one program that will eliminate drug abuse in all communities.

Even though sparse resources have been available for the systematic evaluation of prevention programming, the accumulating data on program effects are both encouraging and enlightening. The most promising elements of prevention strategies may now be at least approximated.

Prevention strategies and programs that can make significant reductions in incidence and prevalence of substance abuse will likely reflect:

(1) On the local level, effective prevention will feature comprehensive, coordinated, community-based actions to include parent mobilization and education, peer resistance and leadership strategies, sound school policies and curricula, the provision of meaningful alternatives for youth, wise local ordinances, neighborhood and community solidarity against drugs, and cooperation among community institutions [ including business, churches, youth groups, private and voluntary agencies, law enforcement, the judiciary and responsible governmental agencies], all with exquisite sensitivity to the particularities of the age, demography, ethnicity, cultural background and community context of the various target populations.

(2) On the national level, effective prevention will be enhanced by a coordinated national policy, strong centralized leadership, a national consensus against illicit drugs, wise legislation guiding and supporting local prevention efforts, accurate media campaigns and media messages, special federal concern with alcohol and tobacco use among youth (as "gateway" drugs), and a substantial increase in funding (at least relative to supply reduction and enforcement budgets) for prevention and education.

### Will Prevention Work?

Apparently, there is some reluctance on the part of Congress, the Administration and other policy-makers to make a serious commitment to prevention programming. A part of that reluctance--misplaced optimism on supply reduction and enforcement strategies--is being overcome quickly. Another part has been a somewhat peculiar skepticism about the effectiveness of drug abuse prevention and education. It is as if drug abuse prevention, afforded very limited evaluation and research dollars, has to prove its effectiveness before it can be seriously supported.

The same criterion of proof has not been demanded from, for example, AIDS and cancer prevention. To my knowledge, there have been no rigorous longitudinal evaluations of the impact of AIDS literature or prevention programming. Yet no one seriously challenges the utter necessity of prevention and education as the current key to preventing the spread of AIDS. Later, we will have the luxury of long-term scientific evaluation of AIDS prevention techniques. But we cannot wait for clear statistical proof to generate the most promising strategies.

The same case should be made for drug abuse prevention. We do have research evidence suggesting what might be the most promising approaches; we also are fairly confident of programming strategies that are not likely to make a major difference. We can also call for high standards of accountability and evaluation of programs funded by Federal and State block grants. But we cannot afford to delay prevention programming until long-term research proves that prevention works beyond a shadow of a doubt.

Prevention, of course does work. Tens of millions of Americans have resisted experimenting with easily available drugs, and other millions have ceased experimentation before becoming dependent. Because of our early dependence on the "medical" model of drug use [versus a "public health" model], we have given short shrift to the nature of "immunizing factors" to drug abuse, those qualities of non-using individuals or neighborhoods that make them relatively invulnerable to serious drug abuse. Our remaining challenge is to translate the immunizing factors into organized programming interventions.

Undoubtedly, this and other committees of the Congress have received formal and informal testimony indicting the relative chaos in federal implementation of demand reduction initiatives in recent years, heard opinions about the lack of inter-agency coordination, the "dumping" of funds into state education and block grants with almost no guidance, (perhaps forcing localities to wastefully re-invent the wheel), and listened to charges of leadership by whimsy.

But even in this admittedly cloudy picture [shared perhaps equally by all phases of the anti-drug effort], there are national initiatives that point us in an effective direction for demand reduction efforts. It is likely that the White House Conference for a Drug Free America, in its report to Congress and the President, will present a well-balanced perspective in the total effort against drugs, including some excellent general recommendations on prevention strategies. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has embarked recently on several very sound and systematic research and development projects, linking the best knowledge in prevention and treatment to practical implementation in communities. ACTION has functioned relatively brilliantly in funding community volunteers for innovative local program models, with a minimum of bureaucratic interference and a wise choice of prevention strategies. The Office of Substance Abuse Prevention has funded over one hundred programs for "high-risk" youth, and may be able to learn much from the experiment.

## What Is Needed To Enhance Effective Prevention

Again, deferring specific comments on treatment, education and research to my distinguished colleagues, let me summarize some of the most crucial needs for congressional action involving the prevention side of demand reduction.

(1) More resources, at the least a fair proportion of resources vis-a-vis supply reduction and enforcement.

(2) National recognition of the importance of prevention, and of coordinated federal leadership.

(3) Wise guidelines and accountability for all pass-through funds.

(4) Maximum involvement of the private sector and charitable organizations in prevention activities.

(5) Clear understanding that a long-term battle is being waged; consideration of five and ten year plans with appropriate intermediate goals and objectives.

The American public is now outraged at some of the worst manifestations of our nation's drug and alcohol problems. Naturally, we all wish a "quick fix." But there is no quick fix to be had. Neither combat interceptors nor decriminalization laws offer real promise in this most urgent war. If we are serious about the issue, we must get more serious about the reduction of demand, using the best of what we know in treatment, prevention and education, adequately supported and coordinated, with determination to fight over the long haul.

This struggle must be won and it will be successful. Drug abuse, like AIDS, is ultimately self-limiting. Our collective goal however, is to intervene effectively before our national security is breached, our national economy hobbled and our national health crippled.

It is my feeling that determination and success in the struggle against drug abuse will not only remediate huge and avoidable suffering, but will also give us keys to the solution of several related public health and social welfare problems. In being forced to deal with the roots of this societal "dis-ease," we are also compelled to discover new approaches--psychological, social and spiritual-- to many social problems that demand solution.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Dr. Cohen. Ms. McConnell.

## STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH S. McCONNELL, CONSULTANT ON DRUG EDUCATION

Ms. MCCONNELL. One of the Senators previously mentioned he was from the cocaine using capital of the country. I am from the midnight import State of the Nation, Florida. And I feel real well-founded, since almost a month ago we confiscated 4 tons of cocaine in my neighborhood.

We still do have this problem. I am a trainer and a teacher, and it is real hard for me to sit here. I am going to be as brief as I can, but as a teacher I want to make sure my class is with me. And so I want to give you one key word, and if you learn nothing else from me but you keep this word, perhaps it will stick with us as we work on these bills.

The word is "anti-wishywashyism." I think that is the key to the whole problem in the country. We have lots of little bits and pieces of solutions. No one is standing up and saying, roll up our sleeves, get to work. We have got to do this consistently.

In the education field, I have some real concerns. I have spent 11 years training teachers in drug education, and we have some conflicts. One is, the first thing we have to do is take drug education out of the extra-curricular activity field.

It has to be something that is a part of a child's substantial matriculation through school. It has to be as respected a subject as math, language, arts, and sciences, if we consider it to be the number one problem in our country.

In addition to that, we have to train teachers, classroom teachers, generically trained, like you would a math teacher, so that they are very aware of the problems and how to be a drug educator.

I am suggesting not training teachers to specific curricula and gimmicks, but training them to the whole theory of drug prevention. That also includes all the employees of schools, such as cafeteria ladies, janitors, as there are all kinds of role models in schools. If you recall, it was not always the principal who was the model.

In addition to that, I suggest very strongly that we have a serious conflict, and that is that one of our other concerns in this country is the poor performance of students in our schools.

Here I am asking for more time in their classroom day for drug education when we are monitoring every minute to make sure that the major subjects are covered. One of the things that needs to be done is the curricula has to become a classroom part of every child's learning, K through 12.

There are also methods being looked at of using infusion education so that the facts about drugs and alcohol would be infused into physics, biology, sciences, just as easily as subject matters or learning theories.

I also would like to suggest, as Allan Cohen discussed, that we have to talk about parents. Parents today are very rushed. There are mostly two-income families. We have lots of problems as a result of that.

I am going to offer to you a little story to give you what is kind of an issue in the family today, and that is time. This is about a little girl who came home from school, and when her father got home he came home with a briefcase full of work, and after dinner he went into a room and closed the door and he worked on his work all night. He did this for a number of weeks.

Finally the little girl said to her mother, "Mommy, how come daddy does not have time to play with us after dinner? How come he has to do work?" Her mother said, "Well, your dad is very important and he has lots of work to do. He cannot finish it all, and so he brings it home." The little girl said, "Well mommy, why do they not put daddy in a slower group?"

I suggest that we try to not only emphasize the use of time better as parents but that we provide information for parents on parenting skills and drug prevention at their workplace.

If the workplace could donate an hour a month and a worker would give up a lunch hour a month, that would be 2 hours of parenting education and information for families. That is well ahead of what we have now.

I just spoke to a graduating class of 50 pediatricians. I asked each of them—and these are the pediatricians that are going out to work with our families—how many of you have any information about drugs other than the prescription stuff? None. How many of you have any idea about intervention and treatment? None.

That is 50 new pediatricians entering our community. I suggest that the colleges need to do a whole lot more in training, not only in the specialty areas but in teaching and in any of the social help fields.

We also need to teach children that there are consequences to the drug problem. The kids where I am from in our inner city know that it is a slap on the hand and they are back on the streets.

I think we need to have some sort of examples for children to understand there are consequences that are substantial. I am the mother of two. I have a daughter here with me today.

While I am working very hard to see that she is educated about drugs, she also is quite confused about, why criminals get out as easily as they do? Why do we have this incredible plea bargain system?

In my summary are all the points that I suggest are important in drug education. I will not go through them. I do continue to dream, however. One of my dreams that I keep working on is the creation of a national prevention training center.

We need to train trainers, teams from each community. We need to have these teams be made up of clergy, social workers, law enforcement, emergency room technicians, school administrators, and have these teams of people that are trained by colleagues (such as those at this table) return to their cities and put on trainings for their own peers.

If all of the clergy in one city got the same information and went to work, that is a pretty limitless possibility. That is just one subgroup. So I continue to dream about that.

I continue to suggest to you that anti-wishywashyism might be the title of the 1988 bill. And I thank you for your time.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McConnell follows:]

## Statement of
## ELIZABETH S. McCONNELL
## Consultant on Drug Education
## Tampa, Florida

For the past 11 years, I have worked in the field of drug prevention. I am currently working as a consultant to States and school systems, having spent the last 10 months working on The White House Conference for a Drug Free America. I am also a panelist appointed by Secretary William J. Bennett's office working on the development of K-12 drug curricula guidelines. Previously, I served as Executive Director of the Mendez Foundation and, through that work, spent 10 years writing drug curricula as well as training thousands of teachers across the country. I work closely with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Education, and the National Football League. I am also the mother of two children.

It is flattering to be here. The last year has taught me so much about the scope of the drug problem. The White House Conference inspired me with the energy of the citizens across the country but also depressed me with the realization that we might just need my lifetime to solve this crisis.

With that in mind, I offer you one word I hope you will keep in mind: anti-wishwashyism. We must roll up our sleeves and get to work. I offer this in the spirit of dedication I have been privileged to experience across this country.

In 1984, the RAND Corporation concluded an extensive study on Strategies for Controlling Adolescent Drug Use. It concluded: "We find that while intensified law enforcement is not likely to reduce adolescent drug use, and the benefits of expanded treatment remain uncertain, prevention programs hold more promise. The most encouraging evidence comes from the success of school-based programs to prevent cigarette smoking, which offer a strategy that may be adaptable to other drugs." It further states: "Our results suggest a need for a somewhat different balance in national priorities on the control of drug use. At least as expressed in the federal budget, those priorities favor the traditional enforcement-plus-treatment approach . . . . Through all of this, prevention seems to have been neglected."

With the above in mind, it is not surprising that drug prevention/education efforts over the past years have been sparse, at best. While the Drug Free Schools money has been beneficial, it must be kept in mind that out of a $1.9 billion appropriation, only $200 million was targeted for education. Clearly, more funding is needed.

Historically, we have had drug education efforts being everything from gore pictures and scare tactics through "I-centered, touchy-feely" activities. There is obviously a middle ground which combines accurate up-to-date information with age-appropriate activities that consistently reinforce the illegality and danger of drugs.

We currently sit at a crossroads; some money has become available -- important issues must be resolved, however, before we disburse more. The following are my concerns:

1. With the drug free schools money provided by the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1986, there was little time allowed to provide training to inform States and

school systems as to what they ought to purchase. Stickers, comic books, balloons, and gimmicks are out there being peddled. With little standardization, good money has been spent on some materials that not only contain misinformation but were quite costly, as well. I believe that our first priority should be to place excellent, sequential curricula in each classroom -- then we should entertain the luxury of adding awareness materials and additional "fluff" items.

2. "Drugs are considered the #1 problem facing the U.S. today." If this statement is accurate, drug education must be removed from the status of "extra-curricular activity" and placed as a prioritized subject, equal to other subjects in a student's day. With all the emphasis on improved student performances, this is a difficult situation. Two points are important: a) kids do best what they do most; b) drugged kids never perform well. Therefore, drug education must be given valuable classroom time and not relegated to special activity status.

3. While not as substantial as necessary, some research now lists risk factors for drug and alcohol abuse. Factors such as family history of alcoholism, family management problems, antisocial behavior, parental drug use, and little commitment to school are cited. In the least, educational efforts should be based on such findings.

4. At present, children are aware that the legal consequences of early drug use are, at best, a slap on the hand. User accountability needs to be more seriously addressed, so that students know the risks are severe.

With these points in mind, the following are components of good drug education:

- It should occur at every grade level and be sequential
- Teachers should receive inservice training that is generic (not for a specific curriculum) and updated annually
- Attention should be paid to restricting former abusers from teaching, as they provide "mixed messages"
- Information should be current, up to date, and age appropriate
- Cultural differences should be addressed
- Issues dealing with dependency should be taught in elementary school
- Refusal skills should be taught and practiced
- All programs should clearly state that drugs and alcohol are illegal and dangerous for children

- Evaluation should include both process and outcome efforts
- Parents must be involved early and frequently
- School policy should be explained and strongly supported with no exceptions

While there are more elements to drug education, these are what I consider to be core ingredients. If students in our schools are educated throughout their academic career with accurate and effective drug prevention curricula, we will reach our goal of a Drug Free America during my lifetime.

We must take what we know and spread it consistently with the same voice. I have one constant dream I would like to share with you. That is to create a national prevention training center for trainers from each city in each area of our society that is affected by this problem. Not only school administrators, but clergy, public housing officials, social workers, business leaders, law enforcement officers, youth workers -- literally teams from each community to go back to their community and train their peers in their respective fields. We would create the ripples of good information getting quickly across the pond. This center would have a faculty of the leaders in prevention to create the core curriculum.

My dreams go on, but "anti-wishywashyism" is where we must make our initial investment. Thank you for the privilege of addressing you today.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Ms. McConnell. Dr. Johnston.

## STATEMENT OF LLOYD D. JOHNSTON, RESEARCH SCIENTIST AND PROGRAM DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Dr. JOHNSTON. Yes, thank you, Senator Wirth, and remaining member of the committee. My name is Lloyd Johnston.

I am Program Director and Research Scientist at the University of Michigan where, for the past 15 years or so, I have directed what has become known as the high school senior surveys of drug use.

For about 13 years, we have tracked drug use among American high school seniors. For about 8 years we tracked drug use among American college students. And in more recent years we have tracked drug use among most young people who are in their twenties, except those who have left school before senior year.

Usually I am asked to talk about the direction and nature of the drug epidemic, or really epidemics, that exist in the country, and I would be glad to answer any questions you may have about that.

But on this occasion I was asked to talk about the major policy response of demand reduction. And frankly, this is an issue to which I have given a great deal of thought, not only as a scholar of the area but for 4 years as a member of the National Advisory Council on Drug Abuse, and more recently as a conferee to the White House Conference on Drugs.

To put my comments on demand reduction in perspective, let me start by telling you my general conclusion about our national strategy, which is that we as a nation are placing far too much reliance on supply reduction approaches, including crop eradication, border and high seas interdiction, and local law enforcement.

In my opinion, these strategies are in general destined to failure. And the derivative cost of our obsession with these combative approaches could be very serious for two reasons. First, they are distracting us from the long-term approaches that really have the possibility of effective results, namely on the demand side.

And second, as we become more and more frustrated with our inability as a nation, and the inability of our institutions to solve this problem, we begin to consider more and more radical and really dangerous solutions, in my opinion.

Legalization of drugs is one which we have been hearing lately. I think it threatens to make what is probably an intermediate problem for the country into a permanent one. Tearing out pages of the Constitution is another which I hear increasingly, especially at the White House conference. And previous generations of——

Senator WARNER. What pages are they going to tear out? I missed that?

Dr. JOHNSTON. Well, I think for example, random urine testing of large segments of the population without due cause is a violation of such principles.

I think excessive seizure of assets for very minor infractions is another inappropriate——

Senator WARNER. In other words, what you are saying is, in the tremendous emphasis now in trying to stop drug abuse we might overbalance the equity as we try and work within the Constitution through the years?

Dr. JOHNSTON. Exactly. I hear people say the goal is to get the society drug-free, and whatever it costs to get to there, we will pay the price.

If that means tearing out some pages of the Constitution, so be it. It is very dangerous, I think.

Senator WARNER. I agree with you on that.

Dr. JOHNSTON. And we increasingly hear it. I do not think we are that desperate yet, and I think if we respond properly we are not going to be that desperate.

In discussing the war on drugs, I would like to invoke the wisdom of that great American military strategist, Pogo, who said, "We have met the enemy and he is us." The only battlefield in which we can win the war on drugs is right here at home on the battlefield of demand reduction.

For as long as major segments of the population see illicit drug use as relatively safe, relatively acceptable, and indeed pleasurable, we are going to have a massively profitable market for drugs in this country no matter what we do on the supply side.

One which is profitable enough to bring in an endless supply of supplier countries, of trans-shipment countries, of criminal cartels, and of local street dealers. And if we fill up our jails once and build a new set and fill it up again, there will be another set of jails worth of people out there willing to take the risk for this kind of money.

And even as Allan Cohen said, if through some miracle we could close down the trans-shipment of all natural drug products such as cocaine and marijuana and opium, it would only be a matter of months before basement chemists in this country would flood the market with synthetic analogs.

We have seen it already in the case of heroin. We have seen it in the case of PCP and a number of other hallucinogenic drugs. It is not hard to make analogs for these things when the profits are this great. There will be those basement chemists. And so that is the ultimate fatal flaw, the Achilles' tendon, in the supply reduction strategy in my opinion.

Senator WARNER. And we are growing now what percentage of our marijuana?

Dr. JOHNSTON. I honestly do not know the answer to that. But it helps to illustrate another point. We cannot control the production of marijuana in our own country. Why would we expect countries like Peru and Colombia and Thailand to be able to control the production in their countries?

They do not have the kind of territorial control we do. There are entire states of their countries that are well beyond Federal control. So I think we are asking them to do something that cannot be done.

So the point is that no matter what we do on the supply side, I think that as long as there is this massive market, demand-driven, the supply will be there.

Now, I think really, law enforcement officials from top to bottom have for some years been saying what we seem not to be able to integrate into our national strategy—that the most they can do is a holding action while we figure out how to reduce the demand for drugs.

I recently heard it put another way, in fact by an official of DEA, that the police efforts are like the forest fire brigades on the front line. They are trying to slow the advance of the fire while others in the rear are working with bulldozers and tree cutters trying to create a permanent barrier zone which the fire cannot bridge.

So if I could stay with the metaphor for just a moment, I would say that what the poor front line firefighters in the battle may not know is that there is not a whole lot of activity going on back there with the bulldozers and the tree cutters. In other words, the activity of demand reduction.

It seems to me that everyone—that is, policymakers, the media, and the general public—has been so mesmerized by the drama on the front line that we have been largely ignoring the real long-term solutions. And as a result I contend we may get in the position where we burn down the whole forest trying to save it.

Now, I have used a long time to make these introductory remarks, and I do not have much time for my other points. But I think that——

Senator WARNER. I think he should have the time that he needs. I think your testimony is very informative.

Dr. JOHNSTON. I think the general perspective I have introduced is the most important thing I have to say to the Congress, and to whoever will listen, and in fact I think you have heard it in other words from a number of people here.

The recommendations I have are several. In general, I think there is a sense that we cannot do a lot on demand reduction, and I think that is wrong. I think we have not really given it a fair shot.

I think probably the most important thing we can do is to mobilize every community in this country to deal with this problem. I cannot recall a subject in recent years which has elicited a sense of voluntarism among the American people as this one has, not since World War II.

I think this is an invaluable resource which is waiting for effective leadership and guidance from the President on down. Every community in the country should have a community leadership group which is drawn from all sectors, business and industry, from labor, from office holders and media and so forth, education; and every community should be mobilizing a community response through this leadership group.

Now, you might think a lot of this is going on, but in fact only a few communities in the country are doing it. I joined such a group a year ago in the city of Detroit, which has one of the worst drug abuse problems in the country, and it was just begun.

One of the tasks of such groups is to put in place systems for educating and mobilizing parents in the community. The Federal Government, I think, can play a role by providing startup funds, perhaps in the form of matching funds, to stimulate such a process.

But perhaps more important it needs to make available some models and some demonstration programs to provide guidelines to such community groups. And it should also develop a system of technical assistance and material.

Second, I think we have to do a much more vigorous job of developing the knowledge base for drug abuse prevention in the schools and elsewhere. Now, the omnibus drug bill of 1986 did contain significant funding for school curricula dealing with drugs, approximately $250 million per year.

But the knowledge base available to the schools for spending that money in a meaningful way, frankly, is very thin. Most high school students do think that their drug abuse curricula had at least some of the intended effects on their attitudes toward drug use.

And so, I think in general what we are doing in the aggregate seems to have some positive effect. But clearly they could be far more effective. And about a quarter of the students say they have never had any drug abuse curricula.

And so, I think research and development for both school and community-based prevention efforts should be rapidly accelerated.

Third, I think we should encourage the media and the advertising industries to continue the really splendid efforts that they have undertaken voluntarily to deglamorize drugs.

Students in our 1987 survey indicated high rates of exposure to these programs, and most seemed to feel that they had the desired impact on their attitudes and their inclinations to use drugs.

I find it very encouraging and somewhat surprising, in fact, how strong their statements were. I think we need to be careful not to undercut the enthusiasm and commitment of these private sector voluntary efforts.

Therefore, I think any Federal support should go toward helping communities perhaps to develop their own complementary media efforts.

Fourth, I think that we need to be getting a lot more prevention ideas out on the table for serious consideration. We have been too narrow in the ideas that we have been considering, and to this end I would suggest the funding of perhaps three or four prevention development centers in the country, think tanks in this area, which would actively engage young people, parents, educators, as well as scholars, in a problem-solving mode aimed at suggesting new and promising interventions.

Senator **Warner**. Is that concept parallel to the one that Ms. McConnell mentioned a moment ago?

Dr. **Johnston**. I am sorry, Senator. I cannot hear you.

Senator **Warner**. Is your idea parallel to the one Ms. McConnell mentioned a minute ago about her dream about a national treatment——

Dr. **Johnston**. I think they are different but complementary. I think what she is suggesting is that technical resources and assistance be available to various communities and school systems and so forth, and I agree that there is the need for that knowledge and for technical resources to help people out there to figure out how to start tackling the problem in their community.

What I am suggesting really is a think tank or a set of think tanks which are trying to develop some new ideas. I think we have been far too uncreative in dealing with this. We just do not have enough ideas on the table, and I think we need some places where people have the primary goal and activity of putting a lot more good ideas on the table. The most promising of those should then get implemented and evaluated in various places. That covers the prevention development centers.

My fifth suggestion relates to these new program ideas being developed for schools and families and communities. I think that these need to be evaluated, and we need to be much more serious about evaluation research in this area.

Again, you may think a lot of this is happening. But for all of the years of the drug epidemic we have been devoting really what is a pittance on this really critical component of dealing with the drug epidemic, on the order of a few million dollars—counted on one hand—per year.

And these studies are expensive. They often cost $1 million or $2 million apiece. I contend that had we developed a vigorous program of demonstration programs and serious evaluations as recently as 5 years ago, we currently would have quite a number of good and effective programs.

In the absence of knowing which ones are effective, I think we need to proceed in a way that we do in all other problem areas, as Allan Cohen points out in his written testimony, including AIDS and cancer and so forth.

But it is also important that we know which ones are the most effective, stop wasting money on the ones that are not, and proliferate the ones that are.

Regarding my own area of epidemiological research and monitoring of the drug problem, I think it is fair to say that in this country we have more high quality information about this one of our social problems than about most. And I think we should sustain that position by continuing the important data systems that already exist.

However, there are some important gaps. We do not have good national data on treatment demand, and we should. We have lost that. In 1981 the block grant system had the inadvertent effect of wiping out the CODAP system.

I also think we need a good system for tracking drug use among our out-of-school youngsters, particularly those in the inner city. This would be difficult and expensive to develop, but I think appropriate, given the urgency of the problem.

In general, I think our programmatic research on the epidemiology of drug use has been overly modest, particularly given the range of different populations in which we need to understand this complex set of phenomena.

And I know that in the absence of good epidemiological data, everyone holds to his own conception, and in the end most of them turn out to be misconceptions.

Senator WARNER. I must say that I am not sure what "epidemiology" means in this context.

Dr. JOHNSTON. I was not sure either until I was called one. It is basically the study of the size and nature and spread of a disease. In this case, drug use is often referred to as a disease by certain sectors.

Senator WARNER. I wonder if I might interject at that point with a question, Mr. Chairman. And I am sorry.

I am helping conduct a hearing next door on the Intelligence Committee that relates to drug use. Maybe this question is basic, but sometimes you just have to admit your own inadequacy and lack of knowledge to ask it.

I am a father of three children, but fortunately they are in their late twenties now. We slipped through the marijuana period, touching it lightly, and then went on and they each established their careers.

But as a parent I have missed, probably fortunately, but unfortunately in terms of my legislative responsibilities, what it is that is out there that is making these youngsters, and mine are no different than yours and everyone else's, suddenly turn to these drugs. What is the inducement? What is it?

Dr. JOHNSTON. That requires a complex answer, I believe.

Senator WARNER. Are we doing enough to try and figure out what it is that induces these beautiful young people to use drugs? It seems to be all classes of society.

Sure, we read about it on the streets and in the poor sections. But as I go out and as you have given addresses to high schools, which I am going to do this week, I know it is there and I am told it is there.

But my best sources of information in the past were my three children, which are now well into their advanced twenties and early thirties, and they are out and gone. I do not have any informants anymore that I can rely on. Can you help me?

Dr. JOHNSTON. Well, I can try.

Senator WARNER. I would like to pose that question to each member of the panel.

Dr. JOHNSTON. I think it is hard to understand our current epidemic without looking at how it evolved.

Obviously, we did not have a problem of this type and scale in the 1950s, and it was not until the late 1960s that it started to occur.

Senator WARNER. But now it is exponential, if you hear these witnesses in the last 3 years. It has, I do not know, doubled, quadrupled?

Dr. JOHNSTON. Well, it is——

Senator WARNER. Or are these things exaggerated? Because I noticed in your earlier statement that it may not be as bad a problem as we think it is.

Dr. JOHNSTON. Parts of it have changed, and I would be glad if you would consider for inclusion in the record a short synopsis of a release we did in January of the most recent trend results among high school, college, and young adult populations.

Senator WARNER. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, we would welcome that.

[The information follows:]

**The University of Michigan**

**News and Information Services**

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January 12, 1988 (10)
Contact: Gil Goodwin
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Illicit drug use by American high school seniors, college students and young adults continued to decline in 1987, but U-M researchers say U.S. usage still highest in industrialized world.

FOR RELEASE 9:30 A.M. WEDNESDAY JANUARY 13, 1988

EDITORS: Details of annual drug survey are in attached statement.

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The first substantial decline in cocaine use among American high school seniors, college students and young adults was detected in the 1987 drug survey conducted by researchers at The University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research (ISR).

Social psychologists Lloyd D. Johnston, Jerald G. Bachman and Patrick M. O'Malley cautioned that although overall drug usage among young people continued a trend of gradual decline last year, the United States still has the highest rates among the world's industrialized nations.

Even with the modest improvement in the cocaine situation and other cooling of what they call "the unhealthy romance between many of America's young people and illicit drugs," the U-M researchers insist that "we have come only part way down from a very high mountain, and to a considerable degree that is true of the drug problem in general."

Over half (57 percent) of last year's high school seniors still had tried an illicit drug, and over a third had tried an illicit drug other than marijuana.

The survey found little change in the use of LSD, heroin or other opiates, and there was some evidence of a continuing gradual increase in the use of inhalants.

The use of alcohol was little changed and cigarette smoking—which the researchers say will take the lives of more young people than all other drugs combined—has not dropped among high school seniors since 1984.

##########

(ISR;Johnston;Bachman;O'Malley)(R1a/R1b/R2a/R2b/R3/ISRa/ISRb/ISRc/RTspa/
RTspb/Ed1/Ed2a/Ed2b/Ed3/X1a/X2a/X9/)[0481]

## SUMMARY OF 1987 DRUG STUDY RESULTS

(MEDIA STATEMENT delivered by Dr. Lloyd D. Johnston of The University of Michigan at a national news conference in the Washington, D.C offices of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, made in conjunction with a statement by HHS Secretary Otis Bowen, 9:30 a.m. Wednesday, January 13, 1988.)

* * * * * * *

We are pleased to be able to report that the unhealthy romance between many of America's young people and illicit drugs continued to cool in 1987.

Clearly the most important part of the story is that, for the first time in eight years, cocaine showed a significant drop in use. Cocaine---one of the most seductive of the illicit drugs, one of the most dangerous, one of the most addicting---has also been among the most widely used by American young people.

In recent years cocaine ranked second only to marijuana in active use among both high school seniors and young adults. In fact, the proportion of high school graduates reporting some experience with cocaine by age 27 reached as high as 40 percent. After it had remained at peak levels in these age groups for seven years, there occurred in 1987 a drop of about one-fifth in the annual usage statistics observed among American high school students, American college students, and young adults generally.

It also appears that the worrisome crack epidemic of 1986, which had seemed poised to explode into a much greater health menace, leveled out by 1987---at least among these populations. Unfortunately we do not have measures for the 15-20 percent of an age group who do not finish high school. Certainly in some cities the crack epidemic is particularly serious in this part of the population.

What does all of this mean in terms of numbers? It still means that about one in every six or seven high school seniors has tried cocaine (15.2%) and one in 18 (5.6%) has tried crack cocaine specifically. Among high school graduates in their late twenties today, it means that nearly four in 10 (39%) have tried cocaine and one in 15 (6.7%) has tried crack specifically.

These findings all derive from the 13th annual survey in this series, entitled Monitoring the Future. The study is conducted by The University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research by three social psychologists---Lloyd D. Johnston, Jerald G. Bachman, and Patrick M. O'Malley---and is funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse.

Like all of the previous surveys in the series, this one has a nationally representative sample of some 16,000 seniors in about 130 public and private high schools nationwide. We are also reporting on results of the 1987 follow-up survey of approximately 10,000 graduates from the classes of 1975 through 1986. The follow-up surveys, which are conducted by mail, yield a nationally representative sample of all high school graduates aged 19 to 29 including college students. (The study has contained a national sample of about 1,100 college students each year since 1980.) Thus, today we will be discussing trends for American high school students, college students, and young adults generally up to age 29.

America's drug epidemic is, in fact, composed of many drug-specific epidemics, and these have not all risen and fallen in unison. During the early 1970s the use of most illicit drugs was rising among America's young people. But by the mid-seventies, some---like nonmedical use of tranquilizers and barbiturates---began what was to be a long and gradual decline in use. Others reached their peak levels in subsequent years and then began to decline as well, including: marijuana in 1978; PCP in 1979; LSD in 1980; and amphetamines in 1982.

But it was not until 1987 when the latest and perhaps most troublesome drug---cocaine---gave evidence of beginning to turn downward.

The cocaine epidemic has been particularly troublesome for two reasons. First, cocaine has proven to be highly addictive, and otherwise dangerous for the user. In fact, it has become appreciably more addictive and dangerous with the emergence of crack in the last couple of years. Second, a great many young Americans have been putting themselves at risk by trying cocaine---up to 40 percent of young people reaching their late twenties in the past few years have tried cocaine.

After increasing sharply in popularity among young adults and adolescents in the latter half of the seventies, cocaine use remained relatively stable in these age groups for the next seven years (1979-86); and this was despite expanded efforts at all levels of government to cut off the supply of the drug. (See attached figure.) The increase in availability and drop in price during the period surely helped sustain the epidemic; and they certainly helped to demonstrate that supply control efforts alone are not enough to control a drug epidemic. Demand must be reduced or the lure of great profits simply continues to attract new suppliers.

In 1987 we observed the first drop in demand for cocaine among adolescents and young adults. For example, the number of high school seniors reporting cocaine use in the year prior to the survey fell by one-fifth between 1986 and 1987 (from 12.7% to 10.3%). The same occurred among American young adults (high school graduates) aged 19 to 29---in this case a drop from 20 to 16 percent. Among college students specifically, the drop was from 17 to 14 percent. In all cases, these changes are statistically significant.

This turnround may have a number of determinants, but certainly one has been a dramatic increase in the number of young people who believe that using the drug, even experimentally, is dangerous. Among high school seniors, for example, the number who saw "great risk" associated with trying cocaine once or twice jumped from 34 percent in 1986 to 48 percent in 1987. The corresponding one-year shift in regard to the dangers of occasional use was from 54 to 67 percent.

For a full eight years prior to 1986, there had been virtually no change in the perceived risks of experimenting with cocaine, so this shift was a sudden and dramatic one. Undoubtedly the tragic deaths from cocaine use of sports stars Len Bias and Don Rogers served to get the attention of many young Americans. The message was clear: no one is invincible, not even those who would seem the most likely to be.

But much more was happening during this historical period. The media and many national leaders were drawing public attention to the drug problem and to the hazards of drugs, particularly crack. And these events, in combination, appeared to make an impression on our young people. There was an increase across all of the illegal drugs in the proportions of seniors who see them as carrying great risks for their users.

Personal attitudes and peer norms are changing as well, with a significant increase for every illicit drug in the proportion of seniors who say they disapprove of its use. In fact, in 1987, 87 percent of seniors disapproved of even trying cocaine, a 7 percent jump in one year. Fully 97 percent disapprove of regular cocaine use.

Why do we think that the downturn in cocaine use represents a change in demand? Well, first, we have seen that the fundamental beliefs and attitudes among young Americans about this drug have changed appreciably. But, second, there has been no downturn in the perceived availability of cocaine by seniors; if anything, it is perceived as more available in the last couple of years. Further, we know from DEA figures that, in general, the price has dropped and purity has risen in the 1980s. None of these facts would suggest a reduced supply; therefore it must be the demand which has declined.

Ever since 1978 we have been reporting a decline in marijuana use---indeed, a very appreciable one in terms of daily use---and it appears that much or all of that change reflected a drop in demand as well. In fact, the proportion of seniors who felt that regular marijuana use carried a great risk more than doubled, from 35 to 74 percent, as actual daily use fell by more than two-thirds (from 10.7% in 1978 to 3.3% in 1987). As with cocaine, there was practically no decrease in the perceived availability of marijuana over that interval.

Our evidence on trends in crack use is more inferential than for all other drugs, because we have not had questions about it for as many years. But from the data we have on the proportion of seniors smoking cocaine---which is what most crack users report as their mode of ingestion---we have seen evidence of a rapid spread in crack use between 1983 and 1986. In 1987 there was a slight decline in this statistic for the first time, suggesting either a leveling or slight decline in the use of crack.

We also looked to see how widely crack had spread from the very large cities to other communities. Last year we reported that half of the schools in the sample had evidence of crack having been used by at least some of their students. In 1987 the proportion rose to 75 percent of all schools. Clearly there has been a rapid diffusion of this drug, but we believe that the very extensive media coverage of its hazards helped to put a cap on this epidemic far more quickly than we have seen for any of the other drugs.

To summarize the "good news" part of the story, we have found continuing declines in 1987 in the use of marijuana, stimulants, sedatives, and methaqualone specifically, in all three populations---high school seniors, college students, and young adults generally. Most importantly, we have seen the first substantial decline in cocaine use in these populations. Changing attitudes about the hazards of these drugs and changing norms appear to have played an important role in the declines.

Despite the good news, I want to conclude on a cautionary note. First, there was little change observed in the use of LSD, heroin or opiates other than heroin; and there was some evidence of a continuing gradual increase in the use of inhalants. Second, the improvement in the cocaine situation is modest. We have come only part way down from a very high mountain, and to a considerable degree that is true of the drug problem in general.

Over half (57%) of last year's seniors still have tried an illicit drug, and over a third (36%) have tried an illicit drug other than marijuana. Four in every 10 (42%) had used an illicit drug in just the past year and one quarter (24%) used something other than marijuana.

These clearly remain the highest rates of illicit drug use of any country in the industrialized world. And as our long parade of popular drugs suggests, there likely will be more to come. This means that we must be consistent and sustained in our efforts both to lower these rates and to prepare our young people to deal with new drug problems as they arise.

Finally, regarding the important licit drugs covered in the study, we have seen no further decline in the use of alcohol in the past three years, although there had been some drop for several prior years. Nearly all high school seniors (92%) have had experience with alcohol and two-thirds (66%) are current users (i.e., have used in the past 30 days). About 5 percent are daily drinkers and most important, perhaps, is that nearly 40 percent (37.5%) percent report at least one occasion of heavy drinking in the past two weeks---that is, an occasion in which they had five or more drinks in a row. None of these figures has shown any improvement in the past three years.

Cigarette smoking---the substance-using behavior that will take the lives of more of these young people than all of the others combined---has not dropped among high school seniors since 1984. Nearly a fifth (18.7%) of them are already daily smokers by the time they leave high school and more will convert from occasional to regular smoking in the years following high school. (Note that these statistics do not include high school dropouts, the majority of whom smoke.)

Most of these young people begin smoking by age 13, and their pattern of smoking in adolescence is highly predictive of their smoking behavior throughout adulthood. I think we need to ask why, in an era in which the hazards of smoking are widely recognized and the norms regarding smoking are continuing to become more negative, the smoking rate among our young people is not falling. It is an important question, with literally hundreds of thousands of our children's lives hanging in the balance.

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NOTE: The following tables and figures are taken from the following monograph, now in preparation, which will be published later this year by the National Institute on Drug Abuse: Johnston, L.D., O'Malley, P.M., and Bachman, J.G. "Illicit Drug Use, Smoking, and Drinking by America's High School Students, College Students, and Young Adults, 1975-1987."

## FIGURE 1

### Trends in Lifetime Prevalence of an Illicit Drug Use Index

All Seniors



NOTES: Use of "some other illicit drugs" includes any use of hallucinogens, cocaine, and heroin, or any use which is not under a doctor's orders of other opiates, stimulants, sedatives, or tranquilizers.

◄ indicates the percentage which results if all stimulants are excluded from the definition of "illicit drugs." ◁ shows the percentage which results if only non-prescription stimulants are excluded.

The dashed vertical line indicates that after 1983 the shaded and open bars are defined by using the amphetamine questions which were revised to exclude non-prescription stimulants from the definition of "illicit drugs."

## FIGURE 2

### Trends in Annual Prevalence of an Illicit Drug Use Index

All Seniors



NOTES: Use of "some other illicit drugs" includes any use of hallucinogens, cocaine, and heroin, or any use which is not under a doctor's orders of other opiates, stimulants, sedatives, or tranquilizers.

◀ indicates the percentage which results if all stimulants are excluded from the definition of "illicit drugs." ◁ shows the percentage which results if only non-prescription stimulants are excluded.

The dashed vertical line indicates that after 1983 the shaded and open bars are defined by using the amphetamine questions which were revised to exclude non-prescription stimulants from the definition of "illicit drugs."

## FIGURE 3

### Trends in Lifetime, Annual, and Thirty-Day Prevalence of Cocaine

All Seniors



Trends in Lifetime, Annual, and Thirty-Day Prevalence of Cocaine
All Seniors

| | '75 | '76 | '77 | '78 | '79 | '80 | '81 | '82 | '83 | '84 | '85 | '86 | '87 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lifetime | 9.0 | 9.7 | 10.8 | 12.9 | 15.4 | 15.7 | 16.5 | 16.0 | 16.2 | 16.1 | 17.3 | 16.9 | 15.2 |
| Annual | 5.6 | 6.0 | 7.2 | 9.0 | 12.0 | 12.3 | 12.4 | 11.5 | 11.4 | 11.6 | 13.1 | 12.7 | 10.3 |
| Thirty-Day | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 5.7 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 5.8 | 6.7 | 6.2 | 4.3 |

## TABLE 7
## Trends in Lifetime Prevalence of Sixteen Types of Drugs

| | Percent ever used | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Class of 1975 | Class of 1976 | Class of 1977 | Class of 1978 | Class of 1979 | Class of 1980 | Class of 1981 | Class of 1982 | Class of 1983 | Class of 1984 | Class of 1985 | Class of 1986 | Class of 1987 | '86 – '87 change |
| Approx. N = | (9400) | (15400) | (17100) | (17800) | (15500) | (15900) | (17500) | (17700) | (16300) | (15900) | (16000) | (15200) | (16300) | |
| Marijuana/Hashish | 47.3 | 52.8 | 56.4 | 59.2 | 60.4 | 60.3 | 59.5 | 58.7 | 57.0 | 54.9 | 54.2 | 50.9 | 50.2 | −0.7 |
| Inhalants[a] | NA | 10.3 | 11.1 | 12.0 | 12.7 | 11.9 | 12.3 | 12.8 | 13.6 | 14.4 | 15.4 | 15.9 | 17.0 | + 1.1 |
| *Inhalants Adjusted*[b] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *18.2* | *17.3* | *17.2* | *17.7* | *18.2* | *18.0* | *18.1* | *20.1* | *18.6* | *− 1.5* |
| Amyl & Butyl Nitrites[c,h] | NA | NA | NA | NA | 11.1 | 11.1 | 10.1 | 9.8 | 8.4 | 8.1 | 7.9 | 8.6 | 4.7 | − 3.9sss |
| Hallucinogens | 16.3 | 15.1 | 13.9 | 14.3 | 14.1 | 13.3 | 13.3 | 12.5 | 11.9 | 10.7 | 10.3 | 9.7 | 10.3 | +0.6 |
| *Hallucinogens Adjusted*[d] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *17.7* | *15.6* | *15.3* | *14.3* | *13.6* | *12.3* | *12.1* | *11.9* | *10.6* | *− 1.3s* |
| LSD | 11.3 | 11.0 | 9.8 | 9.7 | 9.5 | 9.3 | 9.8 | 9.6 | 8.9 | 8.0 | 7.5 | 7.2 | 8.4 | + 1.2s |
| PCP[c,h] | NA | NA | NA | NA | 12.8 | 9.6 | 7.8 | 6.0 | 5.6 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 3.0 | − 1.8ss |
| Cocaine | 9.0 | 9.7 | 10.8 | 12.9 | 15.4 | 15.7 | 16.5 | 16.0 | 16.2 | 16.1 | 17.3 | 16.9 | 15.2 | − 1.7s |
| "Crack"[g] | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 5.6 | NA |
| Other cocaine[c] | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 14.0 | NA |
| Heroin | 2.2 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.2 | +0.1 |
| Other opiates[e] | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.3 | 9.9 | 10.1 | 9.8 | 10.1 | 9.6 | 9.4 | 9.7 | 10.2 | 9.0 | 9.2 | +0.2 |
| Stimulants[e] | 22.3 | 22.6 | 23.0 | 22.9 | 24.2 | 26.4 | 32.2 | 35.6 | 35.4 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| *Stimulants Adjusted*[e,f] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *27.9* | *26.9* | *27.9* | *26.2* | *23.4* | *21.6* | *− 1.8s* |
| Sedatives[e] | 18.2 | 17.7 | 17.4 | 16.0 | 14.6 | 14.9 | 16.0 | 15.2 | 14.4 | 13.3 | 11.8 | 10.4 | 8.7 | − 1.7ss |
| Barbiturates[e] | 16.9 | 16.2 | 15.6 | 13.7 | 11.8 | 11.0 | 11.3 | 10.3 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 9.2 | 8.4 | 7.4 | − 1.0 |
| Methaqualone[e] | 8.1 | 7.8 | 8.5 | 7.9 | 8.3 | 9.5 | 10.6 | 10.7 | 10.1 | 8.3 | 6.7 | 5.2 | 4.0 | − 1.2ss |
| Tranquilizers[e] | 17.0 | 16.8 | 18.0 | 17.0 | 16.3 | 15.2 | 14.7 | 14.0 | 13.3 | 12.4 | 11.9 | 10.9 | 10.9 | 0.0 |
| Alcohol | 90.4 | 91.9 | 92.5 | 93.1 | 93.0 | 93.2 | 92.6 | 92.8 | 92.6 | 92.6 | 92.2 | 91.3 | 92.2 | +0.9 |
| Cigarettes | 73.6 | 75.4 | 75.7 | 75.3 | 74.0 | 71.0 | 71.0 | 70.1 | 70.6 | 69.7 | 68.8 | 67.6 | 67.2 | −0.4 |

NOTES: Level of significance of difference between the two most recent classes: s = .05, ss = .01, sss = .001. NA indicates data not available.

[a] Data based on four questionnaire forms. N is four-fifths of N indicated.

[b] Adjusted for underreporting of amyl and butyl nitrites. See text for details.

[c] Data based on a single questionnaire form. N is one fifth of N indicated.

[d] Adjusted for underreporting of PCP. See text for details.

[e] Only drug use which was not under a doctor's orders is included here.

[f] Based on the data from the revised question, which attempts to exclude the inappropriate reporting of non-prescription stimulants.

[g] Data based on two questionnaire forms. N is two-fifths of N indicated.

[h] Question text changed slightly in 1987.

## TABLE 8
## Trends in Annual Prevalence of Seventeen Types of Drugs

| | Percent who used in last twelve months | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Class of 1975 | Class of 1976 | Class of 1977 | Class of 1978 | Class of 1979 | Class of 1980 | Class of 1981 | Class of 1982 | Class of 1983 | Class of 1984 | Class of 1985 | Class of 1986 | Class of 1987 | '86–'87 change |
| Approx. N = | (9100) | (15400) | (17100) | (17800) | (15500) | (15900) | (17500) | (17700) | (16300) | (15900) | (16000) | (15200) | (16300) | |
| Marijuana/Hashish | 40.0 | 44.5 | 47.6 | 50.2 | 50.8 | 48.8 | 46.1 | 44.3 | 42.3 | 40.0 | 40.6 | 38.8 | 36.3 | −2.5s |
| Inhalants[a] | NA | 3.0 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 5.4 | 4.6 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.9 | +0.8 |
| *Inhalants Adjusted*[b] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *8.9* | *7.9* | *6.1* | *6.6* | *6.2* | *7.2* | *7.5* | *8.9* | *8.1* | *−0.8* |
| Amyl & Butyl Nitrites[c,h] | NA | NA | NA | NA | 6.5 | 5.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 2.6 | −2.1sss |
| Hallucinogens | 11.2 | 9.4 | 8.8 | 9.6 | 9.9 | 9.3 | 9.0 | 8.1 | 7.3 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 6.0 | 6.4 | +0.4 |
| *Hallucinogens Adjusted*[d] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *11.8* | *10.4* | *10.1* | *9.0* | *8.3* | *7.3* | *7.6* | *7.6* | *6.7* | *−0.9* |
| LSD | 7.2 | 6.4 | 5.5 | 6.3 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.1 | 5.4 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 5.2 | +0.7 |
| PCP[c,h] | NA | NA | NA | NA | 7.0 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 1.3 | −1.1ss |
| Cocaine | 5.6 | 6.0 | 7.2 | 9.0 | 12.0 | 12.3 | 12.4 | 11.5 | 11.4 | 11.6 | 13.1 | 12.7 | 10.3 | −2.4sss |
| "Crack"[g] | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 4.0 | NA |
| Other cocaine[c] | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 9.8 | NA |
| Heroin | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Other opiates[e] | 5.7 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 6.0 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 5.9 | 5.2 | 5.3 | +0.1 |
| Stimulants[e] | 16.2 | 15.8 | 16.3 | 17.1 | 18.3 | 20.8 | 26.0 | 26.1 | 24.6 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| *Stimulants Adjusted*[e,f] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *20.3* | *17.9* | *17.7* | *15.8* | *13.4* | *12.2* | *−1.2* |
| Sedatives[e] | 11.7 | 10.7 | 10.8 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 10.3 | 10.5 | 9.1 | 7.9 | 6.6 | 5.8 | 5.2 | 4.1 | −1.1ss |
| Barbiturates[e] | 10.7 | 9.6 | 9.3 | 8.1 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 3.6 | −0.6 |
| Methaqualone[e] | 5.1 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 5.9 | 7.2 | 7.6 | 6.8 | 5.4 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 1.5 | −0.6s |
| Tranquilizers[e] | 10.6 | 10.3 | 10.8 | 9.9 | 9.6 | 8.7 | 8.0 | 7.0 | 6.9 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 5.5 | −0.3 |
| Alcohol | 84.8 | 85.7 | 87.0 | 87.7 | 88.1 | 87.9 | 87.0 | 86.8 | 87.3 | 86.0 | 85.6 | 84.5 | 85.7 | +1.2 |
| Cigarettes | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |

NOTES: Level of significance of difference between the two most recent classes: s = .05, ss = .01, sss = .001. NA indicates data not available.

[a] Data based on four questionnaire forms. N is four-fifths of N indicated.

[b] Adjusted for underreporting of amyl and butyl nitrites. See text for details.

[c] Data based on a single questionnaire form. N is one-fifth of N indicated.

[d] Adjusted for underreporting of PCP. See text for details.

[e] Only drug use which was not under a doctor's orders is included here.

[f] Based on the data from the revised question, which attempts to exclude the inappropriate reporting of non-prescription stimulants.

[g] Data based on two questionnaire forms. N is two-fifths of N indicated.

[h] Question text changed slightly in 1987.

## TABLE 9
## Trends in Thirty-Day Prevalence of Sixteen Types of Drugs

| | Percent who used in last thirty days | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Class of 1975 | Class of 1976 | Class of 1977 | Class of 1978 | Class of 1979 | Class of 1980 | Class of 1981 | Class of 1982 | Class of 1983 | Class of 1984 | Class of 1985 | Class of 1986 | Class of 1987 | '86–'87 change |
| Approx. N = | (9400) | (15400) | (17100) | (17800) | (15500) | (15900) | (17500) | (17700) | (16300) | (15900) | (16000) | (15200) | (16300) | |
| Marijuana/Hashish | 27.1 | 32.2 | 35.4 | 37.1 | 36.5 | 33.7 | 31.6 | 28.5 | 27.0 | 25.2 | 25.7 | 23.4 | 21.0 | −2.4s |
| Inhalants[a] | NA | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | +0.3 |
| *Inhalants Adjusted*[b] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *3.2* | *2.7* | *2.5* | *2.5* | *2.5* | *2.6* | *3.0* | *3.2* | *3.5* | *+0.3* |
| Amyl & Butyl Nitrites[c,h] | NA | NA | NA | NA | 2.4 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.0 |
| Hallucinogens | 4.7 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 0.0 |
| *Hallucinogens Adjusted*[d] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *5.3* | *4.4* | *4.5* | *4.1* | *3.5* | *3.2* | *3.8* | *3.5* | *2.8* | *−0.7* |
| LSD | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | +0.1 |
| PCP[c,h] | NA | NA | NA | NA | 2.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 0.6 | −0.7s |
| Cocaine | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 5.7 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 5.8 | 6.7 | 6.2 | 4.3 | −1.9sss |
| "Crack"[g] | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 1.5 | NA |
| Other cocaine[c] | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 4.1 | NA |
| Heroin | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Other opiates[e] | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.8 | −0.2 |
| Stimulants[e] | 8.5 | 7.7 | 8.8 | 8.7 | 9.9 | 12.1 | 15.8 | 13.7 | 12.4 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| *Stimulants Adjusted*[e,f] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *10.7* | *8.9* | *8.3* | *6.8* | *5.5* | *5.2* | *−0.3* |
| Sedatives[e] | 5.4 | 4.5 | 5.1 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.7 | −0.5s |
| Barbiturates[e] | 4.7 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.4 | −0.4 |
| Methaqualone[e] | 2.1 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.6 | −0.2 |
| Tranquilizers[e] | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | −0.1 |
| Alcohol | 68.2 | 68.3 | 71.2 | 72.1 | 71.8 | 72.0 | 70.7 | 69.7 | 69.4 | 67.2 | 65.9 | 65.3 | 66.4 | +1.1 |
| Cigarettes | 36.7 | 38.8 | 38.4 | 36.7 | 34.4 | 30.5 | 29.4 | 30.0 | 30.3 | 29.3 | 30.1 | 29.6 | 29.4 | −0.2 |

NOTES: Level of significance of difference between the two most recent classes: s = .05, ss = .01, sss = .001. NA indicates data not available.

[a] Data based on four questionnaire forms. N is four-fifths of N indicated.

[b] Adjusted for underreporting of amyl and butyl nitrites. See text for details.

[c] Data based on a single questionnaire form. N is one-fifth of N indicated.

[d] Adjusted for underreporting of PCP. See text for details.

[e] Only drug use which was not under a doctor's orders is included here.

[f] Based on the data from the revised question, which attempts to exclude the inappropriate reporting of non-prescription stimulants.

[g] Data based on two questionnaire forms. N is two-fifths of N indicated.

[h] Question text changed slightly in 1987.

## TABLE 10
### Trends in Thirty-Day Prevalence of Daily Use of Sixteen Types of Drugs

| | Percent who used daily in last thirty days | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Class of 1975 | Class of 1976 | Class of 1977 | Class of 1978 | Class of 1979 | Class of 1980 | Class of 1981 | Class of 1982 | Class of 1983 | Class of 1984 | Class of 1985 | Class of 1986 | Class of 1987 | '86–'87 change[g] |
| Approx. N = | (9400) | (15400) | (17100) | (17800) | (15500) | (15900) | (17500) | (17700) | (16300) | (15900) | (16000) | (15200) | (16300) | |
| **Marijuana/Hashish** | 6.0 | 8.2 | 9.1 | 10.7 | 10.3 | 9.1 | 7.0 | 6.3 | 5.5 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.0 | 3.3 | −0.7s |
| **Inhalants**[a] | NA | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | −0.1 |
| ***Inhalants Adjusted***[b] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *0.1* | *0.2* | *0.2* | *0.2* | *0.2* | *0.2* | *0.4* | *0.4* | *0.4* | *0.0* |
| **Amyl & Butyl Nitrites**[c,i] | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | −0.2 |
| **Hallucinogens** | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| ***Hallucinogens Adjusted***[d] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *0.2* | *0.2* | *0.1* | *0.2* | *0.2* | *0.2* | *0.3* | *0.3* | *0.2* | *−0.1* |
| LSD | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| PCP[c,i] | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | +0.1 |
| Cocaine | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | −0.2[g] |
| "Crack"[h] | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0.2 | NA |
| Other cocaine[c] | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 0.2 | NA |
| **Heroin** | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| **Other opiates**[e] | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| **Stimulants**[e] | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| ***Stimulants Adjusted***[e,f] | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *NA* | *0.7* | *0.8* | *0.6* | *0.4* | *0.3* | *0.3* | *0.0* |
| **Sedatives**[e] | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| **Barbiturates**[e] | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| **Methaqualone**[e] | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| **Tranquilizers**[e] | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| **Alcohol** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Daily** | 5.7 | 5.6 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 6.9 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 0.0 |
| **5+ drinks in a row/ last 2 weeks** | 36.8 | 37.1 | 39.4 | 40.3 | 41.2 | 41.2 | 41.4 | 40.5 | 40.8 | 38.7 | 36.7 | 36.8 | 37.5 | +0.7 |
| **Cigarettes** | 26.9 | 28.8 | 28.8 | 27.5 | 25.4 | 21.3 | 20.3 | 21.1 | 21.2 | 18.7 | 19.5 | 18.7 | 18.7 | 0.0 |

**NOTES: Level of significance of difference between the two most recent classes: s = .05, ss = .01, sss = .001. NA indicates data not available.**

[a] **Data based on four questionnaire forms. N is four-fifths of N indicated.**

[b] **Adjusted for underreporting of amyl and butyl nitrites. See text for details.**

[c] **Data based on a single questionnaire form. N is one-fifth of N indicated.**

[d] **Adjusted for underreporting of PCP. See text for details.**

[e] **Only drug use which was not under a doctor's orders is included here.**

[f] **Based on the data from the revised question, which attempts to exclude the inappropriate reporting of non-prescription stimulants.**

[g] **Any apparent inconsistency between the change estimate and the prevalence estimates for the two most recent classes is due to rounding error.**

[h] **Data based on two questionnaire forms. N is two-fifths of N indicated.**

[i] **Question text changed slightly in 1987.**

## TABLE 15

## Trends in Perceived Harmfulness of Drugs

|  | Percentage saying "great risk"[a] |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Q. How much do you think people risk harming themselves (physically or in other ways), if they . . .* | Class of 1975 | Class of 1976 | Class of 1977 | Class of 1978 | Class of 1979 | Class of 1980 | Class of 1981 | Class of 1982 | Class of 1983 | Class of 1984 | Class of 1985 | Class of 1986 | Class of 1987 | '86 – '87 change |
| Try marijuana once or twice | 15.1 | 11.4 | 9.5 | 8.1 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 13.0 | 11.5 | 12.7 | 14.7 | 14.8 | 15.1 | 18.4 | + 3.3ss |
| Smoke marijuana occasionally | 18.1 | 15.0 | 13.1 | 12.4 | 13.5 | 14.7 | 19.1 | 18.3 | 20.6 | 22.6 | 24.5 | 25.0 | 30.4 | + 5.4sss |
| Smoke marijuana regularly | 43.3 | 38.6 | 36.4 | 34.9 | 42.0 | 50.4 | 57.6 | 60.4 | 62.8 | 66.9 | 70.4 | 71.3 | 73.5 | + 2.2 |
| Try LSD once or twice | 49.4 | 45.7 | 43.2 | 42.7 | 41.6 | 43.9 | 45.5 | 44.9 | 44.7 | 45.4 | 43.5 | 42.0 | 44.9 | + 2.9 |
| Take LSD regularly | 81.4 | 80.8 | 79.1 | 81.1 | 82.4 | 83.0 | 83.5 | 83.5 | 83.2 | 83.8 | 82.9 | 82.6 | 83.8 | + 1.2 |
| Try PCP once or twice | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 55.6 | NA |
| Try cocaine once or twice | 42.6 | 39.1 | 35.6 | 33.2 | 31.5 | 31.3 | 32.1 | 32.8 | 33.0 | 35.7 | 34.0 | 33.5 | 47.9 | + 14.4sss |
| Take cocaine occasionally | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 54.2 | 66.8 | + 12.6sss |
| Take cocaine regularly | 73.1 | 72.3 | 68.2 | 68.2 | 69.5 | 69.2 | 71.2 | 73.0 | 74.3 | 78.8 | 79.0 | 82.2 | 88.5 | + 6.3sss |
| Try heroin once or twice | 60.1 | 58.9 | 55.8 | 52.9 | 50.4 | 52.1 | 52.9 | 51.1 | 50.8 | 49.8 | 47.3 | 45.8 | 53.6 | + 7.8sss |
| Take heroin occasionally | 75.6 | 75.6 | 71.9 | 71.4 | 70.9 | 70.9 | 72.2 | 69.8 | 71.8 | 70.7 | 69.8 | 68.2 | 74.6 | + 6.4sss |
| Take heroin regularly | 87.2 | 88.6 | 86.1 | 86.6 | 87.5 | 86.2 | 87.5 | 86.0 | 86.1 | 87.2 | 86.0 | 87.1 | 88.7 | + 1.6 |
| Try amphetamines once or twice | 35.4 | 33.4 | 30.8 | 29.9 | 29.7 | 29.7 | 26.4 | 25.3 | 24.7 | 25.4 | 25.2 | 25.1 | 29.1 | + 4.0ss |
| Take amphetamines regularly | 69.0 | 67.3 | 66.6 | 67.1 | 69.9 | 69.1 | 66.1 | 64.7 | 64.8 | 67.1 | 67.2 | 67.3 | 69.4 | + 2.1 |
| Try barbiturates once or twice | 34.8 | 32.5 | 31.2 | 31.3 | 30.7 | 30.9 | 28.4 | 27.5 | 27.0 | 27.4 | 26.1 | 25.4 | 30.9 | + 5.5sss |
| Take barbiturates regularly | 69.1 | 67.7 | 68.6 | 68.4 | 71.6 | 72.2 | 69.9 | 67.6 | 67.7 | 68.5 | 68.3 | 67.2 | 69.4 | + 2.2 |
| Try one or two drinks of an alcoholic beverage (beer, wine, liquor) | 5.3 | 4.8 | 4.1 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 3.5 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 4.6 | 6.2 | + 1.6s |
| Take one or two drinks nearly every day | 21.5 | 21.2 | 18.5 | 19.6 | 22.6 | 20.3 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 23.0 | 24.4 | 25.1 | 26.2 | + 1.1 |
| Take four or five drinks nearly every day | 63.5 | 61.0 | 62.9 | 63.1 | 66.2 | 65.7 | 64.5 | 65.5 | 66.8 | 68.4 | 69.8 | 66.5 | 69.7 | + 3.2s |
| Have five or more drinks once or twice each weekend | 37.8 | 37.0 | 34.7 | 34.5 | 34.9 | 35.9 | 36.3 | 36.0 | 38.6 | 41.7 | 43.0 | 39.1 | 41.9 | + 2.8 |
| Smoke one or more packs of cigarettes per day | 51.3 | 56.1 | 58.4 | 59.0 | 63.0 | 63.7 | 63.3 | 60.5 | 61.2 | 63.8 | 66.5 | 66.0 | 68.6 | + 2.6 |
| Approx. N = | (2804) | (2918) | (3052) | (3770) | (3250) | (3234) | (3604) | (3557) | (3305) | (3262) | (3250) | (3020) | (3315) |  |

NOTE: Level of significance of difference between the two most recent classes: s = .05, ss = .01, sss = .001.

[a] Answer alternatives were: (1) No risk, (2) Slight risk, (3) Moderate risk, (4) Great risk, and (5) Can't say, drug unfamiliar.

## TABLE 16
## Trends in Proportions Disapproving of Drug Use

| *Q. Do you disapprove of people (who are 18 or older) doing each of the following?*[b] | Percentage "disapproving"[a] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Class of 1975 | Class of 1976 | Class of 1977 | Class of 1978 | Class of 1979 | Class of 1980 | Class of 1981 | Class of 1982 | Class of 1983 | Class of 1984 | Class of 1985 | Class of 1986 | Class of 1987 | '86–'87 change |
| Try marijuana once or twice | 47.0 | 38.4 | 33.4 | 33.4 | 34.2 | 39.0 | 40.0 | 45.5 | 46.3 | 49.3 | 51.4 | 54.6 | 56.6 | +2.0 |
| Smoke marijuana occasionally | 54.8 | 47.8 | 44.3 | 43.5 | 45.3 | 49.7 | 52.6 | 59.1 | 60.7 | 63.5 | 65.8 | 69.0 | 71.6 | +2.6 |
| Smoke marijuana regularly | 71.9 | 69.5 | 65.5 | 67.5 | 69.2 | 74.6 | 77.4 | 80.6 | 82.5 | 84.7 | 85.5 | 86.6 | 89.2 | +2.6s |
| Try LSD once or twice | 82.8 | 84.6 | 83.9 | 85.4 | 86.6 | 87.3 | 86.4 | 88.8 | 89.1 | 88.9 | 89.5 | 83.2 | 91.6 | +2.4ss |
| Take LSD regularly | 94.1 | 95.3 | 95.8 | 96.4 | 96.9 | 96.7 | 96.8 | 96.7 | 97.0 | 96.8 | 97.0 | 96.6 | 97.8 | +1.2s |
| Try cocaine once or twice | 81.3 | 82.1 | 79.1 | 77.0 | 74.7 | 76.3 | 74.6 | 76.6 | 77.0 | 79.7 | 79.3 | 80.2 | 87.3 | +7.1sss |
| Take cocaine regularly | 93.3 | 93.9 | 92.1 | 91.9 | 90.8 | 91.1 | 90.7 | 91.5 | 93.2 | 94.5 | 93.8 | 94.3 | 96.7 | +2.4sss |
| Try heroin once or twice | 91.5 | 92.6 | 92.5 | 92.0 | 93.4 | 93.5 | 93.5 | 94.6 | 94.3 | 94.0 | 94.0 | 93.3 | 96.2 | +2.9sss |
| Take heroin occasionally | 94.8 | 96.0 | 96.0 | 96.4 | 96.8 | 96.7 | 97.2 | 96.9 | 96.9 | 97.1 | 96.8 | 96.6 | 97.9 | +1.3s |
| Take heroin regularly | 96.7 | 97.5 | 97.2 | 97.8 | 97.9 | 97.6 | 97.8 | 97.5 | 97.7 | 98.0 | 97.6 | 97.6 | 98.1 | +0.5 |
| Try amphetamines once or twice | 74.8 | 75.1 | 74.2 | 74.8 | 75.1 | 75.4 | 71.1 | 72.6 | 72.3 | 72.8 | 74.9 | 76.5 | 80.7 | +4.2ss |
| Take amphetamines regularly | 92.1 | 92.8 | 92.5 | 93.5 | 94.4 | 93.0 | 91.7 | 92.0 | 92.6 | 93.6 | 93.3 | 93.5 | 95.4 | +1.9ss |
| Try barbiturates once or twice | 77.7 | 81.3 | 81.1 | 82.4 | 84.0 | 83.9 | 82.4 | 84.4 | 83.1 | 84.1 | 84.9 | 86.8 | 89.6 | +2.8ss |
| Take barbiturates regularly | 93.3 | 93.6 | 93.0 | 94.3 | 95.2 | 95.4 | 94.2 | 94.4 | 95.1 | 95.1 | 95.5 | 94.9 | 96.4 | +1.5s |
| Try one or two drinks of an alcoholic beverage (beer, wine, liquor) | 21.6 | 18.2 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 15.8 | 16.0 | 17.2 | 18.2 | 18.4 | 17.4 | 20.3 | 20.9 | 21.4 | +0.5 |
| Take one or two drinks nearly every day | 67.6 | 68.9 | 66.8 | 67.7 | 68.3 | 69.0 | 69.1 | 69.9 | 68.9 | 72.9 | 70.9 | 72.8 | 74.2 | +1.4 |
| Take four or five drinks nearly every day | 88.7 | 90.7 | 88.4 | 90.2 | 91.7 | 90.8 | 91.8 | 90.9 | 90.0 | 91.0 | 92.0 | 91.4 | 92.2 | +0.8 |
| Have five or more drinks once or twice each weekend | 60.3 | 58.6 | 57.4 | 56.2 | 56.7 | 55.6 | 55.5 | 58.8 | 56.6 | 59.6 | 60.4 | 62.4 | 62.0 | −0.4 |
| Smoke one or more packs of cigarettes per day | 67.5 | 65.9 | 66.4 | 67.0 | 70.3 | 70.8 | 69.9 | 69.4 | 70.8 | 73.0 | 72.3 | 75.4 | 74.3 | −1.1 |
| Approx. N = | (2677) | (2957) | (3085) | (3686) | (3221) | (3261) | (3610) | (3651) | (3341) | (3254) | (3265) | (3113) | (3302) | |

NOTE: Level of significance of difference between the two most recent classes: s = .05, ss = .01, sss = .001.

[a] Answer alternatives were: (1) Don't disapprove, (2) Disapprove, and (3) Strongly disapprove. Percentages are shown for categories (2) and (3) combined.

[b] The 1975 question asked about people who are "20 or older."

## TABLE 24

### Trends in Annual Prevalence of Thirteen Types of Drugs
### Among Follow-Up Respondents 1-10 Years Beyond High School

| | Percent who used in last twelve months | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 1986 | 1987 | '86-'87 change |
| Approx. Wtd. N = | (6860) | (6840) | |
| Marijuana | 36.5 | 34.8 | −1.7s |
| LSD | 3.0 | 2.8 | −0.2 |
| Cocaine | 19.7 | 15.7 | −4.0sss |
| "Crack"[b] | NA | 3.1 | NA |
| Heroin | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Other Opiates[a] | 3.1 | 3.0 | −0.1 |
| Stimulants, Adjusted[a,c] | 10.6 | 8.7 | −1.9sss |
| Sedatives[a] | 3.1 | 2.5 | −0.6s |
| Barbiturates[a] | 2.3 | 2.1 | −0.2 |
| Methaqualone[a] | 1.3 | 0.9 | −0.4s |
| Tranquilizers[a] | 5.3 | 5.1 | −0.2 |
| Alcohol | 88.6 | 89.4 | +0.8 |
| Cigarettes | NA | NA | NA |

NOTES: Level of significance of difference between the two most recent years:
s = .05, ss = .01, sss = .001.
NA indicates data not available.

[a] Only drug use which was not under a doctor's orders is included here.

[b] This drug was asked about in only two of the five questionnaire forms. N is two-fifths of N indicated.

[c] Based on the data from the revised question, which attempts to exclude the inappropriate reporting of non-prescription stimulants.

## TABLE 28

### Trends in Annual Prevalence of Thirteen Types of Drugs
Among College Students 1–4 Years Beyond High School

| | Percent who used in last twelve months | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | '86 – '87 change |
| Approx. Wtd. N = | (1040) | (1130) | (1150) | (1170) | (1110) | (1080) | (1190) | (1220) | |
| Marijuana | 51.2 | 51.3 | 44.7 | 45.2 | 40.7 | 41.7 | 40.9 | 37.0 | – 3.9s |
| LSD | 6.1 | 4.6 | 6.3 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 2.2 | 3.9 | 4.0 | + 0.1 |
| Cocaine | 16.9 | 15.9 | 17.2 | 17.2 | 16.4 | 17.3 | 17.1 | 13.7 | – 3.4s |
| "Crack"[b] | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 2.0 | NA |
| Heroin | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | + 0.1 |
| Other Opiates[a] | 5.1 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 2.4 | 4.0 | 3.1 | – 0.9 |
| Stimulants[a] | 22.4 | 22.2 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Stimulants, Adjusted[a,c] | NA | NA | 21.1 | 17.3 | 15.8 | 11.9 | 10.3 | 7.2 | – 3.1ss |
| Sedatives[a] | 8.3 | 7.9 | 8.0 | 4.5 | 3.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 1.7 | – 0.9 |
| Barbiturates[a] | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 1.2 | – 0.9 |
| Methaqualone[a] | 7.2 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 0.8 | – 0.4 |
| Tranquilizers[a] | 6.9 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 3.8 | – 0.6 |
| Alcohol | 90.5 | 92.5 | 92.2 | 91.6 | 90.0 | 92.0 | 91.5 | 90.9 | – 0.6 |
| Cigarettes | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |

NOTES: Level of significance of difference between the two most recent years:
s = .05, ss = .01, sss = .001.
NA indicates data not available.

[a] Only drug use which was not under a doctor's orders is included here.

[b] This drug was asked about in only two of the five questionnaire forms. N is two-fifths of N indicated.

[c] Based on the data from the revised question, which attempts to exclude the inappropriate reporting of non-prescription stimulants.

Dr. JOHNSTON. Basically, in terms of what is happening in scale, the overall proportion of American young people who use illicit drugs actually peaked about 1980. And it has been in a gradual decline since then. And so if you look at that indicator of the epidemic, you would say things are getting better.

Senator WARNER. And this is pure numbers?

Dr. JOHNSTON. Straight numbers, straight counts of adolescents and young adults which are the highest risk age groups.

And then if you look at a number of the individual drugs, they show similar patterns, though exactly when each drug peaked is different. Some drugs peaked in the early 1970s. Some did not peak until the late 1970s, like marijuana.

We have seen considerable improvement in the marijuana situation, and that of course was the drug of greatest public and social concern in the late 1970s. We have seen some real progress on that front.

Cocaine, I think, has been the clear fly in the ointment. It reached peak prevalence levels in adolescent and young adult populations in the country in about 1980, and has remained at peak levels for most of the years since, despite our increasing efforts to change that fact. Thus, I think, some of the attention the subject gets results from increasing frustration that we are not solving the cocaine problem, even though we are trying.

There was, however, a qualitative change in the cocaine epidemic that was important, and that was that people moved from sniffing cocaine hydrochloride, or powder, into using crack, which is a more dangerous, more addictive form of the drug. And it was also introduced in a way which was much cheaper, and so other segments could afford it.

Senator WARNER. Now, is there a demarcation in the use of crack between, for example, on the street and the poor sections there is crack, whereas the smart set, the cocktail party, the yuppies, still sniff?

Why is it that they are not lured to crack? Is it an economic question?

Dr. JOHNSTON. Well, crack has diffused rather quickly. Crack was not even around, I think, before 1984.

We now find, in our most recent survey in 1987, that about 70 percent of the high schools in the national study had some positive prevalence for crack. And so that was a lot of diffusion. It was not just in a couple of big cities as we believed just maybe 2 years ago.

Still, it seems to be a drug which is both seen as more dangerous than regular cocaine and partly as a result of that is more related to social class, because that is true for heroin as well and PCP and other very dangerous drugs, that is the lower classes, the less educated populations are more likely to be using.

And so I think it is clear that crack cocaine is more concentrated than powdered cocaine in inner city areas. But I think that we would be wrong to conclude that crack is not in a lot of other places.

Ann Arbor is an upper middle class city that I live in—one of relatively small size, 150,000—yet crack is there. It is dealt on the streets, and people can get it if they want it. Still I think the crack problem in particular has tended to concentrate in inner city areas.

And as I mentioned, it is one of the populations on which we have rather poor epidemiological data. It is hard to get. But I think it can be done if we set our minds to it.

To go back to your original question about why do we have the problem? Well, let me finish this. In 1987 we saw the first downturn in our history in cocaine use, in both high school students and college students and in young adults who are high school graduates in their twenties.

All three populations showed the drop. It was about a one-fifth drop in their annual prevalence, or a one-third drop in their most recent month prevalence. An important and statistically significant change.

I think it came about because this population is now finally coming to see that even experimenting with cocaine is a dangerous behavior. And in fact if we look at the different drugs, they have quite different cycles in how long it takes the population to realize how dangerous the drug is and what the consequences are.

If we look at cigarettes, it took 30 to 40 years. If we look at marijuana, it took maybe 15 years. If we look at cocaine, it has taken 7 or 8 or 9 years. PCP only took a couple, and crack I think may have had the shortest cycle yet because the media just blitzed the country with information about the dangers of crack in a very short time after the epidemic set in.

So even with crack it looks like in the in-school population at least, which represents 85 percent of the adolescents, that crack has probably leveled off in 1987. We are about to find out what happened in 1988.

So there has been a lot of natural correction and reduction in demand. It is not a reduction in supply which accounts for this change, because we have two sources of information to test that. One is DEA information, all of which shows that in 1987 crack and cocaine——

Senator WARNER. But in the few minutes I have I would like to get back to—what is the inducement? What is that lure that leads them to start it?

Dr. JOHNSTON. Well, I think the epidemic came about in the late 1960s and 1970s in the Vietnam era. And at that time many forms of drug use were a form of symbolic expression.

It was part of the counterculture, part of the anti-establishment statement by young people. And that served to change norms in those age groups very dramatically. And so people of high school and college age found it quite acceptable to be using marijuana, LSD.

And then you had this large population of people who were using these drugs, and therefore it was not a very big psychological step to be using the new drugs that came along, and eventually of course cocaine came along.

That symbolic motivation is gone now. We are past that era. I think we no longer have that driving force, and that has taken some of the steam out of the epidemic, I think. I think that is why it has peaked and started downward in general.

So now I think what we have largely is a kind of recreational motivation. The norms were already in place. That made it acceptable for at least major segments of the age spectrum—kids think of it as something that is a way to have fun.

And a point I have not gotten to yet, we have a couple of industries in this country that spend a couple of billion dollars a year each convincing our kids that the way to have fun is to get high on cigarettes and on alcohol. And those advertising budgets have grown very dramatically during this epidemic.

So we have a lot of forces that have given rise to the epidemic; but I think most important is the set of norms established that made it acceptable to at least try things. Now I think we are in a period where we are starting to move those norms back again and, as people come to see these drugs as dangerous, the norms change.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Johnston follows:]

# TESTIMONY OF

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Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate having this opportunity to discuss with you the important national issues of drug abuse and the nation's response to this problem.

My name is Lloyd Johnston. I am a Program Director and Research Scientist at the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research, where for the past twenty years I have been studying drug use among America's young people, mostly through the use of national scientific surveys. Since 1975, along with my colleagues Jerald G. Bachman and Patrick O'Malley, I have directed the annual National High School Senior Surveys. (The formal title of the study is Monitoring the Future: A Continuing Study of the Lifestyles and Values of Youth.) Through this survey series we have been able to track and characterize the drug epidemic among American high school students for the past 13 years, among American college students for the past eight years, and among young adults in their twenties (who are high school graduates) in more recent years.* (See Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman, 1987; Johnston, 1988a)

Usually when I speak or testify, it is to describe the direction and nature of the epidemic--or really multiple epidemics--in the use of the various drugs; and I would be glad to try to answer any questions you may have on these topics. However, I have been asked to speak here on the major policy response of demand reduction; and frankly it is an issue to which I also have given some considerable thought, in part because I have been a student of the area, but also in part in my capacity as a member of the National

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*Each year some 17,000 seniors in approximately 135 high schools are sampled to be representative of all seniors in public and private high schools in the coterminous United States. They are given confidential, self-administered questionnaires during a normal class period by representatives of the Institute for Social Research. A representative subsample of 2500 chosen from each class are then followed by mail for some years after graduation. These follow-up participants eventually contain an excellent national sample of college students, so we have reported results on this population since 1980. All of these populations omit young people who drop out of high school before graduating from high school--a group we know to be at considerable higher than average risk for drug abuse.

Advisory Council on Drug Abuse (of which I chaired the Prevention Subcommittee for three years), and in part in my capacity as a Presidentially-appointed Conferee on the White House Conference for a Drug Free America.

To put my comments on demand reduction in perspective, let me first tell you my general conclusion about our national strategy, which is that we are as a nation placing far too much reliance on supply reduction approaches--including foreign crop eradication, border and high seas interdiction, and local law enforcement efforts. In my opinion these strategies are in general destined to failure; and the derivative costs of our obsession with these combative approaches could be very serious in that (a) they are detracting us from the really effective long-term solution of lowering demand through the many methods available to us, and (b) as we become more and more frustrated with the inability of our institutions to solve the problem, we begin to consider more and more radical and dangerous solutions. Legalization of drugs is one: it threatens to make what is probably an intermediate term problem into a permanent one. Tearing out pages of our Constitution, which previous generations have shed their blood to defend, is another. Desperate men seek desperate solutions. I contend that we are not desperate yet, nor should we be in the future if we respond more thoughtfully in dealing with this epidemic.

In discussing the war on drugs, let me invoke the wisdom of that great American military strategist, Pogo, who said, "We have met the enemy, and he is us." The only battlefield on which we can win the war on drugs is right here at home, on the battlefield of demand reduction. For as long as major segments of the population see illicit drugs as relatively safe, relatively acceptable, also pleasurable, there will be a massively profitable market for drugs in this country--one profitable enough to bring in an endless supply of supplier and transhipment countries, an endless supply of criminal cartels, and an endless supply of street dealers. And if, through some miracle, we could reign in all of those evil supplier and transhipment countries, onto whom we have consistently externalized this problem, within months basement chemists would flood the market with synthetic substitutes for whatever could not be imported--synthetic cocaine, for example. Frankly, I don't think it would matter if we poured a quarter of the national treasury into the supply reduction effort: Despite a whole lot more seizures and convictions, drugs would be right there on the street for those still wanting to use them.

Law enforcement officials from top to bottom have for some years been saying what we seem not to be able to integrate into national policy--that the most that they can do is a holding action, while we figure out how to reduce the demand for drugs. I recently heard it put another way by an official from DEA--that the police efforts are like the forest fire brigades on the front line. They are just trying to slow the advance of the fire while others further to the rear toil with bulldozers and tree cutters to clear barrier zones which the fire cannot bridge. If I could stay with that metaphor for a minute, I would say that what the poor front line fire fighters in the battle against drugs don't know, is that there isn't a whole lot of activity going on back there with bulldozers and tree cutters--in other words the activity of demand reduction. It seems to me that everyone--policy makers, the media, and the public included--has been so mesmerized by the drama on the front line that we have been largely ignoring the real long-term solutions. As a result, I contend, we may get in a position where we have burned down the whole forest trying to save it.

Such a long introduction leaves me little time to say much about the specifics of what I think needs to be done, but it may be the most important thing I have to say to you today. On the issue of demand reduction, I make the following suggestions corresponding to the tree cutting and bulldozing needed to stop the forest fire.

First, I think we need to help mobilize every community in the country. I cannot recall a subject in recent years which has elicited a sense of voluntarism among the American people as this one. This is an invaluable resource waiting for effective leadership and guidance, from the President on down. Every community in the country should have a community leadership group, drawn from all sectors, mobilizing a community response and clearly establishing a broad community norm. Only a few have that now.

One of the tasks for such a group would be to put in place systems for educating and mobilizing the parents in that community. The Federal government can play a role by providing start-up funds--perhaps in the form of matching funds--to stimulate the process. Perhaps more important, it needs to make available some models and demonstration programs to provide some guidelines to such community groups, and it should also develop a system of technical assistance and material.

Second, we need a much more vigorous effort at developing the knowledge base for drug prevention programs in the schools. The Omnibus Drug Bill of 1986 did contain significant funding for school curricula dealing with drugs--approximately $250 million per year--but the knowledge base available to schools for spending that money in a meaningful way is thin. Most high school students do think that their drug abuse curricula had at least some of the intended effects on their attitudes toward drug use (Johnston, 1988b), but clearly they could be far more effective. Research and development on both school-based and community-based prevention efforts should be rapidly accelerated.

Third, I think we should encourage the media and advertising industries to continue the splendid effort that they have undertaken voluntarily to deglamorize drugs. The students in our 1987 survey indicated high rates of exposure to such drug spots and most seemed to feel that they had had the desired impact on their own attitudes and inclinations to use (Johnston, 1988b). We should be careful not to undercut the enthusiasm and commitment of these private sector voluntary efforts; therefore, I think any Federal support should go toward helping communities produce (but not air) their own complementary spots.

Fourth, we should be getting a lot more prevention ideas on the table for serious consideration; and to this end I would suggest the funding of perhaps three "think tank" Prevention Development Centers, which would actively engage young people, parents, educators, as well as scholars, in a problem-solving mode aimed at suggesting new and promising interventions. Since the dynamics of the phenomenon is likely to be different for the minority youngster in the inner city ghetto than for the white youngster in a wealthy suburb, different interventions are likely to be needed for different populations. In any case, we need to seriously engage youngsters in the solution to these problems, and I would hope such centers would do just that. Their ideas should help to complement those now being developed through the grant mechanism at the ADAMHA Office of Substance Abuse Programs. All ideas so developed should be made widely available to those who choose to pursue them.

My fifth suggestion relates to the new program ideas being developed for schools, families, communities, the media, etc. It is to institute a serious program of evaluation research on the most promising prevention ideas. For all of the years of the drug epidemic we have been devoting a pittance to this most critical component in our knowledge base for dealing with the drug epidemic--on the order of a few million dollars per year. I contend that had we developed a vigorous program of demonstration programs and serious evaluation as recently as five years ago, we would have a lot more effective programs in our armamentarium at present. If we keep putting it off, the forest will continue to burn.

Regarding my own area, of epidemiological research and monitoring of the drug problem, I think it is fair to say that we have more high quality information about the drug problem than about most social problems, and that we should sustain that position by continuing important indicator systems such as the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), the National Household Surveys on Drug Abuse, and the High School Senior Surveys (which also include college students and young adults).

However, there are some important gaps. Good national data on treatment demand have not existed since NIDA's Client Oriented Data Acquisition Program (CODAP) was scuttled by the advent of the block grant program. Such information is very important for proper policy planning and evaluation, and a replacement system should be developed quickly, particularly in light of the AIDS epidemic. Also a good system for tracking drug use among out-of-school youngsters--particularly in the inner city--has not been developed. To develop a reasonably good one would probably be fairly expensive by social science standards; but very likely justified given the apparent seriousness of the drug problem in those populations.

And in general, I think our programmatic research on the epidemiology of drug use has been overly modest--particularly given the range of different populations in which the problem and its dynamics must be examined. Doubling it would currently cost about another $10 million per year. The one thing I can say from long experience in this country, and in others for whom I have served as an advisor, is that in the absence of good epidemiological data everyone holds to his own conception of what is happening, and that the majority of these are misconceptions.

In fact, I have observed that the scientific enterprise responsible for developing our knowledge base on drugs, and on policy related issues, tends to get forgotten in discussions such as the current one in the Congress, and (I might add) in the White House Conference.

I recently had the Alice in Wonderland-like experience of returning from the National White House Conference in Washington--where virtually all speakers from all sectors called for a more serious effort to deal with drugs--to learn that the National Institute on Drug Abuse had to reduce all of its outstanding grants this year by 5% in order to be able to fund at least a mere fifth of the new grant proposals judged to be scientifically meritorious. And this strange procedure has been followed in a number of recent years. Somehow it doesn't sound like a terribly serious part of the national effort.

Finally, I believe that if we are to be consistent and maximally effective in dealing with our young people, we need to stop those who legally and massively extol the virtues of drug use in our society--in particular the manufacturers of alcohol and cigarettes. Since I have testified on these issues previously, I refer the Committee to that earlier testimony (Johnston, 1985a, b, and 1986). I realize that these are tough issues to take on politically; but for the sake of our young people I think that you in the Congress need to address them. Many have said we cannot just proceed with business as usual if we expect to succeed in solving America's drug problem. I would agree and would argue that this applies to destructive advertising by these industries, as well.

That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions you or other members of the Committee may have.

## References

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Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WIRTH. Ms. McConnell, did you have a comment?

Ms. McCONNELL. As Lloyd stated, it is a very complicated problem, but we have to keep a couple of things in mind about it, especially about crack cocaine. It is a pleasurable sensation to the brain.

Senator WARNER. Initially.

Ms. McCONNELL. But after the drug has subsided, there is an oncoming depression. Cocaine triggers the pleasure center of the brain.

Crack, particularly, is smoked, and the smoking of cocaine has been alluded to as a sensation of multi-orgasmic sensations just by inhaling and exhaling it.

If you take that into account as well as being able to purchase it for $5 to $10, you take the population that is not in school, the kids on the streets, our throwaways, the disadvantaged, the ones that have no skills, literally no family structure, have no norms and standards by which they are judged, pretty well known that their future is about as bleak as what they are looking at around them.

And you say for five bucks, for a few minutes, this incredible sensation is available to you, you can see the desperation and the attitude of, why not?

In addition to that, you have a whole subculture around it of friends and of peers and little family structure, little family resolve. If a kid comes home, if a mother living in a public housing project earns $600 or $700 a month on welfare and her child comes in with $200 or $300, because he has been working as a lookout for dealers, and she has five children, you can see the temptation.

Now, I did hear one mother at the White House conference say that that happened to her, and she took her son by the throat and took him to the police station. But that lady needs to get out to talk to the rest of the folks in public housing. Her resolve is admirable.

We need to give children alternatives. We need to have some sense of opportunities available to them. Perhaps some of our children have too many opportunities. But the ones I am talking about literally are faced with none. I am sure, Karst, you would have some comments.

Senator **Wirth**. If I could pick up on that. The sense of desperation which you describe so well and the sense of, "I will have nothing to lose," is the case in much of the use of crack in this country. And we find a parallel to that going on, say, in the barrios of Mexico City, or in Rio, or in Calcutta or wherever. I would think that the perception of one's potential in life would be pretty bleak there as well.

Ms. **McConnell**. Well, the chewing of the coca plant has been going on for centuries in South America as a mild stimulant.

Marijuana, ganja, hashish in India has been present since my father was there in World War II, he speaks of it and its prevalence in the daily life. I think to a great extent you are correct, that the use of drugs in the barrios of the world has been prevalent for a long time. And clinically, I cannot really comment any further on that.

Mr. **Besteman**. It is very hard for us to admit to what extent people will go to enjoy themselves, to feel pleasure within themselves.

And that is a very strong drive, to experiment with a drug. Most of the drugs where we have great difficulty are not drugs that immediately leap up and give you a bad experience.

When that happens, there is a disinclination to follow the desire for pleasure. You talk about the barrios of Mexico City. I do not think that you will find crack in the barrios of Mexico City, but I know you will find volatile solvents, petrochemicals being sniffed widely in those barrios, because I have been there.

Now, it is a poor man's high and it is a poor high, and it will tear your liver and a few other parts of your body. But you will find that in some of the very poor barrios of this country too.

They are not into crack. They do not have even the small dollar volume for that. But the inclination of the human animal to tinker with perception of reality and to seek pleasure is extraordinarily strong.

And there is evidence of it all over our society and every other society in the world, and we do not like to face that and say, this is what we are dealing with, which is why early in my testimony I said I operate on the assumption we will never absolutely get drug abuse out of our society. It is just part of the human curiosity.

Senator **Warner**. It is much like alcohol. We will never get that out of our society. Is not alcohol a comparable way of unleashing the pleasure?

Mr. **Besteman**. I would say alcohol is a very lousy drug, because it takes so long to act in comparison to crack, and alcohol is dangerous.

But what I am saying is that this is the difference between cooking in an early American fireplace and having a microwave oven. If you get the distinction of that speed.

Senator **Warner**. Well, is speed that necessary to the psychology?

Let us say a person is going out on Saturday night, and I guess the class I am worried about are these people who are able to deal with it on Saturday night and then turn their back on it for the rest of the week and be productive. It is a lure to others to give it a try, but they get trapped and become addicted. They are not as lucky to get away with it coming and going.

You were about to say something, Ms. McConnell. I am trying to draw the parallel with alcohol.

Ms. **McConnell**. That is a tough parallel, because alcohol is a depressant and it slows everything down in the body, so perceptions are more distorted.

Crack cocaine is a high that absolutely—to paraphrase Bill Cosby in one of his tapes, someone was telling him about cocaine and saying, "Wow man, it takes what you are and it takes all that you ever dreamed of being, and instantly you are that dream." And of course Cosby came back with, "Well, what if you start out as a turkey, where do you go from here?"

But the premise is the same, that it takes the immediacy of wanting to be everything that you know you probably will never accomplish, and have that sensation with crack within seconds of inhaling and exhaling.

Whereas with alcohol, while it is a cross tolerant drug that is used by a lot of other drug abusers, it slows everything down and it is not fast, it is not fast food drugs like crack is.

Senator **Warner**. But then how does the user balance off going up with coming down?

Ms. **McConnell**. You see the problem.

Senator **Warner**. But they are willing to accept the downers because the uppers—and I am not sure I know what I am talking about—are so pleasurable. Is that it?

Ms. **McConnell**. Yes, sir. That is it.

Dr. **Cohen**. Until they have no choice. I think your mentioning alcohol, Senator, is not irrelevant, because from the data we have been able to gather, most of the factors related to onset of drugs or alcohol use are curiosity, peer pressure, and other kinds of either role modeling by parents or by the glamorization of the media.

You will not get many kids saying, "Well I was just desperate, life was terrible, and I decided this is the way to go." All these materials, including alcohol, have the nasty ability to change one's very own evaluation mechanism of how one is doing.

And that made some of the newer drugs on the market particularly dangerous, because it is one thing to know where you are going, to say I should not be going that way, and to have to fight the addiction.

It is quite another when the mechanism itself becomes faulty, and it says, "You are doing fine, you are only temporarily down, you will be high again soon." And that is why it can become very, very devastating.

Senator, I think we have not done nearly enough research on kids like your own. We have been so locked into the medical model of asking, what is wrong with these children, when these children are the majority of the children. We really have not said, well, what are the immunizing factors?

What are the factors, in fact (whether they are psychological, social, familial, or spiritual) that keep in the face of temptation, in the face of peer acceptance, in the face of curiosity, folks from not experimenting, from refusing?

Many of the prevention ideas, the new ideas that Lloyd, I think, was referring to, are based on going with the strengths of the fact that most people do make it. They can resist, they do. Let us crystallize those factors and implement them in systematic ways.

Senator WARNER. To come back to alcohol, alcohol is now accepted in our society. For those of us who have active social schedules alcohol is served at almost every event.

Are we approaching the time, in a comparable way, where cocaine is going to be accepted?

Mr. BESTEMAN. Just take your raw numbers of how many people in this society have ever drunk versus how many people have ever tried cocaine, and there is millions.

We are up at about 140 million, 160 million have used alcohol in their lifetime. At a maximum maybe 30 million have tried cocaine.

The chemistry of the two drugs, the social and cultural traditions around the drugs, we do not have the tradition of using cocaine in church sacraments. We use alcohol in church sacraments. I mean, the whole cultural tie with alcohol is very different.

Now, frankly, the people who abuse it——

Senator WARNER. Are those differences going to break down? I mean, you take the children in the home seeing their parents serve alcohol, and they can rationalize, well, if my parents are going to have drinks at home why can I not hit the street and maybe have a sniff of coke?

Dr. JOHNSTON. May I comment on this, Senator?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Dr. JOHNSTON. I think if we legalize——

Senator WARNER. I am not suggesting legalization.

Dr. JOHNSTON. But if we did, that is precisely what I think would happen, and that is why I think legalization is so dangerous.

There is nothing inherently moral about alcohol and inherently immoral about cocaine. We feel differently about them because we have different social norms that evolved.

We are probably overly tolerant of alcohol as a society, even though we have had some changes in recent years as a society, we are still very, very intolerant of cocaine. Even young people are, the great majority of them, at least 70 percent said they strongly disapprove of even trying cocaine.

Senator WARNER. You say you are intolerant and Senator Morgan was up here saying, we have got to start a nationwide—how did you phrase it, Bob?

Senator MORGAN. Moral intolerance.

Senator WARNER. But that does not seem to be working.

Dr. JOHNSTON. We need a greater degree of consensus than we have, but we have a very broad intolerance already, and we cannot lose that. That is our fundamental resource against which we can lever.

Senator WARNER. Then maybe we ought to be putting our bucks behind how to develop that intolerance.

Dr. JOHNSTON. And one of the ways is to demonstrate the dangers of a drug. When people come to see that a drug is dangerous, they become less tolerant of it for themselves and for other people.

Senator WARNER. Then my last question, and I will quit, is medically, are there certain people that can handle this drug and get away with it and others who just succumb to it and become addicts?

Dr. JOHNSTON. I do not know that anyone knows the answer to that question. Clearly, the majority of people who try cocaine never become addicted. That is clear from prospective studies.

Senator WARNER. Then they have these highs on Saturday nights or at infrequent intervals and they are able to go back and do productive work.

To me that is a big danger, because it is the addiction and the destruction of the person that probably is the strongest factor to deter the use of it.

Dr. JOHNSTON. Crack, though, is a different story than powdered cocaine.

Senator WIRTH. Is there overwhelming evidence that people who are children of alcoholics are much, much more likely to become alcoholic? That something is genetic, that something is involved in that?

Why would not the same kind of analysis go on for people who are drug users?

Dr. JOHNSTON. There may be.

Senator WIRTH. Would they be more likely to become addicted than others? Why would that not be just a followup?

Dr. JOHNSTON. I think there may be genetic susceptibility. We do not have the research yet to know the answer.

Mr. BESTEMAN. If I may make one comment. We as an adult world have been extraordinarily intolerant of youthful drug use in this country, and we have put out campaigns against youthful drug use.

We have been very fainthearted in putting on campaigns about adult drug use. And when you look at the people who are winding up in emergency rooms with drug overdose and in treatment programs and in morgues having autopsies, they are not youth by and large. They are 25 to 45 years old.

And we really do not address the adult drug-taking patterns of this country with nearly the vigor that we get in our indignation that our children are doing this. And I think it is one of the mistakes we have made in the last several years.

Senator **Warner**. Mr. Chairman, I must leave, but I want to thank this panel and their tolerance in educating some of us who have not had the opportunity to spend the time that you have. It has been very helpful for this Senator in trying to make the decisions on how to allocate dollars. Thank you.

Senator **Wirth**. May I go back to the question of legalization and ask each of you what your opinion is of legalization and why you think it is that the press for legalization, or the advocates of legalization, have increased. It seems to me there has been a very significant increase in the last 4 to 6 months.

Mr. **Besteman**. If I may start with why the increase. The idea of legalization, I think is an expression of frustration.

People have a very short tolerance for working over a long-term. They want to see a problem disappear. And when it does not disappear on schedule, which in this country probably is 3 years, or certainly less than one President's term, then I think——

Senator **Wirth**. There is a 2-year cycle, because elections occur every 2 years.

Mr. **Besteman**. But the fact of the matter is, this country does not like to have a problem stay with it. They want to see it solved, and then people start coming up with another range of ideas.

As for legalization, I think that that would represent a bad public policy, because it would bring on public health and health consequences, and some social and productivity consequences that we would be unwilling to pay for.

And I think we would see many more people using what we now call illicit drugs. We would have many more addicts. We would have many more health complications as a result of that.

I represent an association that is very heavily involved in providing service to addicts from a professional standpoint. If legalization came, and industry such as those of us who deliver services to addicts would probably expand tenfold in order just to take care of the health consequences of such a move.

But I think it would be just absolutely poor public policy.

Senator **Wirth**. Dr. Cohen.

Dr. **Cohen**. When people hear that 30,000 arrests in the District of Columbia over the last year or so has not markedly decreased the price of drugs or decreased the problem, they think that if supply reduction and enforcement efforts cannot do it, then what can?

It is frustration. Legalization, I agree, would be totally impractical, and would be disastrous. For example, very soon you would find the proponents of legalization having to say, "Well, we cannot really make it available to people under 21 or under 18."

What you would find is a whole series of very, very impractical regulations, all of which would not work, would not knock down the black market, would simply lower the price which increases availability, and in general send just the wrong signal.

It is no coincidence that very few if any countries in the world have ever taken such a step, other than diversion from enforcement programs into treatment. And so I think it is a bad idea.

I do not think the idea is going to go very, very much further when the relevant questions are asked about the details.

Senator WIRTH. I gather from your earlier comments that you both would agree with that. Is that right, Ms. McConnell and Dr. Johnston?

Ms. MCCONNELL. Yes.

Dr. JOHNSTON. I would like to say that I agree with Mayor Koch, who yesterday said to the Conference of Mayors that legalization is one of the looniest ideas to come along in recent years.

Ms. MCCONNELL. That was zany.

Dr. JOHNSTON. In either case, the meaning is the same. I think it is again because folks are frustrated with our supply reduction failures, and I think they will continue to be frustrated.

It does not matter if this Congress doubles the budget on supply reduction, we are still going to lose that battle. And if we keep playing only on that battlefield, we are going to start coming up with zany ideas.

Ms. MCCONNELL. I think the other part of it is that people in neighborhoods, other than the inner city, are beginning to be affected by the problem.

The burglary, the crime rate is up in Tampa. Ours is at its highest level ever. And I think that that means you get your radio stolen out of your car while it is in your garage, we have got to do something about this problem.

Rather than looking at the fact that we very poorly funded education and treatment in comparison to all of the law enforcement efforts, which are very valuable, we are trying to figure out in Tampa whether we ought to build our own prison like we did a performing arts center, with the public raising money for it.

This is kind of absurd, but, you know, it will give you a sense of the desperation of the problem.

Senator WIRTH. Let me close, if I might, with a couple of questions, one related to television and the other related to the budget, and let me take the first one first.

I am struck by the fact that all of the evidence suggests that kids spend vast amounts of time in front of a television set, more than in the classroom, and that television in one form or another has really taken over as a kind of surrogate parent or kind of socializing influence for kids, particularly with more and more single parent families, or both parents working and so on.

So consequently, one would expect that the role of television is very important in the education effort that you all are talking about.

The other side of that, unhappily, we see television doing less and less and less in terms of fulfilling its responsibility toward children, children's television and related kinds of issues.

That is a statement, but it is also a question. And I was wondering, the question is what your view is of the responsibilities of television in the programs that we are talking about here in terms of trying to lower demand. Mr. Besteman?

Mr. BESTEMAN. Well, I think television has done some interesting changing in some other areas. And what little I watch at least it appears to me they are concerned about this issue.

I see enough of it being discussed on things like MacNeil-Lehrer and so on, but I am not sure that is where the youth of America are watching between 7 and 8.

Senator WIRTH. We do hear a lot from television programmers who come up here and say, all you have to do is watch MacNeil-Lehrer and Sesame Street and everything is going to be okay.

Mr. BESTEMAN. But they have reduced the use of cigarettes as a prop over the last several years. They have reduced the pointless drinking that many of the heroes did a few years back in response to society's concern about irresponsible alcohol consumption.

So I think television is sensitive to public attitude, and therefore can exercise its influence, both through news specials and through the way program content is displayed. And in my way of thinking, program content can have just as great an influence as a special hour set aside.

Senator WIRTH. Any other comments?

Ms. McCONNELL. I think television is an unlimited and an untapped resource in the way of education and prevention. But I am talking about interactive television.

I know that the major networks all say whenever they run a special it is a loss for them, they lose viewers. It is not cost-effective. All the reasons are there.

But to tap something like this might come out of your think tanks, Lloyd, to make it interactive, national interactive programming for children, for parents, that has take-home things, from the schools, that are returned to the schools, that are discussion points, to make it great if this is a national priority.

And of course that I am sure would have the media leaping over these tables at you about why that ought not happen. But we have not used it as a resource as much as we can, and we certainly know that it can be very effective.

Dr. JOHNSTON. I will say one of those rare words in defense of television. I think television, to some degree, has been the unwitting recipient of responsibility for raising our children.

Our normal socializing institutions have less time and less influence in their lives, whether it is church, family, the extended family, the immediate neighborhood. We do not do much in our schools in terms of real contact with adults on issues other than curriculum. We have counselors, but they do not counsel. They are too busy with other things.

In essence, I think we are trying to socialize our children on the cheap. And we are paying a real price for that. The drug epidemic is one part of the price for that. Television gets them by default, because it is there and it keeps their attention while they do not have all these other influences acting in their lives.

That is not to let television off the hook. I think producers of television shows and executives of television networks have a lot of responsibility, whether or not they asked for it, to be responsibly influencing our children.

There is no question they influence them. The question is, is it responsible or not? But the fact is, those are not institutions that have as primary goals the socialization of our children or the education of our children.

Seantor WIRTH. Why not?

Dr. JOHNSTON. Well, because they are profit-making institutions. They are primarily involved in selling products and time, and those are the goals.

Now, we would like them to be different, but I am not sure that we have got the mechanisms set up to make it different.

Senator WIRTH. I do not mean to debate the role of television. I think your statement is very good. Both of you are suggesting that television, and you as well, Mr. Besteman, that television in terms of its programming and what it does within that program has changed and become more responsible.

The other side of that, of course, is that we are giving these television stations a public license which is worth hundreds of millions of dollars in major network, major markets.

And coming with that comes a certain responsibility, it seems to me if the public is going to give somebody a very significant gift like that coming back. You know, in my home State of Colorado we do not give people range land to range their cattle on for free. We get a fee back or a cost for doing it.

You do not let people go out and tear down the national forest, because they have a good idea for how to make plywood. You charge them for timber and you control it. It seems to me there should be a kind of grazing fee or whatever as well on television. You know, that they graze on the public airwaves, and in return for that there is a responsibility that they have which in turn ought to go into the kind of programming you are talking about, Ms. McConnell, and you were talking about, Dr. Johnston.

It just seems to me very clearly that is another element in all of this. But we all agree on that, and I think we just have to figure out a much better way of doing it. But that ought to be plugged into whatever kind of demand approach we are talking about.

Let me ask you a final question and I would ask each of you to play the role of the head of OMB, or if you want to call it this way, the David Stockman of 1989. If you were advising the new President, be it Mr. Bush or Mr. Dukakis, and I gather on the first Tuesday of November, to use your words, Ms. McConnell, one of them will be put into a lower group, but one will become President.

What will you tell them? What would you tell them to do in terms of the overall drug operation in the context of how much money it is going to cost?

Mr. BESTEMAN. The first thing I would tell the President to do, if not his chief advisor, is to read the history of the last 20 or 25 years. Because there is a lot of good information there. That is number one. And that is a very difficult thing to get out of a new administration.

The second thing I would tell them is——

Senator WIRTH. What part of that history?

Mr. BESTEMAN. Well, there is a history there that shows that for a period of years we had a national policy of balancing our law enforcement, our supply reduction and our demand reduction activities, and we abandoned that principle in the mid-1970s, and really started to distort it through the 1980s.

And this hearing, and much of what is said in my meetings with law enforcement agents now says that was a failed balance. And I am saying there is some collective wisdom back there that can be looked at, and to rebalance these policies.

Now, does that mean money has to be shifted directly from law enforcement to supply reduction? I do not know. That is a budget issue. That is a priority issue.

Or can that supply reduction money come from someplace else? Fortunately, I would say do it. How you are going to do it, I do not have the answer to, but I think it is extraordinarily important to this country that it be done.

Senator WIRTH. Dr. Cohen.

Dr. COHEN. I would certainly agree with that, and also make really specific suggestions that the balance, whatever the total national decision is about resources and dollar resources, as to which are important but not critical.

A lot of it has to do with national consensus, to make sure that the demand side, the prevention side, the education side, at least has equal funding. We have tried the other strategy.

If it is a question of limited resources, we have to move the other way. The new President and the administration and the Congress has to do more serious in-depth thinking about what this country needs for the next 5 or 10 years.

I think the dumping of money through block grants often is a terrible waste, without any guidance.

Senator WIRTH. What is the balance now in terms of dollars spent on the drug issue; the balance spent on supply and dollars spent on demand?

Mr. BESTEMAN. Approximately one to three. One for demand reduction and three for supply.

Senator WIRTH. Is that generally accepted in the field? Is that the generally accepted ratio? Do people agree that that is the case?

Ms. MCCONNELL. No. In education it was $220 million some out of $1.9 billion.

Senator WIRTH. At the Federal level?

Ms. MCCONNELL. Yes.

Senator WIRTH. In the society as a whole?

Mr. BESTEMAN. Actually, there is, if you start taking law enforcement costs at State and local and adding to that, I fear that the distortion would go more to one to five or one to six. Because there is not a lot of locally funded prevention education.

Senator WIRTH. I am just trying to get a sense, it is somewhere between one and three and one and six. Everybody would agree on that. And a balance is a more likely, a better approach, and something we ought to be shooting for? Is that a rule of thumb?

Dr. JOHNSTON. I think that is the range. But I think even that is an exaggeration of the demand side, because most of the demand side expenditure is for treatment and not prevention.

And the treatment, of course, is after the horse is out of the barn. It is a pound of cure and not an ounce of prevention. So there is a very dramatic imbalance in the ratio. I do not know if anyone has the numbers.

Senator WIRTH. Did you finish, Dr. Cohen? I did not mean to cut you off.

Dr. COHEN. All I was going to add is the tremendous importance I would give to the coordination of the Federal effort and close attention to the implications of the damage that turf warfare does on the Federal, State, and local level.

This problem is cross disciplinary. Most of our promising programs are being if not destroyed, at least delayed by unnecessary turf war. The policy to eliminate that as much as possible must come from the top first. It must be reflected in legislation, and that can then multiply our resources in both areas, demand and supply reduction.

Senator WIRTH. Ms. McConnell.

Ms. MCCONNELL. I think I made most of my suggestions in my comments. I would certainly prioritize this as the number one issue since our citizens are saying that it is for a new administration.

I would also then require, as Allan has suggested, that coordination on a local level grow to a State and a national level, with one voice and one direction. I do not think this country has lined up in one direction since World War II, when my mother was out helping sell war bonds.

I think that we need, in addition to that, the targeting of efforts to say, why did some kids not do drugs? I am sure everyone here in the room knew a guilty mother in your neighborhood. Maybe she influenced all of you to be drug-free. Maybe that is something we need to look more at as the reasons not to.

I think that our children must be taught from the beginning that the drug problem is theirs, it will be in their lifetime. It must be prioritized in their education, rather than a poster contest or whatever we have.

I dream of us being drug-free. It will not happen in my lifetime. I would like it to happen in my daughter's.

Senator WIRTH. Dr. Johnston.

Dr. JOHNSTON. I think the first thing I would say to the President would be, you cannot appoint a drug czar, you are the drug czar. There can be no replacement for that.

But what I think you can appoint is a cabinet level member who is responsible for carrying out your policies and your ideas, and for coordinating all of the various departments of government that have to deal with this.

That, I think, is essential. The President ultimately has to make this thing happen. I think redressing the resource imbalance is critical in terms of effective strategy. By that I do not necessarily mean we should cut down what we are doing on the supply side.

But to the extent we are willing to allocate new resources, I think they should be heavily on the demand side. I think that it will take leadership, energy, creativity, and a lot of push from the White House. The Congress can do a great deal. But the White House has to play a major role.

And so those would be the major things that I would think that I would say to the President.

Senator WIRTH. Well, to all of you, we greatly appreciate your being here. Thank you very much.

And as I suggested earlier, your statements will be included in full in the record. And there may be questions that come from other members of the panel, and we would leave the record open for that.

[Additional statement submitted for the hearing record follows:]

## DON SIEGELMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, ANTI-DRUG POLICY ADVISORY PANEL

I am greatful to Senator Sam Nunn and the members of the Armed Services Committee for the leadership role that you have played in helping raise this issue to its proper place on the national agenda.

I want to first comment on certain statements made recently by Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci which indicated his general opposition to the use of the military. In particular, I want to respond to his statement that the armed services were trained to shoot and kill. The drug gangsters in Colombia, Jamaica and in U.S. cities are also trained to shoot and kill. I believe that our military forces can be trained to have an effective and limited role in three areas: intelligence, interdiction, and the eradication of domestically grown marijuana.

When I ran for Attorney General I had a very simple law enforcement message: If drug dealers want to stay out of jail, they ought to stay away from our kids and stay out of Alabama. I had a Drug Task Force appointed. We had a series of public meetings. Thousands of Alabamians came and testified. We learned about law enforcement and how they had their hands tied. We learned about the lack of money for drug treatment centers. We learned about the need for drug abuse education in our schools. We learned that there were literally thousands of citizens in Alabama who wanted to be soldiers in the war against drugs but didn't know where to properly enlist.

We also learned that we needed to do more to stop drugs before they cross our borders. We learned that Alabama wasn't immune to the drug problem. We had 10,000 drug cases last year. We pulled up 167,000 marijuana plants. We ranked seventh in the Nation in the production of marijuana.

We learned that the United States and Alabama was particularly vulnerable to drug trafficking because of our vast coastline , because of the thousands of airstrips that were built during World War II, and because of our wonderful Interstate System that makes it easy for drug dealers to push their drugs through the Southern States.

We learned from the Department of Education that some 61 percent of all high school seniors admitted to trying some form of illegal narcotic during their senior year, and 57 percent said they bought illegal drugs on campus. We learned from the Chamber of Commerce that some $60 billion a year is lost because of alcohol or drug abuse on the work place. We learned that those who use alcohol and drugs are 5 times more likely to file a workman's compensation complaint.

We learned from the Department of Justice that in this very city some 72 percent of those people arrested for serious crime--murder, rape, robbery--tested positive for hard drugs, drugs like cocain, heroin and PCP. The figure rises dramatically when you include alcohol and marijuana abuse.

We learned that some 75 percent of infant mortality cases, 80 percent of AIDS cases, and a majority of teenage suicides, are directly related to the problems of drug and alcohol abuse. And we heard of the large payments that are made in U.S. dollars to drug traffickers in foreign countries every year. An estimated $4.7 billion went to Colombia last year, alone.

We heard about the 24-year-old Chicago mother who sold her infant some for $50 for a fix, and the 18-year-old Miami crack addict who, after robbing his two fellow employees, doused them with gasoline and set them on fire. We heard about a young man in Wetumpka, Alabama, Scott Palmore, who, after writing a suicide note to his parents explaining how cocaine had taken control and how he was living in hell and wanted out, laid down with his father's rifle and took his life.

To guide our war on drugs in Alabama in addressing these types of reoccuring tragedies, I formed an anti-drug task force which met with drug enforcement officers and experts in drug abuse prevention and rehabilitation. The task force identified five fronts where the war on drugs must be fought:

(1). Strengthening criminal laws regarding illegal drugs. The state legislature responded very favorably to this need and now Alabama has some of the toughest drug laws in the nation;

(2). Increasing state-supported treatment facilities for adolescents who want to escape the vicious cycle of drug abuse;

(3). Providing an extensive, comprehensive drug abuse education program for all school children K-12 so they will be impressed, at the earliest age possible, with the dangers of drug abuse;

(4). Enlisting citizens in the war against drugs at the local level. Through the Community Alliance Network, citizens from all walks of life are offering their assistance to law enforcement, rehabilitation and education programs; and finally . . .

(5). Involving our military forces in the war on drugs. Alabama and other southern states are particularly vulnerable because of our exposure along the Gulf of Mexico coastline. The problem is exacerbated by hundreds of small, secluded airstrips built during World War II. The need for air and sea interdiction outside our borders is absolutely clear.

In keeping with these recommendations, we changed our weak state laws to what are now some of the strongest in the country. We now provide for life in prison without parole for major traffickers. We have passed a cop killer statute. If someone takes the life of one of our undercover narcotics officers, that person is going to pay with his own life, and I recommend that to you. We have a tough conspiracy statute. Alabama's controlled substances statute now included drugs previously left out of Alabama's trafficking laws.

In Alabama, to add insult to injury, the Prison Commissioner did not even view drug traffickers as violent criminals. Because they were viewed as non-violent criminals, they were put back on the streets in work release programs in an effort to reduce the prison population. They were released as fast as we could arrest them.

Unfortunately, however, the individual states are ill-equipped at the present to deal adequately with the onslaught of drugs across our borders.

Prior to January of this year, the Coast Guard station in Mobile, Alabama, used 13 vessels for routine drug patrols along the 300 mile Gulf Coastline stretching from Biloxi, Ms., to Appalachi Bay, FL. Now with the budget cutbacks that have hit the Coast Guard, these routine patrols have been virtually eliminated.

Local law enforcement agencies in Alabama do their best to monitor the hundreds of private airstrips scattered throughout our rural areas, which can accommodate small jets like the ones most commonly used to smuggle drugs from Mexico, the Bahamas, and Central America.

Yet, while the capabilities of civilian law enforcement authorities are being overwhelmed by organized drug trafficking, Active and Reserve Duty military equipment and personnel sit idle at many locations in Alabama. Leaving the Montgomery airport yesterday, I noticed, as I often do, an Army National Guard hanger and flight pad where no less than fifteen helicopters sat awaiting their next usage.

Each time I see this, I can't help wonder just how much could be done if somehow I, as the chief law enforcement officer of the State of Alabama, could communicate with the commander of that installation in carrying out specified, limited, "real-life" drug war maneuvers.

The main impediment to the involvement of the military in civilian drug law enforcement is the statutory limitation known as the Posse Comitatus Law, the origin of which dates back to the late 19th century.

The Posse Comitatus Law was amended in 1981 to allow U.S. Military Forces to provide logistical and operations support to host foreign governments in narcotic control operations, when requested by that foreign government.

Now, the issue before Congress is whether those limitations will be further lifted, to allow the military the power to do more, to assist our civilian law enforcement authorities in drug enforcement efforts in and around the land area of United States.

A year ago, taking a lead from Mayor Ed Koch of New York City, I supported a resolution before the National Association of Attorneys General. It endorsed the use of the military in the interdiction of drugs in a coordinated effort with civilian authorities, and it urged Congress to recognize that it was the Federal Government's primary responsibility to see that drugs don't cross our borders.

After working with Mayor Koch, representatives from Sam Nunn's office, the National Conference of Mayors, the Association of Attorneys General, the U.S. Governors Conference, we supported a measure that increased the Coast Guard's appropriation by shifting $100 million from the

Defense Department. Much more needs to be done, recognizing the Coast Guard's significant and primary role in the interdiction of drugs.

You have heard previously from representatives of the Defense Department who object in principal to the civilian use of military authority. However, they have stated that they will present a series of alternatives to Congress on ways in which the military's role in drug enforcement could be increased. The cost estimates for these new activities reportedly range from $2 million to $20 million.

There is no way for me to know what they are contemplating. I do know that, unless much thoughtful consideration is given to maximizing the cooperation of the military with state civilian law enforcement authorities, such as was suggested in NAAG's March 1987 Resolution, these proposals could represent no more than a duplication of efforts, and a waste of money. This was also the conclusion of reports issued recently by both the Rand Corporation and the government's General Accounting Office (GAO).

I am here to recommend to this panel that, whatever the nature of the Military's proposals are, they should, at a minimum, address the following subjects:

1. intelligence;
2. interdiction; and
3. eradication

Intelligence. First of all, our military must police its own personnel. Last week, the Armed Services began screening new recruits for drugs. This is a good start. The military must make achieving a drug-free service a top priority. When drug trade by military personnel is uncovered, military intelligence must cooperate with civilian authorities so that those outside the military who are involved can also be tracked down and brought to justice.

The Military has an elaborate intelligence network which could be of enormous help to civilian law enforcement authorities. Intelligence gathered outside our borders regarding drug trade with the U.S. should be relayed, when appropriate, to domestic law enforcement authorities so they can be on full alert when drug shipments reach their U.S. destinations.

But even more important, good intelligence is essential for the military itself to carry out what I believe should be its central mission in the war on drugs, interdiction.

Interdiction. Increased interdiction efforts should include DEA and FBI sponsored cross-training for pertinent Naval and Air Force personnel, along the lines of that employed now by the Coast Guard. Defense Secretary Carlucci testified previously that the military was trained to "shoot to kill", and that this was not appropriate for most law enforcement purposes. The fact is, we all know that the military can be trained to do whatever job the Congress determines needs to be done.

That training should involve instruction in the use of "profile descriptions" for identifying private ships and aircraft commonly used in drug smuggling. Data on these private crafts, such as ownership, destination, pilot, cargo, etc., could be supplied to a central law enforcement agency, such as the Coast Guard or DEA. That information could be developed, through the use of computer models, and shared with local law enforcement officials on a regular basis so that suspicious individuals and patterns could be identified. Then local law enforcement authorities could use the information to conduct their own investigations on the activities of such individuals. Hopefully, business enterprises funded with illegal drug money would be discovered and prosecuted through state and federal RICO laws, and property seized through drug asset forfeiture laws similar to the one recently enacted in Alabama.

Eradication. Military equipment and certain personnel should be made available, under specified conditions, to assist civilian authorities conduct air and land marijuana spotting and eradication. Military helicopters and pilots could make a significant contribution to the systematic aerial surveying of suspected marijuana growing areas.

Army Reservists and National Guard troops on weekend maneuvers should be used to destroy those marijuana fields which have been located from the air.

What we are faced with is, indeed, a war -- a war where the invading forces are driven by greed, and the weapons used are chemicals which weaken and undercut our society in a way in which we as a nation would never allow "conventional" weapons to be used against us.

If we are to win, we all must enlist as soldiers in the war on drugs. And there is no room for turf battles in this war. If we let drugs divide us, then drugs will conquer us.

The State Attorneys General stand ready to join with the Congress and the nation's Military Forces to create the kind of cooperative atmosphere that is required if we are to win the war against drugs.

**Senator WIRTH.** We thank you all very much for being here and for your great patience, and what has been I think a very productive morning. And I am sure all members share Senator Warner's gratitude for your help in bringing us up to speed.

We, I am sure, have a long way to go and we will try to get into a higher group, Ms. McConnell. Thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the hearing was adjourned.]

# ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN DRUG INTERDICTION

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 1988

U.S. CONGRESS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, DC.*

The committees met at 10:05 a.m., in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman of the Senate Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Levin, Kennedy, Dixon, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Quayle, Wilson, Gramm, and Symms; Representatives Aspin (chairman of the House Committee), Nichols, Montgomery, Byron, McCloskey, Ortiz, Robinson, Hochbrueckner, Brennan, Pickett, Evans, Hopkins, Hunter, Martin, Bateman, Hansen, Rowland, Weldon, Kyl, Ravenel, and Davis.

Staff present: Senate Armed Services Committee staff members: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; John N. McConnell, system manager; John J. Hamre and George K. Johnson, Jr., professional staff members; Barbara L. Braucht, Lori M. Jackson, Mary J. Kampo, Pamela G. Powell, and Debra A. Rice, staff assistants.

Also present: Gregory B. Craig and William J. Lynn, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; and Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson.

## OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The Committee on Armed Services will come to order.

Today the House and Senate Armed Services Committees meet in an unprecedented joint hearing to receive testimony on the role of the military in drug interdiction. Senator Warner, Chairman Aspin, Representative Dickinson, and I agreed to this hearing because the implications of the drug-related provisions we now have in conference, in both the Senate bill and the House bill, are profound and long-term, and also because this committee did not hold hearings on the legislation prior to its passage on the floor.

The House Committee has held several hearings and we have had a few of our own. But today we are joining together because we believe we have to gain a common understanding of the position of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense, and the other top defense officials as to their views on this legislation before we decide the issue in conference.

Again, we are in the middle of conference. We are not pretending to anyone that these are comprehensive, all-inclusive hearings. We do not have time for that. The Senate and the House have decided that our committees, in spite of the fact we do not have real jurisdiction over the broad array of drug-related efforts, are the ones that are going to have to decide this.

In an effort to decide it responsibly, we are getting as much information as we can during a very, very compressed time frame.

Our task in this hearing and in our conference is to determine whether the military's role in drug interdiction can be substantially increased in a manner that is consistent with the readiness of our Armed Forces and also in a manner that contributes meaningfully to the overall national goals of curbing the abuse of drugs in this country.

It is also crucial that we consider carefully any legislation that would place our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in direct confrontation with U.S. citizens. That is not a matter to be treated lightly. It is not a matter to be treated simply symbolically or emotionally.

It is something we ought to consider with a great deal of care. Today we will receive testimony on the House and Senate bills from Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, from Gen. Robert T. Herres, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from Adm. Frank B. Kelso, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Secretary Carlucci will provide us with a policy perspective of the Department of Defense on the appropriate role for the armed services in drug interdiction. General Herres, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our Nation's senior military leadership, will discuss the potential impact of the pending proposals on the readiness and operations of the Armed Forces.

Admiral Kelso, who has been most directly involved in drug interdiction operations, will give us an operational commander's perspective.

It is imperative that we turn to the testimony as quickly as possible because Secretary Carlucci has other commitments, and we will conclude the hearing at 12:30.

We have carefully worked out the order of recognition. We do not know how many members are going to come from the House and Senate, but we are going to do that in a pre-arranged way that we believe will be as fair as possible with the time constraints we have.

Rather than going into any more of my opening statement, I will simply put the rest of it in the record.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Nunn follows:]

## PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Today, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees meet in an unprecedented joint hearing to receive testimony on the role of the military in drug interdiction. Senator Warner, Chairman Aspin, Representative Dickinson, and I agreed to this hearing because the implications of the drug-related provisions we now have in conference are profound and long-term. Both committees have held separate hearings, but today's should enable us to gain a common understanding of the positions of DoD's top civilian and military leadership.

Our task in this hearing, and in our conference, is to determine whether the military's role in drug interdiction can be substantially increased in a manner that is consistent with the readiness of our Armed Forces and our overall national goals on drug abuse control. It is also crucial that we consider carefully any legislation that would place our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in a direct confrontation with our citizens.

Today, we will receive testimony on the House and Senate bills from Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, from Gen. Robert T. Herres, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from Admiral Frank B. Kelso, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Secretary Carlucci will provide us with the policy perspective of the Department of Defense on the appropriate role for the Armed Forces in drug interdiction. General Herres, representing Joint Chiefs of Staff—our Nation's senior military leadership—will discuss the potential impact of the pending proposals on the readiness and operations of the Armed Forces. Admiral Kelso, who has been directly involved in drug interdiction operations, will give us an operational commander's perspective. I would note that Admiral Kelso's nomination for reappointment as a four-star Admiral for the position of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command is pending before the committee, so we will be weighing his testimony with particular care!

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We welcome the Secretary and his colleagues. I would add one other criteria to your framework for this hearing, and that is we have to determine what is the most cost effective way to spend the taxpayers' dollar in fighting this drug war.

Mr. Secretary, you will recall that during the hectic days when we were putting together the final pieces of the authorization bill, at my invitation and that of Senator Dole, you came over to consult with us and in due course brought the Attorney General and others.

At that time, we did the very best we could, given that we had only about 24 hours to involve the President and others in trying to make some decisions with respect to the pending legislation.

Since that time, we have had an opportunity to have a learning process through this hearing or series of hearings and through other contacts that we have made individually.

It appears to me, speaking only for myself at this time, we did move a little hastefully in both Houses, in terms of the legislation.

There was a stampede at that time, and I feel that this learning process has helped to corral that stampede and hopefully redirect so that we can further involve the Department of Defense in the drug war, but perhaps not to that degree that we originally envisioned at the time the two bills were before the respective Houses. And again, we have to seek the most cost effective way.

There are only so many dollars to be spent, and the question is to what extent can you add further assistance in interdiction and the cost of that versus the cost of putting more money into the Coast Guard or putting more money into the domestic situation, law enforcement, and analyzing why there is this apparent continuing, if not increasing, demand.

Those are the evaluations that I think both Houses must make as we proceed to draft our final provisions. Your testimony today will be very helpful in redirecting our efforts in a more constructive and more cost effective way to involve your Department in the drug war.

I thank you.

Chairman NUNN. We have two Senate votes coming up, but we are going to leave the committee in the good hands of Bill Nichols and Larry Hopkins. Bill is the chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee on the House Armed Services Committee and Larry is the ranking member of that subcommittee. We are pleased to have you all here this morning, and I suggest that we have opening statements from the two of you if you would like to make any comments, and then limit the opening statements to that.

Senator Warner and I will go vote. We have got two votes, but we have a time pressure and so we are not going to ask any delay.

And, Bill, if you will chair until we get back and make whatever opening statement you would like to make.

Representative NICHOLS [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the interest of time, let me just say to the witnesses and those present in the audience that, on the House side, our House Subcommittee on Investigations has had two hearings, one in Miami, one on the Texas border with Mexico.

We have heard from the Border Patrol, we have heard from Customs, we have heard from sheriffs, police departments. We have heard from the Coast Guard. And in each of these cases, we have asked these Federal officials what the military might contribute in order to be of assistance to them.

We have gotten some pretty good ideas. So this morning, I want to welcome you on behalf of the House to this hearing. And we are interested, Mr. Secretary, in what you and your panel have to say.

At this time let me yield to my ranking minority member, Mr. Hopkins of Kentucky.

Representative HOPKINS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I would tell Secretary Carlucci and gentlemen, as the chairman implied a little earlier, we have visited some of our outlying States to find out what their immediate problems might be from people that are, if you will, on the front lines.

I do not recall hearing one mayor, one judge, one police chief imply that we should not in some way get the military involved. They are under the impression that, if this is war, it is being lost.

But it is not time for us to surrender. It is time for every citizen to volunteer, including those in the military. They are wondering, as citizens land throughout the country and they see C-130's sitting there, used by the National Guard, why we cannot utilize some of the equipment that we now have.

I very frankly think that there has to be a limited use of the military for us to get a grasp on what is going on, since it has become the largest single business in the world today. $300 billion is what I am told.

We had 18,000 planes coming to our country illegally last year.

So I look forward, Mr. Secretary, to your contribution this morning and appreciate your being here. Thank you.

Representative NICHOLS. Mr. Secretary, you have a prepared statement. You may proceed. It will be made a part of the record without objection.

## STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK CARLUCCI, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary CARLUCCI. Mr. Chairman, I and my colleagues are pleased to be here today to discuss the role of the Department of Defense in the Nation's effort to eliminate drug abuse.

Let me commend you, Senator Nunn and all of your colleagues, for scheduling this unusual joint hearing of the two committees. The subject matter clearly warrants special consideration.

Drugs are entering our country at an alarming rate. Drug dealing is on the increase, and our streets are the scene of an ever-increasing number of drug-related crimes.

I fully agree that our Nation must increase its efforts. The toll in terms of the loss of life and reduced productivity is unacceptable.

The Department of Defense, though, is no stranger to fighting the evils of drug abuse. As a result of a comprehensive testing and education program, our troops are far more drug-free today than they were 8 years ago. We have told our soldiers that drugs will not be tolerated in the military, and reported drug use has decreased at least 67 percent since 1980.

Ask our commanders and they will tell you that drug testing works.

The chart before you depicts the dramatic decline in drug use in the military. Mandatory testing should be an element of any proposed solution to the drug problem.

Over this same period of time, we have also substantially increased our support for law enforcement agencies in their efforts to eradicate and interdict drugs. Our increased contribution is depicted in this chart that we have before you.

I am sure you are aware of the 2,500 ship days the Navy provided to the Coast Guard in fiscal year 1987; the more than 16,000 flight hours provided by the Air Force and the Navy to the interdiction effort, our contributions to operations in the Bahamas, Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia, and Operation Alliance in the Southwestern United States; as well as more than $300 million worth of equipment we have on loan to law enforcement agencies.

I am proud of what the Department has done to date.

The primary role of the Department of Defense is to protect and defend this country from armed aggression. Nothing must stand in the way of our readiness or our preparedness to perform this task.

During the early 1980s, the administration requested and the Congress approved the resources to bring our troops and equipment to a point where they can perform their responsibilities with an acceptable level of risk. However, dwindling defense resources during the past several years and the resulting increased level of risk are a matter of deep concern to me.

The defense budget has been reduced by over $50 billion in the last two budget cycles. Adding another mission at this time will come at the expense of the Department's primary mission, unless additional resources are made available.

The Department of Defense will continue its active support to the drug law enforcement agencies. This activity should remain in a support mode and not as lead agency. However, this support role is not an inactive one, as some would assert.

But it does rely on the express needs and requests for support from those law enforcement agencies that are legally charged with a mission to interdict drugs.

It is also constrained by the Department's requirement to perform its primary mission under strict budgetary constraints.

There are those who say the answer to the drug problem is to use the military to seal the borders to prevent drugs from entering our country. Others would have the military seal a portion of the border and/or empower our troops with law enforcement authority.

We have looked carefully at both the House and Senate proposals in the respective defense authorization bills. Section 1103 of the House bill requires that, within 30 days of enactment, the President shall employ equipment and personnel of the Armed Forces sufficient to halt the unlawful penetration of the U.S. borders by aircraft and vessels carrying narcotics.

It does not say part of the border. It will require covering the Canadian and U.S. border, the east, the gulf, and the west coast, as well as the southwest border. Our initial estimate on the costs of accomplishing this, including land interdiction to close our land borders, was in excess of $18 billion a year. This assumes the utilization of the current DOD inventory. The cost would increase by millions of dollars if additional equipment was necessary.

The cost to implement the provision in the House bill, which does not require sealing our land borders, would be slightly less. However, it would be less effective in stopping aerial and maritime smuggling, and it is likely to force traffickers to utilize land routes.

The Senate proposal will have us establish a $C^3I$ network that would integrate the assets of all Federal agencies in the drug interdiction area and provide an appropriate increase in flying hours dedicated to drug interdiction.

While precise cost estimates are difficult to make due to a lack of definition of appropriate increase, they would be considerable, on the order of several hundred milllion dollars a year.

I suggest there is a real question whether these actions can be accomplished and, even if successful, whether they would only serve to trigger a significant increase in domestic production.

Recent independent studies by the GAO and by the RAND Corporation reached strikingly similar conclusions. GAO reports that among law enforcement experts there is no agreement that increased Federal interdiction efforts, with or without increasing DOD assistance, will significantly reduce the amount of drugs entering the country.

The RAND study strongly suggests that, "a major increase in military support is unlikely to reduce drug consumption in the United States."

None of the interdiction approaches in and of themselves will work. I believe that these are not solutions to the problem, but rather the result of our rising frustration and our inability to find a real solution.

Aside from the practical problems involved in these proposals, there are more fundamental constitutional principles involved. I remain absolutely opposed to the assignment of a law enforcement mission to the Department of Defense.

And I am even more firmly opposed to any relaxation of the posse comitatus restrictions on the use of the military to search, seize, and arrest. I have discussed this matter with the President and other senior members of his Cabinet, and I can report that these views are shared throughout this administration.

The historical tradition which separates military and civilian authority in this country has served both to protect the civil liberties of our citizens and to keep our Armed Forces militarily focused at a high state of readiness. Further, our equipment assets are designed for war-fighting and not law enforcement. They are therefore of doubtful cost effectiveness in a law enforcement role.

An AWACS costs an estimated $4,200 an hour to fly. It requires a crew of 27 to operate fully. The total inventory of them worldwide is barely sufficient to meet current obligations.

The Navy's E-2C is a carrier-based airborne early warning aircraft, and in view of the wing crack problems we are now experiencing there are not enough of them to fulfill the Navy's existing requirements.

When these assets are regularly diverted to a law enforcement mission, a mission which experience indicates they are not ideally suited for, the taxpayer is ill served and readiness for our war-fighting mission is degraded. Additional training demands and potential logistical complications attendant to any use of the military in a law enforcement function would likely cause additional degradation in readiness.

The law enforcement agencies currently charged with enforcing drug smuggling laws should remain the sole entities with the power to search, seize, and arrest; and they should be provided the resources they need to do the job. We must explore all possible avenues to halt the supply of illicit drugs.

However, all the eradication and interdiction programs in the world will not be effective as long as the demand for illegal drugs in this country is so great. I wish I had a magic answer, but I do not. And I wish that requiring the military to seal the borders would cure the problem, but it will not.

There are things that the Department of Defense can do to increase its level of support for drug interdiction. Let me touch on several that we are looking at:

—Increasing the role of the National Guard in Title 32 status, specifically to augment U.S. Customs Service and Border Patrol personnel and increase air operations capability;

—Expanding language training for law enforcement personnel at the Defense Language Institute;

—Providing more operational planning assistance to the national narcotics border interdiction system and law enforcement agencies, including planning team deployments to operational areas;

—Staging additional military exercises near our border areas or in other areas of high drug trafficking;

—More special overseas operations, such as Blast Furnace and Op BAT, are possible with the invitation of the host country and with the cooperation of the Department of State;

—Completing the installation and augmentation of fixed site surveilliance networks in the Caribbean Basin as soon as possible and full integration of DOD's networks with those of law enforcement agencies;

—Increasing the operating tempo of tactical assets that are most useful for mobile aerial and maritime surveilliance and interdiction; and finally, we are working on the transfer of 20 additional excess operational helicopters to the law enforcement community.

Mr. Chairman, let me interrupt my prepared testimony at this point to add one more item to this list. And I apologize for not including this in my prepared testimony. But as some of you know, I only returned this weekend from a lengthy trip and had only today and yesterday to give this some thought, and talked to the President about it yesterday.

It seems to me there is another area where the Department of Defense can have a major impact on the demand for illegal drugs, and that is in the defense contracting community, a community of some 3,200,000 people. It would be my intent to issue a regulation requiring that defense contractors provide a drug-free work place.

This would mean counseling activities, referral activities, voluntary testing, and under carefully controlled circumstances, mandatory testing programs. I have in mind mandatory testing programs for employees who handle classified or sensitive matters or employees where safety is a paramount consideration, either at the work place or in the final product.

If I may continue, Mr. Chairman, any discussion of the expansion of the military's role must include careful consideration of the cost of such an expansion, cost in terms of both mission preparedness and dollars. The Defense Department can increase the level of support we provide to the Nation's anti-drug efforts, but we must be provided additional resources. Otherwise, our military readiness, which is already under pressure due to budget restrictions, will suffer even more.

The only answer to the demand problem that I can see is an extensive education campaign, backed up by stringent legal methods of dealing with those who sell and those who buy illegal drugs.

In this regard, I read with interest a proposal sponsored by several Members of the Senate for a drug-free America by 1995. This proposal focuses on the demand side of the drug problem, and it contains a number of constructive initiatives.

I believe that we can make some inroads into the supply problem if the executive and legislative branches can work together to interdict and eradicate drugs and raise the pressure on drug producers, drug dealers, and drug abusers.

While the Congress does have a role to play in this national effort by providing the necessary resources, my initial analysis suggests that the Congress has not fully lived up to this responsibility.

Over the past 4 years, for example, the Congress has reduced the Coast Guard operating budget by $458 million, and their procurement budget by $396 million, for a total reduction of $854 million.

As a result, Coast Guard hulls are tied up at the dock for lack of fuel, and the helicopter decks on some of their vessels are empty due to a lack of helicopters. These reductions have a direct adverse impact on the Coast Guard's ability to support drug interdiction efforts.

This year the House Appropriations Committee has proposed transferring $475 million from DOD to the Coast Guard, while at the same time reducing the Coast Guard budget by a similar amount.

Such actions by the Congress undermine our drug interdiction efforts. I might note that they are also contrary to the budget summit agreement. We have lived up to our part of that agreement in good faith, and I would request that the Congress live up to its part of the agreement.

In addition to fully funding the Coast Guard, there are other actions the Congress could take to enhance our drug interdiction efforts.

These include increasing security assistance for Latin America and funding for the State Department's International narcotics matters, and the Drug Enforcement Agency's international programs.

Funding we provide to source countries through these programs has had a dramatic impact on joint efforts to address the drug threat.

Fund the Navy's request for its relocatable over-the-horizon radar program, and fund the continuation of the Air Force over-the-horizon backscatter radar program.

If testing of the Custom's P–3 aircraft with the E–2C radar is successful, then more of these aircraft should be bought, to relieve pressures on the inadequate inventory of military airborne early warning assets.

I would urge you to consider requiring transponders and pre-filed flight plans along established mandatory air entry corridors for all aircraft entering our national territory, and transponders on selected categories of boat traffic entering our coastal waters.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, the Department of Defense stands ready to do what is required to succeed in the crusade against illicit drugs. The Department of Defense can play a role, but it must be an appropriate one.

The Armed Forces should not become a police force, nor can we afford to degrade readiness by diverting badly needed resources from their assigned missions. We should certainly not make the age-old mistake of assigning the Department of Defense an additional mission without the appropriate resources necessary to carry it out.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my prepared testimony.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carlucci follows:]

## STATEMENT OF
## THE HONORABLE FRANK C. CARLUCCI, III
## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to discuss my views on the role of the Department of Defense in the nation's effort to eliminate drug abuse. I would like to commend you and your colleagues for scheduling this unusual joint hearing of the two Armed Services Committees. The subject matter clearly warrants this special consideration. Drugs are entering our country at an alarming rate, drug dealing is on the increase, and our streets are the scene of an ever-increasing number of drug-related crimes. Indeed, this nation must increase its efforts. The toll in terms of the loss of life and reduced productivity is unacceptable.

In the Committee's letter of invitation, you asked me to address a number of specific issues including the drug interdiction proposals contained in the House and Senate versions of the FY 1989 Defense Authorization bill. In view of the uncertainty regarding what these provisions would actually require, and the numerous assumptions, variables and qualifications involved, it is very difficult to provide such a detailed response. Instead, I will address the broad policy issues raised in regard to increasing the Department's role in drug interdiction. General Herres and Admiral Kelso will focus on the operational and programmatic implications of using military assets to perform a drug interdiction mission.

The Department is no stranger to fighting the evils of drug abuse. As a result of a comprehensive testing and education program, our troops are far more drug free today than they were eight years ago. We have told our soldiers that drugs will not be tolerated in the military and reported drug use has decreased at least 67 percent since 1980. Ask our commanders and they will tell you that drug testing works. The chart before you depicts the resulting dramatic decline in drug use in the military. Mandatory testing should be an element of any proposed solution to the drug problem.

Over this same period of time, we have also substantially increased our support for law enforcement agencies in their efforts to eradicate and interdict drugs. Our increased contribution is depicted in the chart before you. I am sure you are aware of the 2,500 ship days that the Navy provided to the Coast Guard in FY 1987; the more than 16,000 flight hours provided by the Air Force and Navy to the interdiction effort; our contributions to Op BAT in the Bahamas, Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia, and Operation Alliance in the Southwestern United States; as well as the more than $300 million worth of equipment we have on loan to law enforcement agencies. I am proud of what the Department has done to date.

The primary role of the Department of Defense is to protect and defend this country from armed aggression. Nothing must stand in the way of our readiness or our preparedness to perform this task. During the early 1980's, the Administration requested -- and the Congress approved -- the resources required to bring our troops and equipment to a point where I believe they can perform these duties with an acceptable level of risk. However, dwindling defense resources during the past several years, and the resulting increased level of risk, are of deep concern to me. The defense budget has been reduced by over $50 billion in the last two budget cycles. Adding another mission at this time will come at the expense of the Department's primary mission -- unless additional resources are made available.

The Department of Defense will continue its active support to the drug law enforcement agencies. This activity should remain in a support mode, and not as a lead agency. However, this support role is not an inactive one as some would assert. But it does rely on the expressed needs and requests for support from those law enforcement agencies that are legally charged with the mission to interdict drugs. It is also constrained by the Department's requirement to perform its primary mission under strict budgetary constraints.

There are those who say the answer to the drug problem is to use the military to seal the borders in order to prevent drugs from entering our country. Others would have the military seal a portion of the border, and/or empower our troops with law enforcement authority. We have looked carefully at both the House and Senate proposals in their respective Defense Authorization bills. Section 1103 of the House bill requires that,. "Within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this act, the President shall deploy equipment and personnel of the Armed Forces sufficient to halt the unlawful penetration of the United States borders by aircraft and vessels carrying narcotics". It does not say part of the border. It would require covering the Canadian/United States border, the East, Gulf and West Coasts, as well as the Southwest border. Our initial estimate on the cost of accomplishing this, including land interdiction to close our land borders, was in excess of $18 billion a year. This assumes the utilization of the current DoD inventory. The cost would increase by billions of dollars if additional equipment was necessary. The cost to implement the provision in the House bill, which does not require sealing our land borders, would be slightly less. However, it would be less effective in that stopping aerial and maritime smuggling is likely to force traffickers to utilize land routes.

The Senate proposal would have us establish a C3I net that would integrate the assets of all Federal agencies in the drug interdiction area, and provide "an appropriate increase" in flying hours dedicated to drug interdiction. While precise cost estimates are difficult to make due to the lack of definition of "appropriate increase", they would be considerable -- on the order of several billion dollars a year.

I suggest that there is a real question whether these actions can be accomplished and, even if successful, whether they would only serve to trigger a significant increase in domestic production. Recent, independent studies by Congress' General Accounting Office and by the Rand Corporation reach strikingly similar conclusions. GAO reports that, among law enforcement experts, there is no agreement that increased Federal interdiction efforts, with or without increasing DoD assistance, will significantly reduce the amount of drugs entering the country. Rand's study, and I quote, ". . . strongly suggests . . . that a major increase in military support is unlikely to reduce drug consumption in the United States'". None of the interdiction approaches, in and of themselves, will work. I believe that these are not solutions to the problem, but rather the result of our rising frustration at our inability to find a real solution.

Aside from the practical problems involved in these proposals, there are more fundamental constitutional principles involved. I remain absolutely opposed to the assignment of a law enforcement mission to the Department of Defense. I am even more firmly opposed to any relaxation of the posse comitatus restrictions on the use of the military to search, seize and arrest. I have discussed this matter with the President, and other senior members of his Cabinet, and I can report that these views are shared throughout this Administration.

The historical tradition which separates military and civilian authority in this country has served both to protect the civil liberties of our citizens and to keep our Armed Forces militarily focused and at a high state of readiness. Further, our equipment assets are designed for war fighting, not for law enforcement. They are, therefore, of doubtful cost-effectiveness in a law enforcement role. An AWACS costs an estimated $4,200 an hour to fly, requires a crew of 27 to operate fully, and the total inventory of them --

world-wide -- is barely sufficient to meet current obligations. The Navy's E-2C is a carrier-based, airborne early warning aircraft, and in view of the wing-crack problems we are experiencing there are not enough of them to fulfill the Navy's existing requirements. When these assets are regularly diverted to a law enforcement mission -- a mission which experience indicates they are not ideally suited for -- the tax payer is ill-served and readiness for our war fighting mission is degraded.

Additional training demands and potential logistical complications attendant to any use of the military in a law enforcement function would likely cause additional degradation in readiness. The law enforcement agencies currently charged with enforcing drug smuggling laws should remain the sole entities with the power to search, seize and arrest, and they should be provided the resources they require to do their jobs.

We must explore all possible avenues to halt the supply of illicit drugs. However, all the eradication and interdiction programs in the world will not be effective as long as the demand for illegal drugs in this country is so great. I wish I had the magic answer, but I do not. And I wish that requiring the military to seal the borders would cure the problem, but it will not.

There are things that the Defense Department can do to increase its level of effort. Let me touch on several that we are looking at:

-- Increasing the role of the National Guard in Title 32 status specifically to augment U.S. Customs Service and Border Patrol personnel and increase air operations capability;

-- Expanding language training for law enforcement personnel at the Defense Language Institute;

-- Providing more operational planning assistance to NNBIS and law enforcement agencies, including planning team deployments to operational areas;

-- Staging additional military exercises near our border areas or in other areas of high drug trafficking;

-- More special overseas operations, such as Blast Furnace and Op BAT, are possible with the invitation of the host country and with the cooperation of the Department of State;

-- Completing the installation or augmentation of fixed-site surveillance networks in the Caribbean Basin as soon as possible, and full integration of DoD's networks with those of enforcement agencies;

-- Increasing the operating tempo of tactical assets that are most useful for mobile aerial and maritime surveillance and interdiction;

-- Finally, we are working on the transfer of twenty additional excess operational helicopters to the law enforcement community later this summer.

However, Mr. Chairman, any discussion of the expansion of the military's role must include careful consideration of the costs of such an expansion -- costs in terms of both mission preparedness and dollars. The Defense Department can increase the level of support we provide to the Nation's anti-drug efforts, but we must be provided additional resources. Otherwise, our military readiness -- which is already under pressure due to budget restrictions -- will suffer even more.

The only answer to the demand problem that I can see is an extensive education campaign, backed up by stringent legal methods of dealing with those who sell and those who buy illegal drugs. In this regard, I read with interest a proposal sponsored by several members of the Senate for a drug-free America by 1995. This proposal focuses on the demand side of the drug problem, and it contains a number of constructive initiatives. I believe that we can make some inroads into the supply problem if the Executive and Legislative branches can work together to interdict and eradicate drugs, and keep the pressure on drug producers, drug dealers and drug abusers.

The Congress does have a role to play in this national effort by providing necessary resources. My initial analysis suggests that Congress has not fully lived up to this responsibility. Over the past four years, for example, the Congress had reduced the Coast Guard operating budget by $458 million, and their procurement budget by $396 million -- for a total reduction of $854 million. As a result, Coast Guard hulls are tied up at the dock for lack of fuel, and the helicopter decks on some of their vessels are empty due to a lack of helicopters. These reductions have a direct adverse impact on the Coast Guard's ability to support drug interdiction efforts. This year, the House Appropriations Committee has proposed transferring $475 million from DoD to the Coast Guard, while at the same time reducing the Coast Guard budget by a similar amount. Such actions by the Congress undermine our drug interdiction efforts.

In addition to fully funding the Coast Guard, there are other actions the Congress could take to enhance our drug interdiction efforts. These include:

-- Increasing security assistance for Latin America, and funding for the State Department's International Narcotics Matters (INM) and the Drug Enforcement Agency's international programs. Funding we provide to source countries through these programs has a dramatic impact on joint efforts to address the drug threat.

-- Fund the Navy's request for its relocatable, over-the-horizon radar (OTH-R) program, and fund the continuation of the Air Force over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radar program.

-- If testing of the Customs P-3 aircraft with the E-2C radar is successful, then more of these aircraft should be bought to relieve pressure on the inadequate inventory of military airborne early warning assets.

-- I would urge you to consider requiring transponders and pre-filed flight plans along established mandatory air entry corridors for all aircraft entering our national territory, and transponders on selected categories of boat traffic entering our coastal waters.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, the Department of Defense stands ready to do what is required to succeed in the crusade against illicit drugs. The Department of Defense can play a role, but it must be an appropriate one. Our Armed Forces should not become a police force, nor can we afford to degrade readiness by diverting badly needed resources from their assigned missions. We certainly should not make the age-old mistake of assigning the Department of Defense an additional mission without the appropriate resources necessary to carry it out.

After the testimony of General Herres and Admiral Kelso, I stand ready to answer your questions.

Chairman Aspin [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Carlucci. Let us now hear from General Herres, who has a statement, and then Admiral Kelso, you have a statement too. Let us finish all of the statements before we go to the questions. General Herres.

## STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT T. HERRES, U.S. AIR FORCE, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Herres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a rather lengthy prepared statement. I would not propose to read it in its entirety.

What I had thought I might do is share with you some observations that I have made after having looked at this problem over the last 4 weeks.

Chairman Aspin. Without objection, the complete statement will be printed in the record at this point. General Herres, you may proceed in any way you like.

General Herres. Thank you. Since the week during which the two amendments under consideration were passed, at the Secretary's behest, I have looked into this problem of increased DOD participation in the drug effort from an operational standpoint in some depth.

I bring to this problem a background that began with my first assignment in the Air Force as an interceptor pilot in the Air Defense Command, and it was extended through a variety of assignments, as some of you know, some of which concentrated in the command and control business and ended in the operational phase of my career with my assignment as the Commander in Chief of NORAD. So I do know a little bit about the aerial interdiction problem and the connected maritime interdiction effort.

When we recognized that there was a considerable amount of interest in much greater DOD participation in this effort, I thought the best thing to do is to go around and see what everybody is doing firsthand.

I visited some of the places just ahead of you, Chairman Nichols, on my trek, talked to people from all the principal agencies so that I could get their ideas about the problem and what we might best do to support it in a rational way.

One of the things that I noticed as I went through this experience, and also as I heard arguments posed by a number of different people, is that there are some very commonly held misperceptions, not only about our role, the Department of Defense, but about the drug problem in general; and in particular about the role that interdiction, both maritime and aerial interdiction, could play.

When I refer to interdiction in these remarks, let me specify that I am not talking about the interdiction of drugs, illicit drugs, that are brought into the country under the guise of being legitimate commercial traffic. That in itself is a gigantic problem. When we use the term interdiction, we tend to overlook that point. The interdiction aspect of this problem that I focused on is the smuggler who is bringing the drugs in through the illicit entry method rather than the concealment in commercial traffic. As you know, for example, there are about three million containers of commercial cargo that come into this country every year, about 2 billion tons of cargo that come into this country every year. So I am not referring to interdiction of that kind of traffic.

Let me get to these myths. I will just comment on each one of them briefly. The first myth is that our defense resources include a seamless impenetrable network of air surveillance radars that protect our national borders and coastlines. This is not the case.

As many of you have learned in other capacities in reviewing defense budgets in the past, we have a lot of holes in our air defense system. The reason we have holes is that we have had to expend funds in support of this mission in competition with higher priorities—the strategic offensive missions, our commitments overseas, our support of NATO, and so forth.

The threat, compared to the threats with which other mission areas were faced, was modest. The Soviets do not have a large bomber inventory, although we are facing a potential buildup of that and we are also looking at the possibility that there may be a significant cruise missile threat in the future.

But the point is today there are all kinds of ways for airplanes, not only drug smugglers but hostile aircraft, to penetrate our network. We have been working hard to build up that network. The over-the-horizon radar program and the acquisition of the E-3 airborne warning control systems are the centerpieces of our surveillance effort against the Soviet air-breathing threat. But by no means is this a seamless network, and it is certainly not designed to deal with the kind of threat that the drug smugglers can use in the aerial penetration technique.

The second myth is that the process of detecting and interdicting hostile strike aircraft is similar to that of detecting and intercepting drug smugglers.

The drug smuggler is operating in a peacetime environment. We are not working with a generated force. He is able to operate as a lonely operator, a lone eagle so to speak. He can even use such techniques as piggybacking underneath or above airliners or other aircraft which are ostensibly legitimate penetrators.

The kinds of techniques that he can use to thwart our efforts to surveil and to reveal his presence are not the kinds of techniques that a strike aircraft, a Bear G or a Bear A or B from the Soviet Union, or one of his launched cruise missiles could employ.

This is a very stealthy kind of penetrator. He can pick the time and place of penetration of his choosing. If the threat is high, he can stand down. If he detects, and he has the capability and equipment to do so, that there are surveillance aircraft covering an area, he can circumnavigate the area of coverage.

We have even noticed that some of these people have been flying radar calibration missions soon after we have installed new radar down in the Caribbean area, to detect, just as we do when we install new aircraft, where the low altitude coverage will be weak and where he will not be able to be detected. It is quite a different problem intercepting a Bear bomber than it is intercepting a small light aircraft carrying contraband.

A similar situation exists with maritime interdiction. Dealing with the hostile maritime threat to the United States is quite different than dealing with the maritime smuggler. I do not suggest that there are not similarities. But I just want to simply point out that there are some considerable differences that are often overlooked.

The third myth is that participation in drug surveillance and interdiction activities should be good training for military purposes.

Again I would not say that there is no training to be derived from the operation of our equipment for this purpose. I simply say that it is marginal. And after a very modest amount of such employment, the training benefit is going to be well past the knee of the curve.

While our people spend long tedious hours engaged in this kind of a function, they are missing training opportunities, and they are missing the opportunities to use their equipment so that they can hone the skills that they are required to sustain in order to carry out their warfighting mission.

The business of war is the business of putting firepower in the right place at the right time. Our people have to be trained. We currently do not have enough training time for our people to learn how to do those things in the wide variety of supporting functions that it takes to carry out military missions.

Clearly, as I said, there are similarities in some of these activities. But the similarities are marginal and, to some degree, they are rudimentary. We can and do make a contribution, as the Secretary has indicated; but please do not think that the training is completely transferable. We lose training when we participate in this mission.

A fourth myth, the cost of combating drug smugglers can be discounted through the application of DOD resources to maritime and aerial interdiction functions.

If we take our people from their training activities, we will have a force that is less combat ready. We will have a force that is less professional.

When we deployed two brigades of troops to Palmerola Air Field in Honduras a few weeks ago, I am sure that you and all of the American public were most anxious that those be very well disciplined, and very well trained troops. Indeed they are combat ready, well trained and well disciplined because they spend a lot of time at that business. They spend between 140 and 180 days a year in the field. All of their training time is accounted for.

If we use those people, for example (and I only use the Army as an example because all of what I am saying is transferable to other functions), if we use those people doing other duties where the return on their time in terms of training and honing their skills is marginal, we will have less professional forces to field for those kinds of missions.

When the Navy crews saved our two ships over in the Persian Gulf, they were able to do that through heroic efforts and because they were extremely well trained. We should be very proud of what they did, but we should also be proud of the structure and the system and the infrastructure that produced well trained, well disciplined and well supervised sailors.

I would like to make one more point on that fourth myth. If we draw down, as in effect we will have to do, as I have suggested, DOD resources to support this mission, we will have to compensate in other ways.

If we cannot make that compensation, what you will have done in effect is cut defense budget. If we can compensate in some way, we will have to expend resources, people, or dollars. There is no free way to put DOD on this problem is the point that I want to make.

The fifth point, availability and the use of drugs in the United States will be significantly reduced by substantial increases in the volume of interdiction. I will not elaborate on this point. I think you have heard testimony from others who have addressed this point.

There are studies and there are experts far better equipped than I to address this point, but I have talked to a number of them and I am quite convinced that their conclusions are true.

There are a significant number of ways to put those drugs on the street, and interdiction in this fashion is not going to prevent that.

Six, the reason that the aerial and maritime drug interdiction campaign is not achieving the results hoped for is that the responsible agencies are unable to do the job as effectively as the Department of Defense.

I suggest that that is a very, very open question. You have a lot of very fine people out there in the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Customs, the Coast Guard, the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and so forth, who are doing a fine job.

Clearly all of us in the Government can always do whatever job it is we do, better. If given the resources and the right kind of support, I believe they can do this job as well as anybody, including the Department of Defense.

As the Secretary has said, there are more things that we could do. In progress right now is a review by the Drug Policy Board and its substructure, to look at more ways, as is constantly the case, for increased DOD participation. We will facilitate the activities of these people who are empowered and responsible to carry out this mission.

And finally, the last myth is that DOD support of agencies having responsibilities in drug enforcement has not been significant.

Gentlemen, I know you have received a number of reports, you have heard a number of figures, we talk a lot about AWACS hours and E-2 hours and ship steaming days. I must tell you that as I went around over the last 4 weeks to see what is going on, every rock I turned over I found one more little thing that was not on the list that I started out with. There are a lot of things going on in the Department of Defense to support this effort. I do not think it is possible to make a complete audit of all of the individual efforts.

General Olmstead, who devotes all of his efforts to facilitating DOD participation in this effort, has done a magnificent job, and has turned on lots of people. We have loaned equipment; we have trained a lot of people; we have given a lot of advice; and we have provided heavy participation in a number of studies and efforts, which have helped guide this effort. Yet, I think there is probably more that we can do; however, we are probably very close to the point where anything more we do, in effect, amounts to what I referred to earlier—a cut in the defense budget. How much of that you are willing to make in order to support this effort is an issue you will have to address.

I simply want to point out to you that we have a lot of defense commitments around the world. You study every year, in some detail, the amount of resources with which we should be able to carry out those missions—numbers of people, number of dollars for equipment, O&M dollars for the execution of missions and the support of exercises in training. If there were excesses in those dollars, we have both failed to find them.

If we take more of those resources and those dollars and divert them to the drug effort, you will in effect be cutting the defense budget. We are already doing a lot.

Those are the thoughts that I would share with you and offer with you; and I am ready for whatever questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of General Herres follows:]

# STATEMENT BY
## GENERAL ROBERT T. HERRES, USAF
## VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committees:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and to participate in the deliberation of an issue of critical national importance. In response to your specific requests on the letter inviting me to be here, I have prepared the following statement which begins with an outline of assistance currently being provided by the Department of Defense to assist the various law enforcement agencies in the drug interdiction effort. Following this summary, there are some brief assessments of DoD's capabilities in this area and the various Senate and House proposals on the subject. I will not attempt to analyze the legality of these proposals and will only note, at this point, that some of them may infringe on the constitutional prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief. The statement concludes with some thoughts and recommendations on what might be done to significantly impact the total effort.

For the past several weeks I have had the opportunity to spend time with just about all of the federal agencies involved in the anti-drug effort. In general, what I have found is a large number of very dedicated people trying hard to produce effective results under trying circumstances. Everywhere I have gone I have made it a point to ask a simple question, "What is it that DoD can do for you?" The answers have been interesting and diverse; however, they have helped focus our efforts to identify resources and capabilities that can be made available to combat the drug menace.

While all this research has made me conversant in the hard work currently being expended by many local, state and federal officials, I am certainly no expert. However, it did confirm that, in spite of what some critics might say, the Department of Defense has been providing for the past several years, considerable surveillance, transportation, equipment and training support to various law enforcement agencies consistent with the limits of present legislation. Not only has our support been significant, it is on the rise. While much of our effort is not easy to quantify, some of it is. I will try to avoid getting bogged down with numbers, however they are often useful to illustrate the scope of the undertaking.

One of the most measurable areas of DoD support has been airborne surveillance. In FY87, 16,300 hours were flown by military pilots to include Navy P-3 and E-2 aircraft along with the Air Force's E-3 AWACS in support of drug enforcement agencies, a 32% increase over FY86. The 4,000 AWACS hours alone, at an estimated direct cost of $4,200 per hour, cost about $17 million, and that hourly cost factor is quite conservative as it does not include associated overhead which would run the hourly cost to almost $10,000. Air Force B-52s and C-130 units from both the active and Reserve Components have been used routinely for maritime surveillance. We have used U-2's, RF-4C's and Army National Guard OV-1 Mohawks equipped with sophisticated electronics for surveillance of airstrips and suspected transloading areas.

In FY87, the Navy provided the Coast Guard 2,500 shipboard steaming days for law enforcement detachments to patrol high traffic areas, a 100% increase over FY86. This adds to the program of Navy ships on the alert for suspicious activities and vessels listed in the Coast Guard's "Lookout" bulletin. The Army has a detachment with UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters in the Bahama's supplementing the Coast Guard's teams that provide local law enforcement agents the ability to be inserted quickly when suspicious aircraft land at the numerous remote strips. Students from the Army's Military Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, deploy ground sensors and radars that can detect and monitor the movement of personnel, vehicles and flying aircraft crossing the border from Mexico. This combination of assets, dubbed Operation Groundhog, has been activated 20 times with 518 confirmed detections resulting in 176 apprehensions by civil law enforcement authorities.

In 1986, we supported the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration in Operation Blast Furnace. Six Army helicopters and two Air Force C-130 transporters were used in support of Bolivian authorities. Following the completion of this operation, six UH-1H helicopters were transferred to the Department of State for use by the Bolivians, and a US military training and maintenance team still remains deployed and quite active with DEA agents in support of the Bolivian endeavor. In addition to this direct support, the DoD has made available as "loans," significant numbers of aircraft, communications equipment and other hardware to various government agencies involved in drug enforcement. In FY87 the total value of that equipment was $303.5 million. For every piece of equipment on loan, the DoD has provided some level of training. In addition, we train law enforcement personnel in survival techniques, land navigation and riverine operations. We share intelligence at all levels on drug related topics, and provide considerable planning expertise as well as secure tactical communications, to include dedicated satellite channels.

Less quantifiable is the support provided in the realm of training, intelligence sharing and countless many man-months of study efforts and other residual services. For example, the Air Force operates two aerostat radars at Cudjoe Key and Patrick Air Base that are linked to the Customs Service's Command Center in Miami. The Puerto Rican National Guard operates a coastal radar which was recently upgraded by the Air Force. With Army support, the U.S. Customs Service has installed an aerostat at Fort Huachuca; later this year, a new Air Force aerostat will be sited in Deming, New Mexico, which will also be operated by the Customs Service. Subsequent aerostat balloon radar acquisitions will cover the southwest border area and the Caribbean. The network will be completed in FY90.

The National Guard Bureau estimates that in CY87, it spent 8,900 mandays and 2,600 flying hours in support of requests from 25 states for drug eradication and interdiction assistance. About 95% of this support was provided as "incidental to training" which means the costs were not passed on to the requesting agency. The rate for CY88 indicates a steady increase in both the requests and the Guard's assistance. The staff of the National Guard Bureau is currently exploring methods to further increase this outstanding support.

As a final note, the DoD has assigned full-time personnel to the National Drug Policy Board staff, the seven regional National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) centers, the NNBIS headquarters in Washington as well as to various other drug enforcement agencies. This does not include the personnel supporting numerous small sites, such as the radars at Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba, Key West, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic, whose efforts, while not focused exclusively on drug interdiction, are key to our radar envelope and have a significant impact on law enforcement efforts. In addition, there are more than 100 personnel occupied full time producing and analyzing drug related intelligence and about 300 to 400 working this problem at least part time.

In addressing the drug interdiction legislative proposals of the Senate and the House, some of my comments are offered as applicable, in some degree, to all proposals: airborne early warning aircraft (AEW), pursuit aircraft, Posse Comitatus, and the National Guard. Each subject is addressed in turn:

Airborne Early Warning Aircraft. All proposed legislation contemplates the increased use of AEW aircraft for surveillance and identification of air and sea traffic entering the national territory of the United States. These AEW aircraft are effective military systems, but do have limitations when applied to this mission; they are tailored to complement other systems, expensive to acquire and operate, and are essential for currently validated military missions. For example, there are only 34 E-3 surveillance aircraft; this is an inventory that falls well short of our established requirement, yet it must meet all of our world-wide operational commitments. These 34 airplanes and their crews are, in fact, clearly over committed right now. The maintenance of one continuous 24 hour orbit requires five of these planes, costs over 100,000 dollars per day or about 40 million dollars per year (accounting only for operations and maintenance costs), and would eliminate all AWACS support to joint exercises for that year -- precisely the mission-oriented training the crews must have to maintain combat proficiency.

The best application of AEW aircraft would be to supplement and complement land based radar assets in some variety of ways that would tend to keep smugglers off balance -- at least guessing. They have radar warning receivers and know when we fly; they can easily circumnavigate our coverage. So we must be very clever about how we use these assets or they will be wasted. We need to continue our improvements in land based assets, such as the aerostat balloons and over-the-horizon (OTH) radars. The value of our AEW assets in interdiction of drug traffic is the same as in normal military applications, i.e., in its flexibility and its ability to fill gaps in coverage of other more economical land based radar sources which lend themselves well to 24 hour coverage.

If you should decide to provide a surveillance and identification mission for DoD in support of drug interdiction, it is important that you not give the military an impossible mission such as "sealing the borders;" and that the mission statement be as general as possible to allow us the maximum amount of flexibility to organize and execute as appropriate. The drug smugglers adapt quickly and effectively to new methods of interdiction. Most know when radar aircraft are flying, either through the use of lookouts or by the use of radar detectors. They turn around, go home and wait for a better time or send the drugs by other routes or methods. Only the best planned use of AEW aircraft will serve the intended purpose, and even then, it is not a panacea by any means. It is critical that our commanders have maximum flexibility to use the aircraft in an unpredictable, patternless fashion, complementary with other assets.

Pursuit Aircraft: H.R. 4264, the House proposal, requires the President to deploy pursuit aircraft carrying law enforcement officials whereas the Senate proposal directs the loan of these aircraft to Customs and Coast Guard officials. As discussed below, law enforcement activities such as chasing and arresting drug smugglers are best left to civilian authorities. Both the Customs Service and the Coast Guard have access to sufficient pursuit capability at the current interdiction rates. The loan of additional helicopters is an appropriate means of providing additional resources if more capability is necessary.

Posse Comitatus: Each proposal either expressly or implicitly enlarges the role of the military in what normally are police functions. The House proposal is very far reaching in that it directs military personnel to be used to locate, pursue, and seize vessels and aircraft and to arrest their crews. This is unnecessary and would be a mistake. Unnecessary because there should be adequate numbers of properly specialized and trained civilian law enforcement personnel capable of seizing and arresting these drug criminals and a mistake since the result would be a reversal of a one hundred year old law and a wise tradition of this country that predates the Constitution, keeping military and civilian authority separate. I worry also about the practical problems: the training required for our personnel, their frequent deployments and tranfers that might result in their nonavailability when the trial finally occurs;

all of this would mean that people diverted for this purpose are just not ready or available to carry out the national security missions for which they were recruited and trained. Finally, I must raise a note of caution at the thought of military personnel gathering law enforcement related intelligence on U. S. citizens.

National Guard: Expanded use of the National Guard is a sound proposal. We should use the National Guard as much as possible in a federal role when mission essential skills are reasonably compatible with the interdiction mission, such as the Army Guard Military Intelligence Battalions equipped with the OV-1 Mohawk; and in the State role under Title 32 at every opportunity. The Governors have the necessary authority today, but most are unable to fully utilize their militia because of a lack of available funding. I concur with the Senate proposal to help provide these funds. I note also that when operating under State control, even when acting in a law enforcement capacity, Posse Comitatus restrictions would not apply.

Certain parts of the House and Senate proposals are unique, therefore, I would like to address them separately:

Substantially Halting Unlawful Penetration. The House proposal requires the Armed Forces, within 45 days, to substantially halt the unlawful penetration of United States borders by aircraft and vessels carrying narcotics. This is an unrealistic expectation and a mission the Armed Forces cannot accomplish under any foreseeable rules of engagement for use within our own borders. We are designed to shoot down intruding aircraft and to sink enemy ships; search and seizure capabilities were never factored into our force structure or training programs.

Lead Agency for Detection. The decision to leave this choice to the President is a good one. If the Department of Defense is to play a larger role and have increased responsibilities, then we would like to see some agency clearly in charge of the surveillance and monitoring mission. The merits of our assumption of this role would have to be based upon the relative level of our involvement since Customs and the Coast Guard have considerable expertise and experience as the major players in this area.

Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Network. There are a considerable number of agencies involved in the drug interdiction effort. Ideally, this effort should have an umbrella C3I architecture to tie these agencies together, but it is far from certain that the architect should be DoD. The program will be very expensive and will require talent, people, and money not available in DoD; and probably not in the other agencies either. Whoever assumes responsibility will certainly have to seek substantial and costly assistance from defense industry sources which have experience and expertise in this field. The proposal, to require the President to provide a plan to Congress for a C3I program may be appropriate; nevertheless, it will be costly to devise and implement if it is to encompass a comprehensive architecture that can tie together the many command and operations centers of the numerous agencies at the federal, state and local levels that are necessarily engaged in the drug enforcement problem. Designation of DoD as the responsible agency should be carefully evaluated.

As you know, there are a number of government agencies whose well established role for years has been the control of people and goods entering the country. The vast amount of goods and traffic that enter the country each year by commercial air, automobile, private aircraft, cargo containers, pleasure and commercial vessels, etc., makes it obvious that finding the small, hidden packages that constitute an estimated one to two hundred tons annual supply of cocaine is literally a "needle in the haystack" problem. Heroin detection is yet another order of magnitude more difficult. Thus, the major efforts of the Coast Guard, Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service, which are most involved in interdiction at, or enroute to the border, must be supplemented by heavy involvement of other federal activities which play leading roles in complementary aspects of the drug enforcement effort. State and local law enforcement agencies bear similar relationships in the interdiction effort. Each is a potential source for raw intelligence information that can contribute materially to the problem.

If the DoD is tasked to become a major player to "...halt the flow of illegal drugs...," we become one more major participant in this effort, for there is no way we can supplant the role these other agencies play. The real question is whether the additional major contribution we would make would serve our national purpose better than would be the case if the Coast Guard or Customs Service resources were enhanced. In either case, even a massive dedication of our military capabilities to the interdiction mission as our departments' highest priority commitment would not suffice to "halt the flow of illegal drugs." The adversary just has too many options at his disposal. The supply would not be strained even if we were to triple or quadruple the rate of seizures; even, according to a recent Rand Corporation study, if seizure rates as high as 50% were to be achieved, the supply would not be strained nor would street prices change significantly. Both the Rand study and a recent report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) question the useful payoff of a massive air interdiction program. This is not to say that interdiction efforts should be abandoned; rather that a carefully balanced campaign is the best choice of approaches. At present, the smuggler uses the most convenient conduit available within acceptable risk levels. We can increase his risk and cause him considerable inconvenience, but as long as the demand is high and the product so concealable, he will continue to be successful because of the creativity that greed and high profits inevitably inspire. There is no practical way the Armed Forces of the United States can "seal our borders" or assure the Congress that illegal drugs cannot enter the country.

Nevertheless, meaningful contributions can be made to the interdiction effort if we find ways to intelligently supplement activities of the agencies presently involved. Although DoD surveillance cannot prevent smuggling by air, it can contribute in several ways to the process of making this a less convenient, more costly method of illegal entry. These assets can also be used to collect useful intelligence data. If mandatory use of transponders and air corridors by aircraft entering our national territory were to be implemented, there is great potential that, with manageable investment in the surveillance program, the risk and inconvenience threshold would be raised to a level that drives the adversary to other transportation methods.

The Joint Staff queried each of the Unified and Specified Commands as to what additional assets could be made available for the drug interdiction effort. Those responses were collated and forwarded by the Director of the Joint Staff to the Secretary of Defense for consideration. I believe that document has just recently been made available to the Congress. In addition, we can further explore the use of reconnaissance resources to supplement current surveillance and intelligence collection assets; we may find a useful synergism there. Training should continue to be an area in which our unique capabilities are broadly applicable and effective, although not as visible in terms of direct results. But much of the training base we could devote to assist other agencies is of no avail unless those agencies are fully funded to meet their responsibilities.

Those of us in the Department of Defense realize the severity of this threat to the American way of life. We have committed a consider amount of our resources to making the military drug-free with great success; we are eager to do our part in its total eradication from our society in general. However, we cannot lose sight of our primary mission nor can we wish away the incompatabilities between our force structure and the drug trafficking threat. As you deliberate these critical issues, I urge you to weigh the recommendations in Mr. Carlucci's submitted statement which I personally support and firmly believe are absolutely essential to any serious effort to interdict the flow of illegal drugs into this country.

Thank you for this opportunity and now I am prepared to answer your questions.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Thank you very much, General Herres. I believe we will go on to Admiral Kelso and then come back to questions.

## STATEMENT OF ADM. FRANK B. KELSO II, U.S. NAVY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET

Admiral KELSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be with you this morning.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to provide my thoughts on the war against drugs.

In my view, the illegal drug problem in this United States can only be dealt with successfully through a national multifaceted deterrence program. This war against drugs program must have the active support of the majority of our citizens.

As I see it, there are three problems requiring actions. First, the source of supply of drugs. Drugs are introduced illegally from all parts of the world, ranging from Hong Kong and Thailand to the Middle East, Europe and the Caribbean, in addition to drugs grown or manufactured illegally in the United States.

We must work closely with the leaders of these countries to establish procedures to reduce the flow of drugs into our country and stop their production at the source. Domestically, we must make the risk too high for our own citizens to produce or use illegal drugs.

I must emphasize that the source of the problem is not restricted to the areas south of the United States. In military terms, the drug source threat axis is domestic and 360 degree threat around our island Nation. Even if we could seal our borders, drugs would still be available from domestic sources in large quantities.

Second, the demand for drugs. Concurrently with reducing the source of drugs, we must reduce the domestic demand for drugs.

On the demand issue, I recently met with our Latin American naval leaders who all emphasized that we in the United States must help their nations stomp out the drug plague through deterrence in the demand in this country.

They said quite frankly that without this deterrence in demand they felt it would be impossible for them to stamp out their sources.

The Latin American naval leaders view the drug providers as a real threat to their national and collective security. We must create a national consensus for zero tolerance of drugs through education and through deterrence to use.

Third is interdiction—the problem of interdiction in the lines of communication and transportation of drugs. Interdiction is the most difficult and most expensive initiative to fight drugs.

In military terms, it is like attempting to shoot down a missile after it is fired rather than shooting the shooter. We must shoot the archer not the arrow.

Later in my statement I will compare our open ocean antisubmarine warfare experiences to this drug interdiction problem to demonstrate that finding the smuggler after he is at sea is like finding a needle in the haystack.

The Navy has had a considerable experience in the drug war. I have been involved with it since I was a lieutenant commander running a school of about 2,000 students in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

As a father, citizen, and naval officer and fleet commander, I support fully the national commitment to the war against drugs. I have seen the negative effects that drugs have on our young people, including our sailors. I have also witnessed the deleterious effect that use of drugs had on the morale, health, and productivity of the young Americans in uniform.

Therefore, before I discuss how we in the military and the fleet specifically can contribute to drug interdiction, I would like to make a comparison of how we in the Navy dealt with the drug problem in the late 1970s and 1980s, and the problem facing our Nation today.

Let me use our experience in fighting our own drug war to advise you on what worked and what did not work for us in the Navy.

In the late 1970s we had both a serious drug user and pusher problem. In 1980, about 40 percent of our sailors used marijuana ranging from casual experimental use to habitual abuse.

However, our Navy experience was essentially a reflection of national usage by the same age group. The sailor demand was high, as is our society's demand today. Our early Navy efforts were directed at keeping drugs off our ships and bases, i.e. interdiction.

Initially, we would not face up to the problem, as most of us believed it was a problem of our national society, and we could do no more in the Navy than the country was willing to do.

As a result, we had no user policy. Some followed a zero tolerance approach while others followed a lenient policy. The users and pushers found ways to use and sell drugs to beat the system.

At that time, the drug of choice was predominantly marijuana. But today there is considerably more cocaine abuse. We attempted to seal off the Navy borders. It failed. Users and suppliers continued to get drugs.

This all changed with the crash of an EA-6B aircraft during a night landing aboard U.S.S. *Nimitz* on May 26, 1981. Fourteen people were killed and 48 injured during the crash and fire.

Later it was confirmed that traces of illegal drugs were found in the bodies of several flight deck crewmen. It was this tragic 1981 accident that caused a maximum combination of zero tolerance and a strong deterrence policy, starting with the leadership from the Chief of Naval Operations through the chain of command down to the lowest ranking petty officer.

We also instituted education programs, mandatory random urinalysis, drug testing, administrative and legal action against users and distributors. We cut that 40 percent figure in half in 1 year, and eventually to about a 3 percent drug usage in the Navy today.

The main factor in our success was not new regulations or laws. It was adherence to policy by all in a command. A testing system for deterrence and eventually peer pressure by all hands that drug usage would not be tolerated in the workplace, in berthing compartments, on liberty, or anywhere else in the Navy.

In short, the Navy society said no to drugs and made in stick. We simply found that most American sailors did not want drug usage entered into their service records. When they had to face a deterrent test, it no longer was a lark to play with drugs. Why should we think our students today will be any different?

The Navy found interdiction did not work. We sealed a ship's border, but drug dogs continued to find drugs on our ships and stations.

It was not until we developed a deterrence program linking strong action against the seller and user in combination with a total Navy environment where drugs were not accepted professionally that we came to grips with the problem.

I am not suggesting that civil liberties should be curtailed to solve the drug problem. They should not be.

In the early days of our drug problem in the Navy, I worried that we may have punished some innocent people. The only way we had to know if a sailor used drugs was by possession or by witnesses.

I recall one case where one young sailor supplied information about one user which led ultimately to about 250 students removed from a technical education program. All were implicated by the accusations of others.

With today's valid tests, we can identify the user. We can deal with the correct culprit without guessing.

Even with extensive drug searches, our experience was that there is no 100 percent solution through interdiction alone. We must face the problem squarely, as we did, and we need to deter the user and his demand.

We in the Navy did not appreciate the difficulty of stopping the supply to our sailors, and that is certainly minor compared to the difficulty of sealing our borders.

For example, the extent of the interdiction problem was cited by former Secretary of Defense Weinberger when he stated recently: "290 million people cross our borders unchecked each year. 30 million air passengers arrive unchecked on 500,000 commercial airliners. 7.5 million commercial cargo containers arrive unchecked each year by land and sea. 100 million pieces of mail cross our borders unchecked, and 89 million land vehicles enter unchecked for drugs each year."

A Center for Naval Analysis study concludes that to attempt to seal our U.S. east coast and gulf coast maritime borders would require 111 ships, 12 Orion P-3 aircraft, and 16 Hawkeye E-2C aircraft. This is required to maintain a seven day, 24 hour watch.

In addition, Air Force E-3A maritime AWACS aircraft would be needed to cover the air picture in the Gulf of Mexico approaches.

This study is based on interdicting coastal freighters in excess of 1,000 tons. Therefore, it is a very conservative study.

An example of the problem is that in our most recent interdiction operations in the Caribbean, conducted May 9 to 26, we had four destroyer frigate ships with a total of two LAMPS helicopters and one oiler. They had 571 surface radar contacts, boarded 35 suspect vessels, which resulted in one seizure.

To improve the boarding rate effectiveness in order to achieve the study goals, it would have required considerably more ships and the number of suspect boardings greatly increased.

The total cost for the five-ship operation, including support ships and aircraft, was $6.5 million. One seizure amounted to $405,000 worth of marijuana.

I mentioned a comparison of our ASW, or anti-submarine warfare, experience to interdiction operations. As a naval officer, I view our anti-submarine warfare as having a parallel to the interdiction problem of the drug war. First, 75 percent of the world is covered by water. The submarine threat is a 360 degree threat, as is the drug smuggling threat in the open ocean air and sea lanes.

Even if we just focus our efforts on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, this is equivalent to searching all the States east of the Mississippi, or 1.5 million square miles. A single destroyer can cover less than one-tenth of 1 percent of that area.

It would require about 1,200 destroyers for this area alone. Added to this problem is the number of false contacts generated and the limited range of our radars to detect small ships.

This is like searching for a needle in a haystack. In the AWS analogy, when we concentrate our ASW forces in one area, then the enemy shifts to another. Smugglers do the same thing.

The submarine skipper is wily to prevent detection and attack. The drug traffickers are equally wily to prevent detection and prosecution.

The first key to successful ASW, and I believe drug interdiction, is accurate and shared intelligence on the point of origin, destination, and most likely course to his mission area.

Over a vast sea area, we must use intelligence to cue our ASW forces and not waste expensive and limited assets. Also in ASW, we have a good idea of the type of sub for which we are looking. Even armed with that data, finding a sub is not easy.

In wartime, once we find him we attack. We do not have to board, inspect, and then tow the sub in for lengthy court proceedings.

To be effective in the war on drugs, every ship and aircraft must be searched. The search alone takes 6 hours on the average and can take up to 15 hours, depending on the size of the vessel, layout, and cargo carried.

The second key to successful ASW is a single integrated chain of command. In World War II, Admiral King created the 10th Fleet because a single command was needed to fight the U-boat battle of the Atlantic. King believed he could better focus his existing assets, rather than asking for forces which were needed elsewhere. In his words, it was essentially a reshuffle and regrouping of units.

The third key to successful ASW is adequate communications. We need to be able to talk to each other on covered circuits.

The druggers have extensive communications themselves and often are easily tipped by our uncovered communications. We need compatible inter-agency communications systems which allow us to direct our energy to the place with the highest probability of success.

Another key to successful ASW, is the use of cumulative expertise and systems designed from inception to perform the ASW mission system. Technologies are a force multiplier which provide the edge. Advanced naval technology cannot always be applied as force multipliers in drug interdiction operations.

The final key to successful ASW is a clear set of rules of engagement. Naval personnel are not trained in law enforcement procedures. This added training would be an undertaking of great expense, as Admiral Yost has testified. We would have legal and training problems, which I will discuss later.

The Navy gradually became part of a national solution to the drug problem through increasing cooperation and support of civilian law enforcement officials in the early 1980s. When military surveillance developed more leads than civilian officials could prosecute, we loaned equipment and began to use naval platforms with Coast Guard law enforcement detachments aboard to investigate suspect carriers.

The results of past operations. From November 1984 to December 1985, a period of about 12 months, we had 181 ship days and over 1,000 aircraft hours, devoted in the Atlantic Fleet to drug interdiction. We seized three ships and 119 tons of cargo.

Between November 1985 and February 1986 we devoted 827 ship days and 2,500 flying hours. We seized nine ships and 70 tons of cargo.

Between October 1986 and April 30 1988, we devoted 1,587 ship days, 6,500 flying hours, seized 44 ships, and 223 tons of cargo.

The problems are that we must share all source intelligence for cueing. An example of the need for better cueing intelligence relates to the Caribbean. Looking at 18 months of operations there, out of every 1,000 radar contacts, 800 were visually sited; 100 boarded; which resulted in only five seizures. This is not an efficient use of limited forces.

Lack of ability to communicate in real time with other agency forces is a problem. Radar gaps in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico are extensive. As an example, to cover the body of water between Cuba and the Yacatan Peninsula in Mexico, it would take five 3D radar picket ships and then would provide only 18 minutes of contact time for a private aircraft flying at 200 feet at 180 knots.

There are some unique Navy impacts. Navy people are not trained to do police work, and requiring Navy personnel to appear at court proceedings would create readiness impacts on individual commands. We can anticipate tieing up naval personnel from parent commands in long court cases.

The Coast Guard has made arrests at sea and shielded naval personnel from becoming necessary witnesses in court cases. But it has happened. For example, a commanding officer of a PHM had to return from his deployment to the States for a Federal court case. Obviously, this is a major impact.

There is an impact on operating tempo. We are meeting our worldwide commitments today and this operating tempo results in our people based in ships and aircraft squadrons being away from their families about half of the time.

It is our policy that our people be in their home ports one-half of the time in order to provide a reasonable family life. We have so far committed resources to drug interdiction operations and been able to maintain this policy. This policy was instituted because the

American sailor told us his greatest reason for leaving the Navy was too much time away from home.

Any substantial increase in forces beyond our current commitments will result in abandonment of this policy, and you can be assured it will result in a reduction in retention of our people.

In addition, we are not funded in spare parts, steaming hours, or flying hours to increase operating tempo. And we cannot reduce training and still deploy units ready to do their jobs correctly.

Drug interdiction operations do not provide the necessary training to prepare our planes or ships to deploy to such areas as the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean Sea. Without a corresponding decrease in current commitments, an increase in operating tempo for increased drug interdiction will be paid for by the American sailor in more time at sea, and we will be less ready to deter war.

In conclusion, I, of course, believe reducing the use of drugs in this country is of utmost importance to the future of the country, and I think we in the Navy should assist in the effort.

I am not, however, convinced that interdiction efforts will result in a substantial reduction in drug usage in our country, and nothing I have experienced or read would lead me to this conclusion.

We can work to improve our interdiction efforts and this is one part of the equation. Improvement in intelligence, which makes current forces more effective, is of highest priority, and improved command, control, and communications is most important.

We also should continue to work to stop those who produce the drugs and assist our South American friends who are willing to help in this effort.

It is my opinion, however, that none of this will be successful unless we educate the young Americans to the disastrous results of drug usage, establish and enforce a clear policy of zero tolerance to its use throughout our society, and provide a deterrent test to the user.

We in the Navy had little success in deterring until the Navy leadership made up its mind to establish a clear policy of zero tolerance, provided the requisite education and a test to deter the user.

I might add, in my opinion, although I cannot quantify it for you, morale, retention, and recruitment have benefited by this drug policy.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Kelso follows:]

# STATEMENT OF
# ADMIRAL FRANK B. KELSO, II, USN
# COMMANDER IN CHIEF
# U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET

## I. INTRODUCTION

GOOD MORNING, MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.

I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE MY THOUGHTS ON THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS. IN MY VIEW, THE ILLEGAL DRUG PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES CAN ONLY BE DEALT WITH SUCCESSFULLY THROUGH A NATIONAL MULTI-FACETED DETERRENCE PROGRAM. THIS WAR AGAINST DRUGS PROGRAM MUST HAVE THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF OUR CITIZENS. AS I SEE IT, THERE ARE THREE PROBLEMS REQUIRING ACTIONS:

1. SOURCE OR SUPPLY OF DRUGS. DRUGS ARE INTRODUCED ILLEGALLY FROM ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD RANGING FROM HONG KONG AND THAILAND TO THE MIDDLE EAST, EUROPE AND THE CARIBBEAN, IN ADDITION TO DRUGS GROWN OR MANUFACTURED ILLEGALLY IN THE UNITED STATES. WE MUST WORK CLOSELY WITH THE LEADERS OF THESE COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO REDUCE THE FLOW OF DRUGS INTO THE UNITED STATES AND STOP THEIR PRODUCTION AT THE SOURCE. DOMESTICALLY, WE MUST MAKE THE RISK TOO HIGH FOR OUR OWN CITIZENS TO PRODUCE OR USE ILLEGAL DRUGS. I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM IS NOT RESTRICTED TO THE AREAS SOUTH OF THE UNITED STATES. IN MILITARY TERMS, THE DRUG SOURCE THREAT AXIS IS A DOMESTIC AND 360 DEGREE THREAT AROUND OUR ISLAND NATION. EVEN IF WE COULD SEAL OUR BORDERS, DRUGS WOULD STILL BE AVAILABLE FROM SOME DOMESTIC SOURCES IN LARGE QUANTITIES.

2. DEMAND FOR DRUGS. CONCURRENTLY WITH REDUCING THE SOURCE OF DRUGS, WE MUST REDUCE THE DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR DRUGS. ON THE DEMAND ISSUE, I MET RECENTLY WITH LATIN

AMERICAN NAVAL LEADERS WHO ALL EMPHASIZED THAT WE IN THE UNITED STATES MUST HELP THEIR NATIONS STAMP OUT THE DRUG PLAGUE THROUGH DETERRENCE IN THE DEMAND IN THIS COUNTRY. THEY SAID QUITE FRANKLY THAT WITHOUT THIS DETERRENCE IN DEMAND THEY FELT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO STAMP OUT THE OVERSEAS SOURCES. LATIN AMERICAN NAVAL LEADERS VIEW THE DRUG PROVIDERS AS A REAL THREAT TO THEIR NATIONAL AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY. WE MUST CREATE A NATIONAL CONSENSUS FOR ZERO TOLERANCE OF DRUGS THROUGH EDUCATION AND THROUGH DETERRENCE TO DRUG USAGE.

3. INTERDICTION. THE THIRD PROBLEM IS THE INTERDICTION OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION OF DRUGS. INTERDICTION IS THE MOST DIFFICULT AND MOST EXPENSIVE INITIATIVE TO FIGHT DRUGS. IN MILITARY TERMS, IT IS LIKE ATTEMPTING TO SHOOT DOWN THE MISSILE AFTER IT IS FIRED RATHER THAN HITTING THE SHOOTER. WE MUST SHOOT THE ARCHER, NOT THE ARROW! LATER IN MY STATEMENT, I WILL COMPARE OUR OPEN OCEAN ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE EXPERIENCES TO THIS DRUG INTERDICTION PROBLEM TO DEMONSTRATE THAT FINDING THE SMUGGLER AFTER HE IS AT SEA OR IN THE AIR IS LIKE FINDING A NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK.

## II. NAVY'S EXPERIENCE IN DRUG WAR

- AS A FATHER, CITIZEN, NAVAL OFFICER, AND FLEET COMMANDER, I SUPPORT FULLY THE NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS. I HAVE SEEN THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS THAT DRUGS HAVE ON OUR YOUNG PEOPLE INCLUDING OUR SAILORS. I HAVE ALSO WITNESSED THE DELETERIOUS EFFECT THE USE OF DRUGS HAD ON THE MORALE, HEALTH AND PRODUCTIVITY OF THE YOUNG AMERICANS IN UNIFORM. THEREFORE, BEFORE I DISCUSS HOW WE IN THE MILITARY AND IN THE FLEET SPECIFICALLY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO DRUG INTERDICTION, I WANT TO MAKE A COMPARISON OF HOW WE IN THE NAVY DEALT WITH THE DRUG PROBLEM

IN THE LATE 1970'S AND 1980'S AND THE PROBLEM FACING OUR NATION TODAY.

- LET ME USE THE NAVY'S EXPERIENCE IN FIGHTING OUR OWN DRUG WAR TO ADVISE YOU ON WHAT WORKED AND WHAT DID NOT WORK FOR US IN THE NAVY.

- IN THE LATE 1970'S, WE HAD BOTH A SERIOUS DRUG USER AND PUSHER PROBLEM. IN 1980, ABOUT 40% OF OUR SAILORS USED MARIJUANA RANGING FROM CASUAL EXPERIMENTAL USE TO HABITUAL ABUSE. HOWEVER, OUR NAVY EXPERIENCE WAS ESSENTIALLY A REFLECTION OF NATIONAL USAGE BY THE SAME AGE GROUP. THE SAILOR DEMAND WAS HIGH, AS IS OUR SOCIETY'S DEMAND TODAY. OUR EARLY NAVY EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AT KEEPING DRUGS OFF OUR SHIPS AND BASES, I.E., INTERDICTION. INITIALLY, WE WOULD NOT FACE UP TO THE PROBLEM AS MOST OF US BELIEVED IT WAS A PROBLEM OF OUR NATIONAL SOCIETY, AND WE COULD DO NO MORE IN THE NAVY THAN THE COUNTRY WAS WILLING TO DO. AS A RESULT, WE HAD NO USER POLICY; SOME FOLLOWED A ZERO TOLERANCE APPROACH WHILE OTHERS FOLLOWED A LENIENT POLICY. THE USERS AND PUSHERS FOUND WAYS TO USE AND SELL DRUGS TO BEAT THE SYSTEM. AT THAT TIME, THE DRUG OF CHOICE WAS PREDOMINATELY MARIJUANA, BUT TODAY THERE IS CONSIDERABLY MORE COCAINE ABUSE. WE ATTEMPTED TO SEAL OFF OUR NAVY "BORDERS." IT FAILED! USERS AND SUPPLIERS CONTINUED TO GET DRUGS. THIS ALL CHANGED WITH THE CRASH OF A EA-6B AIRCRAFT, DURING A NIGHT LANDING ABOARD USS NIMITZ, ON 26 MAY 1981. FOURTEEN PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 48 INJURED DURING THE CRASH AND FIRE. LATER, IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT TRACES OF ILLEGAL DRUGS WERE FOUND IN THE BODIES OF SEVERAL FLIGHT DECK CREWMEN. IT WAS THIS TRAGIC 1981 INCIDENT THAT CAUSED A MAXIMUM COMBINATION OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND A STRONG DETERRENCE POLICY, STARTING WITH LEADERSHIP FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND DOWN TO THE LOWEST RANKING PETTY OFFICER. WE ALSO INSTITUTED EDUCATION PROGRAMS, MANDATORY RANDOM URINALYSIS DRUG TESTING, ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL ACTION AGAINST USERS AND DISTRIBUTORS. WE CUT THAT 40% FIGURE IN HALF IN ONE YEAR AND EVENTUALLY TO A THREE PERCENT DRUG USAGE FIGURE TODAY. THE MAIN FACTOR IN OUR NAVY SUCCESS WAS NOT NEW REGULATIONS OR LAWS: IT WAS ADHERENCE TO POLICY BY ALL IN A COMMAND, A TESTING SYSTEM FOR DETERRENCE AND EVENTUALLY PEER PRESSURE BY ALL HANDS THAT DRUG USAGE WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED IN THE WORKPLACE, IN BERTHING COMPARTMENTS, ON LIBERTY OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE NAVY. IN SHORT, THE NAVY SOCIETY SAID NO TO DRUGS AND MADE IT STICK! WE SIMPLY FOUND THAT MOST AMERICAN SAILORS DID NOT WANT DRUG USAGE ENTERED INTO THEIR SERVICE RECORDS. WHEN THEY HAD TO FACE A DETERRENT (URINALYSIS TEST), IT NO LONGER WAS A LARK TO PLAY WITH DRUGS. WHY SHOULD WE THINK TODAY'S HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS WILL BE ANY DIFFERENT?

– THE NAVY FOUND INTERDICTION DIDN'T WORK. WE SEALED A SHIP'S BORDER, BUT DRUG DOGS CONTINUED TO FIND DRUGS ON OUR SHIPS AND STATIONS. IT WAS NOT UNTIL WE DEVELOPED A DETERRENCE PROGRAM LINKING STRONG ACTION AGAINST THE SELLER AND USER, IN COMBINATION WITH A TOTAL NAVY ENVIRONMENT WHERE DRUGS WERE NOT ACCEPTED PROFESSIONALLY, THAT WE WERE SUCCESSFUL. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT CIVIL LIBERTIES SHOULD BE CURTAILED TO SOLVE THE DRUG PROBLEM. THEY SHOULD NOT BE. IN THE EARLY DAYS OF OUR DRUG PROBLEM IN THE NAVY, I WORRIED THAT WE MAY HAVE PUNISHED SOME INNOCENT PERSONNEL. THE ONLY WAY WE HAD TO KNOW IF A SAILOR USED DRUGS WAS BY POSSESSION OR BY WITNESSES. I RECALL ONE CASE WHERE ONE YOUNG SAILOR SUPPLIED INFORMATION ABOUT ONE USER WHICH LEAD ULTIMATELY TO ABOUT 250 STUDENTS REMOVED FROM A TECHNICAL EDUCATION PROGRAM. ALL WERE IMPLICATED BY THE ACCUSATIONS OF OTHER SAILORS. WITH TODAY'S VALID TEST, WE CAN IDENTIFY THE USER; WE CAN DEAL WITH THE CORRECT CULPRIT WITHOUT ANY GUESSING.

EVEN WITH EXTENSIVE DRUG SEARCHES, OUR EXPERIENCE WAS THAT THERE IS NO 100 PERCENT SOLUTION THROUGH INTERDICTION ALONE. OUR SOCIETY MUST FACE THE PROBLEM SQUARELY AS WE DID IN THE MILITARY, THAT WE NEED TO DETER THE USER TO REDUCE THE DEMAND.

## III. DRUG INTERDICTION EXPERIENCE: PROBLEMS

- WE IN THE NAVY DID NOT APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTY OF STOPPING THE SUPPLY TO OUR SAILORS AND THAT IS MINOR COMPARED TO THE DIFFICULTY OF SEALING OUR BORDERS.

- FOR EXAMPLE, THE EXTENT OF THE INTERDICTION PROBLEM WAS CITED BY FORMER SECDEF WEINBERGER WHEN HE STATED THAT:

  -- 290 MILLION PEOPLE CROSS OUR BORDERS UNCHECKED FOR DRUGS EACH YEAR.

  -- 30 MILLION AIR PASSENGERS ARRIVE UNCHECKED FOR DRUGS ON 500.000 COMMERCIAL AIRLINERS EACH YEAR.

  -- 7.5 MILLION COMMERCIAL CARGO CONTAINERS ARRIVE UNCHECKED FOR DRUGS EACH YEAR BY LAND/SEA.

  -- 100 MILLION PIECES OF MAIL CROSS OUR BORDERS UNCHECKED FOR DRUGS EACH YEAR.

  -- 89 MILLION LAND VEHICLES ENTER UNCHECKED FOR DRUGS EACH YEAR.

- A CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS STUDY CONCLUDES THAT, TO ATTEMPT TO SEAL OUR U.S. EAST AND GULF COAST MARITIME BORDERS, IT WOULD REQUIRE 111 SHIPS, 12 ORION P-3C MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT, AND 16 HAWKEYE E-2C RADAR AIRCRAFT. THIS IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN A SEVEN DAY, 24 HOUR WATCH. IN ADDITION, AIR FORCE E-3A MARITIME

AWACS AIRCRAFT WOULD BE NEEDED TO COVER THE AIR PICTURE IN THE GULF OF MEXICO APPROACHES.

- THE CNA STUDY IS BASED ON INTERDICTING COASTAL FREIGHTERS WITH TONNAGES IN EXCESS OF 1000 TONS. THEREFORE, THIS IS A CONSERVATIVE STUDY. AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT IN OUR MOST RECENT DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN CONDUCTED 9 - 26 MAY 1988, WE HAD FOUR DESTROYER/FRIGATE SHIPS WITH A TOTAL OF TWO LAMPS HELICOPTERS, AND ONE OILER. THEY HAD 571 SURFACE RADAR CONTACTS, BOARDED 35 SUSPECT VESSELS WHICH RESULTED IN ONE SEIZURE. TO IMPROVE THE BOARDING RATE EFFECTIVENESS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE STUDY GOALS, IT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED 17 SHIPS CONDUCTING FOUR TIMES THE NUMBER OF SUSPECT VESSEL BOARDINGS. THE TOTAL COST FOR THE FIVE SHIP OPERATION, INCLUDING SUPPORT SHIPS/AIRCRAFT, WAS 6.5 MILLION DOLLARS. THE ONE SEIZURE AMOUNTED TO $405 THOUSAND WORTH OF MARIJUANA.

## IV. COMPARISON OF ASW EXPERIENCE IN INTERDICTION OPS

- AS A NAVAL OFFICER, I VIEW OUR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AS HAVING A PARALLEL TO THE INTERDICTION PROBLEM OF THE DRUG WAR.

- FIRST, 75 PERCENT OF THE WORLD IS COVERED BY WATER. THE SUBMARINE THREAT IS A 360 DEGREE THREAT AS IS THE DRUG SMUGGLING THREAT IN OPEN OCEAN AIR/SEA LANES. EVEN IF WE JUST FOCUS OUR EFFORTS ON THE GULF OF MEXICO AND THE CARIBBEAN, THIS IS EQUIVALENT TO SEARCHING ALL THE STATES EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI OR 1.5 MILLION SQUARE MILES. A SINGLE DESTROYER RADAR CAN COVER LESS THAN 1/10TH OF ONE PERCENT OF THAT AREA. IT WOULD REQUIRE ABOUT 1200 DESTROYERS FOR THIS AREA ALONE. ADDED TO THIS PROBLEM IS THE NUMBER OF FALSE CONTACTS GENERATED, AND THE LIMITED RANGE OF OUR RADARS TO DETECT SMALL SHIPS.

- THIS IS LIKE SEARCHING FOR A NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK. IN THE ASW

ANALOGY, WHEN WE CONCENTRATE OUR ASW FORCES IN ONE AREA THEN THE ENEMY SHIFTS TO ANOTHER; SMUGGLERS DO THE SAME. THE SUBMARINE SKIPPER IS WILY TO PREVENT DETECTION AND ATTACK; THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS ARE EQUALLY WILY TO PREVENT DETECTION AND PROSECUTION.

- THE FIRST KEY TO SUCCESSFUL ASW (AND DRUG INTERDICTION) IS ACCURATE AND SHARED INTELLIGENCE ON THE POINT OF ORIGIN, DESTINATION AND MOST LIKELY COURSE TO HIS MISSION AREA. OVER A VAST SEA AREA, WE MUST USE INTELLIGENCE TO CUE ASW FORCES AND NOT WASTE EXPENSIVE AND LIMITED ASSETS. ALSO, IN ASW, WE HAVE A GOOD IDEA OF THE TYPE OF SUB FOR WHICH WE ARE LOOKING. EVEN ARMED WITH THAT DATA, FINDING A SUB IS NOT EASY. IN WARTIME, ONCE WE FIND HIM, WE ATTACK; WE DON'T HAVE TO BOARD, INSPECT AND THEN TOW THE SUB IN FOR LENGTHY COURT PROCEEDINGS. TO BE EFFECTIVE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS, EVERY SHIP AND AIRCRAFT MUST BE SEARCHED. THE SEARCH ALONE TAKES SIX HOURS ON THE AVERAGE AND CAN TAKE UP TO 15 HOURS DEPENDING ON THE SIZE OF THE VESSEL, LAYOUT AND CARGO CARRIED.

- THE SECOND KEY TO SUCCESSFUL ASW IS A SINGLE INTEGRATED CHAIN OF COMMAND. IN WWII, ADM KING CREATED THE TENTH FLEET BECAUSE A SINGLE COMMAND WAS NEEDED TO FIGHT THE U-BOAT BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC. KING BELIEVED HE COULD BETTER FOCUS HIS EXISTING LIMITED ASW ASSETS RATHER THAN ASKING FOR FORCES WHICH WERE NEEDED ELSEWHERE. IN HIS WORDS "IT WAS ESSENTIALLY A RE-SHUFFLE AND RE-GROUPING OF UNITS UNDER ONE COMMAND RATHER THAN ONE OF THE NEW CREATIONS THAT WERE POPULAR IN WARTIME WASHINGTON."

-THE THIRD KEY TO SUCCESSFUL ASW IS ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS. WE NEED TO BE ABLE TO TALK TO EACH OTHER ON COVERED CIRCUITS. THE DRUGGERS HAVE EXTENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS THEMSELVES AND ALSO ARE EASILY TIPPED BY OUR UNCOVERED COMMUNICATIONS. WE NEED COMPATIBLE INTERAGENCY SECURE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS WHICH ALLOW

US TO DIRECT OUR ENERGY TO THE PLACE WITH THE HIGHEST PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS.

- ANOTHER KEY TO SUCCESSFUL ASW IS THE YEARS OF CUMMULATIVE EXPERTISE AND SYSTEMS DESIGNED FROM INCEPTION TO PERFORM THE ASW MISSION. SYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES ARE A FORCE MULTIPLIER WHICH PROVIDE THE EDGE IN ASW. ADVANCED NAVAL TECHNOLOGY CANNOT ALWAYS BE APPLIED AS FORCE MULTIPLIERS IN DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS.

- THE FINAL KEY TO SUCCESSFUL ASW IS A CLEAR SET OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. NAVAL PERSONNEL ARE NOT TRAINED IN LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES. THIS ADDED TRAINING WOULD BE A TREMENDOUS UNDERTAKING AT GREAT EXPENSE AS ADMIRAL YOST HAS ALREADY TESTIFIED. WE WOULD HAVE LEGAL AND TRAINING PROBLEMS WHICH I WILL DISCUSS LATER.

## V. DRUG INTERDICTION EXPERIENCE: PROBLEMS.

- THE NAVY GRADUALLY BECAME A PART OF THE NATIONAL SOLUTION TO THE DRUG PROBLEM THROUGH INCREASING COOPERATION AND SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IN THE EARLY 1980'S.

- WHEN MILITARY SURVEILLANCE DEVELOPED MORE "LEADS" THAN CIVILIAN OFFICIALS COULD PROSECUTE, WE LOANED EQUIPMENT AND BEGAN TO USE NAVAL PLATFORMS WITH COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT DETACHMENTS ABOARD TO INVESTIGATE SUSPECT CARRIERS. THE RESULTS OF PAST SUPPORT OPERATIONS:

NOV 84-DEC 85 (2 MONTHS)

| SHIP DAYS | (P-3C/E-2C/ OV-10/LAMPS) FLYING HRS | SEIZURES/ | CONTRABAND |
|---|---|---|---|
| 181 | 1,062 | 3 SHIPS | 119 TONS |

NOV 85-FEB 86 (2 MONTHS)

| SHIP DAYS | (P-3C/E-2C/ OV-10/LAMPS) FLYING HRS | SEIZURES/CONTRABAND | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 827 | 2,497 | 9 SHIPS | 70 TONS |

OCT 86-30APR88 (18 MONTHS)

| | SHIP DAYS | (P-3C/E-2C/ OV-10/LAMPS) FLYING HRS | SEIZURES/CONTRABAND | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1,587 | 6,450 | 44 SHIPS | 223 TONS |
| TOTALS | 2,595 DAYS | 10.009 HRS | 56 SHIPS | 412 TONS |

– PROBLEMS:

--SHARING ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE FOR CUEING. AN EXAMPLE OF THE NEED FOR BETTER CUEING INTELLIGENCE RELATES TO THE CARIBBEAN. LOOKING AT 18 MONTHS OF OPERATIONS THERE, OUT OF EVERY 1,000 RADAR CONTACTS, 800 WERE VISUALLY SIGHTED, 100 BOARDED, WHICH RESULTED IN ONLY FIVE SEIZURES. THIS IS NOT THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF LIMITED FORCES.

-- LACK OF ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE IN REAL TIME WITH OTHER AGENCY FORCES.

-- RADAR GAPS IN CARIBBEAN AND GULF OF MEXICO ARE EXTENSIVE. AS AN EXAMPLE, TO COVER THE BODY OF WATER BETWEEN CUBA AND THE YUCATAN PENINSULA IN MEXICO, IT WOULD TAKE FIVE 3D RADAR PICKET SHIPS, AND THEN WOULD PROVIDE ONLY 18 MINUTES OF CONTACT TIME FOR A PRIVATE AIRCRAFT FLYING AT 200 FEET AT 180 KNOTS.

## VI. SOME UNIQUE NAVY IMPACTS:

- LEGAL (NAVY PEOPLE ARE NOT TRAINED TO DO POLICE WORK AND REQUIRING NAVY PERSONNEL TO APPEAR AT COURT PROCEEDINGS WOULD CREATE READINESS IMPACTS ON INDIVIDUAL COMMANDS). WE CAN ANTICIPATE TYING UP NAVAL PERSONNEL AND PARENT COMMANDS IN PROLONGED COURT CASES. THE COAST GUARD HAS MADE ARRESTS AT SEA AND SHIELDED NAVAL PERSONNEL FROM BECOMING NECESSARY WITNESSES IN COURT CASES, BUT IT HAS HAPPENED. FOR EXAMPLE, A COMMANDING OFFICER OF A PHM HAD TO RETURN FROM DEPLOYMENT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR A FEDERAL COURT CASE. OBVIOUSLY, THIS WAS OF MAJOR OPERATIONAL IMPACT. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE WILL BE A LINKAGE BETWEEN DEPLOYABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS/UNITS AND COURT SCHEDULES.

- IMPACT OF INCREASED OPERATING TEMPO. WE ARE MEETING OUR WORLD WIDE DEPLOYMENT COMMITMENTS TODAY AND THIS OPERATING TEMPO RESULTS IN OUR PEOPLE, BASED IN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS, BEING AWAY FROM THEIR FAMILIES ABOUT ONE HALF OF THE TIME. IT IS NAVY POLICY THAT OUR PEOPLE WILL BE IN THEIR HOMEPORTS ONE HALF OF THE TIME TO PROVIDE THEM A REASONABLE FAMILY LIFE. WE HAVE, SO FAR, COMMITTED RESOURCES TO DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS AND MAINTAINED THIS POLICY. THIS POLICY WAS INSTITUTED BECAUSE THE AMERICAN SAILOR TOLD US HIS GREATEST REASON FOR LEAVING THE NAVY WAS TOO MUCH TIME AWAY FROM HOME. ANY SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN FORCES BEYOND OUR CURRENT COMMITMENTS WILL RESULT IN ABANDONMENT OF THIS POLICY AND YOU CAN BE ASSURED IT WILL RESULT IN A REDUCTION IN RETENTION OF OUR PEOPLE. IN ADDITION, WE ARE NOT FUNDED IN SPARE PARTS, STEAMING HOURS OR FLYING HOURS TO INCREASE OPERATING TEMPO, AND WE CANNOT REDUCE TRAINING AND STILL DEPLOY UNITS READY TO DO THEIR JOBS CORRECTLY. DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS DO NOT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TRAINING TO PREPARE OUR PLANES OR SHIPS TO DEPLOY TO SUCH AREAS AS THE PERSIAN GULF OR MEDITERRANEAN SEA. WITHOUT A

CORRESPONDING DECREASE IN CURRENT COMMITMENTS, AN INCREASE IN OPERATING TEMPO FOR INCREASED DRUG INTERDICTION WILL BE PAID FOR BY THE AMERICAN SAILOR IN MORE TIME AT SEA AND WE WILL HAVE A NAVY LESS READY TO DETER WAR.

## VII. CONCLUSION:

— I, OF COURSE, BELIEVE REDUCING THE USE OF DRUGS IN THIS COUNTRY IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY, AND I THINK WE IN THE NAVY SHOULD ASSIST IN THE EFFORT. I AM NOT, HOWEVER, CONVINCED THAT INTERDICTION EFFORTS WILL RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN DRUG USAGE IN OUR COUNTRY AND NOTHING I HAVE EXPERIENCED OR READ WOULD LEAD ME TO THAT CONCLUSION. WE CAN WORK TO IMPROVE OUR INTERDICTION EFFORTS AS THIS IS ONE PART OF THE EQUATION. IMPROVEMENT IN INTELLIGENCE WHICH MAKES CURRENT FORCES MORE EFFECTIVE IS OF HIGHEST PRIORITY AND IMPROVED COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS IS MOST IMPORTANT. WE ALSO SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK TO STOP THOSE WHO PRODUCE THE DRUGS AND ASSIST OUR SOUTH AMERICAN FRIENDS WHO ARE WILLING TO HELP IN THIS EFFORT. IT IS, MY OPINION HOWEVER, THAT NONE OF THIS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL UNLESS WE EDUCATE THE YOUNG AMERICAN TO THE DISASTROUS RESULTS OF DRUG USAGE, ESTABLISH AND ENFORCE A CLEAR POLICY OF ZERO TOLERANCE TO ITS USE THROUGHOUT OUR SOCIETY AND PROVIDE A DETERRENT TEST TO THE USER. WE IN THE NAVY HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN DETERRING USE UNTIL THE NAVY LEADERSHIP MADE UP ITS MIND TO ESTABLISH A CLEAR POLICY OF ZERO TOLERANCE; PROVIDED THE REQUISITE EDUCATION AGAINST USE; AND A TEST THAT DETERRED THE USER. I MIGHT ADD THAT IN MY OPINION, ALTHOUGH I CAN NOT QUANTIFY IT FOR YOU, MORALE, RETENTION AND RECRUITMENT HAVE BENEFITTED BY THIS DRUG POLICY. MOST AMERICAN SAILORS ARE PROUD TO SAY NO TO DRUGS.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much, Admiral.

We've got an excellent turnout from the House and Senate, and we thank our House colleagues for coming over. And I think it is obvious to everyone we are not going to be able to ask questions for very long, and we are going to have a very hard time getting around.

So what we are going to do is alternate between two House members and two Senate members. We will have a 4-minute rule. We will recognize members on the basis of when they came in for the hearing, the so-called early bird rule.

If the House has another procedure you would like to ask us to implement for you, we would be glad to do that. We will recognize our members on the earlybird rule.

I am going to defer to Congressman Aspin and then Congressman Dickinson or their designees for the first questions.

Chairman Aspin. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield to the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Nichols.

Representative Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I listened very carefully, Mr. Secretary, to the discussion here this morning. And I want to commend you on the list of things you feel like you can do. I think they certainly beg the attention of the committees here when we go into conference.

One thing, however, that I notice was absent in your recommendations, and I would like to make inquiry about it, and that relates to the trip that the committee made and the hearings that we had in Miami. Numerous witnesses there from the Coast Guard and from other agencies stressed the fact that the military could provide additional help through additional intelligence.

Now, right or wrong, that perception is what we picked up very definitely from the witnesses. And so I must ask you and your panel here first, what is the Department of Defense doing currently in the way of providing intelligence to the Coast Guard and other agencies on ships, planes, that may be leaving the Central American countries coming in here?

Second, what kind of priority have you assigned, has the intelligence community assigned, to requests for support from the narcotics interdiction people?

Third, has consideration been given to increasing or stepping up that priority?

Secretary Carlucci. Mr. Nichols, we are providing both strategic and tactical intelligence to the law enforcement agencies. But I think you put your finger on an area where we could do more. Part of the problem is connectivity and the problem of classification.

Sometimes the law enforcement agencies are not equipped to handle classified information.

I do not set intelligence priorities. That is a function of the DCI. I would have to defer to him for the specifics on the collection priority assigned to drugs. Going back to my own days in CIA, which is now some time ago, I know that a very high priority was set, and so I anticipate that the answer will be that it has a fairly high priority.

I would like to submit something for the record on that.

[Refer to questions for the record.]

Secretary CARLUCCI. Let me ask General Herres, who has had some first-hand experience with the law enforcement agencies in this area, to amplify on my response.

General HERRES. Yes, sir, Mr. Nichols. That is one area I found, too, where I think we can do more. There are efforts underway to do more.

We are at the point now where, when we carve out a more significant role here, it is going to take more people to do the job. We have provided a fair amount of training. We have people already working the effort full time.

I could talk about it in more detail in a closed hearing. And as you know, we orient all our intelligence collection to sources and methods that focus on the Soviet Union and the rest of the military and national security threats. So there is the problem of mixing sources and methods in a different environment and how do we classify things, how do we compartment things, how do we encrypt the way we communicate, and so forth. These are all problems that should be addressed.

There is work ongoing to address some of those problems, and perhaps a classified response to your question might be more helpful. But I can tell you that we are talking, not on the order of tens of people, but over 100 people who work full time in various agencies on this problem, and others who work part time on this problem. It is a difficult problem. You know, intelligence in this area is quite different from the kind that we normally collect.

However, it occurred to me that there are some techniques that we could try. I do not know whether we might hit a few dry wells, but there are some techniques and methods that we might use that might be applicable to this problem. Some have thought of some of these before, and perhaps some analysis of all that might be fruitful.

Reconnaissance missions, for example, consolidated and coordinated in some fashion with surveillance missions, might be of some use. We might be able to do that on an incidental to training basis, a non-interference to training basis, or at modest cost.

So I think there is potential here.

Representative NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Nichols.

Congressman Hopkins.

Representative HOPKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nichols mentioned the word "perception." The truth is what the people perceive it to be and the perception today is that you have the equipment, that you have the money, and that you have the responsibility.

Now, your responsibility is to protect this country when it is being attacked, to defend this country, particularly if we are at war. Some people think this is war.

My question is, at the end of your statement, Mr. Chairman, you said your role must be an appropriate one. If we are being attacked, if we are being threatened, if we are at war, what more has to happen for your role to become more appropriate?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would submit there is a very significant distinction, Mr. Hopkins, between law enforcement and the military. At the risk of oversimplification, the military are trained and equipped to shoot everybody who comes over the hill. They are not trained and equipped to distinguish the good guys from the bad guys.

They are trained and equipped with weapons of mass destruction, and that is a very important distinction between warfare and law enforcement. To tell a military man, as Admiral Kelso said to take the ship and in 2 years you will process a court case, that is not what we did in the Persian Gulf.

The training and the equipment are very different.

Now, if you want to seal the borders and you want to use the military to do it, then effectively seal the borders and let nobody come in and everybody who does gets shot down. The military is equipped to do that. We would have to divert assets because we do not have that complete an air defense system in this country, but that would be a military role.

I would submit that statements like "we are at war," are not terribly helpful in defining the military role. As I have tried to explain today, we have equipment, but it is equipment that is geared to modern warfare.

You say we have the money. We have the money for our military mission, and for 4 years in a row our budgets have been going down. We are in an extremely financially constrained environment.

As for the responsibility, just because people say it is a national security responsibility does not mean it is automatically a Defense Department responsibility. Counter-intelligence is a national security responsibility, but it is handled by the FBI.

We have to be very precise when we talk about using the military and get away from highly generalized statements.

Representative HOPKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. I know the House has got a vote, so we will switch to the Senate side. Just a couple of questions I would like to ask.

The testing emphasis that has been given in the military is very interesting, and Admiral, you were very high on the testing program in the military and you say you have removed guesswork.

Now, in polygraphs and other kinds of tests we found very large error rates. What kind of error rates are you finding in testing military personnel?

Admiral KELSO. When we first started, we had a good many errors because we did not realize how careful we had to be administratively with the system. You have to have a very good record of the chain of events from the time that accurately ensures the right persons are tested and you keep track of that sample perfectly. Otherwise you will have problems with it.

We have improved that considerably. The test itself is highly accurate. If the person tests positive the first time and he says, hey, I do not do that, we give him another chance. He gets another test.

If he continues to test positive, then there is enough tests that it will take care of the inaccuracy of the test.

Chairman NUNN. How much does it cost to have an accurate test, per test?

Admiral KELSO. I will have to give you that for the record. I do not think there would be any problem with furnishing that.

[The information follows:]

COST PER TEST

The average cost per test conducted by Navy labs is $15 per test which includes initial screening and confirmation if necessary. Confirmation of tests conducted on Naval personnel is required 3 to 4 percent of the time.

Admiral Kelso. We have tested this year about 200,000 in the Atlantic Fleet, so it is fairly extensive in the military today. And it is fairly accurate.

Chairman Nunn. Could you tell us what the accuracy is?

Secretary Carlucci. I am informed, Mr. Chairman, we have had no false positives in 3 years of testing in the military.

Chairman Nunn. Zero?

Secretary Carlucci. That is right, sir. The tests have been validated by either other tests or admissions, and we have gotten the false positives down to zero.

Chairman Nunn. Let me see if I can frame this so that we can find a constructive and a positive role for the military that we can have a consensus on. It is my understanding that, Admiral Kelso, that you probably have more operating experience in the military than anyone else, and you certainly have a lot of expertise in this area.

You are coming down strong on two points, as I understand it, and I think both of them are something that I would identify with. One is you believe the military can do more in furnishing intelligence, as I read your statement; and two, you believe the military can do more in helping with communications.

That intelligence, knowing which ship has the drugs on the ship, seems to me to be all-important and does not simply involve taking an AWACS over the Caribbean and flying around for hours and hours and observing thousands and thousands of vessels, none of which have written on top of it "We have drugs on board."

You have got to know which ship has the drugs on it. Now, how can the military be effective in both intelligence and communications?

Admiral Kelso. I certainly believe that we should do anything we can to make the intelligence more effective. I think General Herres is right, and if I could talk in classified session I could tell you some of the things we have done to improve the intelligence. We should continue to do that.

I do not think it is necessarily the military's role to be able to give human intelligence, which would be very important in this issue, to have some idea of when it is leaving, what ship it is on, and that sort of thing.

Chairman Nunn. I am talking about physical intelligence.

Admiral Kelso. Physical intelligence, and anything we can do to improve it. Yes, we should very much try to improve the intelligence, because if you have intelligence and you know where you are looking, you do not have to expend so many resources.

If you do not have that kind of intelligence, you have to look at every contact. And the greatest resource expenditures are those that are false contacts. So you look at 100 and you find one has the drugs on it.

If you had some sort of cue to get down to maybe look at, one of these five will have it, I agree, I think that is very important to us, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Would it make more sense to have military aircraft, surveillance aircraft, used on call when we have an intelligence tip, rather than simply to have them fly around all the time?

Admiral KELSO. Yes, sir, we agree completely. You are far more effective if you have an idea of when you need it, rather than just say, all right, I am going to fly a mission for 50 hours and go out and surveil. You may find absolutely nothing, whereas if you had a tip, 1 hour's flying time might be productive for you.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I would like for all of you to turn your attention to the question of how the military could be more effective. We are going to come out of this conference with some sort of increased role for the military. We all know that.

Both bills gave very strong directions. Now, the question for our conferees is how we do it in a way that is effective and that is consistent with both our drug enforcement goals, our military readiness, and our overall perspective about the appropriate role for military and law enforcement.

I hope that we can bear down on those areas where we do have agreement. It seems to me that those two areas are intelligence and command, control, and communication in some fashion.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will just pick up on that. I add again this element of being cost effective. Even though you, Mr. Secretary, are charged with the DOD role, undoubtedly you, or your associates, have looked at the overall war on drugs and have some evaluation of where the dollars can be spent most cost effectively.

Now, it seems to me, having participated throughout these hearings and done a considerable amount of independent study and also having examined the RAND report, that interdiction is perhaps the least cost effective of our dollars being spent.

That is the role in which you have perhaps the greatest potential. Certainly if we limit—and I think we probably should—any arrest authority, although I am opposed to any arrest authority, but if we are going to do it beyond the continental limits, the interdiction role plus the intelligence that the chairman mentioned is where your primary concern or ability to augment these operations that you now have rests.

So let us go back to the question of cost effectiveness. Do you agree with me that perhaps interdiction is the least costly?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do agree that it is the least cost effective. And without having given it any thought or having had the benefit of staff advice, I dare say that the measure that I announced while you and the chairman were out, that is to require defense contractors to provide a drug-free environment, may turn out to be more cost effective than much of the interdiction that we do.

I personally believe that the demand side is much more cost effective than the supply side, and that on the supply side you are dealing with quicksilver.

Senator Warner. Well, I concur in that. Certainly the hearings before this committee have documented that the demand side is where the dollars can be most effectively expanded.

Now, let us assume we have $100 million the Congress determines it wants to put into this interdiction program. Where can it be spent most cost effectively? By adding it to the Coast Guard budget or by adding it to the DOD budget?

Secretary Carlucci. I think it could be handled most effectively by putting it in the Coast Guard budget. But once again, let me argue that DOD is not a slush fund for other Government agencies.

Senator Warner. I am not suggesting it is coming out of your accounts. I am just suggesting that we want to surge ahead and apply more dollars to the drug effort.

I simply say, given the $100 million——

Secretary Carlucci. I would put it in the drug enforcement agency. An AWACS or an F-14 or an F-4 or whatever you may have is not cost effective. They were not designed for this mission.

Senator Warner. That is clear in your testimony—it is not cost effective. Although you are ready to stand up and salute the Commander in Chief's orders if he is responsive to the Congress, we should have it documented that there are more cost-effective ways to spend these dollars in interdiction, as well as on the demand side, back in the domestic law enforcement.

Secretary Carlucci. That is my firm view, Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Now, Mr. Secretary, I am constrained to ask another question here this morning unrelated to drugs, because the House and Senate Armed Services Committees are meeting this afternoon on some final decisions with respect to this budget.

On the top of that decision list is how we allocate funds in our strategic programs, and more specifically the allocation of funds between Midgetman and rail MX mobile. This morning we were greeted in the press with stories that the Democratic nominee, Mr. Dukakis, says, "We do not need MX missiles running around on railroad cars. We need an antitank weapon."

The Post reports this morning: "And he wishes to pay for some of his programs in the military by killing some nuclear weapon systems, including the proposed Midgetman missile and the mobile version of the MX missile system."

Now, my question to you is, given the fact that the Soviets have put tremendous emphasis on mobility, they now have operational systems mobile on road and on rail, and I do not know of anyone but a handful in the Congress of the United States who want to kill both programs—there has been an argument and a divisive one on which program should go forward, but not kill both.

Indeed, this is first grade student logic, to kill both of these programs in the face of the Soviet emphasis on mobility.

I ask you, what is the repercussion if a future President were to kill both of these mobile programs?

Secretary Carlucci. Well, Senator Warner, as you know, traditionally Defense Secretaries do not get involved in political campaigns.

Senator Warner. I recognize that.

Senator Levin. That is a great tradition. Let us maintain it this morning. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. The concept of mobility originated under a Democratic administration and a Democratic Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, put the emphasis on mobility.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, Senator Warner's time has expired. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. It has expired on the question, not on the response.

Chairman NUNN. I do not think the MX or the Midgetman are going to do much on the drug problem, as far as I can determine. I think that is a subject for another day.

But if you would like to answer, go ahead.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, let me only say that I think it is vitally important that we have a mobile missile capability in this country. Our fixed silos are extremely vulnerable. The Soviets could cover them with three SS-18 warheads to each silo.

So what you are talking about is, effectively, the end of the triad. Moreover, to have nothing but fixed silos would be highly destabilizing and it would be very tempting for a first strike.

Finally, in light of what you pointed out, that the Soviets have two mobile systems that are operational, if we were to end up with no mobile system in this country we would have lost very significant bargaining leverage in the START talks.

I do not see how you could get a START agreement under those circumstances.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, I generally agree with you. I think it would be interesting if you made that statement to whoever in the administration proposed that we ban mobility in the arms control talks, which has been our position for the last couple of years.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Our position is banning mobility until we can get verification, and we are working on the verification regime. We have submitted a very extensive mobile verification regime.

Chairman NUNN. But the verification regime that you have submitted, now that we are completely off the scope of these hearings, limits the mobility and designates a very limited area for that mobility. So you are moving in the very opposite direction than you are talking about.

But let me defer to Congressman Hunter now, and I hope we can stay on the subject of the drug hearings.

Representative HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, let me pose a scenario to you and show you something that a number of us on Armed Services on the House side think you can do.

Last year we saw over 300,000 pounds of cocaine flown into this country, almost exclusively across the southern border of the United States. The success rate for entry was about 98 percent. That means we caught less than 2 percent.

That means we caught less than 2 percent of them with the Customs and Coast Guard assets that you in 1986 told us could do the job if we beefed up a bit. The reason we are not catching those planes is because there is no radar. You do not catch aircraft, whether you shoot them down or simply follow them down, unless you have radar.

Let me pose to you the prospect or the possibility of establishing with military assets, because it is the only agency that has the assets, aerial radar coverage of the southern border of the United States, at least during hours of darkness, which is when these planes come in, low level with their lights off.

If you will look at that picture of the United States in front of you, you will see a number, in fact over 20, red dots and blue dots on the southern border. Those, gentlemen, are naval air stations and Air Force bases of the United States—testimony to many years of southern domination of the House Armed Services and Senate Armed Services Committees. [Laughter].

The idea that we have to build more military construction for you folks to be able to involve yourselves in drug interdiction is nonsense. Also, the idea that somehow we have to guard the Bering Straits, which was your response to our first proposal, is also nonsense.

No drug planes are coming across the Bering Straits. With regard to Canada, Mr. Secretary, we are a net exporter of cocaine to Canada. The planes are flying north, not south. You do not have to put a bunch of AWACS across the northern border of the United States.

You have today 98 E-2C's in the inventory. Four you have loaned to Coast Guard and Customs. We have 27 being repaired in naval air rework facilities. We have 16 in the fleet. You have deployed four per carrier. We have four carriers out—16 deployed out of 98.

Now, you have another 16 in what we call near-term workup. Those are the planes that will go out and ulimately replace in 5 or 6 months the fleet aircraft that are deployed around the world right now.

You also have—and we propose to leave those alone. You also have 16 that are being used for training for new pilots. We propose to leave those alone.

That leaves, Mr. Secretary, another 16 aircraft that are not working with the fleet. They are undergoing long-term workup. That means they do not deploy for 9 to 15 months.

Now, according to OP-05 they are only getting 25.7 hours worth of flight time per month. That is 25 air crews. He told me, Admiral Ilg, that they need 40 if they are going to be combat ready, and he said, you in Congress took away our flying hours.

I asked: Well, would you fly in the drug wars? And he said: Well, we would rather fly in the drug wars than not fly at all, which is largely what is happening now. 25.7 hours a month. They need 39 or 40.

If you took those 16 aircraft and you used them with the existing Aerostats—we have an Aerostat in New Mexico that just went up. It has approximately the footprint of an E-2C. If you took the Aerostats in Florida—there are two of those up.

If you took the four E-2C's that Customs and Coast Guard have and you took the four P-3's that Customs and Coast Guard have and you took the one Lockhead converted P-3 that has now an E-2C radar on it and you used only one of two AWACS, maybe gave them one orbit so you would not draw down on the AWACS capability or reserve, you could in fact cover the entire southern border of the United States, at least during hours of darkness when these planes come in, low and slow with their lights off.

Now, Mr. Secretary, there is no shooting down. The way you catch these drug planes is with a triad of tools. You need first your radar, either an Aerostat or a radar aircraft. He sees on his radar the drug plane coming north.

He scrambles a chase plane. Currently we have 14 Citation II's, jet aircraft with F-16 radar. They can follow planes at night. They also have FLIRs. He scrambles on the drug plane and as the drug plane goes north, the tracker plane follows the drug plane north.

Recently they made a bust in Senator Warner's area in Leesburg, VA, doing precisely this. The drug plane travels north with the tracker plane following him. As the drug plane begins to descend to some remote airstrip, a Blackhawk helicopter which has been alerted and is also part of the team comes in.

It has night vision goggles, at least for the pilot, the crews. And that helicopter can contain Customs agents. If you do not want to make the arrest, put Customs agents on board the Blackhawk.

But the Blackhawk comes down and lands literally right next to or in front of the drug plane as he taxies to a halt at this remote airstrip.

That is the way we catch these planes. We do not shoot people down. We do not use weapons of death and destruction, and we do not have to leave the Straits of Malacca unguarded.

Now let us go to costs. OP-05 tells us that for 16 E-2C aircraft for 1 month for 60 hours apiece, flying hours one month, $1.7 million. OP-05 reports it is $410 per hour per E-2C.

We have, again, 14 tracker planes already in the inventory. We envision we need to have about 24. We need four tracker planes to service each of the six sectors that you see on that map of the United States.

And you also need to have four Blackhawk helicopters to service each of the six sectors.

I would submit to you, Mr. Secretary, that you are the only agency that currently has the capability of creating a radar perimeter across the southern border of the United States.

Customs and Coast Guard do not have it. They have got a few assets, very few. By the time we give them money to buy more assets, we are looking at 1992, 1993.

Now, the Aerostat perimeter is going to be going up——

Chairman NUNN. Congressman, your time has expired. I want to let you finish.

Representative HUNTER. Could I finish my sentence, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman NUNN. Yes.

Representative HUNTER. The Aerostat perimeter will be going up and will be up in about 1991. As each of those Aerostats go up, you are going to be able to draw your assets back off the line because the Aerostat in fact will be supplying that radar coverage.

Is that not something, gentlemen, that you could do?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, let me ask General Herres to address the technical aspects. Better still, I think since you have outlined a very complex scenario, if you submit it to us we will analyze it and come back with the additional cost that we think it might entail or any degradation of readiness that it might entail, because our view is firmly that there is no free lunch here.

Yes, you can do a number of things if you want to degrade military readiness or if you want to add to the cost. I will defer to General Herres on whether that particular scenario is feasible.

But I would submit that once you seal the southern border, experience has demonstrated that the drug dealers would begin to flow their product through other areas. And the RAND study indicates that at most we could constrain the supply by 5 percent and maybe impact the price slightly.

So it is not clear to me what you gain by all of this. But let me ask General Herres to address the technical aspects.

General HERRES. I think you are right, Mr. Hunter, the coverage would come out about right and it would take just about 24 E-2's dedicated full time to provide that coverage during the hours of darkness.

I do not think you could do the interdiction job with four Blackhawks for each one of those sectors. I do not think, with some of the threat aircraft, you could have the closure times that would be required. There are ways to supplement that, however. And what you have described is a scenario that is not unachievable. To do the same kind of coverage with E-3's would take fewer airplanes, but of course, it is more costly aircraft in an inventory that is already overcommitted.

So it is possible to provide all of that coverage during the hours of darkness with a fairly good probability that we would detect intruders. There would still be some that would get through.

It would be easy enough to fly around this network. What we find, as I said earlier, is an adversary who is almost unlimited in his creativeness. As I said in my statement, greed tends to stimulate that kind of thing, and these people are good at that. You will find them using different kinds of airplanes and different techniques. The piggyback technique that I talked about earlier perhaps will be used more.

What we do when we do these things is to increase the inconvenience and the risk to the smuggler. We will not wipe him out of business at all.

Now, I am not saying we should not do interdiction. I am just trying to tell you that what you have described is not an effective panacea. It is a way to increase the risk and to increase the inconvenience.

It would take more interceptor aircraft and more of greater performance. Now, the Coast Guard is bringing on the Falcon jets, as you know. They would be effective in this kind of a situation. I think the Coast Guard or the Customs Service is building up a fleet with a variety of aircraft in that it would be effective and would be able to supplement the efforts of the Blackhawk. But I do not think the Blackhawk is the only thing that we would want to depend on in this kind of a situation for certain airfields and certain circumstances.

And so, if I were the operational commander tasked to implement this particular concept, I would want to put a little English on all of this. It would cost money and it would divert resources. Now, if that is the choice that has been made, it is implementable.

What you have to weigh is the cost and the impact on our capability to meet other national security commitments versus what you achieve by doing this.

And I would also point out that 75 percent of the aircraft that are used in this business are stolen aircraft, and so it is not a business of them having to worry about their inventory. They will just go find some other different kinds of aircraft with different performance and use different techniques. They will fly during the daytime, too. We would increase their risk by doing this, but they would fly during the daytime.

Now, that Aerostat network is going to significantly increase the effectiveness of any surveillance strategy that is developed. And I would encourage you to heed the Secretary's words. I think if we do deploy those, the rest of that Aerostat program that is planned—although the Aerostat is not a panacea either, since we have to pull it down in thunderstorms. The Air Force developed the first experience with those things down at Cudjoe Key and at Patrick AFB, Florida. But only about 60 percent of the time are they able to stay up.

That is when you would like to use your airborne surveillance. You want to do things in this business that keep the other guy off balance. As soon as we establish a pattern and employ predictable techniques, he will devise ways to work around those techniques.

Just as sure as we are sitting here, this is a very flexible kind of an adversary. When we deal with the Soviets and he builds a fleet of 300 Bear aircraft, we can predict within limits what he is going to be able to do with those Bear aircraft. We can watch his training and exercising and so forth. He does not have the flexibility the drug smuggler does, who just decides, well, I will go steal an aircraft with different performance and start using that.

The business of dropping drugs out in the ocean and having small boats come out and pick them up is another technique. Which, of course, is very difficult to deal with. And so I could go on about those kinds of things.

But you have described a scenario that can be dealt with. I think the resources you have described tend to underestimate the cost of doing this.

Chairman NUNN. We are going considerably over the time, and what that inevitably is going to do with the 12:30 cutoff here, because of the Secretary's schedule and our own schedule, is leave people at the end that just are not going to get to ask questions. But that was a very important area, and I wanted to give time for it to be answered.

Congressman Montgomery, and then Senator Kennedy, you will follow. And then Senator Gramm.

Representative MONTGOMERY. Thank you very much. I sure will try to keep in my time, and if the answers could be short from the witnesses it would also help.

Mr. Secretary, in defense participation in your statement, it seems that the National Guard will be the main participant recommendation from the Department of Defense, if I am saying that correctly. And I really do not have any problems of using the National Guard in missions such as this.

In fact, I read in one of the statements of the witnesses where 25 States call on the National Guard in individual cases to help them in drug interdiction. I believe that it will be additional good training for the Guard, and I believe they can do the job, and I believe they would accept it, and it would help greatly.

But my question to you, Mr. Secretary, is, both in the Senate bill and the House bill on drug interdiction, if you use the Guard, as I understand it, there are no special funds earmarked to pay for this extra participation of the National Guard.

And if you do not give them funds, or if the Congress does not and you do not ask for them, it would not be fair, the training of main missions of the Guard would go down, because they would not have enough money to do both.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I believe the Senate authorization bill does have some funds earmarked for this, Mr. Montgomery. I think if my memory is correct it is about $60 million.

Representative MONTGOMERY. It did not add any new money.

Secretary CARLUCCI. No. What I said was it earmarked money.

Representative MONTGOMERY. They fenced $60 million.

Secretary CARLUCCI. But they took it out of other things.

Representative MONTGOMERY. Right.

Secretary CARLUCCI. And once again we are back to the old budget question, do we adhere to the summit agreement or do we fund what in effect are law enforcement undertakings by means of using DOD resources, which is in effect a cut in the DOD budget below the summit agreement.

I would agree with your general thesis that this will cost money. The training, while useful, is not exactly analogous to the kind of training that the Guard needs. And so we would have to provide it alongside of some of the regular training.

But as I said in my statement, there is more that we could do with the Guard, and we intend to do that.

Representative MONTGOMERY. Would you not agree that you are going to have to give the Guard extra money? The Congress is, if we give them——

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would support that.

Representative MONTGOMERY. You would support it?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, sir.

Representative MONTGOMERY. In my last question, Mr. Chairman, following up on Mr. Hunter, there is a radar system down at Gulfport, MS, it follows the training of the planes in that area. I think it is called OTHB.

And I am told that you could use other radar systems in the gulf coast and full-time man them, which the Guard does not do at this time, only when the planes are out, and you could just about cover that gulf coast for planes coming in.

I think it is a suggestion, and I only bring it out here, Mr. Chairman, that it might be a way to do it to cover the gulf coast and also save some money. And you would have to hire full-time people and Guardsmen to run that radar 24 hours a day.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Let me ask General Herres to comment.

General HERRES. Sir, we do of course. The tracks from all of the joint surveillance system, which is the joint Air Force-FAA surveillance system that goes around the whole periphery of our country—all of those radar tracks are fed into the so-called C$^3$I centers that Customs and Coast Guard man.

Those C$^3$I centers are being upgraded right now under Customs Service contract. The one at March AFB should be coming on line this year, and then Miami is the next one. Small prototype centers are being operated now and all those tracks are fed into those centers.

The radar you are referring to is not an over-the-horizon radar. There is an over-the-horizon radar system that would have three locations in the continental United States—one on the east coast, which is installed now; one sector is operational, and others are being tested by the contractor; another for the west coast, and another the central portion of the sector.

One sector of that over-the-horizon radar site will cover a good portion of the gulf area. I could go into more detail on that if you wish in a written response.

Representative MONTGOMERY. My time is up. Thank you.

Representative NICHOLS [presiding]. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to express my appreciation to the Secretary of Defense for his testimony.

I think every family in this country is concerned about the problems of the children's abuse of drugs. I find that about every elderly person is concerned about their life, whether they are going to get mugged or whether they are going to get beaten or are they going to get murdered. This country does want a war on drugs.

Those words may be characterized in a different way, but they do want action. And I think what the Secretary is reminding us, after action that has been taken by the House of Representatives and in the Senate of the United States is, perhaps we leaped before we looked.

Although you are not saying that explicitly, I have the feeling that perhaps the Members of Congress have been stampeded in this effort to try and deal with something which is of enormous concern to the average families of this country.

I believe that the Secretary has mentioned that there is an important role for the military, but it is a limited role. And if we are talking about scarce resources, then we ought to put it where those resources can have some effect.

In his testimony, he points out the importance of education. He has mentioned a comment in response to questions about support for local law enforcement, and State law enforcement, as well as treatment programs.

I am wondering if the Secretary would agree with me, if we were able, using all the military forces necessary to eliminate every coca plant, every poppy seed, every marijuana plant in the world today, that as long as the demand is out there it would only be a matter of days or weeks before more plants would be right back up.

But if you stop by whatever means, if you had a magic wand and were able to say, we are going to stop the users, that that would be a devastating blow to the drug cartels, to the international movers, to all those that are penetrating our borders.

In your view, Mr. Secretary, how do you view that whole balance between demand and supply. Would you agree with me that there is a role for the military and it is an appropriate role, and I think it has been outlined here by the chairman and by others, but that it is a limited role?

We really are deceiving the American people by saying we will give you billions of dollars and you are going to solve the drug problem. Would you agree?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would agree, certainly, Senator Kennedy, that there is an appropriate, limited role for the military and we are prepared to explore that role to the fullest.

I would also agree wholeheartedly that the leverage on this problem comes from the demand side. I talked to the President about this just yesterday and I know that is his view as well.

I would only point to the testimony before this committee by Peter Reuter of the RAND Corporation where he indicated the leaf that goes into making a kilogram of cocaine costs about $1,000 to buy, and not much more goes into the refining process itself.

Fully 99 percent of the price of the drug when it sells on the streets of the United States is accounted for by payments to people who distribute it. So if you try to go after the source, it is very easy to replace the source, very cost effective to replace the source. The only real leverage you have is on the demand side of the equation.

That does not mean, as General Herres says, that we should not look at interdiction. What can reasonably be done.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me just ask finally, because we are running out of time, do you think that if we suggest to the American people, just give this problem to the military and we will wash our hands of it, that we would be doing a real disservice to those families that are concerned about their children and about the elderly people that are concerned about their own safety and security?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think that would be a disservice to the families and to the military themselves, to give them a mission without the resources to carry it out, and to force them to abdicate their other national security responsibilities in order to carry out that mission. If we are going to do it, then you have got to provide the resources, the additional resources, and the mission.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Representative NICHOLS. Senator Gramm.

Senator GRAMM. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to immediately associate my remarks with Senator Kennedy, and I would like to first go to what Congressman Hunter is talking about.

My biggest concern out of this whole debate is that we are going to create the impression on Main Street America that this is a problem that we can eliminate simply by having the military take it over.

I think that that creates a terrible misimpression. I think there is a great deal of escapism in this whole approach, and the approach is, let us build a wall around America and let us keep this problem away from our schools, from our children, from our workplaces.

The cold reality is, as I look at the economics of the problem, the value of cocaine, for example, grows 208 times from the time that it is harvested in the field until it sells on 14th Street in Washington, DC.

So if you put into effect the Hunter proposal and it were 100 percent effective, that is, you caught every plane flying across the southern border, in the short run you might affect the price of cocacine on Main Street by 10 percent, in the long run you are going to affect it by less than 5 percent.

The plain truth is that we could take every single person in the military and commit them to this effort and we could not double the price of cocaine on Main Street America under absolutely any circumstances.

And that is why, Mr. Secretary, I want to congratulate you on your program of promoting a drug-free workplace for defense contractors. We are going to have to replicate that all over the economy.

The only way we are going to deal with this problem in my opinion is by dealing with demand. I want to thank you for referencing a study, which Senator Wilson and I and others worked on, which was really a 2-month effort to sit down with the best minds in the country, who had spent years studying this problem, and try to come to some understanding of the problem.

So I for one am committed to military involvement. I think it has got to be well targeted, and I think we have got to recognize that one of the reasons we are doing it is that we are never going to get the American people to do what they have to do to tell the 23 million people that are using drugs on a regular basis that we are not going to put up with it, if we are not going to have some military involvement.

But any idea that we are going to solve this problem by using the military is an absolute sham and fraud, and it basically distorts the whole picture of reality to the American people. Frank, let me give you a chance to comment on that.

Secretary **Carlucci**. You have said it much more articulately than I have, Senator Gramm. What we have to create in this country is a user-unfriendly environment.

I am hopeful that the step I have taken with regard to defense contractors can be a first step in instituting a testing program and encouraging employers and others to begin to address the demand side of this problem in a serious way. As you point out, that is the only place where you can get the leverage.

All the interdiction in the world only pushes the cost up marginally. And with the fat profits that they make, the drug dealers will find their way around any kind of system, military or otherwise, that we put up. Not that we should not work on interdiction, but we should not look on that as a panacea, and least of all should we look upon the military as a panacea or a solution to this problem. We will contribute to the best of our ability.

Senator **Gramm**. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me sum up in the time I have got.

I think the step that the Secretary has announced today with regard to a drug-free workplace in defense contracting, combined with what the Department of Transportation is doing in terms of testing for people that are driving buses and flying planes and driving trains, is an important step in the right direction.

We have got to have military involvement to show the American people we are serious, and in the areas where you are going to be doing training anyway being involved can be helpful. I think coordinating intelligence is important and should be part of an overall effort.

But this is not the solution to the problem, and we ought to be honest, up front, in saying that it is going to help only marginally. Unless military involvement is part of some big overall effort focused on the demand, we are not going to win this war.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I agree with that.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Ms. Byron.

Representative BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me agree with many of my colleagues today at the importance of this issue and the fact that we are looking at it from both sides of the aisle in joint hearings, and I think that is very effective.

Mr. Secretary, we had what I thought was some very effective joint exercises using our military, and that is the Blast Furnace Operations that we saw down in South America. I am one that believes that that kind of limited military usage is quite effective, and I think we can look at that in a better vein.

That was where we used our American helicopters to put DEA agents into the jungle to eradicate some of the labs. It was not long term, but I think it made an impact, and it was one that I think was felt.

I am one that thinks of that kind of usage on a limited basis, where you have a beginning and an end of a mission, as opposed to a complete across-the-board usage. Could you comment a little bit on that?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, once again, we think that that is useful. It is not, as you yourself recognize, a solution.

It is complicated, because it involves diplomatic considerations. You have to be invited in by the host countries, and there is no question that the international drug cartel is assuming increasing power and influence in a number of countries.

We are prepared to do that wherever we can, wherever we can cooperate with the State Department and wherever we get invited, but I would submit to you that that is a solution of limited effectiveness. It is quite cheap to replant the coca crop. It is useful, and we will continue to do it.

Representative BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Mr. Rowland.

Representative ROWLAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join my colleagues in thanking you all for being here. And quite frankly I find some of the comments and the testimony to be somewhat intriguing.

In all of your opening statements you make reference to the fact that drugs are indeed one of the biggest problems we are facing in our Nation, and that it is increasing and costing loss of life. And then in each of the statements you all go into great detail to explain why the military will not be all that effective in stopping the interdiction of drugs.

Admiral, especially in some of your remarks, you went into great detail, talking about the problems the Navy would have in stopping shipments and drug smugglers from coming into this country, and I do not want to believe that.

I do not want to believe that the Air Force, the Army, or the Navy would have difficulty in stopping drug smugglers. As a matter of fact, if we are to believe that, or if we were to believe that, if I were an enemy of this country, and if I wanted to inflict some type of harm on this country, from what I have heard today, I would disguise myself as a drug smuggler and come over the borders of this Nation.

I would like to ask two simple questions. One is that, is there really a difference in tracking an enemy boat, an enemy ship, an enemy airplane? Or even an enemy intelligence operation? Is there a difference between those operations and tracking drug smugglers?

And if there is not a difference, a significant difference, is it not good training? And we are not at the same time accomplishing something good for our Nation and something good for our people?

I have heard all the arguments about cost and sharing, and we are sensitive to those. But I think we need to understand and agree that the military can indeed carry out these operations, and then bang out the agreements between both the Congress and the Pentagon.

Secretary CARLUCCI. At the risk of oversimplification again, Congressman, let me say that, to me, the job of interdicting drug smugglers is much closer to dealing with spies and terrorists than it is to dealing with warfare.

Now, that does not mean there are some capabilities in the military establishment that could be brought to bear. We have discussed some of them.

Representative ROWLAND. Mr. Secretary, if I could interrupt for a second, would you not on a scale of looking at the threats of this Nation, would you not agree that probably the number one threat, and I am talking about militarily now, are terrorist actions, the Qaddafi actions, and certainly smaller nations inflicting harm in our Nation?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The number one threat?

Representative ROWLAND. One of our major threats.

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, I would not agree it is the number one threat.

Representative ROWLAND. One of our major threats. Are we not addressing, in other words, are we not addressing that issue militarily? And can it not be applicable to drug smugglers?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Just because something is a national security threat does not automatically mean that you bring defense resources to bear.

We use the FBI, our other intelligence organizations, to deal with spies and terrorists. We have to use the most appropriate vehicle is what we are saying. We do not want to mislead the American people and tell the American people we can do something that we are not trained and equipped to do.

Let me ask Admiral Kelso to address the training question.

Admiral KELSO. Sir, it is a quite different job. I will give you an example. All I have to do is see a Libyan patrol boat and my pilots can recognize he is an enemy. I have one guy to tackle and one guy to shoot at.

In the drug business, it is a million dollar yacht. He may have 13, 20, 40 of them. One of them may have drugs on it. You have got to search all of them. And the process of identification can take as much as 6 to 15 hours to find the stuff once you get on board.

So, the number of resources to do the same job is greatly expanded, and you are doing a completely different job than interdiction of military forces, which are easily recognizable by the people that are trained to do it.

Plus you have got to take them to court and all the process associated with that. So, it is a completely different evolution than interdicting forces that are coming, and generally military forces accumulate together to put their power in one place in order to be effective. They do not try to intersperse themselves to be not seen or heard.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. I believe next—is Senator Shelby back? I do not believe he is. I believe Senator Levin is next and then Senator Wilson.

Representative ROWLAND. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the questions that we face is to what extent do we emphasize drying up the demand versus interdiction.

We can debate that balance back and forth, but I think the truth of the matter is we are going to continue to try to do both. And we should do both.

The second question that I know is the subject of our concern is, to what extent on the interdiction side is the military the most cost-effective way to do the interdiction?

I think that is a separate question, but it is the one I want to focus on in my few minutes, because we had some hearings here a few days ago which went into some of the costs of interdiction.

Those cost figures were kind of startling in terms of what the cost per arrest is when the military does the direct intervention?

We had a GAO report which said that in fiscal year 1987 the Air Force designated 591 AWACS flying hours to drug interdiction, which resulted in six seizures and 10 arrests at a cost of $2.5 million. The bottom line on that is that it came down to between $350,000 and $450,000 per seizure during that particular study.

We had another study in 1987, and it showed that the Navy provided a certain number of ship days, 2,500 ship days, to the LEDET program, resulting in 20 vessel seizures and 110 arrests, at a total cost of $40 million. This averaged to about $2 million per seizure, or $360,000 per arrest.

When we asked the GAO how that compares with the cost to the Customs Service per seizure and arrest, and the cost to the Coast Guard per seizure and arrest, those figures were not available.

We do not have a way of comparing how much it costs the Coast Guard and Customs Service per ton or per arrest or per seizure, compared to how much it costs the military when they do the direct surveillance and interdiction. Do you have any comparative figures for us?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No sir, we do not have comparative figures. Part of the problem is that there is no standard data base that we can use.

And I would not depend too heavily on the figures that you set forth, although they are rough estimates. They do not take into account, for example, the number of people we might have deterred. On the other hand, those people probably went by some other route.

Senator LEVIN. That is true also with Coast Guard deterrence and Customs Service deterrence.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is right.

Senator LEVIN. We do not have an estimate of the deterrence success because there is no way of knowing that.

Secretary CARLUCCI. There is no way of knowing it.

Senator LEVIN. But that seems like an awful lot of money per seizure is my point.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would agree with that. I do not think that we are the most cost-effective way to do this.

Senator LEVIN. The way to prove that, let me suggest to you, Mr. Secretary, is for us to find a way of analyzing the cost per seizure per arrest by the Coast Guard, and by the Customs Service, so that we do have a way of seeing whether or not it is cost-effective. My hunch is it is not.

I think it is very valuable for you all to be here this morning to talk to us about the limitations of the military in the drug interdiction area. It is important that we do a common sensical thing and not just something which sounds or seems popular at the moment because it relates to drug interdiction.

We want to use our dollars effectively. From what I have seen, I do not think that the use of the military is the best way of spending our dollars in drug interdiction.

But let us suggest to you that the only way that we can know that for sure is to compare what the Coast Guard and Customs Service produces per dollar compared to what you do. And I would urge you to work with the Coast Guard, with the Customs Service, with the GAO, to get us some way of knowing whether in fact our hunches are true on this.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would be glad to do that. Anecdotally, I can make a comment. The other day I visited our Aegis cruiser, the San Jacinto.

And the commanding officer of that cruiser, Admiral Kelso was with me at the time, said that he had been requested to go out on a drug interdiction mission, because the Coast Guard hull, which was much more cost-effective for handling the job, was tied up for lack of O&M money.

Now, that makes no sense whatsoever. So I suspect just from that anecdote that you are probably right.

Senator LEVIN. I think my time is up.

General HERRES. Could I add one comment to the cost-effectiveness aspect of this? When the Customs Service and the Coast Guard are involved in drug interdiction activities, they are enforcing other laws as well.

There are fishery laws, pollution laws, and so forth and so on, and other Customs regulations to enforce. And so if you are going to apply an asset to the job and try and make it as cost-effective as possible in the process, it seems to me that those two agencies are carrying the brunt of the interdiction role right now.

Senator LEVIN. The bottom line, it does not make sense to be cutting the Coast Guard budget while we are spending huge amounts per arrest in the military. But we need the comparative figures. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The purpose of this hearing really is not quite clear to me, and I hope very frankly that it is not a prelude to an effort by conferees to cut back, because they have been stampeded or otherwise, through some strange faintheartedness, into coming to some curtailment of what has already been adopted that will lead to a point of order problem.

But let me just take advantage of the brief time I have. There has been much talk about the curtailment of demand. I would hope that we could stipulate that if there were no demand there would be no problem.

And having come to that revelation, it is not a useful one. What is useful is to do something about demand. And as Senator Gramm indicated, he and I and others have been much involved in that, and it will be very interesting to see whether or not others who are now parading this buzz phrase of curtailment of demand are actually willing to vote for the things that are necessary to do it. And I have my doubts.

But let me just make some points. I am hearing a great deal today frankly that I find disappointing, almost disingenuous. The concept that somehow, Mr. Secretary, that the Coast Guard should be assigned to do a job that you think infeasible for the military but not infeasible for them that involves the kind of Air Force assets that the Coast Guard does not have strikes me as coming close to disingenuous.

And I frankly was most disappointed in the responses that I have heard to Congressman Hunter's comments this morning. But let me get to you, General Herres. You say that this will degrade the effectiveness of the military, that it will divert important resources.

Admiral Ilg has testified, or at least has sent written comunications, indicating that those in OP-05-B fly about half the hours, the training hours, that is necessary for them to have proficiency with the E-2C aircraft. Thirty-nine hours per month, and they are not quite at 26.

Now, his comment was, we would rather fly real missions rather than paper exercises, and clearly rather fly those than not fly at all. How can you disagree?

General HERRES. Let me explain, first of all, and Admiral Kelso can amplify on this point.

I suspect that, without knowing the details off the top of my head, that one of the reasons they are short on flying time is because of the wing crack problem. Nevertheless, all of our flying time, whether it is E-2s, E-3s, P-3s, or any other aircraft, is programmed by aircraft type and accounted for and budgeted for by the number of hours necessary to conduct the training and participate in the exercises in the military activity planned.

If you do use the E-2s or whatever vehicles, and E-2s are not very well suited for this particular job—it was designed to operate off of aircraft carriers—you will have to appropriate funds or take funds from what exists in our budget to cover the flying hours.

And whichever way you do it, something has to give. And so you do pay a price. If you take those flying hours and add them to the E-2 program, then you have got to take them from someplace else.

Now, the E-2, of course——

Senator WILSON. Currently we have aircraft sitting on the ground and pilots sitting on the ground because you say Congress is not funding the necessary hours. Perhaps Congress should do that.

General HERRES. That is not what I just said. I am just trying to explain the fact that we budget our activity and fund the activities of the aircraft by flying hours.

Senator WILSON. At the risk of being rude, let me interrupt you because we do not have much time.

You made the point that interdiction will not be wholly successul. Of course it will not. And neither, I will tell you, for 25 years have been the efforts to curtail demand. And I have been involved in it that long.

There are a number of instant experts who are suddenly abuzz with the phrase of curtailment of demand. If you talk to people who have been in the business, those on local law enforcement, they will tell you you have got to do both. Curtail demand, and to the extent you can interdict the supply, and do so beyond the borders of the United States.

Because once this poison gets in, they have a hard time, when they are trying to deal with it, with distribution at retail, they are overwhelmed.

And all the conversation, Mr. Secretary, about price, and all the RAND reports and the other econometric studies miss the point that the availability on the streets has led to a depression in the price. It is down to less than $25 a bag for crack now.

And what they are saying is that because of the availability, local law enforcement are running into a problem they did not have in times past, and that is there is an aggressive effort, just as in the case of legitimate businesses, to increase the volume.

And because of that, you have got the kind of effort that is being made at retail for people to go out and give this stuff to small children.

Now, to the extent that you could eliminate the availability of what has become at any price a flood of drugs in almost all the communities of America, local law enforcement people will tell you that you would be doing them an enormous service, as well as the people whom they protect.

We are going to have to do both. And if General Herres is talking about increasing risk to the smugglers, yes that is precisely what we aim to do with interdiction. That is also the purpose of criminal law, to deter the criminal by increasing the risk. And it is not 100 percent successful.

But you do not simply throw up your hands and say, it is impossible. These people are ingenious, they will devise a new means. Frankly, I think that you have got the opportunity to do something significant for what is in fact a major threat to our national security.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Wilson, let me argue we are doing something significant. I have listed in my testimony a number of things we are doing, and I have listed some additional things that we will do.

I think creating a drug-free environment at the workplace with defense contractors——

Senator WILSON. All of that I applaud, Mr. Secretary. But let me just say that it is not enough.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wilson, let me say the time has expired. We have got 15 minutes and we have got six or seven members that have not been able to ask any questions.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I understand that, and I will just yield by saying that time is indeed expiring. Congressman Hunter was right when he said about it being 1992 before our being able to equip some alternative, and everybody knows this Congress is not going to do that.

Chairman NUNN. Let me call on Chairman Nichols, who has got to leave.

Representative NICHOLS. I apologize to the other members who have not spoken. I will keep mine to 1 minute. It involves the intelligence area that we discussed a little earlier.

I believe there are some areas there that the conferees might want to look at very closely. You have offered to provide answers for the record, and I would ask that you respond to three or four questions that I raised.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman NUNN. I believe Mr. Hochbrueckner is next.

Representative HOCHBRUECKNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be as swift as possible.

I believe that the military should play a much greater role. Having served in the U.S. Navy myself, I believe it is highly likely and possible that one could interweave training exercises with actual drug interdiction. You can do both. You can train our men, you can use our aircraft carriers with the E-2Cs aboard to help, in fact, interdict the drug flow.

As someone who spent 25 years in the aerospace industry, I would like to raise one important area and be very specific about it. As you know, the E-2C aircraft which has been raised here earlier has been very effective.

The two that the Coast Guard has had for the last several years have been very effective in interdicting drugs. We have been told by Admiral Yost, in fact no less than 45 minutes ago at a House hearing of the Coast Guard Subcommittee, that if he had eight aircraft he feels he could make a major dent in the flow of drugs into the east coast of the United States. He has two now.

As you know, the House authorized three additional E-2Cs through a swap, giving the aircraft to the Navy and have the Navy kick out three older aircraft to be used by the Coast Guard, as they did with the first two. That makes a lot of sense.

I put in a bill that would authorize or direct the Navy to loan three additional aircraft to the Coast Guard, using those that happen to be part of this wing crack fleet that you have.

As you know, right now, of course, you have I think 26 aircraft, E-2Cs, that cannot be flown off the carrier. But they are allowed an additional 200 hours if they are operating from land bases.

I would like to see the Navy allow these aircraft that are awaiting rewinging and crack repairs to in fact be utilized by the Coast Guard, thus putting together a total complement of eight aircraft, along of course with the O&M money that was authorized by the House.

I think we could make a large dent in the flow in the east coast. And so, obviously, it is one element, but an important element, along with many others that can make for a real war on drugs.

And Mr. Secretary, in conclusion, I would just ask you to please consider the possibility of having the Navy lend these aircraft to the Coast Guard so that we can cycle them through. And with eight aircraft we think we can really do a job. And I would hope that——

Secretary CARLUCCI. You would have us then return them to their carriers after they are——

Representative HOCHBRUECKNER. Yes. You have a series of aircraft strung out, scheduled to have those fatigue cracks repaired.

Since they can still be used from land bases, what I would hope you could do, and in fact I put this question to the previous Secretary of the Navy and it was denied last year, but I think it is a reasonable approach to loan these aircraft to the Coast Guard, and then when it is their turn to get the reworking pull them back out and replace it with another loaner. And I think in that way we can put together this complement of eight E-2Cs.

Admiral KELSO. We will take a look at that, but the E-2C problem is an inspection problem. In fact, once they go down they fly so many hours they have to be inspected again. And then there is another problem in the wing that they are down. So there are about 28 airplanes that are down.

Representative HOCHBRUECKNER. But I understand that you are evaluating a plan to allow an additional 200 flight-hours on an aircraft that is only operating from land.

Admiral KELSO. A good percentage of them after that come down hard, and I am not sure that there is that many available is my point.

I do not agree either with the gentleman that there are that many E-2Cs available that are not being used for training that is legitimate within the Navy today and are being used today.

Representative HUNTER. Will the gentleman yield just on that point?

I have OP-05's report, Admiral. You are wrong. You have 98, 4 of them with Coast Guard and Customs, 27 grounded with wing cracks, 16 deployed today, 16 on near-term workup, 16 being used for training, and you have 16 that do not go to sea that have 25 crews attached who are getting some inadequate flying hours, 25.7 flying hours per month. They need 40 according to OP-05. And they do not go to sea for 9 months to 15 monhts. So you do have the aircraft.

Admiral KELSO. Mr. Hunter, I am the operator, and the operator who works for me does not agree with that. We do not agree that we have the extra E-2Cs.

[Additional information follows:]

The remaining 15 aircraft are assigned to five fleet squadrons with five crews per squadron (including about 50 pilots) conducting shore-based training during the at home period prior to beginning workup for deployment. This training is critical in the development of pilot/NFO warfighting readiness. In addition, during this shore-based phase, essential aircraft maintenance and modification are conducted.

Representative HUNTER. Here is your memo stating that.

Representative HOCHBRUECKNER. Mr. Chairman, recapturing my time, I would hope the Navy could look hard and hopefully find these three additional E-2Cs that could be cycled through in order to help the Coast Guard with a program that has already proven to be very effective. And I thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much. I misspoke a moment ago. The next in order of recognition will be Mr. Ravenel and then Mr. Robinson, and then Mrs. Lynn Martin, then Mr. Jack Davis. Mr. Ravenel.

Representative RAVENEL. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, I have a position which is not new with me. I ran on it in the last election, and I still maintain it.

I feel that if this country ever is going to get serious about stopping drugs, and if indeed we are in a war against drugs, then we are going to have to involve the military, from what I have heard today drag you guys into it kicking and screaming, interdict these people, and upon positive identification shoot these drug-bearing aircraft down, and machine gun the survivors.

Think of all the long trials it would save us. All that expense, and maintaining these devils in prison, ad infinitum, or until we turn them loose to go back at it.

The same thing would go for you guys, Admiral, in the Navy, upon positive identification draw off, shell those ships, sink them. They would very soon get the message, such as the experience you have had in Indonesia and China with the same problem. Where they kill, they kill the vendors, they kill the drug dealers.

I think sooner or later that is what we are going to have to come to, if we are really serious about it.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, I have no quarrel, Mr. Ravenel, with tough action in dealing with drug dealers.

If my memory serves me correctly, the average prison, the median prison sentence is something like 17 months for drug dealers. It seems to me there's a lot more that we could do to crack down on drug dealers.

The issue before us is whether the military is the most appropriate vehicle to do that. As I said earlier, if you want to close the borders to everybody and shoot anybody who crosses the border, then we can turn that into a military mission.

If you have got to discriminate and take people to court and worry about legal liability, then the military is not geared for that exercise.

Representative RAVENEL. Mr. Secretary, you were not listening to me. I said, upon positive identification. And of course, you know the average prison term is 17 months now. You would not have to worry about that problem anymore. It would be forever, and we would solve our problem very quickly. I am convinced of it. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman NUNN. I believe Mr. Robinson is next?

Representative ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three brief questions, Mr. Secretary.

Number one, to your knowledge, do coca leaves grow in Russia?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I cannot answer that off the top of my head. I do not know. It is not an exporting country.

Representative ROBINSON. Good. Why are you suggesting that we put infantry divisions in Alaska, knowing that there are no cocaine dealers in Russia? I mean, who is coming from Russia into this country to smuggle cocaine?

I mean, it is a very valid question because you have taken our position of sealing the southern borders and parleyed that into infantry divisions throughout the continental United States, specifically in Alaska, which makes absolutely no sense to me, and that no dope dealers live anywhere near outside of the borders of Alaska.

They might be flying an aircraft, the Soviets would shoot them down. I mean, can you respond to that?

Secretary CARLUCCI. First of all, Mr. Robinson, the statute, at least in one of its sections, directs the President to seal all the borders.

Representative ROBINSON. It does not.

Secretary CARLUCCI. It says the President will deploy equipment and personnel of the Armed Forces sufficient to halt the unlawful penetration of the U.S. borders—well, this is a different version—by aircraft and vessels.

Representative HUNTER. How high are you going to throw those infantrymen?

Secretary CARLUCCI. If we are going to seal the borders, based on their track record, it is very clear that if you seal the southern border the drugs will come in through Canada.

If we seal that off, Alaska is part of the United States. They are going to be flowing drugs in wherever they can. Once we cut it off at one point it is like quicksilver, it flows into another point.

If the mission here is to seal the borders, then we have got to seal all the borders of the United States, and that includes Hawaii and Alaska.

Representative HUNTER. Will my friend yield for one second?

Representative ROBINSON. I will in just a minute. Without belaboring the issue, I do not know of any aircraft that the drug cartel is using today that could afford to fly from Colombia around to Europe, across the straits, into Alaska or out in the Atlantic Ocean and around. They would all crash. But I would yield in just a moment.

A second question. Are military policemen in the armed services today trained in law enforcement procedures?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Representative ROBINSON. A third question, and then I would yield to my friend. I just left a very lengthy meeting this morning with your President, with your Secretary of State, with the NSA director, and with Vice President Bush in reference to Central America. And as you know I am a strong supporter of Contra funding.

It just seems ludicrous to me that the Pentagon states that we cannot stop a low-flying Cessna aircraft coming across the southern border. If you cannot do that, how are you ever going to be able to stop a MIG fighter, if they chose in Cuba to come after the United States?

Secretary CARLUCCI. If you tell me to shoot down, the military to shoot down all aircraft coming across the border we can shoot down that Cessna.

Representative ROBINSON. We are not saying that. We are talking about aircraft that have not received permission from the FAA to land at an airport. They are supposed to file a plan.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Okay. If I understand you correctly, you want to shoot down any aircraft that has not filed a plan.

Representative ROBINSON. We do not want to shoot down aircraft, we want you to use AWACS planes and notify the appropriate authorities that a low-flying aircraft with no destination filed with the FAA is coming into this country. It can work.

You are the only agency in my opinion that local law enforcement officers feel good about because they do not feel threatened by the military. There is no interservice rivalry.

Why can you not assist this country in trying to stop the flow of drugs coming in? It is not a big deal.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Mr. Robinson, we are assisting the law enforcement agencies in stopping the flow of drugs into this country. I have explained that time and again.

The question is, who should be the front-line agency? What should be the front-line agency, and what is the most cost-effective way to do this? If you want E–2Cs, fund the Coast Guard, let them have E–2Cs.

Representative ROBINSON. Why do we not deduct it from your budget and transfer it to the Coast Guard?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Because we are not a slush fund for other agencies. We have a budget summit agreement, and we lived up to our part of that agreement.

Representative ROBINSON. Well, hopefully the FBI will shed some light on that. I would yield back the balance of my time, since my time has expired.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Jack Davis?

Representative DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I am not going to ask any questions.

I am shocked and dismayed here this morning to hear the testimony that all three of you gentlemen have given. It is hard for me to believe, after both Houses of the U.S. Congress, have passed an expanding military role amendment to their respective authorization bills and are going to conference, that you would come into this room this morning without some notion of a positive plan, some notion of a supplemental appropriations request, or some notion of a cost somewhat geared to what we have been talking about this morning.

Just some plan, instead of a bunch of negatives. We cannot do this, this myth is there, that myth is there. The people of the United States through their elected representatives in the Senate and the Congress, want an expanding military role.

How can we drive that home any more graphically to you than has been driven home this morning? Are you so bureaucratized and stilted that you cannot accept the mission that Customs is doing right now and has successfully raised their interdiction rate, with the Cuojoe Key Aerostat, and the Bahama Aerostat that is coming on, up to about 38 percent from a very low of 5 percent, in the last 3 years with your help?

And Aerostats are coming on. We are asking you to get involved until that happens. I just frankly do not understand this. If I were the Soviet high command, I would have an order in with Cessna aircraft right now for 1,000 new aircraft.

And I would put them into Central America, ready for some kind of invasion, because you guys are telling us you cannot do it. That is what you are saying. You cannot do it. Well, what can you do well?

And that is my statement. And if I sound a little bit tough, gentlemen, and a little mad, it is because I am. I cannot believe you would come into this room and give us this kind of stuff.

Now, you better get with the program, Mr. Secretary, and you better get into that conference committee and help us work this out, and help us get an appropriate role, as you call it, in the military, an expanded appropriate role, so that we can get on about the business of interdiction, of education, of punishment, of all the legs of the pier or the pie, or whatever acronym you want to use, and so we can get this job done and stop the murder on our streets in America.

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. And I pulled this out because I was ready to surrender after listening to you guys.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, we will give you time to respond if you would like.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not think I want to respond to that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Do we have anybody else that is still here that has not had a chance to ask questions? Any other comments from any of our witnesses?

We will have questions for the record for which we will appreciate responses as quickly as possible.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

### CONSEQUENCES OF ADOPTING THE HOUSE PROPOSAL

Senator NUNN. The House bill requires you to "deploy equipment and personnel of the Armed Forces sufficient to halt the unlawful penetration of the United States borders by vessels and aircraft carrying narcotics." I have several questions about how you would implement such a requirement:

a. What type of units would likely be involved in performing this mission?

b. What is your estimate of the number of personnel, aircraft, and ships that would be required to perform such a mission?

Secretary Carlucci. Sea—Cruiser/Destroyer/Frigate/Patrol Hydrofoil Missile (PHM) (Combatants).

Total—210 ships (198 combatants and 12 logistics) required to support 53 continously on station.

Subtotal—53 combatants on station: Pacific 21; Gulf 11; Atlantic 16; Choke pts 5.

Air—110 E-3s to support 22 orbits with only 34 in inventory; 32 E-2s to support 4 orbits with 98 in inventory of which only 71 are operational (wing cracks); 88 P-3s to support 22 orbits with 390 in inventory.

The number of required interceptor and apprehension team aircraft are assumption dependent.

Senator Nunn. c. What other resources would be required to support such a mission.

Secretary Carlucci. Logistics—Fuel to support increased OPTEMPO; repair funds to support increased OPTEMPO.

Senator Nunn. d. Illustrate the types of national defense missions, now performed by such units, that would have to be cancelled if you had to divert these units into drug interdiction activities.

Senator Carlucci. Capability to meet warplan mobilization requirements to deploy reserve forces to Europe and/or the Pacific.

All worldwide E-3 surveillance missions.

Elimination of all carrier battle group deployments.

Significantly reduce support for escort operations in the Persian Gulf.

Senator Nunn. e. Considering the fact that the House bill does not address drug smuggling by land, what is the likely impact of the House bill on the flow of illegal drugs into the United States?

Secretary Carlucci. Agree with RAND Study.

Extremely difficult to reduce cocaine consumption over 5 percent (most stringent interdiction effort).

The real problem must be attacked within borders. (Demand)

### IMPLICATION OF LAND INTERDICTION

Senator Nunn. If you were given the mission of halting the flow of illegal drugs in the United States by land, as well as by sea and air——

a. What type of units would likely be involved in performing the land interdiction mission?

b. What is your estimate of the number of personnel, aircraft, and ships that would be required to perform such a mission?

Secretary Carlucci. Land—TOTAL: 96 Infantry Bns/53 Helo Companies.

Note.—This number of infantry Bns is six more than our present CONUS strategic reserve. Deploying them to borders significantly affects ability to execute warplan mobilization.

North—60 Inf Bns/13 Helo Companies.

South—26 Inf/Bns/30 Helo Companies.

Both coasts—10 Inf Bns/10 Helo Companies.

Additional info:

Total USA Maneuver Bns=199 (AD, USAR, ANG).

Total USMC Inf Bns=27.

Total USA Helo Companies=112.

Total USMC Lift Helo Sqns=24.

Total USMC Attack Helo Sqns=6.

Sea—Cruiser/Destroyer/Frigate/Patrol. Hydrofoil Missile (PHM) (Combatants).

Total—210 ships (198 combatants and 12 logistics) required to support 53 continuously on station.

Subtotal—53 combatants on station: Pacific 21; Gulf 11; Atlantic 16; Choke pts 5.

Air—110 E-3s to support 22 orbits with only 34 in inventory; 32 E-2s to support 4 orbits with 98 in inventory of which only 71 are operational (wing cracks); 88 P-3s to support 22 orbits with 390 in inventory.

The number of required interceptor and apprehension team aircraft are assumption dependent.

Senator Nunn. c. What other resources would be required to support such a mission?

Secretary Carlucci. Logistics—Fuel to support increased OPTEMPO; Repair funds to support increased OPTEMPO.

Senator Nunn. d. Illustrate the types of national defense missions, now performed by such units, that would have to be cancelled if you had to divert these units into drug interdiction activities.

Secretary **Carlucci**. Capability to meet warplan mobilization requirements to deploy reserve forces to Europe and/or the Pacific.

All worldwide E-3 surveillance missions.

Elimination of all carrier battle group deployments.

Significantly reduce support for escort operations in the Persian Gulf.

Senator **Nunn**. e. What is likely impact of such assistance on the flow of illegal drugs into the United States?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Agree with RAND Study.

Extremely difficult to reduce cocaine consumption over 5 percent (most stringent interdiction effort).

The real problem must be attacked within borders. (Demand)

### SECURE BORDERS (AIR/SEA—HUNTER)

Senator **Nunn**. If given the mission to halt the unlawful penetration of the southern border by vessels and aircraft carrying illegal narcotics—

a. What type of units would likely be involved in performing this mission?

b. What is your estimate of the number of personnel, aircraft, and ships that would be required to perform such a mission?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Sea—Cruiser/Destroyer/Frigate/Patrol Hydrofoil Missile (PHM) (Combatants).

Total—99 ships (93 combatants and 6 logistics) required to support 25 continuously on station.

Subtotal—25 combatants on station: Pacific 3; Gulf 12; Atlantic 5; Choke pts 5.

Air—25 E-3s supporting 5 orbits with 34 in inventory.

Or—48 E-2s supporting 6 orbits with 98 in inventory of which only 71 are operational.

Or some mix of the two.

The number of required interceptor and apprehension team aircraft are assumption dependent.

Senator **Nunn**. c. What other resources would be required to support such a mission?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Logistics—O&M funds to support increased OPTEMPO; Repair funds to support increased OPTEMPO.

Senator **Nunn**. d. Illustrate the types of national defense missions, now performed by such units, that would have to be cancelled if you had to divert these units into drug interdiction activities.

Secretary **Carlucci**. Significantly reduced capability to meet warplan mobilization.

All deployed E-3 surveillance missions.

Significantly reduce naval operations in Mediterranean.

Take across-the-board cut in deployed naval operations worldwide causes significant increase in vulnerability/risk.

Senator **Nunn**. e. What is the likely impact of such a limited program on the flow of illegal drugs into the United States?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Causes smuggler to change modes/routes for transit. Since the smuggler seeks the path of least resistance such a limited approach will not appreciably change the flow.

### TRAINING MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY

Senator **Nunn**. If you were to provide military personnel with the same type of training in arrest, search and seizure that is provided to Coast Guard personnel—

(a) How long a training period would be required?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Our estimate would be six months minimum; longer for Supervisors/OIC's. However, we really have no baseline on which to base an accurate requirement.

Following information from Coast Guard and Customs:

USCG requires a top Seaman (E-3) with 2 to 3 years of experience with training on a small boat unit as ENTRY-level training.

The USCG Maritime Law Enforcement School (5 weeks) is for Petty Officers slated for leadership roles on a LEDET.

Senior members of LEDET are Officers of CPO's.

Coast Guard Boarding Officers—those who lead boarding teams and are authorized to actually seize and arrest-attend a 4-week Boarding Officers course. An additional 3-6 month OJT is required before an individual is fully qualified as an independent boarding officer.

Senator NUNN. What would be the impact of such training period on individual military skills and unit readiness?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Major changes in rotation of personnel.

"Sea/Shore" rotation a specific Navy concern (morale and readiness factors).

Loss of training time for military mission.

An impact statement is difficult to estimate because we are not sure what the training requirement is; however, each training hour devoted to law enforcement will preclude an hour of essential war-fighting training.

### RADAR COVERAGE

Senator NUNN. The House bill requires you to deploy radar aircraft in sufficient numbers so that during the hours of darkness there would be continuous aerial radar coverage of the southern border. What assets would you have to deploy to cover such a mission?

(a) What would be the effect on the illegal flow of drugs if such coverage was provided only during the hours of darkness?

(b) What units would likely be affected and what missions would have to be canceled by this diversion of assets?

Secretary CARLUCCI. E-3's (five orbits/three each) or 24 E-2's (six orbits/four each) or some combination.

Night coverage only would have limited effect because traffickers adapt alternate times, routes, modes.

No military missions should be canceled. If E-3's/E-2's are used as postulated, a major impact on military readiness is obvious.

### PURSUIT AIRCRAFT

Senator NUNN. What assets would be required to devote to drug interdiction to meet the requirements in the House bill that you deploy pursuit aircraft in sufficient numbers to pursue and seize intruding aircraft? What units would likely be affected and what missions would have to be canceled as a result of this diversion of aircraft?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The quantity of assets required to pursue and seize intruding aircraft is a function of a variety of situational, operational and resource factors. However, it appears that significantly more than 4 chase aircraft and 4 interdicting helicopters are necessary per air suveillance sector.

Sufficient chase aircraft must be deployed to challenge traffickers' ability to saturate the system.

Sufficient interdictory helicopters must be deployed so as always to be within 30 minutes of suspected trafficking aircraft positions.

### SUPPORT FOR HOST NATIONS

Senator NUNN. What steps can DOD take to support drug enforcement efforts in host countries?

Secretary CARLUCCI. State INM is the lead agency for drug suppression in foreign countries.

Any assistance depends on a request from the host government; with a request for assistance we can provide:

Mobile Training Teams [MTT's] to assist in:

Assessments of the threat, capabilities of the host country to cope with the threat, and recommendations for improvements;

Airmobile and riverine operations, logistics maintenance, communications, and intelligence planning.

Recommendations to State on equipment needed to meet the threat;

Helicopter support operations such as Blast Furnace; and

In-CONUS training of key foreign personnel in drug suppression techniques.

DOD is providing:

Six UH-1H helicopters on loan to Bolivia;

Three 18-man MTTs in Bolivia; and

Two U.S. Army warrant officers assigned full time for maintenance assistance and training in Bolivia.

We are now in planning phases for providing:

Up to 20 helicopters to State for use in Central and South America; and

Six more officers for full time assignment to assist in planning drug suppression operations.

### COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

Senator NUNN. What are the biggest challenges you would face in establishing a command, control, communications, and intelligence system for drug interdiction?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The primary challenges would be resources, and the development of a concept of operations to support law enforcement activities dealing with interdiction and apprehension. The difficulty is compounded by lack of a coordinated systematic strategy for interdiction and command roles to employ enforcement assets.

Also, there is the need to identify the appropriate information sources to meet the requirements, and to establish the necessary framework for the connectivity between (1) the information sources and the correlation/fusion activity, and (2) the production facility and the various law enforcement command nodes.

### INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Senator NUNN. What kind of collection assets might be useful in providing intelligence information to drug enforcement activities? What problems do you face in terms of providing intelligence information to civilian agencies, and what can be done to overcome those problems?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Use of existing and programmed tracking/surveillance assets and enhancing their effectiveness through a smart collection management process using all sources of information to cue the collection, correlation and reporting.

Providing intelligence information to civilian agencies is hampered by most law enforcement activities' inability to use classified material. To effectively provide intelligence support, a clear definition of requirements is necessary in order to provide appropriate declassified material. Also, law enforcement activities must determine the purpose for which the intelligence (even if declassified) is to be used. If ultimate use is for evidence in prosecution, use in court must be considered.

### RADAR

Senator NUNN. What type of radar systems do you have that can be used to assist in drug interdiction activities? What is the current mission of such systems? What limitations are there on the effectiveness of using these systems for drug interdiction? What plans do you have for the future for radar systems and how will these plans affect the prospects for improved drug interdiction surveillance? Please address the potential use of the OTH-B, ROTHR, CBRN and SASS programs for tactical surveillance of potential drug smugglers. Can the Navy's current ROTHR R&D program, now in place in Virginia, be immediately used for testing this system's compatibility for drug detection? What plan do you propose for bringing radar detection data into fusion and can the current Air Force and Custom C-$^3$I centers be used for such a mission?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Radar Systems/Mission/Limitations:

AWACS (Airborne Early Warning and Control).

Limited assets: 34 aircraft in inventory; requires 5 E-3s for one 24-hour orbit.

Limited duration: 9.5 hour sortie (unrefueled), 14-16 hour sortie (refueled).

E-2C (Airborne Early Warning and Control).

Limited assets: 98 operational aircraft; requires 8 E-2's for one 24-hour orbit.

Aerostats (Detect Low Flying A/C).

Limitations: Short range (150 NM); weather interruptions (example: thunderstorm within 10 NM); periodic maintenance (Approximately every 14 days); easy to know when radar coverage is down.

Mobile Ground Tactical Air Control System (TPS-43).

Limitations: Short range coverage below 500 feet is approximately 30 NM; 32 radars available (Air National Guard and active duty).

JSS (Joint Surveillance System—Military/Civilian (USAF/FAA)).

Limitations: Mostly high altitude coverage (above 10,000 feet); lower coverage near airport areas.

Caribbean Basin Radar Network [CBRN]: Long-range, fixed-based, 3D (range, bearing, altitude) radars provide excellent detection against high altitude targets (above 10,000 feet).

Five existing radars/8 additional planned will complement airborne early warning (AEW) platforms and planned DOD strategic surveillance systems.

Planned Strategic Radar Implementation (still in test phase).

U.S. Navy Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar [ROTHR], when permanently sited, has potential as a by-product of military surveillance requirement to provide extremely long-range and large area coverage of portion of the Caribbean Basin and northern areas of South America. System testing for drug detection compatibility is ongoing.

U.S. Air Force Over-the-Horizon Radar [OTH-B] network, when completed, has the potential to provide extremely long-range and large area coverage of U.S. western, southern, and eastern borders, including sea and land approaches to those borders.

Planned Tactical Radar Implementation.

U.S. Army Small Aerostat Surveillance System [SASS], currently in RD&TE, has potential as a by-product of military requirements to detect air, land and maritime targets.

Interconnectivity of DOD surveillance systems in regional (i.e. Caribbean) fusion centers is required to permit "all-source" sorting of potential targets prior to commitment of response (interceptors, trackers, and apprehension) aircraft.

Target data interfaced to appropriate drug law enforcement facilities.

### SPENDING ADDITIONAL FUNDS

Senator NUNN. Assuming a substantial increase in funds was made available to DOD for drug interdiction activities, how would you spend it?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Establish Special Center whose job is correlating sensor and all-source information to manage collection and provide targeting information to the interdiction/apprehension command node(s).

And, insure interoperable, secure communications between (1) the information sources and the special center, and (2) the production facility, the command node(s) and the interdiction/apprehension assets.

And procure, operate and maintain requisite surveillance/detection assets.

### SURPLUS HELICOPTERS

Senator NUNN. It is our understanding that about 450 helicopters are going to be declared surplus by the Army? Can any of these be made available to civilian agencies for drug interdiction?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Army will remove 350 utility helicopters and 100 observation helicopters from service in active units during fiscal year 1988. Virtually all will be operational but will require varying levels of repair. All can be made available to non-DOD agencies in accordance with standard DOD directives. The Army is presently coordinating with agencies that have made inquiries. An additional 900 helicopters will be removed from service during fiscal years 1989–94. If the helicopters are not claimed, serviceable components and selected parts will be removed and turned into the supply system; the air frames will be disposed of in accordance with appropriate directives.

### AEROSTATS

Senator NUNN. Should DOD purchase additional aerostats for drug interdiction? If so, how many and where should they be placed?

Secretary CARLUCCI. There is a law enforcement requirement for additional aerostats.

Customs is contract agency.

Three aerostats will be operational December 1988 to January 1989.

Four additional aerostats will be on contract July 1988.

Will complete coverage of SW Border.

### TRANSFER OF DOD ASSETS TO OTHER AGENCIES

Senator NUNN. If DOD is given the mission of air and sea surveillance, does it make sense to take assets from the Defense Department and give them to other agencies to perform the same mission?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No.

DOD has opposed the use of its budget to fund other Departments/Agencies. Nevertheless, Congress has done just that.

Competing activities performing the same mission will only cause confusion.

Also, taking these assets from DOD would undoubtedly impair readiness, as surveillance assets usually are neither acquired nor deployed in large numbers.

### ASSETS REQUIRED FOR AIR AND SEA SURVEILLANCE

Senator NUNN. If you were given the mission of air and sea surveillance, do you currently know what would constitute the best mix of personnel and equipment to perform the mission in the most efficient manner?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No. Until a concept of operation is established, too many varied assumptions would have to be addressed, thereby defeating any effort at systems optimization.

The drug threat is highly dynamic, requiring flexibility in program emphasis and resources allocations.

The law enforcement agencies can best make such assessments, and we would rely heavily on their recommendations.

The efficiency and effectiveness of DOD personnel and equipment utilization in anti-drug programs must include an assessment of the impact on readiness.

### THE AIR INTERDICTION PROCESS

Senator NUNN. If DOD were given the air interdiction mission as outlined in the House bill, please explain how the interdiction process would work (and what mix of assets would be employed) at each stage of the process from surveillance through pursuit and arrest.

Secretary CARLUCCI. A fused product from all-source intelligence on trafficker departures, routing, and destinations along with radar resources would be integrated to support the detection phase of the interdiction effort.

Existing ground and maritime based radars, as supplemented by available E-3 and/or E-2 aircraft, would be used to detect inbound traffic as early as possible. Military and FAA procedures would be used to sort and identify suspected traffickers.

Actions by aircraft that may indicate a potential trafficker include: penetrating ADIZ without a filed flight plan; deviating from flight plan; not following ADIZ entry procedures; failing to respond to communication attempts; flying at an extremely low altitude; not displaying proper lighting; and flying without an operating transponder.

All targets not classified as non-traffickers would need to be tracked and intercepted by appropriate aircraft.

Intercepted aircraft would be followed while directing disposition authorities to the final destination.

The terminal escort phase would employ forces prepared to react to narcotic air drops or other deception tactics.

Disposition would include seizure of aircraft, contraband, and apprehension of traffickers, taking into consideration security from armed traffickers, arrest jurisdiction, and disposal of contraband. Arrest authority should remain with civilian agencies.

### THE SEA INTERDICTION PROCESS

Senator NUNN. If DOD were given the sea interdiction mission, please explain how the interdiction process would work (and what mix of assets would be employed) from the time of surveillance to the time of arrest?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Gather, analyze and disseminate all-source strategic and tactical intelligence for planners and operational units.

Employ ground, sea-based and airborne sensor platforms along known or suspected trafficking routes between source countries and U.S. borders to detect potential maritime smugglers.

Deploy surface assets in trafficking areas to respond to intelligence/surveillance, and to conduct random patrols; employ shipboard helicopters.

Coast Guard cutters and Coast Guard personnel augmented by Navy ships with LEDETS (USCG) embarked.

Emphasize surveillance and patrol operations in forward areas close to source and transit countries.

Conduct an aggressive program involving routine board and search of vessels at sea.

Maintain additional units in ready status in strategic locations to respond to tactical intelligence and sightings.

At-sea interdiction must be complemented by an intense program of inspection of commercial cargo at maritime ports of entry.

### PERCENTAGE OF IDENTIFICATION INVOLVING LEDETS

Senator NUNN. Based on the experience of the civilian agencies and DOD's experience with the LEDET program, what percentage of identifications are likely to result in an interception that actually involved illegal drugs?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Coast Guard estimates that between 30,000 and 40,000 vessels are boarded every year. These boardings are selected from nearly 100,000 sightings of the millions of potential ships and vessels transiting waters near the United States, Mexico, Caribbean, and the offshore waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Coast Guard boardings are conducted for various functions: law enforcement, safety, fisheries, pollution, etc. While Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) aboard Navy ships are primarily used for drug interdiction, the results of a boarding may result in incidental safety or general law enforcement citations. In fiscal year 1987 the Navy provided 2,512 ship days in support of the maritime drug interdiction strategy. Twenty vessels, 227,715 pounds of marijuana, and 549 pounds of cocaine were seized, and 110 persons arrested. This means that approximately one drug-carrying vessel is seized for every 125 ship days.

While specific seizure data has some usefulness, a more important factor is deterrence—every Coast Guard cutter and every Navy ship is a distinct threat to the maritime drug smuggler. Prior to the initiation of the LEDET program, about 200 Coast Guard vessels were available to confront maritime drug smugglers. The potential of a LEDET on virtually every class of Navy ship could add substantially to our Nation's effort to deter the maritime drug smuggler.

This capability has curtailed the flow of South American marijuana greatly; however, this success is offset by increase in domestic production. Regretfully, the United States is now the third largest grower of marijuana in the world.

### EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERDICTION IN THE CARIBBEAN

Senator NUNN. What has been the effectiveness of Naval drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Solid quantifiable measures of maritime interdiction effectiveness are difficult to obtain.

Absolute amounts seized or seizures as a percentage of supply are weak approaches as they do not reflect the value of interdiction as a deterrent and because estimates of supply vary widely.

Qualitative measures such as disruption, displacement or deterrence are somewhat better but reliability and interpretation vary.

In fiscal year 1987, 2,512 ships days yielded: 20 vessels seized, 110 arrests, 227,715 pounds of marijuana, and 549 pounds of cocaine.

### IS THERE TRAINING VALUE IN DRUG INTERDICTION ACTIVITY

Senator NUNN. What training value do servicemembers receive from drug interdiction activities?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Rudimentary proficiency skills in operating the equipment are largely transferable.

Very little transferability to combat/war-fighting skills.

### USE OF FRIGATES TARGETTED FOR RETIREMENT

Senator NUNN. Should the sixteen Navy frigates being retired in the fiscal year 1989 budget be retained for use in the drug interdiction effort?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, because:

High O&M ($10—11M per year each);

Poor endurance needs "oiler support";

Too big compared to more effective USCG; cutters;

Unique power plant (dissimilar).

In compliance with the President's fiscal year 1989 budget submission, Navy has implemented plans to decommission 10 FF 1040 Class and 6 FFGI Class ships. Retention would require restoration of all funding for operations, maintenance, and personnel. The decision to retire the ships was based on economic and military priorities. Retention is not deemed prudent.

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE WILSON

### DOD CONTRIBUTION TO DRUG ENFORCEMENT

Senator WILSON. During fiscal year 1987, the Department of Defense provided $75 million in unreimbursed assistance for drug interdiction efforts. This represented less than 1 percent of the $274 billion the Department of Defense expended in that year. Considering this disproportionate funding relationship, do you feel that the Department of Defense has made a significant contribution to the drug interdiction effort and is there room for greater involvement in the future?

Secretary CARLUCCI. For fiscal year 1987, Department of Defense (DOD) data show that our cost estimate for direct operational support to law enforcement activities was approximately $91.3 million. This figure is a reflection of the operations and maintenance costs for military equipment used in support of law enforcement agencies during operations in which we determined that DOD derived substantially equivalent training. Therefore, DOD absorbed this cost and did not seek reimbursement under the Economy Act. It should be noted that the unreimbursed cost represents only a portion of the total support DOD provided to law enforcement agencies. We purchased for or loaned over $300 million of equipment to various law enforcement agencies in fiscal year 1987. In addition, we provided training, intelligence, and planning expertise along with personnel who work to maximize DOD's support. There is always the potential for new types of assistance, and we are looking at several initiatives.

### FUNDING FOR INTERDICTION EFFORTS

Senator WILSON. At present, significant funding for drug interdiction efforts is funneled through the Department of Defense to the Customs Service and the Coast Guard for equipment and operational expenses. Would you recommend that this funding should be provided directly to these agencies or should we continue to fund interdiction efforts out of the DOD budget?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We oppose using the DOD budget as a slush fund for the "pass through" funding of other Departments and Agencies. Departments/Agencies should be funded directly.

### OPERATIONS OF MUTUAL BENEFIT

Senator WILSON. To maintain the readiness of Defense personnel, equipment, and facilities, drug interdiction efforts may take a role of secondary importance when assistance to law enforcement agencies conflicts with defense missions. National defense is the primary role of the Department of Defense and it will always remain its primary role. In contrast, where DOD assistance in drug interdiction does not conflict with military readiness and may provide valuable readiness-related training, the DOD should not only participate eagerly, but should strive for greater involvement. What has the DOD done to evaluate those operations that benefit both DOD and civilian law enforcement efforts?

Secretary CARLUCCI. DOD constantly initiates and evaluates our operations and training activities to assist the civilian law enforcement community. For example, Navy P-3s have a number of mission requirements. One mission is maritime surveillance. We have taken this requirement and very effectively dove-tailed these missions to provide maritime surveillance against drug smugglers. Similar examples pertain to all military services. Additionally, we carefully examine the capabilities of new equipment. For example, we are evaluating the use of military over-the-horizon radars as a potential sensor to detect, track, and target potential aerial drug smugglers. We are pro-active in this regard to the degree that support to civilian drug law enforcement does not detract from our primary mission.

### RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR DRUG INTERDICTION

Senator WILSON. As the role of the military becomes more defined in drug interdiction activities, what special rules of engagement would be required for military forces involved in investigation, search and seizures, firing of weapons, and the proper selection and utilization of military resources?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The military role in drug interdiction is defined in Title 10 USC (371-380). If the law is changed it should define changes to "special rules of engagement." The Department is opposed to the use of military forces for direct law enforcement activities.

### SCREENING CONTAINERIZED SHIPMENTS

Senator WILSON. Customs currently can inspect less than 3 percent of containerized shipments entering the United States. The Defense Science Board says DOD Research and Development capabilities may be able to develop improved and more effective screening methods. Would you favor DOD research and development assistance to the drug enforcement agencies?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, we would favor such assistance.

### AIR INTERDICTION SUPPORT

**Senator WILSON. You claim increased support for air interdiction of drug smugglers will hurt military readiness. Don't small planes flying low and slow represent a threat DOD should train to deal with? Why will drug interdiction not provide that training?**

**Secretary CARLUCCI. DOD is prepared to deal with this threat in time of war when air traffic is restricted and tightly controlled. However, in time of peace and prior to the deployment of the planned aerostats, the resource expenditure necessary to detect the large volume of total air traffic and to intercept and search suspect aircraft would displace the majority of training dedicated to the defense of our borders against the anticipated threat from an armed aggression.**

### SCHEDULING DOD ASSISTANCE

Senator WILSON. DOD spent $75 million in fiscal year 1987 for drug law enforcement assistance without significant results. Isn't the effectiveness of DOD hampered by the need for advanced scheduling of law enforcement assistance to have it coincide with training? Wouldn't the assignment of a specific mission to DOD which would allow for a better response to tactical intelligence be more effective?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Not necessarily, for example, specially designated E-3 (AWACS), some E-2C, some ship support and forward deployed military assistance (radars, communications, MTTs, etc.) require advance scheduling. Such activities complement drug law enforcement operations and are most effective when planned in advance. Other support is scheduled around a block of time (i.e. "August 3-12") where specific flights are flown in response to tactical intelligence. Still other support offers quick-reaction support to an immediate threat. It should be clarified that military support is a by-product of a "military or training activity."

### HELICOPTERS FOR OPERATIONS BAHAMAS

Senator WILSON. We understand that the Army currently has four Blackhawk helicopters stationed in the Bahamas to transport Bahamian police and U.S. agency personnel. These helicopters are very effective but apparently they are going to be withdrawn by DOD. Why are they doing that?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Coast Guard is assuming the mission. The OPBAT mission requirement can be met with a combination of resources. In fiscal year 1987 the Coast Guard flying HH-3F helicopters relieved the USAF flying UH-1N helicopters at the Nassau site. On October 1, 1988 the Coast Guard is scheduled to relieve the Army that flies UH-60 helicopters sited at the Great Exuma. When available, the Coast Guard plans to open a third site at Turks and Caicos. In addition to its previous organic HH-3F helicopters, the Coast Guard plans to use six CH-3E helicopters that were transferred from the Air Force in support of the OPBAT mission. If Coast Guard resources are unable to meet a future mission requirement, the Attorney General, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense could, under the "Emergency Declaration" provision of 10 USC 374, redeploy military resources to support OPBAT.

### SUPPORT TO BAHAMAS

Senator WILSON. The Bahamian government has made a specific request for more U.S. ships, radars and helicopters to be dedicated to drug interdiction assistance in the Bahamas. What will our response be?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Department of State is examining the proposal. Some aspects of the proposal may have merit and should be examined in the overall context of maximizing effective military support.

### MILITARY SUPPORT ON THE BORDERS

Senator WILSON. As you know, the legal regime that exists at and near the U.S. borders is not as stringent as that elsewhere within the United States. For instance, only reasonable suspicion is needed to stop and inspect or inspections can be conducted on a routine basis as contrasted with the rather more complicated body of law surrounding probable cause and search and seizure. Wouldn't it be relatively easy for military personnel to be trained to operate in support of law enforcement personnel in the border areas?

Secretary Carlucci. Under current statutes, such activity is prohibited for active duty, reserve and National Guard (under Federal aegis) personnel. Even if it were not, it would be difficult and expensive to train military personnel to perform such duties.

### MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INSPECT CARGO

Senator Wilson. Several witnesses have indicated that military manpower could be used to assist in the inspection of container cargo. Wouldn't the marshalling and deployment of several hundred personnel on short notice to a designated port for a 3-4 day "pulse inspection" of cargo be both useful training and an effective deterrent to smugglers?

Secretary Carlucci. Legalities and the training derived by such proposals are of questionable value since there is no compatible military mission. Nevertheless, we are looking into an increased use of National Guard personnel under a Title 32 status. This may be one way in which they could be effectively utilized.

### ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Senator Wilson. Has the role of Special Operations Forces in drug interdiction or eradication operations been defined and proposals developed?

Secretary Carlucci. DOD is exploring the applicability of military forces to the various phases of the drug problem. Special Operations Forces do appear to have some utility for dealing with the source phase of the drug problem. The application of U.S. forces in this manner is dependent upon the initiative of a request by the host country. Such a request would be reviewed by the State Department and those portions germane to the military would be reviewed by DOD prior to final approval by State. It is premature to define or assign roles until the desires/requirements of the host countries are known.

### DOD ROLE IN AIR MISSION

Senator Wilson. It appears that Customs is developing a mini-Air Force of its own—largely funded by decrements in the DOD budget. One of the principal assets of air power is flexibility—the ability to shift assets quickly to meet a threat. In view of the considerable air assets of the DOD and all the advantages of flexibility they afford, does it make any sense for Customs to have a limited air arm? Shouldn't the DOD work the air mission?

Secretary Carlucci. DOD is not and should not be empowered to perform civil law enforcement responsibilities. Accomplishment of the air mission requires this authority. U.S. Customs and the Coast Guard, the agencies appropriately charged with enforcing drug smuggling laws, must be provided the necessary equipment and funding to carry out that responsibilities. Although DOD does and will continue to provide substantial support, funding the agencies' requirements through the DOD budget represents a dollar-for-dollar reduction in DOD's ability to provide the deterrent force or if necessary defend against armed aggression.

### SCHEDULING OF MILITARY EXERCISES

Senator Wilson. Are DOD exercises and training missions developed with a view toward maximizing collateral drug interdiction? In other words, why not develop a training and exercise program that maximizes the opportunities to contribute to drug interdiction rather than see whether a specific agency request can be accommodated within already scheduled training.

Secretary Carlucci. Yes, DOD participates in the quarterly scheduling conferences hosted by the Office of the Vice President's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System for precisely this purpose. Planners from all Military Departments, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the drug law enforcement agencies meet to review planned and projected training and operational missions to maximize the available DOD assets.

### HALTING FOREIGN DRUG PRODUCTION

Senator Wilson. What specific policies do you have that link efforts of foreign governments to halt drug production and trafficking to FMS, MAP, or other such military to military programs?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Drug producing countries are encouraged to allocate available grant funds and FMS credits for counter-drug programs where appropriate. For example, more than half of Bolivia's fiscal years 1986 and 1987 MAP and IMET was channeled into equipment and training directly associated with that government's drug interdiction program. However, current drug legislation makes the receipt of U.S. military assistance conditional on meeting eradication quotas.

Congressional earmarks on security assistance have further reduced the Administration's flexibility in meeting the requirements of Armed Forces in countries besieged with drug trafficking. This fiscal year, due to budgetary constraints, there is no MAP or FMSCR for Bolivia, Colombia or Peru, the key drug producing countries in South America.

### MILITARY R&D

Senator WILSON. The Defense Science Board has indicated that military R&D could usefully be coordinated with law enforcement agencies, particularly as to drug sensing and container inspection technology. Have you followed up on that recommendation?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes. The Defense Science Board Summer Study Report on Detection and Neutralization of Illegal Drugs and Terrorist Devices was forwarded to the Chairman, National Drug Policy Board (NDPB) on 18 November 1987 by then-Secretary of Defense Weinberger. The Report was forwarded for a thorough analysis under NDPB auspices, and to ensure DOD participation in any of the suggested action be pursued under the umbrella of national policy decisions. The NDPB review process is still underway. In response to a provision in the DSB Report and a subsequent DOD proposal, the NDPB has established a new Science and Technology Special Committee, with the charter to ensure drug law enforcement agencies, DOD and other elements of the Federal government share science and technology that supports efforts to detect and suppress the flow of illegal drugs and aids programs to reduce demand. The Committee's role is to advise and coordinate in areas pertaining to technology development, acquisition, exploitation, awareness and evaluation.

### PATROLING RURAL AREAS OF UNITED STATES

Senator WILSON. What Army units (infantry, cavalry, etc.) are best suited for patrolling the rural areas of the U.S.-Mexico border?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Light and Mechanized Infantry, Armored Cavalry, Light Helicopters, and Military Police Units are capable of performing a patrol mission.

### MILITARY POLICE AND LEGAL PERSONNEL

Senator WILSON. We have heard that military personnel are not trained in law enforcement-that they shoot to kill. Is it not true that military personnel arrest civilians everyday for offenses ranging from larceny to drug offenses and that judge advocates prosecute these people in federal court. Are you saying that these civilians are not afforded due process? How many people such as military policemen, paralegals, and lawyers do we have in DOD-and why couldn't some of these resources be used to assist civilian agencies?

Secretary CARLUCCI. All post commanders are responsible for the maintenance of good order and discipline on their installations. Military personnel are subject to court-martial and other disciplinary proceedings for violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Civilians who commit crimes on military installations are also subject to the authority of post commanders which includes the identification, temporary detention and subsequent turning over to civilian law enforcement authorities of such civilian offenders. To carry out their responsibilities with respect to civilian as well as military misconduct on base, post commanders are provided with a small, well-trained force of law enforcement personnel as well as a limited staff of judge advocates who, depending on the installation, are permitted by the U.S. Attorney to prosecute selected cases in federal courts. In carrying out these duties, both law enforcement and judge advocate personnel apply generally accepted rules of due process and federal law. The vast majority of uniformed members—soldiers, sailors and airmen—are untrained in civilian law enforcement procedures and are not qualified to carry out those duties. It must be kept in mind that the geographic area in which these military law enforcement functions are performed is small, the crimes unsophisticated and local in nature, without criminal organizational backing, and the number of military law enforcement and judge advocate personnel limited. Expansion of their duties to provide general assistance beyond the installation to civilian agencies will be at the expense of their normal duties to maintain law and order on military installations.

### SCHEDULING OF DOD ASSISTANCE

Senator WILSON. The normal planning cycle for the use of DOD assets such as AWACS, ships and E-2Cs is 3-6 months in advance. Is there any way to make DOD assets more responsive to tactical situations? Wouldn't that provide better training and more effective interdiction?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The amount of DOD assets such as AWACS, ships, and E-2Cs is, as you know, very limited. As mentioned earlier, our most effective training is accomplished in joint exercises involving more than one of the Military Departments. The joint nature of these exercises makes advance planning very necessary in order to maximize the benefits of our concentrated training missions. However, we continually evaluate our training requirements and mission planning in an effort to provide as much support as possible to law enforcement agencies. On a case-by-case basis, with supporting tactical intelligence, we can respond on a real-time basis.

### MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR INTERCEPTORS

Senator WILSON. We hear statements that you cannot intercept Cessna's with F-16s. Agree. What aircraft do we have in the military that would make good interceptors? Are you familiar with the use of the Marine Corps OV-10D aircraft in drug interdiction? Why not dedicate a squadron (18) of such aircraft to drug interdiction?

Secretary CARLUCCI. First, the OV-10D is not an effective interceptor aircraft. It does not have a radar. Because of its FLIR and when provided targeting from a radar aircraft, it is very effective as a night aircraft tracker and for use against marine targets including "GO-FAST" boats. The DOD total inventory of OV-10Ds is 17—all in the Marine Corps. There are plans for the conversion of additional Marine Corps OV-10s to the OV-10D configuration (night observation/gunship system). The OV-10D weapons system includes FLIR, laser target designator, capability to use sidewinder missiles, rockets, flares, and free-fall stores. The mission of the OV-10D is to provide day/night visual operation and reconnaissance, support naval gunfire, perform spotter missions and provide small armament suppressive fire for conducting helicopter escort operations. OV-10Ds have demonstrated the capability to be effective in support of drug interdiction; however, full-time dedication to this support would detract from its military mission requirements.

### RETENTION OF FRIGATES

Senator WILSON. We have received testimony that additional Navy ships dedicated full-time to drug interdiction would be very useful in the Caribbean choke-points. We understand the Navy was forced to retire 16 frigates because of budgetary pressure. Assuming funding could be made available, would you consider retaining these ships and dedicating them to drug interdiction or would you prefer to dedicate ships out of those remaining after the 16 are decommissioned?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No. With additional funding we would increase our capability to operate more efficient ships with a greater net increase support to Coast Guard than if we retained the 16 *Garcia* and *Brooke* class frigates.

### GEOGRAPHIC INTEGRITY OF UNITED STATES

Senator WILSON. At what point in time did preserving the geographic integrity of the United States from invasion across our borders cease to be a responsibility of the Department of Defense?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Department of Defense remains responsible for securing our nation's borders against armed aggression. Just as securing our borders from terrorist activity is a responsibility given to the FBI and other agencies, securing our borders against the threat posed by drug smugglers is currently the responsibility of civil law enforcement agencies.

### RECOMMENDATIONS IN JCS REPORT

Senator WILSON. In 1985, the JCS established a commission to identify potential types and sources of DOD support for drug interdiction and to develop legislative proposals that might be needed to provide authorization and funding. Several options were developed which were recommended for special staffing. Can you tell us what happened to each of these options and why a significantly expanded DOD role never developed?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The referenced report is classified; however, a copy has been provided to the SASC/HASC and SAC. I can say that most of the recommendations have been implemented.

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

### PRIORITIZATION OF RESOURCES

Senator McCAIN. First, the war on drugs requires much tighter central management, and a much more integrated approach to prioritizing how resources should be used, and to making cost-effective tradeoffs.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I share your view. The notion of tighter, centralized management with an integrated approach to prioritizing resources is attractive, but difficult to achieve under our Cabinet-form of executive branch government.

### INTERDICTING DRUGS

Senator McCAIN. Second, attempts to interdict the flow of drugs across our borders are useful, but they are one of the least cost-effective ways of using additional Federal dollars.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Without a "national mobilization" against drug abuse, interdiction is not cost-effective. Unfortunately, large segments of our country are insatiable drug users. The use of the Federal government, especially the use of the military to impart a social change on its people, is both inefficient and ill-advised. The fact is: America must confess its problem and be prepared to take positive steps to reduce its demand. Nevertheless, interdiction is an important part of an overall strategy that demonstrates our Government's resolve against drug abuse.

### ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO COAST GUARD

Senator McCAIN. Third, if we are to allocate limited additional resources, we would probably accomplish more by restoring funds to the Coast Guard than shifting funds within the Defense budget.

Secretary CARLUCCI. If further funds are committed to drug interdiction, they are most effective if allocated to the responsible drug law enforcement agencies. Such funds should be authorized and appropriated to the Department/Agency and not "passed-through" another Department's/Agency's budget.

### STRONGER CRIMINAL PENALTIES

Senator McCAIN. Fourth, no effort to improve interdiction will be effective without much stronger criminal penalties for drug smugglers, longer times in jail, and much higher fines.

Secretary CARLUCCI. It makes no sense to interdict drug smugglers if convicted felons receive only modest penalties for their crimes.

### MILITARY DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS

Senator McCAIN. Fifth, previous military efforts to aid in the interdiction of drugs have not been particularly effective.

Secretary CARLUCCI. As a "strategy," interdiction is caught between an unlimited supply and insatiable demand. Being in the middle, working against these variables is economically ineffective. To stop drug abuse requires reduction of supply and/or demand, neither of which are easy tasks under today's conditions.

### C$^3$I SYSTEM

Senator McCAIN. Sixth, we lack an effective "C$^3$I" system for integrating even our current surveillance data on drug smuggling, and some $41 million dollars seem to have been wasted on an ineffective Customs C$^3$I system because of weak management within the Customs Bureau and poor contractor performance.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Drug interdiction has never had a C$^3$I system. The two planned drug law enforcement C$^3$I centers (collocated with the Air Force at March AFB, CA and the Coast Guard at Richmond Heights, Miami) are not operational. When operational, a "baseline" can be ascertained on their effectiveness. I have no comment on the allegations that the money has been a waste due to weak management and poor contractor performance. If DOD were mandated, the requirement to "build" a C$^3$I system, we would rely heavily upon the expertise of the lead agencies to define the mission requirement. With this requirement delineated we would use our experience in C$^3$I architecture to define the contract for design and procurement.

### DOMESTICALLY PRODUCED DRUGS

Senator McCain. Seventh, we need to be extremely careful in allocating resources in this area because we could end in driving the drug industry into the domestic production of drugs, or into flooding our borders with individual drug smugglers that either cross the border illegally or who smuggle drugs through Customs.

Secretary Carlucci. Without a change in society's behavioral attitude towards drugs, we would undoubtedly (if successful at interdiction, which is questionable at best) displace foreign-produced drugs with those produced domestically. We have already identified "designer drugs" even more deadly and potentially damaging than their botannical counterparts.

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### Letter and Questions Submitted by Senator Alfonse D'Amato

U.S. Senate,
*Washington, DC, June 15, 1988.*

Hon. Sam Nunn,
*Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,*
*U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.*

Dear Sam: I write today to ask that you submit the enclosed questions to Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci for his response. I ask that these questions and his answers to them be made part of the record of today's hearing on Defense Department support for drug law enforcement. I also request that this letter be included in the record.

The current series of hearings the Senate Armed Services Committee has held on drug enforcement assistance are a proper and necessary effort to build a record on this issue. I believe it is critically important to focus on the amendment actually adopted by the Senate, and to highlight in a positive and supportive manner the contributions the Department can make to our efforts to solve this national crisis.

I am confident that today's Washington Post story containing the comment that ". . . the committee's trying to build a negative record on this issue since it was steamrollered on the floor," is not an accurate reflection of the Committee's motivation or intentions in this regard. Indeed, I expect that the Committee will vigorously defend the position taken by the full Senate on section 940 by record vote.

Having reviewed the prepared testimony of most of the witnesses, I am concerned that they have not focused sufficiently on the specific provisions of section 940 of S. 2355, as passed by the Senate on May 27, 1988. Many of the critical comments that have been made in the course of the Committee's hearings concerning the role of the military in the war on drugs appear to be directed toward a level and type of Defense Department involvement in drug law enforcement that was contemplated by your committees, by the authors of section 940, or by the Senate as a whole, which approved the language of section 940 by a vote of 83 to 6.

I look forward to continuing to work with you on this vital and critical national issue. Since the drug crisis crosses national and state borders, lines of authority dividing federal agencies, and traditional mission categories, it is essential that we work together cooperatively to focus the full resources of the United States on our search for effective solutions.

Sincerely,

Alfonse D'Amato,
*U.S. Senator.*

### S. 2355

Senator D'Amato. Did a representative of the Defense Department, acting for you, participate in the negotiations that produced section 940 of S. 2355?

Secretary Carlucci. A Defense Department representative attended and provided responses to technical questions related to military issues.

Senator D'Amato. Did this person, acting for you, commit the Department to accept the language of section 940?

Secretary Carlucci. No.

Senator D'Amato. Do you support the provisions of section 940 of S. 2355 as they now stand?

Secretary Carlucci. The Department supports the drug enforcement support provisions of the fiscal year 1989 authorization bill.

### INTERDICTION EFFECTS

Senator D'AMATO. The RAND Corporation, in its January, 1988, report entitled, "Sealing the Borders," made the point on pages 9 and 10 (specifically, "IX" and "X" of the Executive Summary) that when 10 of the 11 smuggling routes have a 50% probability of interdiction, consumption falls by 25%. The authors continued, "When 10 routes are subject to a 0.5 interdiction rate, costs (to the smugglers) rise 66 percent, while seizures rise 97 percent. In the latter case, the increase in prices causes a 60 percent reduction in consumption." If this estimate is correct, what level of resources do you think would represent a cost-effective investment to achieve this degree of consumption reduction?

Secretary CARLUCCI. In simple terms the RAND report makes the point that increasing interdiction resources does not substantially increase the price of the drug. Given current demand/supply it is not possible to estimate the level of resources necessary to reduce consumption by a specific percentage.

Senator D'AMATO. Do you believe that it is cost effective for the United States to be spending taxpayers' dollars to build two more Air Forces—one for the Coast Guard and one for the Customs Service—to perform air and sea surveillance, detection, interception, pursuit, and apprehension?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Only the Air Force has the capability to respond to the potential threat of military aggression. Aircraft assigned to the Customs and Coast Guard perform missions unique to these agencies. Other government agencies including the Forest Service, NOAA, and Department of Energy use aircraft to support their requirements.

Senator D'AMATO. Do you believe it is cost effective for the Coast Guard and Customs to purchase unique, nonmilitary standard sensors and platforms to perform this mission when the Defense Department is struggling to define and pursue its air defense initiative, an effort to meet substantially the same mission requirements?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Military aircraft are designed for combat. This requires adherence to very high specifications called "Milspecs." Frequently, nonmilitary equipment can meet the mission requirements of nonmilitary users and in many cases this can be more cost effective.

### LEVEL OF EFFORT

Senator D'AMATO. Given the damage the illegal narcotics trade does to the United States and its people—rising death rates from drug overdoses, rising rates of emergency room admissions for drug-related reasons, more than $50 billion in economic losses annualy (based on a 1983 estimate—certaintly conditions are now worse), and a total illegal narcotics trade or more than $100 billion annually (all in the underground economy, evading taxes and sapping productive investment), what responsibility do you feel as a leader of our government to apply the resources under your control to help halt this plague?

Secretary CARLUCCI. America's drug abuse problem is our number one national domestic problem. Conceptually I'd like to see the country mobilize against this threat as if we were to mobilize for war against an armed aggressor. I'd also like to see the country adopt a "zero tolerance" policy against drug abuse. Maybe the national will is beginning to change. Our government has made great strides to counter this menace but the solution requires the commitment of each American. It is a responsibility of the government to apply its resources to help solve this problem. At this juncture the mandate of the Congress has been directed at supply reduction with emphasis on border interdiction. While interdiction is important, I think we place too much emphasis on trying to stop the flow of drugs into the country rather than trying to change our attitudes towards demand for illicit drugs. I cite marijuana as a good example of successful interdiction that displaced foreign production to the domestic sector. I'm not proud to say that America is now the number-three producer of marijuana. I agree that we face an enormous problem but I believe the solution must be found at the source of demand. I am proud to say that the military approaches the goals expressed in President Reagan's six goals for a drug-free America.

Senator D'AMATO. What percent of this year's Defense Department budget are you devoting to assistance to drug law enforcement?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Department of Defense does not budget for drug law enforcement. As a by-product of military operations and training, the Department has provided substantial support to drug law enforcement authorities.

Senator D'AMATO. Do you believe this is a fair share?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I believe DOD is contributing its fair share by providing support to the responsible agencies. We have also loaned over $300 million in aircraft and equipment to drug law enforcement authorities. In nonmonetary terms, military expert advice; training; planning assistance; use of military facilities; assignment of personnel to NNBIS, State, DEA, and Justice, illustrate our commitment to the national counter-narcotics effort. At present, by law, civilian drug law enforcement authorities are responsible for countering the national security threat posed by drug abuse. These authorities employ resources derived from funds authorized and appropriated by the Congress just as the Department of Defense employs resources derived from funds authorized and appropriated by Congress to counter those national security threats for which it is responsible. As I have stated repeatedly, the DOD budget as agreed at the budget summit is the minimum to perform its military missions. Assignment of a new mission to the Department without the allocation of new resources will, in my opinion, increase the level of risk in our ability to protect our national security.

### NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN

Senator D'AMATO. Is it not true that the President himself has determined that the international trafficking in illegal narcotics is a threat to our national security?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Senator D'AMATO. In April 1986, did not the President sign a National Security Decision Directive to that effect?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes. I am pleased to say that DOD has supported implementation of the NSDD by increasing the levels of military assistance to aid the responsible civilian drug law enforcement agencies.

### DRUG INTERDICTION

Senator D'AMATO. While the proportion of illegal drugs entering the United States by dedicated airborne or seaborne smuggling vehicles is not known, it is believed that the majority of these drugs enter the United States in this manner. Has the Department ever formally studied the ability of our existing civilian agencies to interdict this smuggling activity effectively?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Department, as a member of the National Drug Policy Board organization, participated in the development of six of the nine counter-narcotics strategies. The interdiction strategy, for example, places important emphasis on DOD support to aid the drug interdiction agencies. I do not agree with your view that the majority of drugs enter the United States by dedicated airborne or seaborne smuggling vehicles. Drugs enter by all conveyances. Smugglers readily adapt to the pressure of interdiction and follow the path of least resistance. I would point to the recent seizures in containers as perhaps the greatest current threat for illicit drugs, but any conveyance can be used to smuggle drugs across our borders. I would point to recent record seizures in San Francisco and Seattle to counter the argument of those who advocate "sealing the southern border." Short of restricting free trade, inspecting everything that crosses the border, regulating the free movement of vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, we have an enormous task to attempt to differentiate illegal conveyances from legal use of conveyances. I agree that our government can improve its interdiction capability; however, you are wrong if you think we can shut down the availability of drugs through interdiction without curtailing normal peacetime civil liberties. Between now and FY1990 the resources under procurement by the drug law enforcement agencies and new DOD surveillance resources will greatly improve our Nation's interdiction capability. Our efforts to interdict will keep the pressure on the smuggler; however, the solution to our Nation's drug abuse problem is one which we must solve through demand reduction. Shutting down the importation or availability of one drug only to see domestic displacement or the use of a substitute is no solution.

Senator D'AMATO. Do you believe that the civilian law enforcement agencies charged with the responsibility of preventing illegal entry into the United States by these dedicated smuggling vehicles have the trained manpower, the platforms, the sensors, and the command, communications, and intelligence capabilities and resources necessary to accomplish that task?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, if properly funded to obtain the resources that have been identified in the NDPB strategies.

Senator D'AMATO. Do you think the domestic drug problem is serious enough to warrant broad commitment of all of our national resources to seek effective solutions?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes. The real question is where to commit our resources. I believe that answer must target reduction of demand as the number one priority.

### AIR OPERATIONS

Senator D'Amato. Both the Customs Service and the Coast Guard's air operations are hampered by a lack of resources. They are short of radar surveillance aircraft, pursuit aircraft, and apprehension aircraft. Aerostats are affected by bad weather, and not all of the aerostats we need have yet been employed, so there are gaps in our radar coverage. The Air Force and the Navy have not allocated enough AWACS and E-2C flying hours to address the problem. And the E-2Cs belonging to the Customs Service and the Coast Guard have metal fatigue problems. Section 940 of the Defense Authorization Act will provide additional radar surveillance aircraft flying hours on dedicated anti-drug missions, loan of additional pursuit aircraft to civilian drug enforcement agencies, and direct the President to designate a lead agency for detecting and monitoring airborne and maritime illegal border crossers. Do you support this assistance?

Secretary Carlucci. With appropriate funding the Department can do more to implement the provisions of Section 940.

### $C^3$I INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

Senator D'Amato. There is a lack of coordination of the resources we have. The RAND Corporation, in its January 1988 report entitled, "Sealing the Borders," made the point on Page 7 (specifically, "VII" of the Executive Summary) that "effective drug interdiction requires a combination of factors to produce seizures and arrests. Whether by land, air, or sea, interdiction agencies must detect 'targets' crossing or attempting to cross U.S. borders; identify which of these targets could be smuggles; and intercept those suspects to determine whether they are transporting drugs. Catching a smuggler requires success in each of these components." The Department has special expertise in command, control, communications, and intelligence, and has the technology and the equipment to coordinate this complex operation. Section 940 provides for the Department to integrate the C-Cubed-I system employed to direct our interdiction efforts. Do you support this provision?

Secretary Carlucci. Yes; however, such a plan should have new funding rather than using existing military resources which are committed to our traditional mission to counter the threat of armed aggression.

### NATIONAL GUARD

Senator D'Amato. Given that National Guard units customarily perform domestic law enforcement mission when in state service, do you support the provision of Section 940 providing for an increased role for the Guard and the Reserves in drug interdiction and enforcement?

Secretary Carlucci. Under Title 32, the National Guard can perform domestic law enforcement. Under current law, the Reserves, like the active forces, are restricted from performing domestic law enforcement.

Senator D'Amato. In light of the successful use of the National Guard on the southwest border in this role, do you believe that the $30 million authorized in Section 940 for such increased participation is enough?

Secretary Carlucci. Yes, actually $60M is authorized: $30M to O&M and $30M to personnel.

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## Questions Submitted by Congressman Bill Nichols

### DOD DRUG INTERDICTION INTELLIGENCE

Congressman Nichols. What is DOD now doing to collect, analyze, and disseminate drug interdiction intelligence?

Secretary Carlucci. DOD, other than National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) components within DOD, is not formally collecting, analyzing and disseminating drug interdiction intelligence. The NFIP assets are under the guidance and programmatic purview of the Director of Central Intelligence, and efforts they are performing in support of drug interdiction intelligence are accomplished under their National Foreign Intelligence Community roles rather than an organized DOD mission. Some DOD assets for surveillance are used in an ad hoc manner while others, such as AWACS, are use in a more coordinated manner.

### COLLECTION PRIORITIZATION

Congressman Nichols. What collection priority has been assigned to number (1) above?

Secretary Carlucci. Collection prioritizing deals with national foreign intelligence activities and is a Director of Central Intelligence responsibility rather than DOD.

### DOD SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Congressman Nichols. What more can DOD do to improve the collection, analyzation, and dissemination of drug interdiction intelligence?

Secretary Carlucci. Because interdiction/apprehension operations are law enforcement agencies responsibility, any DOD effort would be in a support capacity. To improve on the collection, analysis and dissemination of drug interdiction intelligence, the effectiveness of DOD efforts would depend on its role in a cooperative effort with the national foreign intelligence community and the law enforcement community.

### ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR DOD SUPPORT

Congressman Nichols. What additional resources are needed to achieve number (3)?

Secretary Carlucci. Any requirement for additional resources would be dependent on the definition and responsibilities of the DOD role in number (3).

Chairman Nunn. We thank you for being here. We hope, Mr. Secretary, you will continue to work with us. We have got a busy 2 or 3 days here to try to work all these matters out. So we will be in touch with you and we thank you for being here. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

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